Soviet Union

Shooting truth in the back of the head

Here's what the Russian government doesn't want you to know about the war in Chechnya.

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Last week in Grozny, as a mighty firestorm of artillery roared overhead and the rebel city burned around us, I stood arguing with a pig-faced Russian lieutenant colonel who wanted to arrest me. My offense was being a foreigner. Which might seem like a strange crime, on the face of it, but for my friend the Federal Security Service (read: KGB) officer who waved a pair of handcuffs in my face it was serious enough.

I can understand, possibly, being arrested (assaulted, insulted) for being a journalist in the wrong place at the wrong time. But there were other journalists there, all Russian, all talking to the same people and photographing the same things as me. What appalled the KGB man was the idea of me, an unaccompanied foreigner, freewheeling around Chechnya with no escort, no army press officer and — horror or horrors — no “permission” to be there.

An atavistic paranoia, strongly reminiscent of Soviet-era spy mania, has swept Russian officialdom since the beginning of this latest Chechen campaign last September. The concept behind it is that foreigners — with Russians working for foreign media thrown in — are spies, traitors, engaged in an organized campaign of “dezinformatsia” directed against Russia. Therefore, the logic goes, they must not be allowed anywhere near Chechnya itself except in carefully herded groups so they don’t get a chance to see for themselves the, er, excellent discipline of the Russian troops and the triumphal advance of the Russian military, happy Chechens liberated from the tyranny of fundamentalist Islamic rule, and so on. But if everything is so great in Chechnya, why can’t we see it?

Just for the record, this is what the Russian government does not want you to know about its latest war to crush “terrorists” in the breakaway republic: Its troops are being killed at a dramatically higher rate than Moscow admits. The Russian assault on Grozny is turning into a bloody stalemate. Russia’s campaign is being crippled by bad leadership, bad morale, bad communications and bad coordination. Russians soldiers routinely loot Chechen villages and kill Chechen civilians.

Do we expect the Russians to admit this? No, of course not. Nor do we expect the Russians to make it easy for us to uncover their lies. No self-respecting government would be stupid enough to tell the truth about its own military disasters. The U.S. authorities in Vietnam didn’t exactly bend over backwards to help Seymour Hirsh investigate My Lai. On the contrary, we expect governments to lie when they are waging war. So whats the difference between Chechnya and every other war in history that governments have lied about?

The difference is this: The Russian authorities have stepped beyond the bounds of propaganda and back into the familiar territory of totalitarian control over what we, as foreign journalists, get to see, where we get to go and who we get to speak to. What we are witnessing in Chechnya is a concerted attempt by a supposedly democratic government to criminalize the coverage of a major world news story. A decade and a half ago, pre-Glasnost, this would not be surprising.

But now the heirs of Russia’s first democratic president — specifically, acting president Vladimir Putin — are actively attacking the very basis of freedom of speech, without which the Soviet regime would not have fallen and Putin would have remained a mediocre KGB spy in East Germany.

I spoke last week to Sergei Yastrzhembsky, former Kremlin spokesman and recently appointed spinmeister for Russia’s Chechen campaign. He told me the following things: that “foreign journalists enjoy equal rights to report in Chechnya as Russians,” that “censorship is illegal in Russia.” Fine — prizes from George Soros all round. But a day later Newsweek received a call from British Airways Cargo at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport, informing us that our weekly package of photos and bureau correspondence had been “arrested” by Russian customs. Why? They had an order from the “special services” (read: FSB, the modern incarnation of the KGB) to stop and examine any material from Chechnya. After some haranguing, the pouch was de-arrested and sent on its way — but we were warned by BA Cargo that in the future, Chechnya-related photos could be held up indefinitely “for investigation.”

We could transmit the photos, of course, by e-mail. But the FSB, citing “anti-terrorist measures”, has in recent months moved to enforce a 5-year-old statute requiring all Russian Internet service providers to build — at their own and their customers’ expense — fiber-optic links to FSB headquarters so that the spooks at the Lyubyanka can read all e-mail correspondence in real time, without a warrant of any kind.

Our experience at Newsweek is just the tip of the iceberg. In fact, Russian correspondents working for Western media run a much higher risk, largely because they are more vulnerable and less protected by the collective clannishness of the foreign journalists’ community in Moscow.

Andrei Babitsky, for instance, a veteran reporter for Radio Liberty and probably one of the most outstanding journalists working in Chechnya today, disappeared 12 days ago. Late last week it emerged, through unnamed sources quoted by the Russian news agency Interfax, that Babitsky had been taken into custody by pro-Moscow Chechens while crossing the front lines on the way out of Grozny. He was being “questioned,” said the source, by the “special services” and may be tried for “participating in illegal armed bands.” There has yet to be any official confirmation of the story. But needless to say, Babitsky’s first-class reports from behind Chechen lines blatantly contradicted the official Russian line. Radio Liberty’s millions of listeners across Russia tuned in to Babitsky in order to get objective news which is banned from the airwaves of the two main state-owned TV channels. Just like in the good old days.

When Reuters stringer Maria Eismont moved a controversial story on Dec. 15 reporting that a Russian column had been ambushed by rebels in the center of Grozny and over 100 federal soldiers killed, the Russian authorities responded not just with a denial but a direct accusation that the story had been “planted” by “foreign special services.” FSB spokesman Lt. Gen. Alexandr Zdanovich said in an official statement that Eismont and her colleague from the Associated Press, Ruslan Musayev, were being “used” by unspecified foreign enemies as “a channel for disinformation.”

When Eismont finally managed to leave Grozny and get back to Moscow’s Vnukovo airport on Dec. 26, airport security officers quite blatantly planted a round of ammunition in the bag of a Chechen woman travelling with her. The single bullet would have been enough to send the Chechen to jail for three years for transporting unlicensed arms — fortunately for all concerned, money changed hands and the woman was freed. But was it a warning to Eismont? Or to all of us, as to how easily the authorities can frame us if they want?

The list goes on. One Belgian photojournalist staying at the hotel Assa in Nazran, the capital of neighboring Ingushetia and the base for most journalists trying to get into and cover Chechnya, found a vital computer cord she needed in order to transmit photos had been neatly snipped while she was out. A bureau chief for a major U.S. news magazine (not Newsweek) had made arrangements to meet a Chechen contact for an interview in Nazran — but a young Ingush man in civilian clothes came to his room and calmly told him, “we know what you’re up to — don’t try it, it’ll end badly.” Point taken.

Compared to that, my brush with the FSB colonel in Grozny was chicken feed. My friend Beslan Gantemirov, commander of the pro-Moscow Chechen forces, overruled the colonel and laughed off his threat to have me helicoptered to Russian military headquarters in Mozdok for interrogation.

Some of my colleagues weren’t so lucky. Seven Western journalists were caught by the FSB on Dec. 30 near Staraya Sunzha, on the outskirts of Grozny, where they had driven by back roads with no escort. They were duly arrested, flown to Mozdok and questioned separately in bare rooms in classic KGB style. They were threatened with having their foreign ministry accreditations revoked — tantamount to being expelled from the country — if they repeated their offense.

But what was their offense — or mine, for that matter, that noisy afternoon on the front line in Grozny? All foreign correspondents have Foreign Ministry accreditation and visas which give us the right, according to the Law on the Press, to work anywhere in Russia. Since this war is, after all, largely about proving that Chechnya is an inalienable part of Russia, it seems strange that our documents are supposedly invalid. Some of us, including myself, have a piece of paper from the military commandant of Chechnya giving us “permission to work in the liberated territories of the Chechen republic”. But even that cuts little ice with the FSB.

We have broken the “rules” — but the “rules” are unpublished. We don’t know what rules we are not supposed to break — a very classic Soviet situation. I asked Yastrzhembsky whether the rules in fact existed, and if they did, to fax them to me. I’m still waiting. I know why. Any “rules” restricting our movements are illegal — a point the Law on the Press is quite explicit about, saying that journalists’ movements can only be controlled if a state of emergency is declared. Russia has not only declared no such state of emergency in Chechnya, it hasn’t even declared war, insisting that this is an “anti-terrorist operation”. Hence, no published rules.

The only accreditation that gives you any official access to the front lines is one issued by the Defense Ministry, and then only for a few days only with the explicit proviso that the powers that be will have to “look at” what is written or broadcast and make a judgement about its “objectivity.” Russian journalists are given the accreditations freely, with the proviso that they must not “channel the material abroad.”

Of the Western media, only The New York Times, CNN and the BBC have succeeded in getting military accreditation — but inevitably, whether it exists or not, the correspondents are open to the threat of self-censorship in the interests of preserving their access.

The rest of the foreign press corps — with the exception of a few journalists who slip into “liberated” Chechnya illegally or semi-legally, or those who work on the Chechen side — are herded onto carefully scripted Intourist-style press trips. The highlight of one such trip I went on a few weeks ago was a visit to a chicken factory to demonstrate the resurgence of the Chechen economy under Russian rule. Except that, as the jovial chief vet explained to the embarrassment of our herders, they had no eggs and no chickens “because the rebels ate them all.”

The clever thing about the press trips is that they prevent the journalists hearing what’s really going on. As I discovered, Russian soldiers and officers will tell you the most hair-raising tales of resentment and disillusionment when you speak to them one on one. But with FSB officers and press goons hovering around within earshot, they stick religiously to the official line.

There was a time when I thought that Russia was progressing somehow towards a more or less civil society, with a more or less free press. Maybe I was naive. Correction: I was naive. Propaganda I can accept. Lies, even, are par for the course. But what is happening in Chechnya is beyond propaganda, beyond mere lies. This is an information blockade, backed with the not-so-subtle threat for the full force of totalitarian reprisals. The result is that we are worse informed about his war than any other of modern times — with the notable exception of Cambodia in 1975.

Truth, as we all know, is the first casualty of war. But in most cases truth makes it through alive — battered, even horribly mutilated, but alive. In this Chechen war the Russian authorities are doing their best to take truth around the back and shoot it in the back of the head for treason.

Owen Matthews is a foreign correspondent for Newsweek magazine. He is currently based in Moscow.

What to watch instead of “Winnie the Pooh”

While the yellow bear makes a comeback on the big screen, his Soviet doppelganger Vinni Pukh deserves some love too

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What to watch instead of Vinni Pukh (or Vinni-Puh), the Soviet cousin of Winnie the Pooh.

With its totally un-Pixarlated look and nougaty nostalgia core, Disney’s new “Winnie the Pooh” movie might be the perfect antidote for the summer 3-D blockbuster. Then again, do you really want to pay $12 for a film whose main appeal is that it feels old? Not to get all Eeyore on you, but I’d just as soon fork over my money for something I haven’t seen before. (Which also rules out the new “Transformers,” with its reused fight sequences.)

I know I’m not the intended audience for “Winnie the Pooh,” and by all rights, it looks like a very cute picture. But if you’re looking for a more far-out interpretation of A.A. Milne’s children’s classic, check out the Soviet-era “Vinni Pukh” cartoons (sometimes translated as Vinnie-Puh), a trilogy of Russian shorts based on Boris Zakhoder’s translation of “Winnie the Pooh.”

Not only does Pukh-Pooh look and talk like an Ewok, but the world he inhabits is beautifully sketched out in smudged colored pencil, giving you the sensation that you are actually watching animated characters walk around the illustrated landscape of a children’s book.

Episode One: “ Winnie the Pooh

 

Episode Two: “ Winnie the Pooh Goes Visiting

 

Episode Three (in two parts): “Winnie the Pooh and a Day of Care

For any native Russian speakers out there: How well does the translation hold up? Do you prefer Vinni Pukh, or the American Pooh?

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Drew Grant is a staff writer for Salon. Follow her on Twitter at @videodrew.

Gorbachev accuses Putin of contempt for voters

Former Soviet leader also says Russian government only has imitations of parliamentary and judicial systems

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Gorbachev accuses Putin of contempt for votersRussian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin seen during his meeting with Sports Minister Viltaly Mutko, left, and Tatarstan regional President Rustam Minnikhanov to discuss preparedness for the Universiade-2013 in Kazan, in the Konstantin Palace near St. Petersburg, Russia, Wednesday, Feb. 9, 2011. (AP Photo/RIA Novosti, Alexei Druzhinin, Pool)(Credit: AP)

Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has accused Russia’s current rulers of conceit and contempt for voters in his harshest criticism of the government yet.

Gorbachev on Monday criticized Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev for saying that they will decide between them who should run for president in Russia’s March 2012 presidential vote.

Gorbachev said the statements show an “incredible conceit” and disrespect for voters. Gorbachev has previously avoided personal criticism of Putin, who is widely expected to reclaim presidency.

Gorbachev, who will turn 80 next week, also denounced the main pro-Kremlin United Russia party as a “bad copy” of the Soviet Communist Party and said that Russia has only imitations of a parliament and judicial system.

“How I Ended This Summer”: A thriller from the Russian Arctic

Pick of the week: "The Shining" meets "Shutter Island" in the subtle, spectacular "How I Ended This Summer"

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Grigory Dobrygin in "How I Ended This Summer"

I feel pretty safe in telling you that there are layers of social and political allegory beneath “How I Ended This Summer,” Russian director Alexei Popogrebsky’s thriller about two men alone in the Arctic. I mean, it’s a Russian movie — that goes with the turf. But you don’t have to go spelunking for deep meanings below this impressively crafted piece of cinema to enjoy it. Filmed at an actual meteorological research station in the Russian Arctic coast that was built under Stalin, “How I Ended This Summer” combines memorable images of the gorgeous, rugged wilderness, meticulous sound design that emphasizes the characters’ isolation, a dash of dark wit and a dose of madness.

Yes, if you’re keeping score at home that makes three weeks running that Pick of the Week has settled on a foreign film from a snowy northern country (with a fourth, I suspect, on the way next week). I’m not exactly doing it on purpose, but it may well have something to do with the amazing winter those of us in the eastern two-thirds of the country are enduring. Actually, compared to the frozen slush of the Northeastern megalopolis in February, the desolate beauty, perpetual sunlight and endless seafood buffet of an Arctic Ocean summer look like Barbados.

Officially, we learn very little about Pasha (Grigory Dobrygin) and Sergei (Sergei Puskepalis), the entire crew of this remote island station. They’re spending the Arctic summer monitoring instruments and sending the numbers back to some central authority, but we’re never quite sure what they’re reporting and why, we don’t know where they came from, and we don’t learn much about their lives back in civilization. There might be 20 years or so between them, and Pasha, a sleepy-eyed, earring-clad, Brad Pitt-looking hipster type, is familiar with all kinds of new technology that the grizzled Sergei views with disdain. It’s Pasha’s first and probably only summer on the island, while Sergei’s been coming there for years, and feels intimately connected with a tough-guy history that goes back to 1935.

Popogrebsky builds the psychological tension slowly but inexorably, delivering spectacular time-lapse shots of the changing landscape in this barren but beautiful place (the cinematography is by Pavel Kostomarov) and an entire litany of subtly disorienting sounds: The nearly constant background crackle of radio static; the sloshing of the sea, the hammering of wind and the cries of birds; the ubiquitous house-metal dance music from Pasha’s headphones. The film is often so spectacular, so hypnotic, that you just want to swim in its sensual wonders — but it’s propelling a narrative too. Eventually we notice, without anyone mentioning it, that while Pasha and Sergei sleep and cook walrus meat and report incomprehensible data and play video games (OK, only Pasha does that), the sun never, ever goes down. The landscape goes from morning to noon to afternoon to early evening and then starts all over again. You know, it might be enough to make you a little crazy.

Sergei and Pasha have settled into a tense but reasonably stable dynamic — the former as borderline-abusive dad, the latter as recalcitrant teenager — and life at the station is a strange combination of barren and idyllic. The principal threats seem to be boredom and loneliness, although it’s true that each man must carry a shotgun every time he leaves the station. (A geophysicist at a nearby base was eaten by a polar bear 30 years earlier.) Then Sergei decides to skip a few shifts to go catch them a barrelful of fresh Arctic trout, and while he’s away Pasha receives an emergency radio message delivering terrible news.

Like almost every other thriller in the genre’s history, “How I Ended This Summer” turns on one character doing something that’s both logically implausible and self-destructive. Why doesn’t Pasha give Sergei the bad news directly, as soon as he gets back to camp with his load of fish? To answer that question fairly, you really have to see the film. I mean, of course it doesn’t make sense — but being trapped on an Arctic island with a hot-tempered, violent loner who’s just learned something that might shatter a normal man’s personality, well, that doesn’t make sense either.

Anyway, the important part is that it’s Pasha’s moral decision, or maybe his cowardly inability to make one, that pushes “How I Ended This Summer” into the realm of quasi-Hitchcock intrigue. Pasha constructs a teetering edifice of lies and deception in order to keep the truth from Sergei, and when he can manage that no longer he heads out on his own into the Arctic fog, trying to wend his way between a murderous Sergei and the hungry bears, between a fatal mistake and acts of criminal madness. This isn’t quite a horror movie, nor does it have some astonishing plot switchback near the end, but nonetheless there are elements of, say, “The Shining” or “Shutter Island” here, in that Pasha has to recognize who his principal enemy is if he hopes to survive.

As I suggested earlier, I think you could successfully interpret “How I Ended This Summer” as a fable about generational conflict in Russia, with Pasha representing the complacent, entitled post-Soviet new technology crowd, and Sergei standing for an old-school, Communist-era ethos of macho struggle and sacrifice. Each has a fatefully blinkered vision of each other and their shared circumstances, and their struggle with each other and themselves carries the weight of a moral or religious conundrum, as if they were in a Tolstoy story instead of an Arctic thriller. By the end of this spectacular, unsparing, surprisingly hopeful film, Popogrebsky argues that if these men from different eras and different worldviews can find some way to communicate, they may yet get off that damned island.

“How I Ended This Summer” is now playing at Lincoln Plaza Cinema in New York. It opens Feb. 11 at Cinema Village in New York and Feb. 25 at the Sundance Kabuki Cinemas in San Francisco, with other cities and DVD release to follow.

 

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How “Battleship Potemkin” reshaped Hollywood

An electrifying new restoration reveals Eisenstein's Soviet-era classic as pioneering action cinema

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How

Anybody who thinks that Sergei Eisenstein’s “Battleship Potemkin” is an “art film” either hasn’t seen the movie at all or had it ruined for them by some combination of a butchered print and a tedious film-history professor. As a remarkable new restoration of the 1925 Soviet silent classic makes clear, “Battleship Potemkin” is first and foremost an action drama, a work of straightforward emotion and pulse-quickening tension. This taut, 71-minute picture is stitched together from more than 1,300 shots, very few of them lasting more than three or four seconds. For better or worse, this film’s true revolutionary legacy is not art cinema but Hollywood; it’s got a lot more in common with Tony Scott’s “Unstoppable” than it does with Andrei Tarkovsky.

I’m not being willful or contrarian or anything — it’s just true. Of course Eisenstein was a fervent supporter of the Bolshevik Revolution, who hoped his story about a fabled 1905 uprising by sailors in the Tsarist navy would inspire the oppressed of the earth to throw off their chains and hoist the red flag (hand-tinted in this version, as at the Moscow premiere). But that context was a lot less important than he assumed at the time, and “Potemkin’s” immense cultural impact has almost nothing to do with its purported politics. (The young Joseph Goebbels, whose ideology ran in a different direction, praised the film extravagantly.)

Like other Marxist thinkers and artists of his time, Eisenstein believed that political revolution demanded a revolutionary aesthetics and a revolutionary cinema. He thought his radical innovations in camerawork, composition and (most of all) the quick-cut editing he called “montage” were part of a global shift in mass consciousness, and he was right about that part. Presumably he never imagined that his aesthetic revolution would conquer the world, divorced from the ideology that had inspired it, while the Soviet experiment in social reinvention would become a cruel and miserable failure.

According to film historian Bruce Bennett, “Battleship Potemkin” was personally imported to the United States by silent star Douglas Fairbanks and screened privately for film-industry luminaries on both coasts during the summer and fall of 1926, beginning with a bedsheet projection at Gloria Swanson’s house in New York. “Nobody went Bolshevik,” quipped a columnist for Photoplay magazine at the time, “but a lot of people left with some revolutionary ideas of filmmaking.” It’s safe to say this was one of those collisions that changed the course of cultural history. Has there been a year since the late ’20s when Hollywood didn’t produce multiple imitations of “Battleship Potemkin”?

I’m not so much talking about the most obvious kinds of film-school homage or quotation or rip-off, although the terrifying massacre staged by Eisenstein on the seafront steps of Odessa has been repurposed any number of times, from Brian De Palma’s “The Untouchables” to George Lucas’ “Star Wars Episode III: Revenge of the Sith” to “Naked Gun 33 1/3.” It’s more that “Potemkin” pioneered what became a staple Hollywood genre, the heavily fictionalized, inspirational retelling of historical events, built around easily recognizable archetypes of good and evil. Even more than that, Eisenstein’s montage technique, which builds both tension and momentum through the rapid counterpoint of different images, different camera angles and different points of view, became the model for all future action and suspense cinema.

Any rerelease of an influential classic always raises at least two questions: Can we still see, through the scrim of history, what originally made the movie seem important? And is it still capable of engaging or entertaining us on its own terms? “Battleship Potemkin” may face some of the same problems with viewers as, say, “Citizen Kane” or Godard’s “Breathless” or Bergman’s “Persona,” in that what was once revolutionary about it now seems part of our universal vocabulary. I expected this newly restored version of Eisenstein’s 1925 Russian cut (never seen outside the Soviet Union), the result of almost 20 years of work by film scholars Enno Patalas and Anna Bohn, to be visually impressive, and it certainly is. But I was startled to find myself spellbound by it from beginning to end.

With Eisenstein’s 146 text intertitles — which he conceived as musical or percussive elements — carefully restored and a newly recorded version of composer Edmund Meisel’s score, “Potemkin” no longer seems like a faded relic of Soviet agitprop but becomes a gripping anti-authoritarian melodrama. There’s not much acting or characterization in the modern sense; beefy Bolshevik sailor Vakulinchuk (Aleksandr Antonov) strikes heroic poses, while villainous officer Giliarovsky (Grigori Aleksandrov) snickers through his mustache. (Arguably Hollywood’s principal improvement on Eisenstein’s model was the addition of the star system.)

But the brilliantly mounted early scene in which the ship’s commander orders the mutinous sailors — who have refused to eat borscht made with maggot-infested meat — to be covered in canvas and then shot had me on the edge of my seat. A crazy-haired Orthodox priest, emerging from the shadows like a crucifix-carrying ogre, calls out for the rebels to accept God’s punishment, and some of the condemned men drop to their knees in terror, shrouded by the immense sheet of sailcloth. Exuding the smug, self-satisfied sadism of power, Giliarovsky orders the ship’s guards to raise their weapons and prepare to shoot: “Fire into the canvas.” And then, at the last possible moment, Vakulinchuk steps forward to strike a blow for proletarian consciousness: “Brothers! Who are you shooting at?”

Eisenstein’s mournful, haunting shots of the Odessa waterfront after Vakulinchuk’s death, which is the only section where the film engages a contemplative mode, lead us into the Odessa Steps sequence. I felt as if I were seeing that for the first time. Freed from all the imitation and parody, it’s both a breathtaking technical exercise and a wrenching glimpse of human suffering set against the cruelty of history. The mother with her dying toddler, the old woman shot in the face, the runaway baby carriage — Eisenstein could never have believed that the revolutionary regime he supported would itself commit crimes like these, and worse.

But the tragic historical irony surrounding “Battleship Potemkin” does almost nothing to undercut its power, and like all good political art it cannot be contained by politics. Eisenstein used all the tools at his disposal, inventing new ones as he went along, to engage our passions and emotions first and foremost. He was an artist and a showman more than he realized, and perhaps more than he wanted to be. The young David O. Selznick, who would make “Gone With the Wind” 13 years later, urged his MGM colleagues to study “Battleship Potemkin” as “a group of artists might study a Rubens or a Raphael.” And anybody who thinks that either Eisenstein or Selznick would be horrified by contemporary Hollywood is kidding themselves. If 3-D had been feasible in 1925, I guarantee that baby carriage would be whizzing off the screen right at your head.

The new 35mm restoration of “Battleship Potemkin” opens Jan. 14 at Film Forum in New York, with other cities to follow. This version is also available on DVD and Blu-ray from Kino International.

 

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“Disco and Atomic War”: How David Hasselhoff won the Cold War

A hilarious Estonian documentary (yes, really!) asks whether disco and "Dallas" defeated Communism

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A still from "Disco and Atomic War"

You won’t see another documentary all year long that packs quite the same combination of pure fun and eye-opening information as “Disco and Atomic War,” a strange and delightful work of historical collage from Estonian filmmaker Jaak Kilmi. No, I know — I can feel you slipping into a coma out there: O’Hehir is trying to convince me to watch an Estonian documentary! But hang on a second while I fling a pitcher of ice water in your face and explain that this particular Estonian documentary features David Hasselhoff (in his classic “Knight Rider” phase) and dueling Finnish- and Soviet-made instructional videos about disco dancing. And you have not lived, my friends, until you have seen a bunch of 50ish Finnish people in mid-’70s leisure wear completely giving up the funk.

Composed in roughly equal parts of interviews, dryly amusing re-creations of real events and an extraordinary amount of archival footage, “Disco and Atomic War” portrays an unlikely front in the Cold War, little noticed at the time. Or at least little noticed in the West; Kilmi presents evidence that the KGB was well aware that the pop-culture frontier between Finland and Estonia was gnawing a crucial hole in the Iron Curtain. There were other places in the Eastern bloc where citizens sometimes encountered Western media, of course. But listening to West German radio on the east side of the Wall was a dangerous and clandestine affair, whereas Finnish television poured into homes in Soviet-occupied Estonia virtually unrestricted.

As the film documents, there was a thriving industry in adapters and antennae that allowed Soviet-made TVs in Tallinn, the Estonian capital, to pull in the signals from Helsinki, 50 miles north across the Gulf of Finland. No doubt it helped that Estonia was a cultural backwater (from the Russian point of view) and at best a reluctant component of the Evil Empire. Furthermore, Finnish and Estonian are closely related languages understood by pretty much no one else. (Which didn’t stop Finnish broadcasters from running faux-Soviet comedy sketches with stodgy announcers speaking mock-Estonian gobbledygook.)

Even if it didn’t have a significant historical wow factor, “Disco and Atomic War” would stand as a wonderful work of Baltic deadpan humor, in the long and honorable tradition of small countries and minority cultures making fun of themselves so the outside world won’t have to. But Kilmi builds a pretty persuasive case that when Estonians started to watch episodes of “Dallas” and commercials for Helsinki supermarkets — where you could buy actual steak — a fateful Rubicon was crossed, and there was pretty much nothing the Soviets could do about it. Samizdat videotapes of Finnish broadcasts, dubbed or subtitled into Russian, circulated throughout the Soviet Union; collective farms wrote letters to Moscow announcing that they had met their soybean quota for socialism and now they wanted to know who had shot J.R.

Now, just to be clear, the Soviet Union’s collapse was social and institutional and economic. It was a long time coming, and it wasn’t caused by a Finnish-dubbed David Hasselhoff any more than it was by Ronald Reagan. “Disco and Atomic War” is a droll Estonian fable disguised as a history lesson, and vice versa. It’s an ingenious and masterful film, so funny and so heartbreaking it may leave you giggling and crying by turns, and it reminds us that pop culture, even at its most venal and idiotic — perhaps especially then — is the gooey, delicious sauce that comes on top of Freedom fries.

“Disco and Atomic War” is now playing at Cinema Village in New York, and opens Nov. 26 at the Laemmle Sunset 5 in Los Angeles, with more cities to follow.

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