Of course, like most issues that come up in the heat of an electoral campaign, the missile debate has been characterized by obfuscation. Even informed voters may feel that a correct decision involves political considerations that are impossibly complex, and technical issues that only a specialist could understand.

But it is not really as difficult as it seems. What is at issue, as in all questions that are political, is the nature of human society — in this case, the correct balance between legitimate suspicion, bridge-building and prudent self-defense in our approach to other nations. Here the Clinton-Gore administration has shown a naiveti that is characteristic of liberalism but, in this context, is dangerous in the extreme.

For two terms, the Clinton-Gore administration has anchored America’s security in a system of “arms control” agreements that were concluded in the past with the now defunct Soviet Union. The most important of these agreements is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which Clinton has referred to as “a cornerstone of strategic stability.” In order not to break this treaty (and anger the Russians), the Clinton administration has resisted the development and deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system that would protect Americans for eight years.

In the last month, however, with an election looming in which the Republican candidate has declared this posture unacceptable, the Clinton-Gore team has roused its lawyers to find a loophole in the treaty so that it can propose its own baby step in the direction of an anti-ballistic defense, while claiming that this will not remove the “cornerstone” it has used as an excuse for doing virtually nothing until now.

The purpose of the 1972 ABM Treaty was to stabilize the balance of terror by ensuring that if one of the two powers launched a nuclear first strike against its rival, the other would have the ability to strike back unhindered by an anti-missile defense. This is the doctrine known as MAD (for Mutual Assured Destruction). The arms-control advocates in the Clinton-Gore camp claim that this arrangement “worked” in the past to preserve nuclear peace during the Cold War, and, therefore, should work in the future as well.

Opponents of this doctrine — let’s call them the “deterrence” camp — believe that the history of 20th century conflicts, including the Cold War, shows that MAD is a dangerous illusion in a world composed of sovereign states, whose interests are profoundly at odds and whose reliability in keeping agreements is problematic to say the least. This history is absolutely crucial to framing a judgment in the decision before us, between a Republican candidate who wants to forge ahead with a comprehensive missile defense, and a Democratic candidate who wants to proceed very cautiously (if at all) because his chief concern is calming the fears of foreign leaders, rather than protecting American security.

History shows us that the arms-control approach to national security frequently fails. In the aftermath of World War I, the world’s democracies attempted through a series of international accords to control the ability of nations to develop aggressive military capabilities, particularly sea power — the aggressive weapon de jour. These arms-control agreements culminated in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war as “an instrument of national policy.” It was signed in 1928 by virtually every nation in existence — 11 years before Hitler’s invasion of Poland and the start of World War II.

What the signers of the Kellogg-Briand Pact had failed to appreciate was the difference between “control” and “agreement.” Thus, in the years preceding the Second World War, the democracies of the West adhered to the arms control agreements they had signed, while the totalitarian powers — the aggressors — Germany and Japan did not. In fact, it is probable that the aggression itself was inspired by the perception of German and Japanese leaders that their opponents had tied their own hands behind their backs.

The same pattern was evident during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union systematically violated its arms control agreements, most particularly the very same Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 that Clinton and Gore regard as the “cornerstone of strategic stability,” and whose terms the United States did observe. To this day, Russia has a deployed anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow, in violation of the treaty. But Washington chooses to overlook it, because it is only a partial system and making an issue of it would cause an international crisis. As a result, the chief effect of the 1972 ABM treaty has not been to control the development of defensive missile systems by our adversaries but to hamstring the United States — and prevent us from doing the same.

The ABM Treaty had an even more deleterious impact, however, since it also provided an incentive to Soviet rulers to attempt to develop a “first strike” capability, against which the United States would have no defense. Thus the ABM Treaty’s unintended consequence was not only not to control the arms race, but to escalate it, and to put the United States at a dangerous disadvantage. (See Baker Spring, “The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: In Arms Control’s Worst Tradition.”)

Fortunately, in 1980, voters elected Ronald Reagan, whose administration was ready to meet this challenge head on. Reagan ignored the arms controllers and disarmers who had mobilized the “nuclear freeze movement” with Soviet support, and deployed cruise missiles to Europe to neutralize the Soviet advantage. He then announced the Strategic Defense Initiative — the so-called “Star Wars” program, whose goal was to build a space-based anti-missile defense system, which was maliciously derided by arms-control Democrats and the liberal press as a kind of Hollywood gimmick.

Thanks to the stalling of the Clinton-Gore administration, SDI has never been fully perfected or deployed, although successful missile kills have been achieved. But even the embryonic SDI managed to play a significant role in ending the Cold War. Reagan’s determination to proceed with such a system forced the Soviet leadership to confront the fact that its bankrupt economic system could not underwrite the next stage of the arms race. This caused the Kremlin to initiate a series of reforms (perestroika and glasnost) that caused the entire Soviet system to unravel, culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall.

In contrast to the arms-control enthusiasts on the Clinton-Gore team, deterrence advocates, including George W. Bush, believe that in a world of sovereign states (most of which are ruled by dictators), American security must rest not on unenforceable agreements, but on America’s ability to maintain a superiority of arms that will discourage potential aggressors. In the current stage of weapons development, that means deploying an effective and comprehensive missile defense system.

During the Cold War there were only two nuclear super-powers with missiles capable of crossing the oceans. Today, 36 nations possess ballistic missiles, five with intercontinental reach; 17 nations are believed to have chemical and or biological-warfare programs; eight are known to possess nuclear weapons and four are believed to be close to developing them.

But as a result of years of Clinton-Gore inaction, Americans have no defense against even a single incoming missile tipped with a nuclear, biological or chemical warhead. Since a nation as desperate and poor as North Korea has already demonstrated an ability to reach the United States with a ballistic missile, and since the ability to shoot down one such missile has already been achieved, deterrence advocates view this dereliction and delay by the Clinton-Gore security team as unconscionable — comparable to its laxity in the area of national security that has resulted in the theft and transfer of America’s nuclear and strategic arsenal to Communist China and its allies.

In response to the Bush initiative, the arms controllers have claimed that building such a system would upset our allies and undermine the 1972 ABM Treaty — never mind that it was signed with the Soviet Union, which no longer exists, or that the Soviet Union, when it did exist, systematically violated its terms. And never mind that China has never signed the ABM Treaty. The Clinton-Gore administration does not want to implement a defense that might antagonize the governments of either Russia or China, or upset our allies.

A truly effective missile defense system will of course be opposed by all other states (including our allies), since its purpose is to neutralize the aggressive abilities of all other states. The question is: Is there any other way to guarantee our security? In the deterrence view, achieving a comprehensive missile defense is not only worth the diplomatic price; the opposition one can expect from other nations is the very reason for the defense itself. States do not share a common interest, and can only be trusted to pursue their own; therefore, any other kind of defense entails risks that are unacceptable. There is one qualification to this proposition and that is that democracies, which are open societies and therefore far less likely to cheat on agreements, provide an exception. Bush has already accommodated this exception by proposing to include our democratic allies in the missile shield.

The security issue was joined in the presidential campaign as a result of Bush’s May proposal to build a sea-based and space-based anti-missile defense system that would provide an effective shield against missile attack for the United States and its allies, and that would itself be invulnerable to attack. The Bush plan would in effect implement the Strategic Defense Initiative launched by Reagan.

In his May speech Bush accused the Clinton-Gore administration of denying the need for a national missile defense system and delaying its development. For seven years the administration had refused to act on this issue, until finally the Republican Congress authorized the development of an anti-missile defense system last year and Clinton signed the bill. He did so, however, with the caveat that he would defer a decision on whether to actually develop such a system until this August, less than six months before the end of his term.

In the last few weeks, the Clinton-Gore administration has finally become a convert to some form of missile defense — cynics might say a form sufficient to cover Gore’s vulnerability, but not the American people’s. Gore has proposed a limited, land-based (and therefore vulnerable) missile defense system, which would be built in Alaska, and would be sufficient to deter “rogue states” like North Korea and Iran. But North Korea and Iran are really client states of China. Like most of Gore’s proposals, this one seems focus-group designed. In this case, however, the focus group consists of China and Russia in one corner, and the American voter in the other.

Until recently, the American voter was blissfully unaware of the derelictions of the Clinton-Gore team on the missile defense issue. It was the successful launch of a North Korean “Taepo Dong” ICBM capable of reaching Alaska and probably California that has brought the issue into focus. The United States, today, has no defense against North Korea’s Taepo Dong missile. If the American people were to become aware of the fact that eight years of administration inaction had made them vulnerable to a nuclear attack by North Korea, that awareness could very well impact the Democratic curve in the tracking polls.

And this is just the tip of an iceberg of bad national security news that the Clinton-Gore administration, abetted by a friendly press, has managed to keep under the surface of the political waters. What if the American electorate began to ask other questions? For example: What happened to America’s technological advantage? Why are underdeveloped “rogue states” like North Korea, Iraq, Iran and even Libya potentially in possession of technologies that can overwhelm America’s defenses? Might this have some relation to the policies of the Clinton-Gore “strategic partners” in Moscow and Beijing, who have systematically spread those technologies to their allies in Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea?

Might this security disaster be the result of the systematic removal of security controls by the Clinton-Gore White House, which allowed American missile, satellite and computer technologies to be transferred to the Communist regime in China, which in turn gave (or sold) them to its allies in Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea?

And might all this have something to do with the infamous Buddhist Temple affair and the long-term funding of the Clinton-Gore electoral machine by illegal monies flowing directly or indirectly from the Chinese regime? Would we not know more about these issues except for the refusal of over 100 witnesses to testify before congressional investigating committees — the same witnesses who were abetted and encouraged in their resistance by the Clinton-Gore team?

When, in the 1930s, Japan disregarded the pieties of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to build an aggressive force and attack Pearl Harbor, America was ultimately protected by its geography — the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, which no aircraft at the time could traverse without refueling. As a result America was provided with a chance to regroup and make up the arms deficit caused by its adherence to the agreements it had so idealistically, and myopically, relied on. During the Cold War and the early stages of missile technology, America enjoyed a significant edge over its adversaries that partially made up for the loss of this geographical advantage.

But the Clinton-Gore administration’s voluntary release of all the secrets of America’s nuclear tests, combined with the systematic theft of the secrets that were left as a result of its lax security controls, effectively wiped out America’s technological edge. Since China is the world’s No. 1 proliferator of nuclear secrets, this catastrophe also seriously diminished America’s advantage over such scrupulous observers of international accords as Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il and Muammar Qaddafi.

Now, the Clinton-Gore team is even proposing that America share its anti-ballistic missile technologies with some of these nations. Appeasement of Russian and Chinese sensibilities is apparently more important than achieving the most effective defense America can build. The controllers’ argument is that if we don’t appease the Russians and Chinese, there will be a new arms race and a new Cold War.

But there already is an arms race with Russia and China (and the “rogue states” as well). If there is not, why did China, for example, feel the need to steal our nuclear secrets? Why did the Chinese regime invest so much money in the Clinton-Gore campaigns? Why did it press so hard to have the administration remove the security controls that governed commerce and thus gained it access to previously banned missile and satellite technologies and super-computers?

The answer to these questions is obvious, and ominous. It provides a very good reason for supporting the presidential candidacy of George W. Bush.

Now that Mitt Romney has won the Republican nomination, two key features prevail over the 2012 campaign — and both were also plainly evident in 2004. First, the incumbent president’s reelection fortunes are far from certain; and, second, the incumbent faces a decent but nevertheless weak challenger who is further hampered by internal problems within his party’s coalition.

Because incumbents can’t run for reelection promising “change,” and because “hope” during a lingering recession was also off the menu, the Obama campaign’s 2012 theme of  “forward” — a word that often follows “plow,” mind you — was the best available alternative. That said, and substituting the economy for terrorism, Obama is implicitly if not explicitly advancing the same theme Bush did in 2004: America suffered a tough blow, but the situation could have been worse and, more to the point, under my stewardship the nation is steadily regaining its footing.

This counterfactual campaign theme — vote for me not because of what happened, but what might have but didn’t — is a common thread for Bush and Obama. It’s not an uplifting message, but it sufficed in 2004 and Obama is counting on it working again in 2012.

Politics 101 further dictates that when an incumbent’s reelection is in doubt, he must go negative against the challenger. Obama political operatives in the White House and at the Democratic National Committee long ago made it abundantly clear they were willing to do just that. Team Obama may not go negative against Romney to the degree the Bush camp did against John Kerry in 2004. (By mid-summer 2004, 75 percent of Bush’s TV ads were negative attacks on Kerry.) But don’t be surprised if attacks on Romney’s record and even character are plentiful, harsh and relentless. In 2008, America saw candidate Obama’s toothy grin; four years later, expect to see President Obama’s fangs.

Expect the Obama camp to emphasize two major critiques of Romney: that he is a flip-flopper willing to say anything or reverse any position to win; and that he is an economic royalist whose personal and public life suggest a person incapable of understanding the lives and struggles of average Americans. Again — note the unusual parallels with 2004.

Although Romney is a Republican former governor and Kerry was at the time his state’s Democratic junior U.S. senator, the two Massachusetts pols make for similar targets. Each man is an extraordinarily rich preppie and Ivy Leaguer. Each represents the liberal wing of his respective party. Each has shown a propensity for ruining an otherwise valid point with sloppy, backfiring language. And each has a reputation for lacking political spine.

The flip-flop frame is candidate character assassination of the first order. Like the lone negative number in a string of multiplied positives, the critique that nobody can trust any statement or claim made by a politician has the potential to negate every accomplishment or promise. If it sticks, it can be fatal, as Kerry learned in 2004.

Obama and the Democratic National Committee know their electoral history and, sure enough, last November — a year before the election and two full months before a single Iowan had caucused — the DNC released a four-minute “Mitt vs. Mitt” ad and its accompanying website with the damning tag line, “the story of two men trapped in one body.” The site is a brilliant homage to the Bush campaign’s 2004 windsurfer attack ad and the devastating, 11-minute ad the Republican National Committee produced chronicling Kerry’s “evolution” on Iraq.

And then there is what might be called “the Willard factor”: Romney as Richy Rich, the Monopoly Guy with the Bain Capital background and the Swiss bank account. His bio would be political gold to Romney’s opponent any election cycle, but it’s gold-plated platinum in the first full presidential campaign following the biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression, the rise of the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the long overdue national debate over income inequality.

Again, the wealth-personified line of attack mirrors the out-of-touch, Martha’s Vineyard yoke the Bush team put around Kerry’s neck in 2004. Right on cue, in the first public event of his reelection campaign, last week Obama attacked Romney by name and invoked the economic disconnect card with relish. “He sincerely believes that if CEOs and wealthy investors like him make money the rest of us will automatically prosper as well,” said Obama of Romney, adding that “corporations aren’t people – -people are people.” (For the record, Kerry is actually wealthier than Romney, who would become one of the richest men ever to occupy the White House, should he win.)

Obama will also try to shift the national debate toward areas of strength, as Bush did. Historically, this meant the same strategy, but with inverse implications for each party: The so-called mommy party Democrats would encourage voters to focus on more favorable kitchen-table economy issues — healthcare, jobs, education — and away from less favorable “daddy party” Republican issues surrounding foreign wars abroad and culture wars. Because Obama is net-positive in foreign policy approval and net-negative on the economy, rather than mirroring by inversion, Obama will try to duplicate Bush’s shift-in-emphasis in 2004. GOP complaints that Obama is politicizing the killing of Osama bin Laden reveal Republican fears that Obama is going to play the terrorism card in 2012 just like Bush did eight years ago.

The 2004 parallels extend beyond message. Obama will be amply resourced and enjoy a field technology by virtue of his campaign’s state-of-the-art Web, donor, volunteer and social media innovations. Remember the Bush reelection campaign’s vaunted “72-hour” voter turnout model? That seems like an Edsel compared to the Ferrari the Obama team will be sporting this summer and fall. Among the perquisites modern presidential incumbents enjoy is the option to test-drive the best mobilization machines before anyone else.

Finally, what most connects Obama 2012 to Bush 2004 is the stability of the electoral map itself. Only three states — two net to Bush — flipped from one party to the other between 2000 and 2004; only nine states flipped between 2004 and 2008. Split the difference and a good, back-of-the-napkin over-under for number of states likely to flip between 2008 and 2012 is six. And thus, like the lead sailboat during a windless race, Obama doesn’t need or want conditions to change much from 2008: He merely has to replicate the map that swept him into office, with the burden of figuring out how to shake up the Electoral College falling to Romney, just as it did for Kerry against Bush. Even Karl Rove’s mapping of the 2012 election concedes this reality.

The 2008 election was memorable; to borrow the title of one best-selling chronicle, it was a “game changer.” But 2012 will not be. In many respects, it will be a game repeater, with Obama playing Bush to Romney’s Kerry of 2004. The president may be asking Americans to look “forward” in 2012, but the best preview of his reelection campaign can be found by looking backward eight years.

Republicans lost their popularity on security issues for one reason: George W. Bush’s foreign policy was a disaster. And yet, the party’s nominee, Mitt Romney, has assembled a foreign-policy team composed almost exclusively of individuals with the same war-always mentality and ideology that served Bush — and the United States — so poorly. In some cases, the exact same men responsible for Bush’s catastrophic national security policies are advising Romney. The former Massachusetts governor could have included some of the pragmatists and realists from the George H.W. Bush administration. Instead, a Romney presidency seems like it would be Bush 43 all over again.

Richard Grenell, who served as United Nations spokesman under Bush, may be gone from the Romney campaign after an uproar over his sexuality, but there are plenty more former Bushies. First off, there are Romney’s “special advisors.” There’s Michael Chertoff, W.’s Homeland Security director. Chertoff oversaw DHS’s failures during Hurricane Katrina, and amassed unprecedented powers of secrecy. Next up is Eliot Cohen, counselor to the State Department for Bush’s last two years and on the Defense Policy Advisory Board for the president’s entire term. Cohen was an adamant supporter of the Iraq War and advised Bush directly on the issue. Or take Cofer Black, the man who infamously said to Bush in September 2011 about al-Qaida that “When we’re through with them they will have flies walking across their eyeballs.” Black went on to become chairman of Blackwater, where he resigned after the company illegally bribed Iraqi officials.

Then there are the 13 “working groups” composed of equally worrisome individuals. The Middle East and North Africa Working Group is co-chaired by Bush’s Assistant Secretary of Defense Mary Beth Long, and Meghan O’Sullivan, Bush’s special assistant and deputy national security advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. The remaining co-chair is Walid Phares, who never worked for Bush but advised Lebanese warlords in the 1980s. Romney has reportedly promised Phares a top job in his administration, despite his virulently anti-Islamic views.

All told, Romney lists 37 holdovers from the George W. Bush administration — the very same administration he and all other Republican candidates barely referenced during their many debates because it was so discredited and toxic, even to the Republican base.

It didn’t have to be this way. There are, in fact, people in Republican circles who are sensible on international affairs. The Cato Institute, in particular, has experts that could dramatically change the direction of American foreign policy. Men like Justin Logan and Christopher Preble were prescient on Iraq and a host of other issues. Similarly, the Center for the National Interest (formerly the Nixon Center) has a host of solid scholars, including ones like Dimitri Simes and Geoffrey Kemp, who have valuable government experience in the Nixon and Reagan administrations, respectively, and a history of perceptive analysis. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, would have been another good pick.

So why aren’t guys like this being tapped? Why is the GOP sticking with a discredited foreign-policy approach rather that looking to its own past for wiser counsel? “Most of the realists and pragmatists have simply been driven out of the Republican Party,” says Stephen Walt, who writes a blog at Foreign Policy and teaches at Harvard. “The neoconservatives have been driving the agenda since Bush was elected and they remain well-entrenched.”

Another factor is that the Republican Party’s base remains strongly militaristic and reluctant to recognize limits on American power. Jon Huntsman’s failed presidential campaign illustrated that problem. The good news is that nobody seems to be calling for nation-building and occupying foreign countries in the mold of Iraq and Afghanistan. But that’s the only lesson that seems to have been learned from the last decade of foreign-policy debacles.

Finally, it may just be that the United States has too much power to change course. While the Unites States has undoubtedly made disastrous decisions in the last decades, it is so powerful that it is largely insulated from the consequences of them. If Romney’s foreign-policy advisor list is anything to go by, a Romney administration would have to teach the U.S. all over again about the problems with trying to police the world. Prepare for Bush redux.

Based on published histories and his firsthand observations, and adapted from a lecture delivered in November, the article calls the administration’s rationale for its use of torture — which he nonetheless insists only on calling “extreme interrogation” and “coercive methods” — “radical,” “an amazing contention,” “untenable and extreme,” “unsustainable,” “an unprecedented program of coolly calculated dehumanizing abuse and physical torment,” and, finally, simply a “mistake.” He concludes: “This was a collective failure of American public leadership, in which a number of officials and members of Congress (and staffers) of both parties played a part, endorsing a CIA program of physical coercion without any precedent in U.S. history.”  In fact, “The only defense against criminal prosecution would be that officials acted in good faith reliance on the advice of their government lawyers.”

Part of what makes Zelikow’s analysis so damning and definitive is its judiciousness. The article is deeply empathetic of the uniquely fearful situation under which the Bush administration was initially operating. Zelikow calls the Sept. 11 attacks a “collective trauma” and a “shoc[k] to mass beliefs.” He notes that Bush and others spent time in burn units, morgues and with survivors of the attacks. One traumatic experienced often overlooked — overlooked because it appeared in Stephen Hayes’ stenographic biography of Dick Cheney — was that the vice-president’s daughter was (falsely, it turns out) told that her house with her children in it had tested positive for anthrax. Similarly, Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice were told that they and others had been exposed to an extremely lethal toxin in a particular area of the White House — and might soon die as a result. “The alarms did not stop and they too were not abstract … The pressure on Bush and his senior advisers was so direct because so much of the response had to be invented and improvised,” the article reads.

An additional factor in the power of the article is Zelikow’s credibility and history. Before entering government, he was a civil rights lawyer in Texas battling the Ku Klux Klan and then a highly esteemed Harvard historian specializing in U.S. foreign policy — he co-authored one book with Rice. He then served on the National Security Council under President George H.W. Bush and directed the 9/11 Commission before becoming counselor to Rice at the State Department from 2005 to 2007. He currently volunteers part-time on the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board under President Obama.

Such bipartisan, establishment credentials render the breakdown and conclusion of this article all the more damning. He believes that what should have been a political and moral question — should the United States torture captives? — became strictly a legal matter left up to government lawyers, few of whom had any experience with these issues, and who had to take the necessity of extreme measures as a given. “These lawyers then became secular priests, granting absolution to the supplicant policymakers,” Zelikow writes.

The problems began when the Office of the Vice President and the CIA took central roles in policymaking. Cheney felt himself above the rest of the National Security Council, bypassing Rice and other traditional channels of national security policymaking. Ad-hoc decision-making and improvisation became “a habit of thought,” which seemed initially to pay off in the security of the nation, as well as in Bush’s political standing and self-confidence.

With Cheney and CIA head George Tenet “the key entrepreneurs in setting codes of conduct for the War on Terror,” it was essentially left to their obsequious lawyers to decide, in secret, on the interrogation methods America should employ. Bush even told the Senate’s Intelligence Committee chairman that “the vice president should be your point of contact … [He] has the portfolio for intelligence activities.” Decisions were made to jettison international treaties. By December 2001, the CIA was already interested in reverse-engineering methods “heretofore used only to treat Americans to resist enemy torture.” When a senior al-Qaida member was captured in March 2002, the prototype for the administration’s torture policies was already developed. “So, for the first time in American history, leaders of the U.S. government carefully devised ways and means to torment enemy captives.”

Zelikow notes that “None of the policy or moral issues connected with these choices appear to have been analyzed in any noticeable way.” Perhaps worst of all, no serious consideration was given to weighing the costs of benefits of the torture program, with reference to relevant historical precedents and/or examinations of the respective French, British and Israeli experiences in dealing with captured terrorists. “Bush and Rice should have insisted on this,” Zelikow writes.

The 52-page article observes the successes of Obama’s counterterrorism policies after repudiating the use of torture. On the basis of the empirical evidence then, “[t]here is no evident correlations between intelligence success and the available of extreme interrogation methods,” no matter what Bush and Cheney claim. Finally, “The program’s costs — which include the high-level effort expended in order to establish, maintain, and defense the program — appear on the evidence so far to have well outweighed any unique value the program might have had as a method of counterterrorism intelligence collection.” This is apart from the damage to America’s international standing and corrosion of its traditional values.

Zelikow concludes his analysis by arguing that, although the Obama administration has the right to wage war and use extralegal methods to defeat al-Qaida, its claim of that authority to defeat “associated forces” is unwarranted. “The U.S. government should publish and explain any overarching policy and legal documents that guide and confine the conduct of deadly operation against its foreign enemies … the executive branch of the U.S. government has a duty to articulate the scope of its warfare to the Congress and the public.” The Bush administration’s unprecedented elevation of torture to national policy may be history, but the job to get U.S. foreign policy in line with its constitutional and moral obligations is far from over.

That’s quite a fall for a man who frequently spoke of his Christian faith and family values when asked to comment on the mammoth success of his brand in the early 2000s. “When I got saved, God became my art agent,” Kinkade explained in a 2004 video. He went from a childhood in Placerville, Calif. (invariably characterized as “hard-scrabble”) to an apprenticeship selling his work in supermarket parking lots to his apotheosis as the nation’s “most profitable” artist, the Painter of Light™, and multimillionaire. He was profiled in the New Yorker by Susan Orlean.

I first learned about the dark side of the Painter of Light™ — sorry, couldn’t resist that one — when I reviewed “his” novel, “Cape Light,” in 2002. The novel, first in a series, was produced much as his paintings are: by a semi-industrial process in which low-level apprentices embellish a prefab base provided by Kinkade. He wasn’t the only artist to work in this way; he wasn’t even the only novelist. To the best of my knowledge, his novels — heartwarming, fuzzily pious tales of small-town life — have been coming out ever since, one more facet of a lifestyle brand that, at its most ambitious, included an entire Thomas Kinkade-themed housing development.

My review was just a goof intended to amuse Salon’s readers, but after it appeared, I began to receive emails from people who had sunk their life savings in Thomas Kinkade Signature Galleries (essentially, mall and shopping-district outlets for his prints) and been fleeced. I didn’t really understand how the financial architecture of Kinkade’s gallery empire worked, and I sure didn’t share their taste in wall art, but these people struck me as decent and sincere. They’d believed in Thomas Kinkade — not just in the man or the company, but in the ethos supposedly represented by his work, one in which (to quote Kinkade’s introduction to “Cape Light”) “people have the time to savor life’s simple pleasures” and lead “deep, satisfying lives.”

My conversations with these victims made me uneasy. Was there some relationship between the franchisees’ naivete, perhaps even their willful self-delusion, and their terrible taste? Was it hopelessly snobby to wonder that? What about Kinkade himself? He seemed to be at best a hypocrite and at worst a crook. Was there a meaningful connection between his bad conscience and his bad art? German thinkers of the 1930s would have said so, and they had plenty of opportunity to observe bad fascist art up close. Hermann Broch maintained that someone who chooses to make kitsch is “ethically depraved, a criminal willing radical evil.” The novelist Milan Kundera believes kitsch to be the natural expression of totalitarianism. That’s a lot of moral weight to place on a bunch of garish cottage paintings, but Kinkade was always the first to present his work as a form of ideology.

I felt compassion for the ripped-off gallery operators, and at the same time I was aware that quite a few of them had probably also fallen for the similarly sanctimonious, bogus folksiness of George W. Bush, thereby subjecting our nation to one of the worst presidents in its history. Kinkade and Bush struck me as of a piece, probably because they had both borrowed from Ronald Reagan in promising that we could get back to a better way of life that never existed in the first place. In nearly every encounter with the press, Kinkade delivered a diatribe against the art-world “establishment” that had shut him out. They were “elites” touting unfathomable, downer junk to hardworking people who needed uplift instead. Art snobs were the aesthetic counterparts of the so-called liberal elites, a group that surely included me.

At the same time, I must admit that I, too, like a cottage. Granted, I like the stylized, art-deco kind painted on bone china, rather than the insanely detailed and phosphorescently lit specimens in Kinkade’s pictures. And I’m in little danger of equating my new teacup with a Brancusi just because it’s cheerier. Nevertheless, I suspect that my idea of what’s pleasing about a cottage isn’t too different from that of Kinkade’s fans: an aura of harmless coziness, of modest domestic beauty and comfort not too cut off from the past. It’s as if we’re speaking the same word, but in different languages.

I suspect this is why Kinkade’s paintings have exerted their weird, hypnotic effect on me. They are so preposterous (especially the stream-side ones; he really needed to sit down with an architect and go over the basics of drainage), so awful. And yet I can still detect — beneath that cacophony of hollyhocks and cobblestones and snapdragons — the whisper of something intelligible. I’m pretty sure I know why the hordes of Kinkade collectors love his work, even if I don’t like it myself. Kinkade’s paintings are irredeemably false, like all kitsch, but through them you can just barely glimpse the honest desires they seek to exploit, sinking under the dreck.

Kundera defined kitsch as “the absolute denial of shit,” meaning it offers an airbrushed, sterilized, sentimentalized view of the world. From that, it doesn’t necessarily follow that art wallows in shit, but art doesn’t exist for the primary purpose of denying it, either. Kitsch is, first and foremost, a lie; its very existence is founded on bad faith.

Kinkade, like Bush, peddled a falsely simplified image of the world — one without mildew or flooded basements, for one thing — which, no surprise, turned out to be plastered over a whole lot of stinky stuff. The true believers, the ones who bought into these men the most during the 2000s, ended up paying some of the highest prices, from the Kinkade acolytes who invested in his gallery Ponzi scheme to the working-class red-staters who sent off their kids to die in a pointless war. Bad taste, harmless as it may seem, can end up costing you a lot.

Further reading

Los Angeles Times obituary for Thomas Kinkade

Susan Orlean’s 2001 profile of Thomas Kinkade for the New Yorker

A 2006 Los Angeles Times story documenting Kinkade’s business problems

Salon’s Janelle Brown visits Hiddenbrooke, a Kinkade-theme housing development in Northern California

Laura Miller reviews “Cape Light,” a novel by Thomas Kinkade and Katherine Spencer