U.S. Military
The shadowy world of Special Operations
Any strike against bin Laden will rely heavily on the military's Special Forces, known for daring, high-risk raids that are all too often disastrous.
Last week’s attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon ushered in what some military theorists have dubbed the “fourth generation of warfare.” To fight this new kind of war, most experts believe, the Pentagon will rely heavily on its Special Operations arm, the unconventional class of warriors who specialize in counterterrorism, with an emphasis on lightning raids, sabotage, kidnapping, deep reconnaissance and the training of foreign insurgents.
The special operations community has long existed on the margins of the Pentagon, always in the shadows. A unit insignia of an old Green Beret task force sums it up well: It features a large mushroom over which the words “Kept in the Dark, Fed Only Horseshit” are inscribed. The American military establishment has always had an uneasy relationship with these unconventional warriors. In fact, the joint special operations command, which includes all branches of the armed forces, was established only after the embarrassment of the disastrous Iranian hostage rescue attempt of 1980, code-named “Desert One.”
For their part, special operations leaders feel their exceptional skills have never been properly appreciated by the generals, who almost always come from the more traditional branches of the service and who look at these alleged “super soldiers” as prima donnas, wild men and wasters of precious resources. But this may have changed with the elevation of Gen. Hugh Shelton to the position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1997. Shelton had previously served as the commander of the Army’s Special Operations command and rose higher than any previous officer with a Special Forces background.
In the past, working too long in the “spec ops” world was a sure way to end a promising career. This past Sunday, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld spoke to the nation with Shelton by his side, he seemed to be trying to heal all these old wounds when he bent over backward to praise America’s Special Operations forces, saying “we may very well need more of them” for the coming war.
The current U.S. Special Operations Command, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Fla., is made up of the Army’s famed Delta Detachment, the Navy’s SEAL Team Six, units of the 75th Army Ranger Regiment and selected Air Force squadrons. Born out of the ashes of the Desert One debacle, the command presides over America’s dark soldiers, who have a disturbingly mixed record of daring and disastrous raids undertaken at phenomenal risk.
A major problem in attempting to assess the “spec ops” world is that one mainly hears about the missions that go wrong. Those that go right — a terrorist apprehended, an attack foiled — often remain a secret. Their most famous operations have been spectacular failures, from Desert One, to the ill-fated Ranger mission to capture Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid in 1993 recounted in Mark Bowden’s sobering “Black Hawk Down,” to the exquisitely executed Son Tay raid in North Vietnam, which nonetheless failed to yield a single American POW as planned.
But special operators slogged on after these bitter defeats and achieved some victories, most of which the American public never hears about. (A special operator once told me that the only way that he knew a covert operation was underway was when he saw a pair of empty jump boots outside of the chapel at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, indicating that a Special Forces soldier had been killed on a mission.) A few stunning victories have made headlines: After several abortive attempts to capture elusive war criminals in northern Bosnia, sailors from the Navy’s elite SEAL Team Six physically tackled a suspect in the street in December of 1998. Two other war crimes fugitives were also captured in this operation.
And the Army’s Delta Force played a pivotal role in the pursuit and eventual assassination of Colombian cocaine king Pablo Escobar in 1993. That particular campaign bears some resemblance to the current battle confronting the U.S. military in Central Asia, pursuing Osama bin Laden and his allies. Escobar commanded a labyrinthine network of agents, couriers and bodyguards that practically smothered Colombia, and any offensive move by Colombian government forces was swiftly detected and counteracted by Escobar’s lieutenants.
To win this war, American operatives began speaking of “bringing down the mountain,” i.e., dismembering the intelligence matrix that Escobar sat atop which kept him alive. It was this systematic campaign of intense intelligence collection, counterintelligence and smart, surgically orchestrated strikes that eventually brought Escobar to his end. This type of war, fought against an equally insidious enemy, is likely what is being planned in USSOCOM’s Crisis Action Center, deep in the bowels of MacDill.
The controversial, gray war fought against Pablo Escobar is considered by some in the “spec ops” world to be their crowning achievement. It proved that they could coordinate a shifting battle against a wily and fantastically elusive foe and, after numerous false starts, rebound and kill him (The facts surrounding Don Pablo’s death remain hidden under the haze of uncertainty that characterizes all special operations. Officially, Colombian government forces killed him.) Much like bin Laden, Pablo Escobar was a nontraditional enemy who fought his pursuers not so much with guns and bombs as with his wits and his network. The lessons learned by America’s special operators in this dark, quasi war will no doubt be applied in the coming months.
The highly specialized force that we have now didn’t develop out of thin air. The special ops’ military subculture traces its roots to the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, formed by President Roosevelt during the darkest days of World War II. The historical parallels here are far from accidental. The U.S. birthed the heterodox OSS in a time of national crisis and quickly disbanded its motley ranks after the Japanese surrender. The members of the OSS, many of them expatriates and roguish ne’er-do-wells, went on to form the nucleus of both the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Army’s Green Berets.
As in many fields of martial endeavor, the U.S. was preceded by the British in the development of a true special operations capability. The legendary Col. “Charging Charlie” Beckwith, a two-tour Vietnam vet with a swampy Georgia accent, formed the Army’s Delta Detachment in 1977 in response to numerous well-publicized terrorist incidents around the world. Beckwith had spent a year as an exchange officer with Great Britain’s Special Air Service, then the world leader in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist operations. This experience greatly influenced him as he began organizing and training the unusual body of men that would become “The Dreaded D.”
Beckwith built upon an already elite group of Green Beret volunteers and transformed them into what is considered by some to be the premier surgical strike force in the world today. But, as in the Son Tay raid, one is continually faced with the problem of brilliantly executed tactics being hamstrung by poor decision-making by the generals — and by shoddy and even downright false intelligence.
During Desert Storm, after Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf seemed to be doing everything in his power to exclude Delta and the SEALs from his master plan, several teams struck out into the shifting sands of Iraq in search of the elusive Scud missile launchers that were consistently evading U.S. warplanes. At this end of what the SAS dubbed the “Great Scud Hunt of ’91,” only a few missile launchers were confirmed as destroyed. In retrospect, it appears as if these raids were launched prematurely and lacked the necessary coordination required for special operations, which are exceptionally intelligence-intensive.
The long-term effect of engaging in a spec ops campaign on the scale being suggested by Rumsfeld and the Bush administration could be to almost completely upend the American military establishment. Historically, special operations have always been just that: “special,” as in very rarely done. Deploying, supplying and recovering the forces necessary for the coming war will require a new and unseen type of commitment from our nation’s military. But most importantly, the coming conflict will force Americans to look at warfare in a whole new light. In the past, the modus operandi of special operations has sometimes been perceived as underhanded, dirty, roguish and possibly un-American. But if this terrorist Pearl Harbor has taught us anything, it is that all the rules have changed.
David J. Morris is a former Marine officer and the author of "Storm on the Horizon: Khafji -- The Battle That Changed the Course of the Gulf War" (Free Press). He has embedded with Marines in Iraq for multiple tours since 2004. More David J. Morris.
Don’t ask, don’t tell 2.0
Conservatives in Congress are pushing for new ways to keep discriminating against gay and lesbian soldiers
(Credit: AP/David Lewis) People who thought the repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell” was the final word on discrimination against gay and lesbian soldiers were mistaken. As the House of Representatives debates the National Defense Authorization Act this week, Republicans will push for two amendments to permit the military to discriminate against gay and lesbian service members, using “religious freedom” as a cover.
One amendment, offered by Mississippi Republican Steven Palazzo, would prohibit the use of military property to “officiate, solemnize, or perform a marriage or marriage-like ceremony, involving anything other than the union of one man with one woman,” even on bases in states in which same-sex marriage is legal. Rep. Todd Akin’s, R-Mo., amendment would require the military to “accommodate the conscience and sincerely held moral principles and religious beliefs of the members of the Armed Forces concerning the appropriate and inappropriate expression of human sexuality” and would prohibit “adverse personnel actions” against them.
Continue Reading CloseSarah Posner is the senior editor of Religion Dispatches, where she writes about politics. She is also the author of God's Profits: Faith, Fraud, and the Republican Crusade for Values Voters" (PoliPoint Press, 2008). More Sarah Posner.
America’s real Hunger Games
Young people are already being sacrificed at the whims of the 1%. Just look at Iraq and Afghanistan
U.S. Army soldiers respond after a suicide attack on the US..-led provincial reconstruction team (PRT) compound in the Behsood district of Jalalabad, east of Kabul Afghanistan, on Sunday, April 15, 15 2012. (Credit: AP Phot/Rahmat Gul) When I was growing up, I ate books for breakfast, lunch and dinner, and since I was constantly running out of reading material, I read everyone else’s — which for a girl with older brothers meant science fiction. The books were supposed to be about the future, but they always turned out to be very much about this very moment.
Some of them — Robert Heinlein’s “Stranger in a Strange Land” — were comically of their time: that novel’s vision of the good life seemed to owe an awful lot to the Playboy Mansion in its prime, only with telepathy and being nice added in. Frank Herbert’s “Dune” had similarly sixties social mores, but its vision of an intergalactic world of disciplined desert jihadis and a great game for the substance that made all long-distance transit possible is even more relevant now. Think: drug cartels meet the oil industry in the deep desert.
Continue Reading CloseRebecca Solnit grew up in California public libraries and is thrilled to be revisiting them all over the state as part of the Cal Humanities California Reads project, which is now featuring five books, including her A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities That Arise in Disaster. More Rebecca Solnit.
Conservatives mad at liberal media, Obama over Afghanistan photos
Confused right-wing responses to a grisly scandal
U.S. Army soldiers from 4-73 Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division walk during a mission in Zhary district of Kandahar province, southern Afghanistan April 17, 2012(Credit: REUTERS/Baz Ratner) The L.A. Times Wednesday published photos of American troops in Afghanistan posing and grinning with the body parts of dead Afghan insurgents. There are 18 photos in all of soldiers posing with human remains, all from 2010, and the Times published two of them. The newspaper received the photos from a soldier in the unit depicted, who, according to Times editors, sought to publicize “dysfunction in discipline and a breakdown in leadership that compromised the safety of the troops.”
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Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene More Alex Pareene.
The army’s new photo scandal
Photos released by the LA Times show American troops posing with the corpses of Afghan suicide bombers
In a cropped version of a photo released by the LA Times, a soldier from the Army's 82nd Airborne Division with the body of an Afghan insurgent killed while trying to plant a roadside bomb (Credit: Los Angeles Times) The Los Angeles Times released photos on Wednesday showing American troops posing with the mangled corpses of Afghan suicide bombers, leading the Pentagon to issue a strongly worded statement condemning the actions in the pictures, which were taken in 2010.
The photos were provided to the newspaper by a soldier distressed about the actions of his division. He sent 18 photos saying they pointed “to a breakdown in leadership and discipline that he believed compromised the safety of the troops,” the newspaper wrote. The Army requested the newspaper withhold the images.
Tim Fitzsimons is a freelance print, photo and radio journalist based in Washington, D.C. More Tim Fitzsimons.
Afghanistan syndrome
Today's endless war has overtaken Vietnam in our collective consciousness as America's great military nightmare
Wounded U.S. soldiers lie on the ground at the scene of a suicide attack in Maimanah, the capital of Faryab province north of Kabul, Afghanistan on Wednesday, April 4, 2012 (Credit: AP Photo/Gul Buddin Elham) Take off your hat. Taps is playing. Almost four decades late, the Vietnam War and its post-war spawn, the Vietnam Syndrome, are finally heading for their American grave. It may qualify as the longest attempted burial in history. Last words — both eulogies and curses — have been offered too many times to mention, and yet no American administration found the silver bullet that would put that war away for keeps.
Richard Nixon tried to get rid of it while it was still going on by “Vietnamizing” it. Seven years after it ended, Ronald Reagan tried to praise it into the dustbin of history, hailing it as “a noble cause.” Instead, it morphed from a defeat in the imperium into a “syndrome,” an unhealthy aversion to war-making believed to afflict the American people to their core.
Continue Reading CloseTom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. His latest book, "The United States of Fear" (Haymarket Books), has just been published. More Tom Engelhardt.
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