Terrorism

America’s homegrown terrorists

An expert on right-wing hate groups talks about the tortured emotional roots of their rage, their response to Sept. 11 and their role in the Oklahoma City bombing.

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The state of Oklahoma will have to wait a little longer before prosecuting Terry Nichols for his role in the murder of 160 civilians in the Oklahoma City bombing; his attorneys’ appeal for more legal fees from the state have delayed the trial. (Nichols, already serving a separate life sentence in connection with the deaths of eight federal agents in the tragedy, was found guilty four years ago of conspiring to bomb the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building with Timothy McVeigh.) And while Oklahomans surely are anxious to bring Nichols to full justice, what could turn out to be the most compelling aspect of Nichols’ trial is whether his lawyers will introduce new evidence about what happened on April 19, 1995. Remember those mysteriously missing thousands of pages of FBI documents on McVeigh? Some suspect that those documents hold the answer to an often-speculated possibility: Were more people than McVeigh and Nichols involved in this domestic terrorist attack?

With “In Bad Company: America’s Terrorist Underground,” Mark S. Hamm builds a convincing case for the widely held theory that McVeigh couldn’t have pulled off the bombing alone. Hamm’s investigation points to the Aryan Republican Army, a small group of disaffected right-wing white men who went on a Midwestern bank robbery spree in the early 1990s and who, like McVeigh, were outraged by the FBI’s ambushes at Ruby Ridge and Waco. In the book, Hamm, a professor of criminology at Indiana State University, also profiles these men, shading in the violent years that might have led them to Oklahoma City. According to Hamm, one of these men might be the shadowy John Doe No. 2.

I couldn’t sleep after reading Hamm’s book, mostly for two reasons. First, Hamm tells a good, scary story. Second, attempting to understand these characters is chillingly frustrating: Even with all Hamm’s research on and experience with the terrorist mind, it still seems as if there’s something about his subjects that’s impossible to understand, and therefore impossible to challenge.

Hamm spoke to Salon from his home in Bloomington, Ind., about what makes a terrorist, why Americans can’t understand them and whether the FBI is equipped to take them down.

Was it disturbing to talk to these people?

Not really. I spent 13 years working in prisons so I’ve been around inmates and violent men. And I’ve been studying and interviewing skinheads for a good 10 years. But I will say that I’ve never met anyone so violent and extreme as Pete Langan [the head of the Aryan Republican Army]. From what I know about [Richard "Wild Bill"] Guthrie [another ARA member] — and I never interviewed him — he’s the same way. These people were way off the radar chart.

Was it the language he was using or something in his demeanor?

At certain points, and on certain issues, he would definitely exhibit an unresolved rage. On other things he was quite easy to talk to. But you can tell from talking to him that he has some real underlying problems surrounding his gender identification crisis and his conflict with authority. When you get into the business of justice — in his terms — that’s where the real rage comes from.

What makes a terrorist?

There are two things that go on. Somewhere in the background of many of these men, and certainly all of the men who were involved in the Aryan Republican Army, there’s an incident that has led to profound shame or humiliation. In Langan’s case, it was the prison rapes. That was a turning point. One way that they rise above that shame, which often has to do with an assault on their masculinity, is through militarized masculinity. They go overboard to compensate for that shame.

It seems as if many of them had some experience with the military, either personally or through their families.

Certainly the leadership of the ARA did. The younger skinheads were too dysfunctional to make it into the military to begin with. But certainly the leadership — Langan, Guthrie, McVeigh — all had experiences with the military that had a significant impact on their lives and on their extremist beliefs.

Some of them failed to make the cut.

Particularly Guthrie. Guthrie’s and McVeigh’s biographies are very similar in that respect. Guthrie had one goal in his early life and that was to make it into the Navy SEALs. He failed because he couldn’t meet physical requirements. The same thing happened to McVeigh; he washed out of the Green Berets. After that Guthrie developed an agenda against the government, and the same can be said of McVeigh.

You say that had Waco and Ruby Ridge never happened, Oklahoma City would never have happened. Do you really think so? Wouldn’t they have found something else to be angry about?

If Waco and Ruby Ridge never happened, then there never would have been a citizen militia movement in this country, and without the militia/patriot movement in this country, the ARA and these extreme anti-government groups would have never had a cause. It is unlikely that they would have ever met each other. It is unlikely that they would have engaged in crime together. McVeigh’s attorney said that if there had been no Waco, there would have been no bombing of Oklahoma City. That’s from his interviews with McVeigh.

That might have been McVeigh’s way of justifying it. But don’t you think he would have found something else?

All terrorism begins with a grievance. If you start with that premise, then you have to look at the period we’re talking about here — early ’90s to mid-’90s. If there wasn’t Waco and Ruby Ridge, what else did we have that could have provided these men with a grievance? The only answer that you come up with is the Brady Law. But that wasn’t toxic enough to create this revenge against the government. I must say that I don’t think these men would have robbed banks and funded bombings without something dramatic.

The other thing you talk about is that they were alienated from American culture. How much do you think that plays into it? We hear about that with the Islamic world, that this disgust with American culture serves as a foundation for their hatred of America. Do you really think that American culture has this effect on domestic terrorists?

Oh, of course. These men were creatures of subculture. From an early age, they began to turn their back on mainstream culture, especially institutions. None of them went to college. The only institution they had any faith in was the military. When they got out of the military, they became adrift and alienated. Out there emerged this incredible anti-government movement with its own subculture: its own music, its own propaganda, its own books, its own videos. They became steeped in that subculture, as years before they had been deeply steeped in the remnants of the flower power subculture. The question I always wondered about was: If an alternative subculture that was more left-leaning had risen in one unified voice to speak out against Waco and Ruby Ridge, would it have attracted the likes of Langan, Guthrie and McVeigh? But the only game in town to protest this was the right.

You talk about these men’s interest in music quite a bit. How much did hardcore metal like Judas Priest and Black Sabbath, as well as British white power bands like Skrewdriver and Brutal Attack, attract people to the extremist right?

Without it there would have been no Aryan Republican Army. The young kids — Scott Stedeford, Kevin McCarthy, Michael Brescia — were first and foremost musicians in the Philadelphia area. It was through the music that they became involved in the white power movement.

When you talked to them would they name things in American culture that they felt alienated them?

Each one of them had — and this holds true for all the extremists that I’ve studied — something that served as the straw that broke the camel’s back. There were numerous failures and disappointments and then along came that one thing that causes them to cross the line and now they’re in this netherworld of neo-Nazism. They’re picking up guns and robbing banks.

Take McVeigh, for example. Can you trace how this one major disappointment led to extremism?

It was not making the cut for the Green Berets. Had he made it, we might not have seen him return home to poverty and dead-end jobs. That’s when he becomes involved in conspiracy theories and gun shows and meets these other extremists. I believe that, for him, was the turning point.

The other thing is that if you look back, all of these men have real tragedy in their childhood. Deaths of mothers and fathers and abandonment. These issues leave a scar on them that they carry through life. It becomes such a burden that at some point, they break. But again, they break in the company of others. They don’t break alone. We find very few in this movement who were lone wolves. They’re doing things in a collective.

So when you watched McVeigh and people said he was simply sick and depraved, would you disagree?

There’s an explanation for everything. People don’t come into this world full of hatred. People don’t come into this world with the capacity to commit murder and mayhem against innocent people. They have to be taught that. They’re taught that in a group with others; they become politicized through this group process.

With regard to McVeigh, I never from Day 1 thought he was crazy or somehow mentally unbalanced. His school performance was remarkable. McVeigh went all the way through junior high and high school and never missed a day. He was not only bonded to conventional norms, he was hyperactive in his bonding. Langan and Guthrie were excellent students as young boys. Langan had a great education; at 9 years old, he spoke three languages fluently. People who knew Guthrie said he was nearly a genius in science and history. He spoke several languages. Stedeford was the consummate artist. He had something of a following among Philadelphia subcultural edgy youth. In all of these people, in terms of intellectual capacity, I don’t see any pattern of deficiency.

As much as racism and anti-Semitism has to do with their hate, it seemed like there were so many other things that motivated them even more. Was that the case? Individually, how deep was their prejudice?

These men were products of the time. I believe that in the aftermath of Waco and Ruby Ridge, because those were such monumental events in the world of the radical right, anti-government sentiment came to replace racism and anti-Semitism as the guiding principle of the radical right. Although they do subscribe to this notion of the Zionist Occupied Government, their hatred for the government trumped their racism and anti-Semitism. Primarily, it’s the hatred of the FBI. That’s who their war was against.

How important was religion, particularly Christian Identity, a theology that, you write, “gives the blessing of God to the racist cause … the Identity creed proceeds from the idea that Jews are the children of Satan, while white ‘Aryans’ are the descendents of the Biblical tribes of ancient Israel and thus are God’s chosen people”?

Christian Identity was very important to all of them in the development of their paramilitary profiles. It wasn’t necessarily the fire of Identity teachings that influenced them as much as it was the bonding and sense of belonging that they got there. One of the characters, for example, is nearly illiterate. He doesn’t have the capacity to read the Bible like most people [in order to] understand religion and gain some morality from it. In contrast, Identity was passed on as an oral tradition. So it was the seduction that they found in these bizarre alternative explanations of Christianity that became attractive to them. Then they found a brotherhood among other true believers of this religion.

They justified arming themselves through the Bible too, didn’t they?

They believed that the founding fathers were the true Christians and chosen people and when they created the Bill of Rights and the Constitution — specifically the Second Amendment — that those were somehow divinely inspired.

You make the point that Jesse James, a famous early American terrorist who was their hero, would never have murdered children. What made these men different?

James definitely was one of their heroes. They were students of Jesse James, they patterned their bank robberies after his and they even used certain techniques and phrases that James used.

The ARA during these bank robberies prided themselves on the fact that no one was hurt and no one was shot. On that level, I believe that they followed in the Jesse James tradition. When it came to Oklahoma City, it was that technology could be used; materials could be amassed and bombs could be constructed and ignited and the perpetrators could be somewhere else. The quickness with which that act was done could allow them to separate themselves. No blood on their shirts. That squares with McVeigh’s pattern of violence dating back to the war against Iraq, the Persian Gulf War, where he killed his first human being from a Bradley fighting vehicle a mile away.

Did you ask them about this contradiction after Oklahoma City?

The thing about McVeigh, quite honestly, is that you cannot determine when he’s telling the truth. Ask any question of McVeigh and you can go back and see where he told one journalist one thing and another thing to another. There was a time when he told his psychiatrist that he did not know there was a day-care center there until two days before the bombing. Then he told someone that the windows of the day care center were blackened so he didn’t know children were there. Always, his motive was to portray himself as a hero and a historical figure of the anti-government movement. The only power he had left in his last years was the mystery about himself.

You criticize the way the media approaches right-wing extremists. What don’t we understand about terrorists and why is it so hard for us to do so?

Because terrorism has not been something we’ve had to deal with for a long time. Consequently, we’ve turned a blind eye to it in other countries and to the phenomenon in general. When it is visited upon us, as it has been so dramatically since 1995, we don’t have the language and concepts to understand who these people are and why they do what they do.

Another reason is that when the media or analysts try to understand terrorism, they almost exclusively rely on court testimony. Court testimony is designed to serve a legal aim. It’s not necessarily the best material to use for research purposes. When you do research on burglars, for example, the best thing to do is to interview burglars. For some reason, we don’t have the tradition of doing the same with terrorists. And it’s so hard to get access to them. They’re locked away and attorneys and judges won’t let you get to them. We’ve never really come to terms with terrorists in this country as the Israelis have — with an ambitious agenda for understanding political extremists who commit crimes.

What do the Israelis do?

The Israelis have topologies of suicide bombers and countless interviews with them. It seems to me that the research on terrorism that comes out of Israel is not even in the same realm as what we do in America. The many books that we produce in this country on the phenomenon of terrorism are almost exclusively reliant on secondary sources.

Can we learn from what they’ve found? What are some of the universal traits of terrorists — regardless of what country they’re from?

I believe that first and foremost on that list is that these people should be thought of for what they are. They are warriors. The term “criminal” doesn’t do justice to what we’re dealing with here. “Extremist” or “white supremacist” or “Islamist” — these are all terms that, while useful for background purposes, don’t get us very far. Even the term “terrorist” doesn’t really describe what they are. First and foremost, they are warriors. They are combatants and true believers who are willing to die for their cause.

So you don’t think they ever could have been rehabilitated?

Not necessarily. The metaphysics of age take over. These people burn out, just like a career criminal does. They slow down and disengage. The same thing can and does happen with terrorists. The men in this book — almost every one of them — began to forge genuine human relationships and disengaged from criminal life. One of them had a kid, one had an authentic relationship, and they put down the rifle.

What do you think they thought of Sept. 11?

I’ve talked to them about this. They say they can understand the rage against the government.

They didn’t feel at all protective of their country?

No.

Did they feel sad at all?

Emotionally, these guys keep their cards pretty close their chest. No, I didn’t get any of that.

Were they impressed?

I didn’t hear any of that, though I did see quite a few Internet postings from cyber-warriors who talked about being impressed by it.

What’s the difference between those guys and the quieter ones?

My theory is that there are above-ground activists and below-ground activists. The above-ground activists always talk and that’s bigger than their bark. It’s the below-ground activists, the Langans, McVeighs and Mohammed Attas, the people you never hear about, who are the dangerous ones. You won’t hear them spouting off on the Internet. These are the people building the pipe bomb or hijacking the plane. Unfortunately, we never know about them until after the fact.

Where is the movement now?

There are some who want to say that the patriot/militia movement is in disarray. Certainly, all the figures I’ve seen confirm that the numbers have dwindled. The government hasn’t given them another cause. They don’t have a burning grievance on the table.

There’s another school of thought that says that the neo-Nazis are still a force to be reckoned with. You still have your Eric Rudolphs [responsible for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics bombings] out there running around — if he’s still alive. The Internet is one indicator that the movement is still alive; there are more and more sites and CDs and publications. The big gun shows still go on.

What’s the scariest group right now?

Again we’re back to the issue of above- and below-ground activists. Just because we know about a group isn’t exactly helpful when it comes to terrorism. For example, we didn’t know about the ARA until after they were arrested.

The FBI knew about the Bank Bandits, but they didn’t know that they were part of the ARA.

Right.

Do you believe that they were robbing the banks to fund the Oklahoma City bombing?

The measure of a good theory is not that it accounts for all of the relevant facts but that it accounts for those facts better than any other theory. And I believe that the theory that the ARA was involved in funding or implementing the plan to bomb the Murrah Federal Building is a theory that accounts for the facts better than the government’s lone wolf theory.

Was it easier for the government to pin this on McVeigh and Nichols?

The government didn’t know who was in the ARA and wasn’t aware of all of their criminal activities until sometime around the spring of 1997. By this time, federal prosecutors had already built the case against McVeigh and Nichols. Some say that introducing these other accomplices into the bombing would have diminished the culpability and responsibility of McVeigh. The second problem is that you now have to bring these other guys into court and try them so now you’ve made it five to six times harder than if you simply go after one individual.

One of the reasons I wrote this book is because I can’t forget the Time/CNN poll of 1997 that shows that 70 percent of the American people believe that there were others responsible for the bombing. That is a sentiment I found in my lectures and consulting with other groups and talking to survivors of Oklahoma City and talking to the students I teach. There are too many unanswered questions.

Then we get to the final year of McVeigh’s life and the revelation comes out that he couldn’t pass a polygraph test when asked whether there were others involved. He passed on every other question.

And Langan said?

Langan will say whatever benefits his case at that point in time. He’s very circumspect about what he does say. He will say that he has information about the bombing conspiracy and he will indicate that Guthrie knew McVeigh and Guthrie robbed the gun dealer Roger Moore and the proceeds from that robbery were used to build the bomb. He will indicate that Nichols was elsewhere on April 19 but there were others from the ARA who were in fact in Oklahoma City.

So the FBI is no longer investigating whether there are more people involved?

That’s correct, but we still have the State of Oklahoma vs. Terry Nichols. There you have an opportunity to bring in other evidence.

The second thing is: Remember all the mysterious documents about Timothy McVeigh that went missing preceding his execution? Those still have not been released. News organizations have filed Freedom of Information requests and they have not been responded to yet. There have been hints that those documents did identify accomplices seen with McVeigh in the days leading up to April 19.

The person who holds the key to this is Langan, I believe. Because there were deals negotiated between the FBI and Langan’s attorney concerning information Langan may have had about accomplices in the Oklahoma City bombing. Those were not followed up on.

Do you feel confident that the FBI is better equipped now to deal with terrorism?

In the years after Oklahoma City, their response to crisis situations was well informed by the mistakes they made. For example, in the Jordan, Mont., siege of 1996, no shots were fired. The FBI waited with endless patience, they brought in third-party negotiators. They used none of the coercion they used with Randy Weaver or David Koresh.

So you’re saying that the FBI has to take special care when dealing with them?

Waco and Ruby Ridge were wake-up calls to federal enforcement agencies. I’ve spoken quite a bit to these groups and what I find is that many times they don’t know the history of the radical right. They don’t know how the radical right got so angry in the first place. Many agents haven’t read about these groups. It seems like the FBI has come a long way but that they also have a long way to go.

Suzy Hansen, a former editor at Salon, is an editor at the New York Observer.

Senate Democrats heroically fund TSA

Democrats score the dumbest political victory of 2012

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Senate Democrats heroically fund TSA (Credit: Reuters/Frank Polich)

On Tuesday, a Senate Appropriations Committee vote effectively highlighted everything that is stupid about politics.

The Transportation Security Administration, a universally loathed government agency, is facing a shortfall, despite its more than $8 billion budget. Instead of having a debate over what effective airport security might actually look like and how much should reasonably be spent on the honestly rare threat of commercial-air-travel-based terrorism, there was a debate over how best to come up with the money needed for all the radioactive naked picture machines and bomb-sniffing dogs. The Democrats suggested passing on the cost of ineffective, cumbersome and intrusive security theater to citizens, via higher fees on airfares. The Republicans, even more predictably, suggested cutting spending that directly helps poor people to ensure there is enough to spend on stopping imaginary future 9/11s.

The newspaper account of the debate in The Hill just reinforced the Republican spin, highlighting the Democrats’ decision to make people spend more money on the hated TSA and downplaying the actual existing Republican alternative to the proposal, which was not “spend less on the hated TSA” but rather “raise money for the hated TSA by slashing needed aid to states.” The Democrats won, or “won,” and now they will earn the fruits of that victory: well-deserved scorn from everyone. And Ben Nelson (D-Troll Town) voted with the Republicans. (Though surely having users pay the fees for supposedly necessary security measures is perfectly conservative, isn’t it? Am I missing something here? I mean besides the fact that the two sides in this debate weren’t actually “liberal” and “conservative” but rather “people who want to come up with a way of paying for the oppressive and useless national security state” versus “people who want there to be an oppressive national security state but hate government spending on feeding and sheltering impoverished people.”)

I don’t know of anyone not employed by the TSA or some other arm of Homeland Security that believes the TSA does a good job and deserves its massive budget, but everyone in Washington apparently feels differently (and is terrified of being blamed for “voting to cut TSA funding” if there is another terrifying and deadly underwear bomber, of course). This is why everyone hates politics and Congress and Washington. This and Iraq. And the drug war.

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Alex Pareene

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

Police arrest artist setting up ‘I Love NY’ work

The installation included a plastic bag with a battery inside of it, hanging from a tree

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Police arrest artist setting up 'I Love NY' work (Credit: http://tmiyakawadesign.com/)

NEW YORK (AP) — An artist who was setting up an “I Love New York”-themed public art display in Brooklyn was arrested after the wired contraption was mistaken for an explosive device.

Takeshi Miyakawa, a visual artist and furniture designer, was arrested Saturday after placing the installation in two separate areas of the same New York City neighborhood. His lawyer and employer both called the arrest a misunderstanding.

The first apparatus was found Friday morning after a caller reported a suspicious package to police. It consisted of a plastic bag that contained a battery and was suspended from a metal rod attached to a tree. The bag, which had the classic “I Love New York” logo printed on it, was connected by a wire to a plastic box that contained more wires.

The area was evacuated for two hours until a bomb squad determined that the device was not dangerous.

At about 2 a.m. Saturday, a police officer discovered Miyakawa on a ladder not far from where the first contraption was found. Police said he was tying a similar “I Love New York” bag to a public lamp post.

Miyakawa was charged with two counts of first-degree reckless endangerment, two counts of placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the first degree, two counts of placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the second degree, two counts of second-degree reckless endangerment and two counts of second-degree criminal nuisance.

A judge ordered him held pending a psychiatric evaluation. His lawyer, Deborah J. Blum, said Monday that she is filing for emergency relief to have Miyakawa released. A court date was set for June 21 to review the results of the evaluation.

“He’s still being held,” Blum said Monday. “I believe that it was a gross misunderstanding and other than that I don’t have any other comment.”

Miyakawa, who was born in Tokyo and is about 50 years old, has worked for a New York-based architect Rafael Vinoly for the last 20 years and also has an independent design practice.

Vinoly’s firm released a statement Monday praising Miyakawa for his “extraordinary brand of professionalism” and said he has been a mentor to generations of young architects.

“Takeshi is a fabulous human being and a person of extraordinary talent,” Vinoly said. “We hope this misunderstanding is cleared up as quickly as possible.”

New York Civil Liberties Union Executive Director Donna Lieberman said in a statement that the charges sounded “like a wild overreaction.”

“It’s hard to understand why a light-up bag in a tree would be treated as an attempted terrorist act unless there’s more to the story than has been reported in the press thus far,” she said.

In 2007, an artist touched off a terror scare in Boston by placing electronic devices around the city as part of a marketing stunt for Cartoon Network. The city closed bridges, roads and public transit before authorities realized the signs were not bombs.

On an average day, the NYPD receives nearly 100 reports of a suspicious package. Last year, there were more than 4,000 such reports. The number generally rises following any word of terror threats in New York and around the world.

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Behind the underwear bomb

The latest airplane terror plot wouldn't have been foiled without airport security -- but not the kind we all know

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Behind the underwear bombTravelers line up at a TSA checkpoint at Los Angeles International Airport. (Credit: Reuters/Danny Moloshok)

Another deadly plot taken down in the planning stages. This time, thanks to the work of a CIA double agent, officials were able to infiltrate a Yemen-based al-Qaida plot to destroy a U.S.-bound jetliner using a nearly undetectable underwear bomb.The moral of the story: Airport security works!Am I being facetious?  Not necessarily.  It depends on your definition of airport security.

In my mind, the key to keeping airplanes safe is, and always has been, stopping acts of sabotage while they are still in the planning stages. Here in the age of the TSA checkpoint, with its toothpaste confiscations and obsession with pointy objects, we tend not to think this way, preoccupied instead with a kind of airport Kabuki — the tedious, fanatical screening of passengers and their carry-ons. Real airport security takes place offstage, as it were. It is the job of the folks at the CIA and the FBI, working together with foreign authorities. And while TSA has an important role here too, we can do without the spectacle of airport guards rifling through innocent people’s bags in a pathological hunt for what are effectively harmless items.

The concourse checkpoint needs to be there.  Just the same, chances are good that once an adversary has made it to the airport, he or she has engineered a way to outwit the system.  And spend as we might, there will always be a way to outwit the system.  ”Even if our technology is good enough to spot it,” said California Rep. Adam Schiff, commenting on the news of the latest underwear plot, “technology is still in human hands and we are inherently fallible.”

That’s one of the smartest things I’ve heard a politician utter in some time.

Getting a handle on this takes us all the way back to Sept. 11, 2001, the day that everything, and yet really nothing, changed.  I’ve said this before, but it bears repeating: Conventional wisdom holds that the 19 hijackers exploited a weakness in airport security by smuggling box cutters onto four Boeing jetliners. But conventional wisdom is wrong. What the men actually exploited was a weakness in our mind-set — a set of presumptions based on the decades-long track record of hijackings and how they were expected to unfold. (In prior years, a hijacking meant a diversion, perhaps to Havana or Beirut, with hostage negotiations and standoffs; crews were accordingly trained in the concept of “passive resistance.”) The presence of box cutters on 9/11 was merely incidental. The men could have used almost anything — a deadly sharp can be fashioned from a broken first-class dinner plate or a ballpoint pen — particularly when coupled with the bluff of having a bomb. The success of their plan relied not on hardware but on the element of surprise. It wasn’t a failure of airport security that allowed those men to hatch their takeover scheme. It was a failure of national security — a breakdown of communication and oversight at the FBI and CIA level.

To put it succinctly: The success of the 9/11 attacks had almost nothing to do with airport security at all — a great and painful irony, of course, to any passenger forced to endure the checkpoint rigmarole in 2012.

Not that frontline guards don’t play a deterrent role.  And, in the opinions of some, the plot uncovered in Yemen underscores the value of full-body scanners — those controversial walk-through machines that allow guards to look beneath a passenger’s clothing. It’s a compelling argument, but the way in which these scanners have — and have not — been deployed is apt to make some of us cynical. For instance, the vast majority of body scanners are found at U.S. domestic airports. Overseas, where a bomb is far likelier to originate, they are rare. Is this really about safety, we wonder, or is it about billions of dollars going into the coffers of the companies contracted to build these machines?

And although the scanners are effective, where does the arms race end?  Not long ago, the idea that passengers would be marched through body scanners and photographed naked before being allowed to board an airplane, would have seemed outrageous. Yet here we are. What might be next?  The stubborn truth is, we can turn airports into fortresses if we want (in some respects we’re well along that path), yet we’ll never be entirely safe. Airport screening alone, no matter how thorough, how expensive, and how technologically advanced, will never defeat a relentless enough, resourceful enough adversary intent on downing a plane.

That isn’t capitulation, it’s reality.  And acknowledging this reality would go a long way toward warding off panic and overreaction when the next successful attack occurs.

Regrettably, too, we often forget that commercial air travel has long been a target of terrorist extremists.  The 1970s and 1980s in particular were, as I like to describe them, a Golden Age of Air Crimes, comparatively rife with bombings, hijackings and other deadly assaults against airplanes and airports. Over one five-year span between 1985 and 1989 we can count at least six high-profile terrorist attacks, including the horrific bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772; the bombing of an Air India 747 over the North Atlantic that killed 329 people; and the incredible saga of TWA Flight 847.  And let’s not forget what might have been, such as the so-called “Project Bojinka,” the 1994 scheme masterminded by Ramzi Yousef (nephew of Kalid Sheikh Mohammad), in which impossible-to-detect (at the time) liquid explosives were to be used to simultaneously destroy a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific Ocean. Fortunately the plot unraveled and Yousef was arrested.

While we can argue, quite persuasively, that many of the current-day security measures have done little if anything to make us safer, we’ve nevertheless introduced measures that have been useful and effective, from explosives screening of checked luggage to the sorts of trans-border partnerships that broke up the most recent plot from Yemen. Whether in spite of, or because of, the attention we’ve lavished on All Things Terrorism, the past decade has seen fewer attacks against commercial air travel than any since the 1950s.What we need to remember, though, is that our success has had more to do with the security measures we don’t see than those taking place in plain view. And if our luck is to hold, we need to better rationalize and streamline our entire approach to airport security. For instance, if we’re going to have those body scanners, let’s put them where they’re needed. If this requires negotiating with foreign authorities whose airports are beyond TSA’s jurisdiction, so be it. Meanwhile, here at home, TSA’s one-size-fits-all approach, in which every single person who flies is seen as a potential threat, is simply unsustainable in a country where close to 2 million people fly daily. Things like taking snow globes from children, haggling over tiny container sizes, or confiscating a dessert fork from a uniformed, on-duty airline pilot (it happened to me) serve no useful purpose whatsoever. On the contrary, they divert valuable time and resources away from the things that could make us safer.  Let’s scale back that concourse Kabuki and retrain guards in the finer points of a more sensible, risk-based assessment of passengers and their belongings.

And lastly, if only as an aside, let’s behold for a moment the term “underwear bomb.”  That was the operative phrase in literally hundreds of articles and broadcasts over the past several days, and nowhere did it raise a snicker.  What does it say about our country, I wonder, that such a preposterous expression is instantly understood and effectively taken for granted?

Strange times indeed.

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Hiding 9/11′s last secrets

The military tribunal for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed means the American people will never know what drove him to terror

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Hiding 9/11's last secrets (Credit: Reuters//Brennan Linsley)

After a Navy SEAL team killed Osama bin Laden at his Pakistan hideout a year ago this week, it flew his body to the Arabian Sea, weighted it down, and slid it silently off an aircraft carrier into the watery depths.

For many Americans, the secret raid provided a measure of revenge and catharsis for the strikes of Sept. 11, 2001. But it didn’t provide the kind of justice and official reckoning that the country needs to gain real closure. Now the government has a chance to achieve that through a full, fair and open trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four co-defendants, so the world can finally see the evidence against him as the true architect of the attacks on New York and Washington. The trial kickoff — an arraignment for the men — is scheduled for this Saturday at the U.S.-run detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

This should be our Nuremburg, the defining trial of the 9/11 era and a fitting coda to it.

Unfortunately, the U.S. government appears to be on the verge of squandering this opportunity, and with it, the best, and perhaps only, chance for the public to understand not only how the attacks came to be, but why Mohammed waged a relentless war against America and how we might stop the next would-be terrorist mastermind.

The problems lie within the reformed military-tribunal system that the Obama administration put in place after losing its fight for a civilian trial in New York. Political compromises have resulted in a flawed military commissions process that from outward appearances is not only rigged against the defense, but hyper-choreographed, censored and hermetically sealed.

“The process is designed to achieve a conviction, and to do it with as little revelation as humanly possible, but with the veneer of due process and justice,’’ said one participant who said restrictive gag orders prohibited him from talking publicly. “You’re talking about the most heinous crime ever, and we’re going to afford them less due process, less discovery, less of everything than we would the guy who shoplifted a pack of gum from CVS.’’

Obama administration officials say their reformed military commissions system is a vast improvement over the Bush administration’s version, which Obama moved to shut down on his first day in office in 2009.

Defense lawyers disagree, and insist they have been hamstrung in their efforts to mount the kind of aggressive defense needed to do their jobs including full and unfettered access to evidence, witnesses and even the accused themselves.

Four of the five legal teams had so few of their key players in place in recent months that they did not file the “mitigation submissions’’ that the government said it needed to decide which of the five men should face the death penalty and other key issues, such as whether to try them together or individually. They recently filed motions asking that the charges be thrown out because of fatal flaws in the system, which they say make it impossible for them to defend their clients.

“It’s window dressing,’’ Mohammed’s defense lawyer, David Nevin, said of the government’s improvements. “I am not all satisfied that it is a fair process. In fact, it is not a fair process.’’

Many of the defense lawyers have quit out of frustration or for other personal reasons stemming from the many delays in the process. Only a few have been there long enough to even begin to understand their clients’ case, not to mention the convoluted military commission process.

And they say they will be unable to effectively challenge confessions obtained when their clients were coercively interrogated in the CIA’s black site prisons, if they can broach the subject at all. This is important for the four men accused of helping Mohammed with the logistics of the plot. Several claim they have been wrongly accused, tortured into confessing, or both.

It is also important with regard to Mohammed, who confessed to dozens of plots while being waterboarded 183 times, and has said he may plead guilty even before the trial begins. Few U.S. counterterrorism officials believe all of his often boastful confessions, and it is important for the public to hear what, exactly, evidence the government has with regard to what he did and didn’t do, and whom he might have been protecting.

The team of Defense and Justice Department officials overseeing the military commission process, and the presiding judge, should quickly address the defense lawyers’ complaints, or a proceeding that some call “The Trial of the Century’’ will be delayed further by legal wrangling — and forever tainted by accusations of being unfair.

A full, fair and transparent trial, above all, will benefit the public. There is much the public doesn’t know about Mohammed, including the details of how he devised the plot, convinced bin Laden to let him do it and then orchestrated it “from A to Z,’’ to use his own words. It was Mohammed who masterminded dozens of other plots and attacks, some while staying a step ahead of the largest-ever criminal manhunt.

Mohammed, not bin Laden, was the one who traveled the world as a kind of “Johnny Appleseed’’ of terrorism, establishing alliances and creating a network of cells and lieutenants that in some cases remains today. And it was Mohammed who personally recruited young jihadist prospects much like a baseball scout, many of them Westerners, tapping into their grievances to turn them to his cause.

The U.S. government has kept the details of what Mohammed did — and how and why he did it — hidden in its most classified files since his capture in Pakistan nine years ago. The government should set the record straight on that, because there is an important lesson to be learned from the largely untold tale of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: It isn’t some monolithic group like al-Qaida that poses a continuing threat, it’s the one intelligent and energetic person who can emerge from nowhere and orchestrate a 9/11 while the world focuses elsewhere.

To that end, the government should declassify as much evidence as possible, and explain how it obtained it. It should call numerous witnesses to testify, especially since the one who has been publicly identified, Majid Khan, claims he was tortured while in CIA custody overseas.

Instead of limiting access to a few closed-circuit TVs, it should consider televising the proceedings. It should ensure that censorship is minimized, and used only to protect intelligence sources and methods, not to save the government from embarrassment. And it should let Mohammed and the others testify at length on their behalf if they so desire.

By doing so, the Obama administration will be able to say it did its best to put on the kind of civilian trial it has wanted all along, and one with a similar outcome to that of the al Qaida members charged with blowing up two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.

Those of us who witnessed that trial in Manhattan in 2001 saw the defendants squirm in their chairs as prosecutors introduced mountains of evidence against them. We saw eyewitnesses point the finger at the accused, and surviving victims glare at them from the pews.

We heard from the terrorists themselves, and learned a lot about why they did it, about how terrorist networks operate and about what might be done to stop people like them. And when the jury convicted them, there was no question that justice was done.

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Josh Meyer is the author, with Terry McDermott, of the new book, "The Hunt for KSM: Inside the Pursuit and Takedown of the Real 9/11 Mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.’’

FBI heroically locks up ridiculous anarchists on May Day

Feds stop inept radicals from carrying out a plot feds helped them conceive and carry out

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FBI heroically locks up ridiculous anarchists on May DayU.S. Attorney Steven Dettelbach, left, and FBI special agent in charge Stephen Anthony walk past a map showing the location of a bridge on Ohio Rt. 82. Five men, pictured on the wall behind the map, have been arrested for conspiring to blow up the bridge. (Credit: AP/Mark Duncan)

Happy May Day, fellow travelers! If you’re not currently disrupting capitalism and/or having your wrists zip-tied for exercising your right to freely assemble, you probably read about the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s latest, not-at-all suspiciously timed terror sting. The Bureau, in an inspired bit of early-20th century nostalgia, has railroaded a bunch of dangerous anarchists. (Or “dangerous” “anarchists.”) America will not waver in the face of the Galleanist threat!

Five young men from Cleveland are now in jail, accused of plotting to “blow up a bridge in the Cleveland area,” according to the FBI’s triumphant press release/criminal complaint. As is always the case with FBI terror stings, the “sting” part involved the bureau’s informant/agent provocateur mostly inventing the plot the accused have now been arrested for. In this case, the five planned to detonate smoke bombs as a distraction as they “topple[d] financial institution signs atop high rise buildings in downtown Cleveland.” But the informant (as usual, a sketchy unnamed character with a checkered past) strongly pushed the group to seriously consider different, more extreme plots. At the end, some or all of them were going to plant C-4 on the Route 82 Brecksville-Northfield High Level Bridge over the Cuyahoga Valley National Park.

So what was initially a political action aimed at financial institutions somehow morphed into a supposed attempt to destroy or damage a piece of publicly owned infrastructure in a national park. Anarchists sure do hate bridges, and parks, I guess. (No parliament of men has the authority to designate which spaces are “national parks”! The whole world is the worker’s national park!)

The FBI’s affadavit suggests that there was never actually a serious “plot.” The gang tossed around the idea of “taking out” a bridge in order to stop people from getting to work, but they also thought maybe they could use their (pretend) C4 on a Klan rally, or a neo-Nazi organization, or an oil well, or the Federal Reserve Bank. They eventually decided to maybe sink a ship. All of their many plans were super serious and well-thought out. (“To prevent capture, he suggested getting tacks that they could throw out of the back of a car if they get in a chase.”) Eventually they settled on the bridge thing, sort of, and bought fake IEDs from the guy they already suspected was a cop.

In other words, these are a bunch of dumbasses even by the standards of amateur “black bloc” dumbasses. Do you know how I know these morons weren’t serious? They planned to download the Anarchist Cookbook and follow its notoriously awful instructions. Every experienced anarchist knows that the Feds have a mole in your group house, but these guys were mainly concerned with having someone’s “hacker friend” explain to them how bitcoins work. Without the FBI’s intervention the most damage these idiots would’ve ever caused is a broken Starbucks window. So thank god they’re off the streets, and congrats to the FBI for getting this tale of dangerous, bomb-planting anarchists onto the news broadcasts on the day of Occupy’s big May Day action.

(At least the Feds are branching out from only targeting Muslims in these ridiculous “stings.” Some day all Americans, regardless of creed or color, will have their circle of friends secretly infiltrated by a paid informant.)

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Alex Pareene

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

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