And then, with Powell across the border on his way back to Jerusalem, Israel announced the capture of Marwan Barghouthi, head of the Tanzim militia of the Fatah, Arafat’s own faction. Barghouthi is perceived in Israel as the field leader of the current Palestinian intifada and, in some circles, as a possible heir to the current leadership. His arrest is bound to make Powell’s mission harder, just as the interception of the arms ship Karine A in January undermined the mission of the American envoy, retired Gen. Anthony Zinni.

Powell’s goals were to achieve a stable cease-fire, evacuate the Israeli army from the West Bank cities it occupied, and help ease the suffering of the Palestinian population with a plan for humanitarian aid. Soon enough, he faced a standoff. Arafat refused to make any progress toward a cease-fire until Israel withdrew from its freshly occupied positions. Sharon ignored President Bush’s public calls for withdrawal “without delay” and vowed to “complete the mission” before pulling out the tanks and troops from Ramallah, Jenin, Bethlehem and Nablus. This move was further complicated by Israel’s demand that the Palestinians turn over wanted suspects who took refuge at the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem and inside Arafat’s besieged Ramallah headquarters, where Powell came to visit on Sunday.

On Monday, positions seemed to harden. While Sharon told CNN that Israel would withdraw from Jenin and Nablus within a week, he said troops would remain in Bethlehem and Ramallah until the Palestinian terrorists that Israel seeks are handed over. He also insisted there is not “any possibility” Israel would be able to reach an agreement with Arafat.

But while Israeli officials give little hope for Powell’s success, they cannot afford to humiliate him. There is deep cynicism about Arafat, but there has been some division within the government about Sharon’s refusal to deal with him. Israeli intelligence says that Arafat has no incentive to forgo terrorism as his political tool as long as he sees no hope for a generous peace proposal from Sharon. After all, Arafat rejected as insufficient the proposals of former Prime Minister Ehud Barak and former President Clinton, and Sharon is willing to offer him much less. Thus, the tactical deadlock over what comes first, withdrawal or cease-fire, is a mere reflection of the much deeper mistrust and differences over substance. Yet some in Sharon’s government, including Defense Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer, continue to say Israel must deal with Arafat, as Powell so far insists. But they may be defeated as the battle lines harden in the days to come.

As an indication of the poor chances for Powell’s mission, even Moshe Katzav, Israel’s state president, whose job is largely ceremonial, bashed the secretary. “Your friendship is very important to us, but the American call for withdrawal has hurt Israel. It’s unacceptable, as we fight for our lives and our blood sheds, to receive such public censure. It could have been said in private channels,” Katzav told Powell on Sunday.

Meanwhile, Sharon has begun to try to convince the Americans, through conversations with Powell and other channels, that their key Middle East objective — a regime change that topples Saddam Hussein in Iraq — can be accomplished without rescuing Arafat. Israelis widely believe that the renewed U.S. interest in a Middle East peace deal reflects the need to win Arab support for toppling Hussein — and Arab governments are supporting Arafat as the righteous representative of the Palestinian people. But Sharon told Powell this weekend that the United States is making a mistake by giving Arafat the keys to its plans in Iraq — and there is increasing evidence that others in the Bush administration agree, once again isolating Powell as the lone American Arafat defender as he tries to broker an almost impossible peace.

So far, Powell has moved cautiously in the region. While he called on Sharon to withdraw and told Arafat that Palestinian terror should stop, he refrained from banging heads and did not back his words with a big stick of threats, toward either side. In fact, Powell accepted both sides’ core arguments. He agreed that the Palestinians could not do much to promote security and fight terror, as long as they see Israeli tanks outside their windows and watch their security organizations get destroyed by crushing Israeli attacks. Similarly, Powell tried to use the Israeli withdrawal to extract concrete security commitments from Arafat, proposing a phased pullout from the cities, in return for a gradual recovery of the Palestinian security apparatus.

To date these ideas have been met by stubborn rejection from the leaders. Sharon and Defense Minister Ben Eliezer told Powell not to give any “discounts” to Arafat, claiming that he still has a formidable force under his command, especially in places that were exempt from the Israeli invasion, like Gaza. In the usual mirror image, the Palestinians told Powell that without a timetable for Israeli withdrawal, there would be no commitments on their side.

Sharon used the impasse to float his idea of a regional conference of leaders to discuss peacemaking and economic recovery. His only precondition is the exclusion of Arafat, inviting other Palestinian participants in his place. Powell was less enthusiastic, but Arafat grabbed the opportunity to embrace the conference plan, as long as it included him. Egypt and Jordan quickly announced that the Palestinian leader should be invited, and his exclusion would be a nonstarter. American officials made clear that Arafat is essential to any renewed peace process, although later Monday, Powell floated the idea that the conference be arranged as a convening of foreign ministers, which would sidestep the question of Arafat’s attending. But mostly Israel’s attempts to isolate Arafat have backfired by forcing the other players to support him. Powell was expected to meet with Arafat again on Tuesday, but late Monday came word that the meeting had been postponed, at least until Wednesday.

From an Israeli standpoint, the Powell visit is more about cutting losses than about true gains. Operation “Defensive Shield,” the code name for the West Bank invasion, enjoys vast popular support. Its inception has mostly halted the deadly string of daily suicide attacks, despite two exceptions, last Wednesday in Haifa and Friday in Central Jerusalem. The Barghouthi arrest came as a new boost to a public with low morale.

The military, however, is more sober. Israeli defense officials talk about “a temporary setback” of Palestinian terror capabilities, which might reduce the level of attacks for four to six months, but not much longer. Military intelligence foresees an immediate upsurge in terror attacks following a withdrawal, to show that the Palestinians haven’t lost their ground under the attack, and then a period of reduction, due to the loss of “infrastructure” — meaning midlevel activists, explosives labs and other weapons. As this infrastructure recovers, terror attacks would rise again.

Israel’s attempt to “isolate” Arafat by surrounding his Ramallah office with elite troops has essentially failed, so far. Powell punctured the Israeli seal by coming to see the besieged leader. Military intelligence has told Ben Eliezer that Arafat consolidated his power under siege. Once more he proved his survival abilities, and remained the sole contact for dialogue. No political figure in the territories is ready to challenge his leadership. Nevertheless, a few Palestinian figures started to discuss the post-Arafat era, and even though his symbolic stance is stronger, by his own admission he has weaker influence on the ground. The proponents of his expulsion believe that he would be even weaker from a thousand miles away.

On the diplomatic level, of course, the Israeli operation has been even less successful. Lacking a clear political goal, instead of strengthening Israel’s stance in fighting terrorism, it eroded the country’s international position vis-`-vis the Palestinians. As the fighting dragged on, global public opinion turned against Israel, seeing it as the attacker, recalling Sharon’s past excesses in Beirut and elsewhere. Western newspapers over the weekend were filled with reporters’ accounts of what the Palestinians are calling a massacre in the Jenin refugee camp, where Israel says perhaps 100 died and the locals put the figure at 600, mostly civilians. Few seem to remember that the invasion came as a reaction to the “Seder massacre” on March 27, when 28 Israelis were slaughtered as they had their annual Passover rite at a seaside hotel in Netanya.

Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, typically worried about world reaction, warned of severe damage to Israel’s global stance, especially in Europe, which already threatens Israel with economic sanctions. “Powell should not leave here as a failure, given our delicate position in the United States,” Peres told a group of friends and political allies on Sunday.

Military planners in Israel believe that their operation should have been much shorter and more strategic, instead of going house to house searching for Palestinian gunmen. Moreover, they worry that the army wasted its strategic reserve, having mobilized 30,000 reserve troops for a dubious operation with uncertain results. The decisive move toward “a strategic change” in Israel’s favor was postponed to the next round in the war, if not lost altogether.

In policy recommendations to their political masters, the IDF planners suggest that Israel should aim for the expulsion of Arafat “after the next round,” rather than now, after reaching a quiet understanding about his future with Washington. American support is seen as necessary to overcome the opposition of Egypt and Jordan, whose tacit understanding is critical for doing away with Arafat. Israel could live with another public rift with Amman and Cairo, but would be reluctant to sacrifice the peace treaties with them. Currently, Jordan and Egypt are fiercely opposing any move to replace Arafat.

The prevailing mood in Israel today sees no chance for any deal with Arafat. The military sought to reach some kind of an interim, or a bridging deal, with the Palestinian leader, and build it gradually through periods of relative quiet on the ground. Israel failed to use the opportunity of Arafat’s declared cease-fire last December, and then ruined it completely with targeted assassinations. The subsequent escalation of suicide bombings since late February convinced the IDF that Arafat encourages terrorism, and that it’s pointless to deal with him anymore. The intelligence community shares the assessment that Arafat will never fight terror.

“We don’t think that terror will go away with Arafat,” a defense official told me, “but as long as he’s in power, there is no chance for a deal that would truly stop terrorism.” This is the logic behind the expulsion scheme. The means to achieve it are through convincing the Americans that Israel did everything to stop the war, cooperated with Powell and gave another chance for a cease-fire. If Arafat can be blamed for a Powell failure, Israelis believe Washington may be more open to throwing him out. The trump card in Israel’s deck is its acceptance of a cease-fire proposal devised by American envoy Gen. Anthony Zinni three weeks ago. Arafat refused to follow suit, and now the Israelis demand to implement the Zinni plan to the letter, “not because we believe it would lead to cease-fire, but to show the incompetence of Arafat and strengthen our claim for his removal,” said the defense official.

The military expects a “chaotic period” after Arafat’s ouster. In its view, Israel should nurture a new Palestinian leadership, and strengthen its hold over the territories with generous political offerings and economic temptations, going as far as reopening the Israeli labor market to Palestinian workers. But Ben Eliezer rejects this scenario, at least for now. Earlier this week, he pledged to do everything in his power to keep Arafat in place, asserting that his expulsion would be worse for Israel. His underlings, however, believe that Ben Eliezer’s opposition is only temporary. “And what if the next attack kills 100 Israelis? Do you really think that we would leave Arafat in power?” asks a defense official, rhetorically. He knows his boss. Three weeks ago, Ben Eliezer opposed the idea of harming Barghouthi, calling him “part of a future Palestinian leadership.” The future Palestinian leader is now under arrest, with no protest from the defense minister.

Sharon believes that America’s foremost interest In the Middle East is an Iraqi regime change, and its deeper involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian arena is meant to build Arab support for the next stage of Bush’s war against terrorism, and not as a sincere exercise in peacemaking. In other words, the Americans are trying to save Arafat from Israel, in order to pave their way to Baghdad. In Sharon’s view, Arafat shares the same interests with Saddam Hussein and the Iranian regime. All of them want to prevent an American operation in Iraq. Saddam fears for his job, while Arafat and the Ayatollahs are afraid to become the next American targets. Therefore, they are trying to destabilize the region. “Iraq supports the Palestinian terror, just as Arafat supported Saddam in 1991,” Sharon told Powell. An Israeli defense official told me: “The Americans are wrong. Arafat is the obstacle to their Iraq plans, because he’s an obstacle for stability.”

Always the master tactician, Sharon pulled the ultimate political trick. He used his fiercest domestic rival, former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, to pass the same message to Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Both met Netanyahu last Thursday, just as Powell was on his way to Jerusalem. The once and perhaps future Israeli leader told them: “Do what you want in Iraq, and don’t wait for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.” A Sharon confidant who toured the power corridors in Washington last week returned home convinced that only the State Department sees Arafat as a possible partner for an agreement. Officials at the Pentagon and the White House see no chance for a deal with Arafat, but have no idea about an alternative, an example of a “can’t do with him and can’t do without him” situation. All seem to agree that after Saddam is out, the chances for regional peacemaking will grow.

But beneath this grand strategy lies an acute problem: Who will take responsibility for security and preventing terror in the Palestinian cities, if and when the IDF withdraws? The official Israeli position proposes a reconstruction of the Oslo model, with Arafat held accountable for any terror attack, and some form of resurrected Palestinian security force as the responsible authority (and, needless to say, the eventual culprit). The Americans are skeptical. According to sources close to Powell’s entourage, they are starting to lean toward the new panacea, an international observer force, to replace the Israelis until the Palestinian Authority is back. The logic is that both sides are too weak and lack the trust to take responsibility and care for security on their own. Sharon opposes the idea of “internationalizing” the process, fearing an imposed political solution. He is ready only for a small group of American “monitors” of the cease-fire. Which inevitably promises another round of diplomatic skirmishes.

But the American team, desperate as it is for some success, clearly has not given up. On Monday, three American officials — David Sutterfield and Aron Miller of the State Department and Flint Leverett of the National Security Council — traveled to the oasis town of Jericho to discuss possible ways out of the mess with three of Arafat’s lieutenants, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, Gaza security chief Mohammed Dahlan and Arafat economic advisor and confidant Mohammed Rashid. The Americans proposed three “baskets” of initiatives to be discussed: security measures, political moves and economic reconstruction efforts. As a down payment, they told the Palestinians that Powell would be satisfied with a cease-fire declaration by Arafat, which could help him in pressing Sharon to withdraw. There’s no reason to be optimistic about this proposal either, but it’s a sign that the Powell team hasn’t caved to the Sharon line on Arafat, and isn’t likely to anytime soon.

Many governments struggling with dissent appear to be using a double-barreled strategy to fight back against the so-called Facebook revolutions: classic repression and by promoting their own views using the very same platforms.

“The thought police already have a presence online in these countries,” said Mohamed Abdel Dayem, the Middle East and North Africa program coordinator for the Committee to Protect Journalists. “And they have a very heavy presence on Twitter, Facebook and other social media networks. They go out there and intimidate people. And they accuse people of being heathens. And call for their heads.”

Jeffrey Ghannam, a media lawyer and analyst in Washington, thinks the propaganda strategy will win out over subjugation.

“It’s my sense that Arab governments will focus less on control, filtering and blocking — though those efforts will not completely disappear — and begin to assert their own views in the Arab cyberspace,” he said.

“Consider the cases of so-called Bahraini twitter trolls and the Syrian cyber attacks that go after critics of these respective Arab regimes. The official Arab government view is increasingly in the mix,” he said. “Another example is the way the SCAF (Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed Forces) uses Facebook and Twitter. It may not be beautifully done, and it does draw tens of thousands of critical remarks online that are viewable, but the SCAF is contributing its views. These are all significant developments and point to increasing government engagement in the Arab cyberspace.”

Some of the official efforts smack of classic public relations techniques.

In Bahrain, the government launched an online campaign called “We Are All Hamad,” asking supporters to post pictures of Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s ruler, on their Facebook and Twitter pages.

In Tunisia, government officials, including President Moncef Marzouki (@Moncef_Marzouki) have joined Twitter. The royal family in Jordan, as well as the mayor of Amman, Jordan’s capital, also use Facebook and Twitter to speak directly to constituents.

These regimes, however, have a long history of using heavy-handed tactics and are apparently not about to give up on old habits. Many, in fact, have learned that social media can help identify potential targets of their crackdown.

This nascent trend, however, has not led authorities in these countries and elsewhere to give up old habits. Many have continued to opt for the more traditional and heavy-handed response.

Last month, for instance, Moroccan authorities arrested 18-year-old college student Walid Bahomane on charges of “defaming Morocco’s sacred values” by posting unflattering pictures and videos on Facebook that poked fun at King Mohammed VI. Authorities also convicted another student, Abdelsamad Haydour, 24, earlier in the month for criticizing the ruler in a video posted on YouTube.

These developments have taken place in a country largely praised for its response to citizen discontent over the past year. In November, Morocco held peaceful parliamentary elections as part of a governmental reform process initiated by the king that also included a new constitution.

In Saudi Arabia, 23-year-old journalist Hamza Kashgari faces charges of blasphemy, an offence that carries the death sentence, for tweeting an imaginary conversation he was having with the Prophet Muhammad. The uproar over Kashgari’s comments prompted the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh, to issue a fatwa against Twitter, which he told “real Muslims” to avoid as a “platform for trading accusations and for promoting lies,” according to an article in The National.

And in Jordan, a masked assailant on Feb. 20 stabbed university student Enass Musallam after he published a blog post that criticized a member of the Jordanian royal family.

Authorities in the region are now also turning to old laws — such as emergency laws, anti-terrorism laws and press laws — to justify the arrest, fines and incarceration of individuals for online expression.

“When the internet and social media blogs were just starting to become popular, press laws were only applied to the mainstream media. But that’s no longer the case as these media platforms continue to converge,” said Courtney Radsch, program manager for the Global Freedom of Expression Campaign at Freedom House in New York.

Earlier this month, for instance, authorities in the United Arab Emirates arrested pro-democracy activist Saleh al-Dhufairi for tweets criticizing the UAE’s decision to deport Syrian expatriates who demonstrated outside their consulate in Dubai without a permit.

“Saleh al-Dhufairi has been arrested on accusation of spreading ideas by speech, writing and any other means that provoke strife, hurt national unity, and social peace,” a spokesman for Dubai police said in a statement.

Al-Dhufairi’s arrest is a scare tactic by a government that is itself scared of any significant dissent, CPJ’s Abdel Dayem.

“Events are occurring that are of monumental political weight and have very far reaching implications. So what happens in Tunisia matters in the Gulf and what happens in Syria matters in the Gulf,” Abdel Dayem said. “These are obviously separate political entities and separate states but there is a Pan-Arab media consumed across borders, so journalists, bloggers, regular citizens and everyone else is exploring these new found venues for expression.”

“They are testing government tolerance for criticism, not just in Libya, Egypt and Yemen where there was an actual change in the political arrangement, but also in countries where there hasn’t been change.”

And these governments in turn are testing their responses, said popular UAE commentator Sultan Al Qassemi, who has more than 100,000 followers on Twitter.

“What we are seeing today is part of the teething process of accepting social media as an avenue of communication and criticism of society and government in the Gulf,” Qassemi said. “As the adoption of social media tools grows in the Gulf there will naturally be a larger output of opinions, some less agreeable to the authorities than others.”

Citizen journalists, bloggers and average citizens who run afoul of the law for expressing their opinions online must also contend with inadequate legal representation.

“This is a new realm for many lawyers in these countries. It requires training and requires a level of experience with the technology and that’s lacking in many countries if not all,” Radsch said. “Certainly, in the U.S. where you’ve had a longer history with internet-based content you have some more sophistication there.

But in many of these countries, blogging really just got going in 2004 and 2005.”

“With the advent of TV, you saw fewer cases against broadcasters at the beginning because it was still new and they were figuring things out, but you’re going to continue to see this battle between governments and citizens play out,” she said.

This time, however, the very nature of the internet and social networking might be enough to break the cycle.

“One thing is different,” Radsch said. “There are a lot more stakeholders and users of social media. The mainstream media is owned by a few and provides jobs for a few more but the vested interest across the broad swath of the public using social media could mean far more stakeholders could fight for the right to keep this space open.”

In the past few weeks, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon have all held high level meetings in Jerusalem. Barak is scheduled to meet with Panetta and with Vice President Joe Biden. Peres will meet with President Barack Obama, as will Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who will fly to Washington for a much anticipated meeting on March 5.

The subject at hand is nuclear Iran — not the movie version, and not even the proxy war version, which has seen the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, the attempted assassinations of Israeli diplomats, and genial computer viruses attack Iranian nuclear installations, making centrifuges spiral out of control, as in Hollywood’s imagination.

On the eve of the Israelis’ Washington visits, there is a divergence of opinion between the United States and Israel regarding the utility of the recently hardened sanctions on Iran, and a growing apprehension on both sides about what the other may be prepared to accept from the Islamic Republic’s leadership.

Eytan Gilboa, an expert on U.S.-Israel bilateral relations who holds posts at Bar Ilan University and at the University of Southern California, said the situation is stark and in some ways unprecedented.

“The Obama administration has little trust in Netanyahu and vice versa. The new sanctions that have been imposed have produced economic hardship in Tehran, but this does not mean they are working. To work, they have to change the Iranian government’s policy toward nuclear development, and this has not yet happened.”

“The UN Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has just announced that Iran has substantially increased enrichment, which seems to contradict American statements that have appeared in all the media suggesting that Iran has not yet made the decision whether to develop nuclear weapons.”

Two points of dispute stand out in creating what Sen. John McCain, also on a visit to Israel last week, called the “daylight” between the two countries regarding Iran’s nuclear plan.

The first is the question of what constitutes unacceptable progress toward the manufacture of an armed nuclear device, or, in Barak’s words, Iran’s entry into a “zone of immunity.” The other is the extent of uranium enrichment at a nuclear site near the holy city of Qum, which was highlighted by the IAEA report.

The United States and Israel agree that the secret underground structure is better protected from a possible military strike than other known Iranian facilities. But from that point of agreement, different conclusions are drawn.

Israeli analysts believe Iran is moving fast toward a nuclear military option, and taking advantage of the pressure of sanctions and the time granted by European offers to negotiate in order to assemble all the parts necessary to build a bomb. The United States, which is in the midst of an election year, meanwhile, thinks sanctions may yet bring Iran — “if it is behaving as a rational actor,” in Gilboa’s words — to negotiate.

“The process is preparing everything for the building of bombs, with the aim of creating all the parts and then needing only a very short period of time to assemble a weapon. So it is just playing with words if we say that we don’t know whether they have made a decision. If you produce all the parts, it is obvious that means you intend to produce a bomb,” Gilboa said.

“I think that what Obama wants from Netanyahu next week is a commitment not to strike Iran at least until the American election, to give heavier sanctions a chance and not to surprise the United States.”

Gilboa does not believe Israel would attack Iranian nuclear installations without notifying the Americans beforehand.

Still, he points out, “The current situation is unprecedented. The U.S. has never before asked Israel to refrain from military action, and Israel has never before asked the U.S. for permission. This is all new ground.”

The 1981 Israel Air Force attack on Osirak, Saddam Hussein’s French-built nuclear reactor is now ancient history. In that campaign however, only eight jets were involved.

The New York Times estimated that at least 100 Israeli fighter planes would be needed today for a crippling attack on Iran. At the time of the Osirak strike, the United States angrily condemned Israel. But in 2005, former President Bill Clinton said, “Everybody talks about what the Israelis did at Osirak in 1981, which I think, in retrospect, was a really good thing.”

The current disagreement between Israel and the United States seem not to be on the substance of Iran’s nuclear program, or even on the possibility of a necessary, last-resort, military strike, but on the timetable and method of response to the threat.

Many Israeli analysts believe the Obama administration and Europe are not convinced that the full effect of sanctions has yet been felt. Israelis are concerned that by the time they are felt, possibly by next summer, when Europe’s oil embargo on Iran is scheduled to go into effect, it might be too late.

“What Obama would like is to put the crippling sanctions to the test. He thinks that the sanctions being used this time, alongside the oil embargo, will actually have an impact,” said Tel Aviv University professor Uzi Rabi, the director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies.

“He is in effect saying to Israel, don’t surprise us. We want to be updated from A to Z. The second thing, I think Israel is being asked is to play down the shadow war and really just let sanctions work. If the sanctions are going to be fully implemented it could inflict a lethal blow on the Iranian regime, and since what we are talking about is the survival of the regime itself, this could be very effective.”

As to Israel, Rabi says, “It would like to make sure everybody knows that from its point of view, a nuclear Iran is unbearable. This combination of ayatollahs and power is something that poses an existential threat to Israel, and it is something Israel is really afraid of. What Israel thinks is the right thing to do is to make sure the military option is not only on the table, but actually feasible.”

Not many in Israel think that Iran, even with a nuclear weapon in hand, would attack Tel Aviv.

“Based on rational thinking, which is not one of the strongest characteristics of the Middle East, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it would be tantamount to suicide were they to use them. Iran would be wiped out by Israel’s second strike capability and by American nukes,” Gilboa said.

“I think they want them in order to acquire hegemony in the Middle East. By becoming a nuclear power they can threaten anybody. The power of threat is much more than the power of destruction.”

Gilboa predicts that next week Netanyahu will ask Obama how he plans to ensure Iran’s non-nuclear status in the event sanctions fail to cripple the nuclear program, and that Obama “will evade the answers.”

Rabi says “Israel is afraid to be left alone. I don’t think Iran would attack Israel. But their actions provide a source of inspiration for lunatic radical movements like Hamas and Hezbollah, and the fact that they are attacking Israelis in Baku, Delhi and Tbilisi, though ineffective for now, show that this is a state that could act in accordance with the modus operandi of a terrorist group. This has very negative implications for the stability of the Middle East.”

Not all Israeli experts see in the commotion of transatlantic visits and consultations evidence of tension between the United States and Israel. Shlomo Shpiro, vice chair of the Department of Politics at Bar Ilan University, believes those claims to be overstated.

“I think there anxiety among some in the U.S. administration who fear that a powerful Israeli military action against Iran could have an impact on the election in November. I don’t think there is tension. A whole range of senior American officials have been visiting Israel almost on a weekly basis.”

“I think the threat assessment is very similar in Washington and in Jerusalem,” he adds. “I think Obama is very concerned about the possibility of Iran getting nuclear weapons. Both are very worried, and both countries agree the process is moving quickly. The disagreement is only about how to prevent or delay it.”

Any Israeli military option, Shpiro says, would be a “last resort.”

“But if it comes to a last resort, I think Israel’s leadership will not hesitate. It all depends on the progress of Iran’s nuclear program and on information that the U.S. and Israel obtain about that program.”

For now, the war of nerves will play on, with Israel pressuring the U.S. and Europe to fully implement severe sanctions as soon as possible, and demanding assurances, perhaps impossible to give, about what the West will do if sanctions do not deter Iran.

The psychological warfare, many say, may lead Iran to believe it can “safely assume it can continue with its plan to build nuclear weapons without much interference,” Gilboa said. “There is a possibility the Iranians are laughing at everybody. For example, why announce sanctions and then say you’ll impose them only in six months?”

“The Iranians are the only ones producing consistent statements, and this is our problem. Too many of the statements coming from the West are confusing and could be interpreted in any number of ways.”

Hezbollah has enjoyed enormous popularity across the entire region, perceived by many as the champions of the Arab world, successfully standing up to the bully in the playground, Israel. There was a time when the portrait of Hassan Nasrallah hung on the walls of homes and cafes from Baghdad to Casablanca. Yet, following a relatively cool reception of Nasrallah’s speech on the 16^th of February , one got the distinct impression that the Lebanese resistance leader may not enjoy the same popularity he once did with the Arab masses.

A simple explanation might be Hezbollah’s unequivocal support for Bashar el-Assad’s regime in Syria.  In a speech broadcast by al-Manar on May 25^th 2011, Nasrallah declared his group’s strong support for the Assad regime. He hailed Syria for its support of the Resistance movement in Lebanon and Palestine. Many have been unable to comprehend why the former champions of the resistance would side with the regime against the people, especially considering Hezbollah’s unreserved support for the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain. This has eroded the party’s popularity not only among Sunnis in Syria, who dominate the opposition, but also in the Arab world at large as regional tensions intensify between Shi’ite Iran and the predominantly Sunni Arab states.

Ironically, the very cause which won Hezbollah respect from thousands across the region, also, lost them the support of their own people. Throughout the 1990s, the Lebanese, regardless of sect, were united by Hezbollah’s resistance to the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and again in 2006 when Israel threatened reinvasion. However, critics point to Hezbollah’s reluctance to disarm as the main source of national instability. Lebanese political leader Samir Geagea asserting that “The ones who are involving Lebanon [in crises] are those wielding power outside the Lebanese state” and demanding that Hezbollah put down its arms and integrate itself with the official Lebanese army and government.

In a similar vein, Hezbollah has alienated many followers by becoming embroiled in a petty tit-for-tat exchange with the March 14 coalition over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq el-Hariri.  Many, regardless of their politics, had respected Nasrallah for his commitment to his cause and ability to avoid entanglement in party politics.

Though not Hezbollah’s fault, as such, the persisting devastation of the socio-economic condition and infrastructure of southern Lebanon has also served as a harsh reminder, to the organisation’s critics, of the consequences of war with Israel

In the Asia Times, Sami Moubayed, points out Hassan Nasrallah’s total withdrawal from public life in Lebanon in recent years; choosing to address his supporters on live television rather than the massive public rallies for which he has been famed. His disappearance has been due to security fears. However, this has made it difficult for followers to connect with him. It is, also, now harder to draw in new supporters from across the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Despite their somewhat dented popularity, Hezbollah is still massively important on a strategic level, with regard to predicting the outcome of unrest in Syria.

In a speech broadcast by al-Manar on the 25^th August 2011, Nasrallah named Syria as a very important ally in the region “The Syrian support has been crucial. A great part of the Iranian support comes through Syria. If it had not been for the will of Syria, even the Iranian support would have been blocked”.  So, it is reasonable to assume that the fall of the Assad regime would serve a tremendous blow to Hezbollah, but also, act as catalyst to a power struggle within the country. A regime in Syria based on the Sunni Muslim majority would most likely be more friendly to Hezbollah’s local rivals in the March 14 coalition. Such a regime would also have good relations with regional powers that have severe disagreements with the Hezbollah movement over sectarian and political issues.

Prof. Joseph Bahout at Sciences Po in Paris notes that, in such a situation, Hezbollah would be faced with two alternatives, if faced with waning support from Syria “will Hizballah gradually become more flexible in terms of Lebanonization and civilianization? Or, on the contrary, will it increasingly pursue a radical position and bitterly defend its share of the Lebanese system while echoing Tehran’s dictum that Assad’s rule in Syria is a red line?” Judging by Hezbollah’s stern rhetoric over the past few months, the leadership has already decided on the latter and will continue to stand by the Assad regime.

Perhaps, most dangerously, Hezbollah also play an extremely important strategic role in what has been suggested as an imminent conflict between Israel and Iran. Would Israel be capable of conducting an aerial battle with Iran at the same time as defending itself against Hezbollah, closer to home?

Ha’aretz commentator Yoel Marcus thinks not, saying that a strike on Iran would be out of Israel’s league and points to cautions issued by former Mossad chief Meir Dagan against attacking Iran, amidst concerns that such a move would drag Israel into a regional war, which would involve Hezbollah, Hamas and possibly Syria.

Tensions have been escalating between Israel and Iran for some time, recently, heightened following attacks on Israeli embassies in India, Thailand and Georgia. An official for the Israeli counter terrorism bureau, quoted in Ha’aretz warned Israelis of further attacks and noted that Nasrallah’s threats of revenge for the 2008 assassination of Hezbollah commander Imad Mughaniyeh were being taken into account.  Nasrallah categorically denied any involvement in the explosions in his speech on February 16^th.

But what would such a conflict mean for the Arab world at large? It seems unlikely that Egyptians, Jordanians or, the Palestinians, all not so embroiled in the sectarian debate, would support Israel in any conflict against Muslims whether they be in Lebanon or, in Iran. However, countries in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) might have more to gain from a weakened Iran.

The GCC have been concerned about Iran’s capabilities, behavior and intentions for a long time, but it takes on an additional importance in light of the Arab Spring. This has certainly been the case in Egypt and Bahrain, in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, possibly in Yemen, and now in Syria.

GCC countries have repeatedly accused Tehran of attempting to destabilise their internal security, and attempting to instigate sectarian strife. Iran has rejected these accusations, and pointed to the GCC’s appalling treatment of Shi’ite citizens. Particularly, concerning the brutal suppression of the largely Shi’ite uprising in Bahrain against the Sunni al-Khalifa monarchy, a struggle which was obviously covered up by Gulf sponsored media such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya.

Tensions have also been rising over Iran’s ability to developing nuclear weapons, something that is already of great concern to the GCC. Without a nuclear advantage, the Gulf far outguns Iran in terms of military capability, although, Iran is not reluctant to use its geopolitical position and has threatened to close off the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil passes, if pressured.

When placed in the context of a larger regional conflict between Israel and Iran, Hezbollah plays an absolutely crucial part as an ally of Iran, especially in the absence of Syria. Yet, when the financial might of the GCC is also turned against Iran, Hezbollah, which is ultimately a financially dependent arm of Iran, becomes inconsequential.

It is possible that Hezbollah may look to find solutions to its waning popularity, and a possible run in with the GCC, by pre-emptively launching a strike against Israel. In his speech on Feburary 16^th, Nasrallah ambiguously claimed that “We have arms and they are increasing [in number]. We have well-known weapons and there are others which are hidden and unknown. We are hiding them because we need to protect our country and prepare surprises for the Israelis.” Whilst this may be an empty threat, a Hezbollah spokesman has said that the organisation would be willing to go to war with Israel, should Syria be attacked. It seems likely that the same logic would apply if an attack were to be staged against Iran.

Prof. Juan Cole has said that, in the case of a conflict with Iran, Hezbollah would almost certainly launch a rocket attack, which would threaten up to a quarter of the Israeli population. The casualties might be even worse if Hezbollah is able to target toxic gas storage in Haifa or nuclear reactors in Dimona and Nahal Sorek. Already Israel has been taking steps to shut down these facilities, in the event of an attack.

This seems to be a departure from Nasrallah’s statement in 2006, shortly after the 34 day war between Hezbollah and Israel, when he told Lebanon’s NTV that had he would not have ordered the capture of two Israeli soldiers, had he known that this would lead to such devastation. However, six years on, the situation between Iran and Israel has escalated, and for Hezbollah this has become a battle for existence. In an earlier speech, February 7^th, Nasrallah admitted that the organisation has been completely dependent on Iran for “moral, political and financial support” since 1982.

Hezbollah has found itself in the unenviable position of choosing between its Iranian financial backer and its Arab popular support base. Ironically, Hezbollah’s only hope may be an Israelis attack on Iran, thus gaining it some support, once more, as the champion of resistance against the Zionist aggressor. But should the pressure on Iran be laid on by the Gulf states, Hezbollah will be left with no alternative but to cut its ties with Iran or, face complete irrelevance within the Arab world.

On the surface, the criteria that Obama outlined in his Libya speech are present in Syria: impending and ongoing massacres; a multilateral coalition led by America’s traditional allies; and an opportunity to side with the people in a crucial state in the Arab spring. For this reason, many liberal writers have called on the U.S. to intervene. Paul Berman has signed onto a conservative-led letter to the president asking him to intervene in Syria. The New Republic has an entire symposium with intellectuals (mostly) asking Obama to side militarily with the Syrian resistance. “Lead again from behind!” Leon Wieseltier exhorts. Especially powerful is a heartfelt plea for American help from a Syrian activist in Washington:

Pressure is building in Congress. Republican Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who both serve on the Armed Services Committee, have argued for arming the Syrian rebels. Obama’s former State Department policy planning head Anne-Marie Slaughter was among the first to call for intervention. In late January, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said it’s only “a question of time” before President Bashar al Assad falls. In December, the State Department pointman said Syria’s leader was a “dead man walking.” More recently, White House press secretary said on Tuesday that “additional measures” such as rebel-arming may need to be taken if the international community keeps dithering.

There are two significant reasons the administration has not pushed for military intervention, however. First, the international consensus that existed on Libya is not present in Syria. Russia and China vetoed a Western- and Arab-sponsored U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian government. Imagining that they would agree to a military intervention is simply fanciful.

What hasn’t been much discussed is why China and Russia vetoed the resolution. And here we circle back to Libya. The resolution authorizing military action in Libya was limited to protecting civilians in Benghazi and other areas. NATO and its allies quickly went beyond the scope of this mandate, using airpower to assist the rebels in defeating Col. Gadhafi and his forces. Such actions may have been morally justified, but they didn’t go unnoticed by the Chinese and Russians, who are extremely sensitive to infringements on state sovereignty (lest they be targeted one day). Tellingly, foes of the proposed Syria resolution explained their decision in terms of national sovereignty. Russia’s foreign minister said that “the Security Council by definition does not engage in domestic affairs of member states.” Russia’s U.N. envoy faulted the resolution for aiming at “regime change,” even though the wording of the text notably did not call for it and the Arab states explicitly rejected Western military intervention.

The second reason Libya isn’t acting as a template for Syria is one of logistics. As Middle East expert Marc Lynch has explained, “Military intervention in Syria has little prospect of success, a high risk of disastrous failure, and a near-certainty of escalation which should make the experience of Iraq weigh extremely heavily on anyone contemplating such an intervention.” The Syrian opposition, impressive and courageous as they have been, is divided, weak and controls no territory. Air power of the sort the West can provide would not be effective in preventing civilian deaths, and the fighting is taking place in densely populated cities. For these reasons and more, a Libya-style no-fly zone simply won’t fly.

Eventually, the Syrian government’s efforts to suppress the rebellion may be so bloody that the Obama administration feels compelled to intervene. But so far, the conditions that were present in Libya are not present in Syria. It may be a double standard, and one that liberal hawks are not comfortable with, but it is one with good reason.