Clearly Sharon’s U.S. visit produced no breakthrough to the Middle East stalemate. As of late Tuesday, he had not succeeded in convincing the Bush administration to leave Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat out of peace talks, nor had the administration managed to convince Sharon he must bargain with Arafat. Bush, who reaffirmed his support for an independent Palestinian state, could not even get Sharon to go that far. “I think it’s premature to discuss” that issue until Arafat reforms his government, Sharon told the Associated Press.

If there was any news in the visit at all, it was that Bush, by all accounts, did not back down on the message that Sharon must deal with Arafat. Administration forces have been sending mixed signals to Sharon for at least a month — every time Secretary of State Colin Powell tries to pressure the Israeli prime minister, administration hawks seem to undermine his tough stance — but Bush appeared to stick to the script administration sources described to reporters before the meeting. Bush also said he would send CIA Director George Tenet, author of an earlier cease-fire proposal, back to the region to help build a Palestinian security force to fight terrorism.

In a hastily called, high-security press conference before he left for Israel, Sharon seemed to hint at plans for military retaliation in response to the Rishon Letzion bombing, but said he had not shared his plans with Bush. “Israel is an independent counry and we must exercise our right of self-defense,” he told reporters. “Israel will not surrender to blackmail….Israel will triumph.”

Next moves for the Bush administration remain unclear. Will the administration push Sharon to accelerate the peace process? Will the U.S. decide that Arafat isn’t a genuine partner for peace? How will the peace proposal Sharon brought to the U.S. play? Salon asked experts to assess whether the Israeli prime minister’s visit made any difference in the Middle East mess.

Christopher Hitchens, Nation columnist and Salon contributor:

Has anything changed since the last time Sharon met with Bush? Is Sharon’s hand stronger or weaker?

The administration is obviously very split on how to deal with Sharon, as it is on the related question of Iraq. Obviously there’s a short term gain to be had in saying that Israel is our friend, that it’s under attack and should be able to defend itself as it sees fit. That translates as a free hand for Sharon, and it includes thing like the U.S. dropping the demand for a U.N. inquiry in Jenin. That’s fine for now. It’s easy to explain on a chat show and the president probably understands it when it’s put to him.

I think he also understands that it’s risky. How long do they expect Israelis to be able to dominate the Palestinians in an area dominated by millions and millions of Muslims? The people who are quickest to see that are the oil community. They don’t need Prince Abdullah coming here — they have enough Gulf friends already to know that the Arab world will never accept a greater Israel. The Arabs probably would, with bad grace, accept a ’67-borders-size Jewish homeland, but they will never accept a Greater Israel and there’s no way they can be made to. So the question becomes “Can we do Iraq if we’re seen to be partners of Sharon?” Just as a practical matter, to say yes would be very rash.

Is Sharon offering anything new in his peace plan?

It’s the same [as what he's been advocating all along]. The time which he’s gaining is being used to create on the ground a situation where the occupation cannot be undone. It may possibly be it’s already happened that there are so many towns, villages, settlements, roads and people [in the occupied territories] where it’s beyond the power of the Israeli electorate to alter it. That’s what Sharon’s always wanted.

It has nothing to do with Jewish security. If Jewish security was your main concern, you would not want to put a small handful of Jews in the middle of the Gaza Strip. The only reason for doing that is colonization.

Do you think Sharon wants a two-state solution?

Of course he doesn’t. When he says he’s for a Palestinian state, he’s in part lying, because what he means by that is the rebaptism of Jordan as a Palestinian state. The implication is that the Arabs of the West Bank would be not very politely invited to go move there. I don’t think what he’s doing makes any sense unless that’s the endgame — to kick the Palestinians out of the West Bank and into Jordan or to make their lives so unlivable that they have to leave. He’s invited into his Cabinet several people who openly advocate ethnic cleansing and I don’t think the U.S. government has said one word, though it’s forever denouncing extremism.

If you’re not going to give them a state and you agree that the status quo is unlivable, that leaves one other option — expulsion. I think we’re getting nearer to it. Congress and the president should ask Sharon for an advance guarantee in unambiguous words that that will never happen. Why don’t they ask it? Why doesn’t the New York Times or the Washington Post demand it?

Is this issue even on the table? Is there any chance that Bush is going to call Sharon on it?

When have you ever seen an editorial that says what security guarantees the Palestinians would need to protect themselves from someone like Sharon? It’s like Sharon being told he won’t be invited to Washington until he renounces terror. It will never happen. The day he’s asked by the United States to renounce terrorism will never come. It isn’t in our idiom.

Sharon has been meeting with lots of American Jewish leaders. Do you think they understand his endgame?

I don’t know. I hope not. The sad fact is that American Jews who could have been a civilizing force have been supporters of more obdurate forces in Israel. Until recently, many more Israelis than American Jews were pro-Palestinian. I remember thinking things were really changing when Rabin came to America and told the America Israel Public Affairs Committee to get lost, saying Israel wanted to be an independent state and didn’t want to find that its rejectionists were being funded by America.

Does the Bush administration have a coherent plan, or it just improvising?

It’s very clear that it’s the latter. We know one thing about this White House — it’s the most disciplined White House there’s ever been. They’re fantastically good at staying on message and sticking to the line of the day. So for Bush to send Powell off to the Middle East and then torpedo him before he got there by saying Sharon was a man of peace and there wasn’t anything to negotiate, that’s incredible considering the way they all hung together in Afghanistan. Powell was made to look foolish in public. There’s a big divide between State and Defense, and it’s impossible to tell which side Bush is on. I think his instincts are all pro-Israeli. He thinks of Israel as an extension of the U.S., which of course in some ways it is. The only Arabs he’s interested in talking to or knows anything about are oil Arabs, patrons of people like himself and Condoleezza Rice and Dick Cheney. The Palestinians don’t count at all. They’re an inconvenient population. Bush regards them basically as a nuisance.

Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations:

What’s changed since Sharon’s last White House visit?

Well, I think that the deaths of a couple hundred Israelis at the hands of terrorists, the recognition of what Israel was up against, the need to demand radical change in the Palestinian Authority and on the part of Arafat, if he’s to play any role at all. And I think the recognition that Israel and the United States are engaged in the same battle against global terrorism.

How much of the verbal pressure from the U.S. to bring Sharon to the negotiating table is real? How much for show? Is it having any real impact?

I don’t think the U.S. is pressuring. I think they’re in agreement with Sharon that Arafat and the Palestinian Authority have to set up a government that will be transparent, that before funds or security cooperation can be renewed, there has to accountability, where the funds can’t continue to be siphoned into terrorist activities. The role of Arafat is yet to be determined, but the whole infrastructure for terrorism has to be restructured, cleaned up, the old people out, and that will provide hope for the future, that there can be meaningful negotiations. There are some people within who are talking about reform, but not many. All of them were involved in the corruption, and change will require removing all of them.

Did the documents seized by the Israelis during the incursion, and shown to U.S. officials by Sharon this week, change anybody’s mind in Washington?

I think they confirm that what Israel has been saying is true, and gives further evidence of Saudi Arabia’s direct involvement in providing funding to the homicide bombers, encouragement and funds to other terrorist operations, including Hamas and Hezbollah. The documents aren’t necessarily to make the case, the case was very clear. All that Israel found in those documents was how the Palestinians violated the Geneva Convention by placing civilians in harm’s way, by putting bomb factories and military equipment in the heart of densely populated civilian areas. The documents just give greater credence and substance to the charges.

Is this now the beginning of new negotiations, with the Saudi proposal on one hand, and the Sharon proposal on the other?

I don’t know that you can juxtapose them. I don’t know that they’re part of one continuum. These are ideas that have been put forward, but the Saudis have put forward an idea, not a proposal, not a plan. These are ideas that have yet to be defined — the idea that there is a role in the region for pushing Arafat, for cajoling him, and holding him accountable instead of letting him escape and justifying the terrorism. But the Saudis have their own track record to clarify, both in terms of their support for terrorism in the region and also, as we know, in the terrorism that occurred here. The fact that Saudi money is funding many of the terrorist organizations, and the fact that many of the terrorists emerge from their own infrastructure — religious, political, etc. — these are all things that they have to address also. The idea that you have an idea that’s been put forward by them is something that’s on the table and should be pursued.

What do you make of the mixed messages from Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell this weekend?

There’s always been differences of opinion in the administration. As is natural, people have different points of view. The thing that counts is what the president believes. I think that’s what you heard today. The president believes very strongly that Arafat has to be held to account for his actions. I don’t think he wants to impose anything on Israel. He understands what Israel is up against. He understands Israel’s right to defend itself, and he has stated these things very clearly. So I think you have to look at what the president says, and not other people.

Rashid Khalidi, director of the Center for International Studies at the University of Chicago:

Does Sharon’s peace plan offer anything new?

As far as we know it’s not a peace plan. It’s inconceivable that it will lead to peace. Sharon has said that he intends to keep most of the West Bank and all the settlements in place. It’s a plan for more occupation and further war. Only the American press would even use the words “peace plan” without putting it in quotes.

In front of the cameras, Bush basically said he wasn’t going to tell Sharon what to do. Do you think he might have tried to rein him in, in private?

One’s expectations are very low when an Israeli politician who can probably get more votes in Congress than the president is in town. It’s depressing, but one sometimes wonders if the United States even has a foreign policy on this issue, or whether it’s all about campaign contributions and the president’s political base among other Republicans.

Did the resolutions passed in the House and Senate strengthen Sharon’s hand?

One of the interesting things is that there were so many congressmen and senators who either expressed reservations, held their noses while voting for the resolutions or actually courageously voted against them. Usually they all happily jump into the abyss that’s pointed out to them by the American Israel Public Affairs committee. There’s a deep sense in Washington, even in the more benighted corners of Congress, that Sharon doesn’t have a plan that leads toward peace. But they’re afraid, even if they know better.

Of course, some do not know better. You have a House Majority Leader who openly talked about ethnic cleansing. [On MSNBC's "Hardball," Dick Armey said that Palestinians should be removed from the West Bank and Gaza]. It seems to be that should open him up to an investigation for war crimes. The number four official in the United States called for war crimes, and it hardly made the New York Times. So some clearly do not know better.

Lewis Roth, Americans for Peace Now:

How is this trip different than the last time Sharon visited?

Well, one of the major things that’s changed on the ground has been the nearly complete dismantling of the Palestinian Authority’s infrastructure and recognition by the international community that the harsh military measures that Israel has unleashed against Palestinian civilians and population centers in response to terrorist acts, in the long run is not going to bring security for Israel, or bring the Palestinians closer to their political goal of having a viable state.

How much of the verbal pressure from the U.S. to bring Sharon to the negotiating table is real? How much for show? Is it having any real impact?

My sense is that the verbal pressure being applied behind closed doors is even greater than what’s been made public. It’s very unlikely that Yasser Arafat would be walking around outside of his compound in Ramallah today if not for pressure from the United States and others for Israel to let up on the siege on that compound. I think the United States has also been deeply involved in trying to end the stand-off in Bethlehem, as well as try to bring about a general withdrawal of Israeli troops from Palestinian population centers. Having said that, we must realize of course that the United States is doing this in the context of a longstanding friendship with Israel, and is staking out positions in Mideast diplomacy that it realizes are in Israel’s own best interest even if the current government of Israel may not always agree with that assessment. You have Sharon visiting the White House this week knowing that when he returns to Israel he’s going to face a Likud central committee meeting at which they are anticipated to approve a proposal that just flat-out denies the possibility of creating a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River, which flies in direct contradiction with the position that Sharon has at least publicly espoused about creating some kind of Palestinian state at some point in the future. This is part of the gamesmanship that is taking place within Israeli politics between the Netanyahu wing and the Sharon wing of Likud.

At the same time, there’s a new opportunity created on the Palestinian side in the wake of Israel’s incursion. Many of the political voices inside and outside of the Palestinian Authority have raised objection to the way the Palestinian Authority is being run by Yasser Arafat. Last week, one of the Cabinet members of the Palestinian Authority resigned over the lack of movement toward reform. We’ve seen nongovernmental organizations raise their voices more strongly in the past few days calling for changes. Even in Fatah, Arafat’s own political party, there’s clamoring for change, both with the structure and many of the individuals involved in governance.

Is there consensus on what that reform should be?

I think it’s clearly important from America’s point of view that the reforms increase a level of democracy, transparency and rule of law in the territories. But that needs to be done as part of a process of moving towards a Palestinian state, not as a prerequisite necessarily.

At this stage, would more democracy within the Palestinian Authority help or hurt the peace cause?

That’s an interesting question. It would depend on how it’s structured and the level of confidence people have in the changes and the overall circumstances in which reforms are carried out. If you have democratic changes taking place at a time that the economy is continuing to deteriorate, people are radicalized by the lack of employment, lack of social services, that’s clearly going to help more divisive elements in society make gains in the context of democratic elections. However, if Palestinians see that there are real changes taking place on the ground, that corruption is being cleaned up, that economic needs and social needs are being met, then it makes it easier for the secular nationalists, pro-democratic forces, to make a good showing.

What about the American political calculation? Is this at all risky for Bush to get involved in trying to broker a deal?

Well, the right-wing base of the Republican Party certainly has been very vocal on these issues. The Democratic Party has been equally expressive about its support for Israel. I don’t know that this is an issue that people who serve as a base for the White House are going to fall on their sword for. Where are they going to go? Do they really care about this more than the president delivering on issues like the budget, the environment, education, tax policy, things of that nature? They may or may not, I think that’s still an open question.

Does Sharon’s proposal signal the beginning of a real negotiation, with the starting points being the Sharon proposal and the Saudi proposal?

I don’t think the Sharon proposal and the Saudi proposal can be compared to each other. The Saudi plan is not a detailed blueprint for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It’s an umbrella plan that offers the Israelis a broader political horizon should peace break out between them and the Palestinians. What Sharon is attempting to craft is an extremely slow approach to ever having to deal with very contentious political issues which he knows are land mines for him politically in Israel, and things that he personally probably doesn’t want to have to deal with at the negotiating table: Jerusalem, the right of return, settlements — all of those things. What’s missing between the go-slow approach and the final horizon is a more detailed road map for bringing the parties from where they are today to addressing a whole range of security, political and economic issues that will bring both security and a Palestinian state sooner rather than later, and that’s something that the Bush administration needs to do on its own.

Clearly the Israeli government and the Palestinians aren’t going to do this without some prodding. It will probably require some reformulated version of the Clinton proposal from December 2000, or taking a look at the broad outline of the peace plan that was created at the Taba negotiations in 2001 — building on those ideas. I’m not necessarily saying you need a super summit to achieve those things. I think there needs to be serious diplomatic engagement by the two sides, on a multilateral or perhaps a bilateral basis, to think about the core issues of the conflict rather that postponing them to another day and allowing them to fester and get worse.

Do you see a coherent message coming from the Bush administration about how they want to go about solving this conflict?

Hussein Ibish, communications director of the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee:

Is there anything new about Sharon’s peace proposal?

What we know about the proposal is that it’s mainly about fencing off parts of the West Bank and creating more and deeper mechanisms of Israeli control over the occupied territories. In the guise of a peace plan, Sharon’s put forward a proposal to enhance and entrench the occupation. Calling that a peace plan is the most Orwellian thing imaginable.

Sharon lives in a fantasy world where he thinks he has crushed the Palestinian will to resist. He has smashed up the West Bank, isolated Israel, infuriated the Palestinians, alienated the Europeans, and he surveys the wreckage with evident pride and declares that peace is at hand.

Does Sharon have more or less leverage with the American administration than he did the last time he met Bush?

I think he has less leverage than before because I think he’s seen by the Bush administration as someone who is A) not cooperative and B) is a problem. The last couple of times he was here, a lot of people in the Bush administration believed the principal problem was Arafat. Now there are people who see the principal problem as Arafat and Sharon. We’ve seen a change of heart in some of the media that’s close to the government, including leading editorials in the Washington Post and the New York Times.

But don’t the recent pro-Israel House and Senate resolutions strengthen Sharon’s hand?

Congress is a different story. Congress is in the grip of a coalition of extremely influential special interest groups, especially the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and the Christian right, who are a massive voting block. There are also defense contractors, and this is missed by a lot of people, who make billions of dollars each year off of defense sales to Israel.

Don’t you believe the White House is beholden to these same interests?

The executive branch, unlike Congress, is responsible for foreign policy. No senator or representative is going to have to take the blame for a completely incoherent foreign policy. Congress pretty much has a free hand to criticize without bearing the responsibility that might moderate their behavior. In that sense members of the House and Senate are free to be as irresponsible as they want to be. It’s a reflection of the extent to which powerful moneyed interest groups can completely dominate Congress when there’s no pressure coming from the other side. Certainly the Bush administration has never bitten the bullet and decided to spend the political capital necessary to challenge the pro-Israel lobby, but at a certain point you’d have to expect that our national interest would become an issue.

So do you think Bush is putting pressure on Sharon?

No. There’s no evidence that the Bush administration is willing to spend the political capital. It’s less likely that you’ll see Bush pressuring Sharon to agree to U.N. Security Council resolutions and to reenter negations to end the occupation, and more likely that you’ll see Sharon trying to pressure Bush to cut off all ties to the Palestinians.

Sharon is demanding reforms in the Palestinian Authority. Are there useful changes that Bush could push for?

There are a number of reforms that would be useful, including greater democracy and greater transparency. But you can’t have a normal government and a normal relationship between the people and their government under the conditions of military occupation. The Palestinian Authority only makes sense as a political entity in terms of a transition to autonomy. If the Palestinian Authority becomes semi-permanent, then it becomes a Vichy regime, a government that rules in occupied territory in cooperation with the occupying power. The Palestinian Authority only makes sense as a transitional structure. To apply to the Palestinian Authority the standards and norms that you’d apply to a sovereign state entity about transparency and democracy without it being the representative government of a sovereign state is ridiculous.

Does the Bush White House have a coherent plan for dealing with the conflict?

I think they’re improvising. In every administration since the end of the Cold War, it’s become very clear that policy matters relating to Israel operate at two distinct and contradictory registers in American social life. First is the diplomatic register, our interests as a great power, where it becomes clear that we have a real national interest in resolving this conflict. It’s playing havoc with our diplomacy in the Middle East. The second register, the higher register, is that political parties and elected officials all have to face the reality of very powerful, rich, well- organized special interests. What you get therefore is this sort of schizophrenia, where one weekend Bush will say Israel has to stop [the incursions into Palestinian territory] now, and the next weekend, with Israel continuing its offensive, he will say that Israel is meeting its obligation.

The tension between those two impulses has essentially prevented the Bush administration from arriving at a coherent and constructive policy that would genuinely bring the conflict to an end. That would mean pressuring Israel as much as pressuring the Palestinians. Even though in its rhetoric the White House acknowledges a need for an end to the occupation, an end to the settlements and the need for a viable Palestinian state, in terms of policy, because of political interests, we still give uncritical and unconditional support to Israel and its colonial occupation.

Many governments struggling with dissent appear to be using a double-barreled strategy to fight back against the so-called Facebook revolutions: classic repression and by promoting their own views using the very same platforms.

“The thought police already have a presence online in these countries,” said Mohamed Abdel Dayem, the Middle East and North Africa program coordinator for the Committee to Protect Journalists. “And they have a very heavy presence on Twitter, Facebook and other social media networks. They go out there and intimidate people. And they accuse people of being heathens. And call for their heads.”

Jeffrey Ghannam, a media lawyer and analyst in Washington, thinks the propaganda strategy will win out over subjugation.

“It’s my sense that Arab governments will focus less on control, filtering and blocking — though those efforts will not completely disappear — and begin to assert their own views in the Arab cyberspace,” he said.

“Consider the cases of so-called Bahraini twitter trolls and the Syrian cyber attacks that go after critics of these respective Arab regimes. The official Arab government view is increasingly in the mix,” he said. “Another example is the way the SCAF (Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed Forces) uses Facebook and Twitter. It may not be beautifully done, and it does draw tens of thousands of critical remarks online that are viewable, but the SCAF is contributing its views. These are all significant developments and point to increasing government engagement in the Arab cyberspace.”

Some of the official efforts smack of classic public relations techniques.

In Bahrain, the government launched an online campaign called “We Are All Hamad,” asking supporters to post pictures of Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s ruler, on their Facebook and Twitter pages.

In Tunisia, government officials, including President Moncef Marzouki (@Moncef_Marzouki) have joined Twitter. The royal family in Jordan, as well as the mayor of Amman, Jordan’s capital, also use Facebook and Twitter to speak directly to constituents.

These regimes, however, have a long history of using heavy-handed tactics and are apparently not about to give up on old habits. Many, in fact, have learned that social media can help identify potential targets of their crackdown.

This nascent trend, however, has not led authorities in these countries and elsewhere to give up old habits. Many have continued to opt for the more traditional and heavy-handed response.

Last month, for instance, Moroccan authorities arrested 18-year-old college student Walid Bahomane on charges of “defaming Morocco’s sacred values” by posting unflattering pictures and videos on Facebook that poked fun at King Mohammed VI. Authorities also convicted another student, Abdelsamad Haydour, 24, earlier in the month for criticizing the ruler in a video posted on YouTube.

These developments have taken place in a country largely praised for its response to citizen discontent over the past year. In November, Morocco held peaceful parliamentary elections as part of a governmental reform process initiated by the king that also included a new constitution.

In Saudi Arabia, 23-year-old journalist Hamza Kashgari faces charges of blasphemy, an offence that carries the death sentence, for tweeting an imaginary conversation he was having with the Prophet Muhammad. The uproar over Kashgari’s comments prompted the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh, to issue a fatwa against Twitter, which he told “real Muslims” to avoid as a “platform for trading accusations and for promoting lies,” according to an article in The National.

And in Jordan, a masked assailant on Feb. 20 stabbed university student Enass Musallam after he published a blog post that criticized a member of the Jordanian royal family.

Authorities in the region are now also turning to old laws — such as emergency laws, anti-terrorism laws and press laws — to justify the arrest, fines and incarceration of individuals for online expression.

“When the internet and social media blogs were just starting to become popular, press laws were only applied to the mainstream media. But that’s no longer the case as these media platforms continue to converge,” said Courtney Radsch, program manager for the Global Freedom of Expression Campaign at Freedom House in New York.

Earlier this month, for instance, authorities in the United Arab Emirates arrested pro-democracy activist Saleh al-Dhufairi for tweets criticizing the UAE’s decision to deport Syrian expatriates who demonstrated outside their consulate in Dubai without a permit.

“Saleh al-Dhufairi has been arrested on accusation of spreading ideas by speech, writing and any other means that provoke strife, hurt national unity, and social peace,” a spokesman for Dubai police said in a statement.

Al-Dhufairi’s arrest is a scare tactic by a government that is itself scared of any significant dissent, CPJ’s Abdel Dayem.

“Events are occurring that are of monumental political weight and have very far reaching implications. So what happens in Tunisia matters in the Gulf and what happens in Syria matters in the Gulf,” Abdel Dayem said. “These are obviously separate political entities and separate states but there is a Pan-Arab media consumed across borders, so journalists, bloggers, regular citizens and everyone else is exploring these new found venues for expression.”

“They are testing government tolerance for criticism, not just in Libya, Egypt and Yemen where there was an actual change in the political arrangement, but also in countries where there hasn’t been change.”

And these governments in turn are testing their responses, said popular UAE commentator Sultan Al Qassemi, who has more than 100,000 followers on Twitter.

“What we are seeing today is part of the teething process of accepting social media as an avenue of communication and criticism of society and government in the Gulf,” Qassemi said. “As the adoption of social media tools grows in the Gulf there will naturally be a larger output of opinions, some less agreeable to the authorities than others.”

Citizen journalists, bloggers and average citizens who run afoul of the law for expressing their opinions online must also contend with inadequate legal representation.

“This is a new realm for many lawyers in these countries. It requires training and requires a level of experience with the technology and that’s lacking in many countries if not all,” Radsch said. “Certainly, in the U.S. where you’ve had a longer history with internet-based content you have some more sophistication there.

But in many of these countries, blogging really just got going in 2004 and 2005.”

“With the advent of TV, you saw fewer cases against broadcasters at the beginning because it was still new and they were figuring things out, but you’re going to continue to see this battle between governments and citizens play out,” she said.

This time, however, the very nature of the internet and social networking might be enough to break the cycle.

“One thing is different,” Radsch said. “There are a lot more stakeholders and users of social media. The mainstream media is owned by a few and provides jobs for a few more but the vested interest across the broad swath of the public using social media could mean far more stakeholders could fight for the right to keep this space open.”

In the past few weeks, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon have all held high level meetings in Jerusalem. Barak is scheduled to meet with Panetta and with Vice President Joe Biden. Peres will meet with President Barack Obama, as will Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who will fly to Washington for a much anticipated meeting on March 5.

The subject at hand is nuclear Iran — not the movie version, and not even the proxy war version, which has seen the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, the attempted assassinations of Israeli diplomats, and genial computer viruses attack Iranian nuclear installations, making centrifuges spiral out of control, as in Hollywood’s imagination.

On the eve of the Israelis’ Washington visits, there is a divergence of opinion between the United States and Israel regarding the utility of the recently hardened sanctions on Iran, and a growing apprehension on both sides about what the other may be prepared to accept from the Islamic Republic’s leadership.

Eytan Gilboa, an expert on U.S.-Israel bilateral relations who holds posts at Bar Ilan University and at the University of Southern California, said the situation is stark and in some ways unprecedented.

“The Obama administration has little trust in Netanyahu and vice versa. The new sanctions that have been imposed have produced economic hardship in Tehran, but this does not mean they are working. To work, they have to change the Iranian government’s policy toward nuclear development, and this has not yet happened.”

“The UN Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has just announced that Iran has substantially increased enrichment, which seems to contradict American statements that have appeared in all the media suggesting that Iran has not yet made the decision whether to develop nuclear weapons.”

Two points of dispute stand out in creating what Sen. John McCain, also on a visit to Israel last week, called the “daylight” between the two countries regarding Iran’s nuclear plan.

The first is the question of what constitutes unacceptable progress toward the manufacture of an armed nuclear device, or, in Barak’s words, Iran’s entry into a “zone of immunity.” The other is the extent of uranium enrichment at a nuclear site near the holy city of Qum, which was highlighted by the IAEA report.

The United States and Israel agree that the secret underground structure is better protected from a possible military strike than other known Iranian facilities. But from that point of agreement, different conclusions are drawn.

Israeli analysts believe Iran is moving fast toward a nuclear military option, and taking advantage of the pressure of sanctions and the time granted by European offers to negotiate in order to assemble all the parts necessary to build a bomb. The United States, which is in the midst of an election year, meanwhile, thinks sanctions may yet bring Iran — “if it is behaving as a rational actor,” in Gilboa’s words — to negotiate.

“The process is preparing everything for the building of bombs, with the aim of creating all the parts and then needing only a very short period of time to assemble a weapon. So it is just playing with words if we say that we don’t know whether they have made a decision. If you produce all the parts, it is obvious that means you intend to produce a bomb,” Gilboa said.

“I think that what Obama wants from Netanyahu next week is a commitment not to strike Iran at least until the American election, to give heavier sanctions a chance and not to surprise the United States.”

Gilboa does not believe Israel would attack Iranian nuclear installations without notifying the Americans beforehand.

Still, he points out, “The current situation is unprecedented. The U.S. has never before asked Israel to refrain from military action, and Israel has never before asked the U.S. for permission. This is all new ground.”

The 1981 Israel Air Force attack on Osirak, Saddam Hussein’s French-built nuclear reactor is now ancient history. In that campaign however, only eight jets were involved.

The New York Times estimated that at least 100 Israeli fighter planes would be needed today for a crippling attack on Iran. At the time of the Osirak strike, the United States angrily condemned Israel. But in 2005, former President Bill Clinton said, “Everybody talks about what the Israelis did at Osirak in 1981, which I think, in retrospect, was a really good thing.”

The current disagreement between Israel and the United States seem not to be on the substance of Iran’s nuclear program, or even on the possibility of a necessary, last-resort, military strike, but on the timetable and method of response to the threat.

Many Israeli analysts believe the Obama administration and Europe are not convinced that the full effect of sanctions has yet been felt. Israelis are concerned that by the time they are felt, possibly by next summer, when Europe’s oil embargo on Iran is scheduled to go into effect, it might be too late.

“What Obama would like is to put the crippling sanctions to the test. He thinks that the sanctions being used this time, alongside the oil embargo, will actually have an impact,” said Tel Aviv University professor Uzi Rabi, the director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies.

“He is in effect saying to Israel, don’t surprise us. We want to be updated from A to Z. The second thing, I think Israel is being asked is to play down the shadow war and really just let sanctions work. If the sanctions are going to be fully implemented it could inflict a lethal blow on the Iranian regime, and since what we are talking about is the survival of the regime itself, this could be very effective.”

As to Israel, Rabi says, “It would like to make sure everybody knows that from its point of view, a nuclear Iran is unbearable. This combination of ayatollahs and power is something that poses an existential threat to Israel, and it is something Israel is really afraid of. What Israel thinks is the right thing to do is to make sure the military option is not only on the table, but actually feasible.”

Not many in Israel think that Iran, even with a nuclear weapon in hand, would attack Tel Aviv.

“Based on rational thinking, which is not one of the strongest characteristics of the Middle East, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it would be tantamount to suicide were they to use them. Iran would be wiped out by Israel’s second strike capability and by American nukes,” Gilboa said.

“I think they want them in order to acquire hegemony in the Middle East. By becoming a nuclear power they can threaten anybody. The power of threat is much more than the power of destruction.”

Gilboa predicts that next week Netanyahu will ask Obama how he plans to ensure Iran’s non-nuclear status in the event sanctions fail to cripple the nuclear program, and that Obama “will evade the answers.”

Rabi says “Israel is afraid to be left alone. I don’t think Iran would attack Israel. But their actions provide a source of inspiration for lunatic radical movements like Hamas and Hezbollah, and the fact that they are attacking Israelis in Baku, Delhi and Tbilisi, though ineffective for now, show that this is a state that could act in accordance with the modus operandi of a terrorist group. This has very negative implications for the stability of the Middle East.”

Not all Israeli experts see in the commotion of transatlantic visits and consultations evidence of tension between the United States and Israel. Shlomo Shpiro, vice chair of the Department of Politics at Bar Ilan University, believes those claims to be overstated.

“I think there anxiety among some in the U.S. administration who fear that a powerful Israeli military action against Iran could have an impact on the election in November. I don’t think there is tension. A whole range of senior American officials have been visiting Israel almost on a weekly basis.”

“I think the threat assessment is very similar in Washington and in Jerusalem,” he adds. “I think Obama is very concerned about the possibility of Iran getting nuclear weapons. Both are very worried, and both countries agree the process is moving quickly. The disagreement is only about how to prevent or delay it.”

Any Israeli military option, Shpiro says, would be a “last resort.”

“But if it comes to a last resort, I think Israel’s leadership will not hesitate. It all depends on the progress of Iran’s nuclear program and on information that the U.S. and Israel obtain about that program.”

For now, the war of nerves will play on, with Israel pressuring the U.S. and Europe to fully implement severe sanctions as soon as possible, and demanding assurances, perhaps impossible to give, about what the West will do if sanctions do not deter Iran.

The psychological warfare, many say, may lead Iran to believe it can “safely assume it can continue with its plan to build nuclear weapons without much interference,” Gilboa said. “There is a possibility the Iranians are laughing at everybody. For example, why announce sanctions and then say you’ll impose them only in six months?”

“The Iranians are the only ones producing consistent statements, and this is our problem. Too many of the statements coming from the West are confusing and could be interpreted in any number of ways.”

Hezbollah has enjoyed enormous popularity across the entire region, perceived by many as the champions of the Arab world, successfully standing up to the bully in the playground, Israel. There was a time when the portrait of Hassan Nasrallah hung on the walls of homes and cafes from Baghdad to Casablanca. Yet, following a relatively cool reception of Nasrallah’s speech on the 16^th of February , one got the distinct impression that the Lebanese resistance leader may not enjoy the same popularity he once did with the Arab masses.

A simple explanation might be Hezbollah’s unequivocal support for Bashar el-Assad’s regime in Syria.  In a speech broadcast by al-Manar on May 25^th 2011, Nasrallah declared his group’s strong support for the Assad regime. He hailed Syria for its support of the Resistance movement in Lebanon and Palestine. Many have been unable to comprehend why the former champions of the resistance would side with the regime against the people, especially considering Hezbollah’s unreserved support for the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain. This has eroded the party’s popularity not only among Sunnis in Syria, who dominate the opposition, but also in the Arab world at large as regional tensions intensify between Shi’ite Iran and the predominantly Sunni Arab states.

Ironically, the very cause which won Hezbollah respect from thousands across the region, also, lost them the support of their own people. Throughout the 1990s, the Lebanese, regardless of sect, were united by Hezbollah’s resistance to the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and again in 2006 when Israel threatened reinvasion. However, critics point to Hezbollah’s reluctance to disarm as the main source of national instability. Lebanese political leader Samir Geagea asserting that “The ones who are involving Lebanon [in crises] are those wielding power outside the Lebanese state” and demanding that Hezbollah put down its arms and integrate itself with the official Lebanese army and government.

In a similar vein, Hezbollah has alienated many followers by becoming embroiled in a petty tit-for-tat exchange with the March 14 coalition over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq el-Hariri.  Many, regardless of their politics, had respected Nasrallah for his commitment to his cause and ability to avoid entanglement in party politics.

Though not Hezbollah’s fault, as such, the persisting devastation of the socio-economic condition and infrastructure of southern Lebanon has also served as a harsh reminder, to the organisation’s critics, of the consequences of war with Israel

In the Asia Times, Sami Moubayed, points out Hassan Nasrallah’s total withdrawal from public life in Lebanon in recent years; choosing to address his supporters on live television rather than the massive public rallies for which he has been famed. His disappearance has been due to security fears. However, this has made it difficult for followers to connect with him. It is, also, now harder to draw in new supporters from across the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Despite their somewhat dented popularity, Hezbollah is still massively important on a strategic level, with regard to predicting the outcome of unrest in Syria.

In a speech broadcast by al-Manar on the 25^th August 2011, Nasrallah named Syria as a very important ally in the region “The Syrian support has been crucial. A great part of the Iranian support comes through Syria. If it had not been for the will of Syria, even the Iranian support would have been blocked”.  So, it is reasonable to assume that the fall of the Assad regime would serve a tremendous blow to Hezbollah, but also, act as catalyst to a power struggle within the country. A regime in Syria based on the Sunni Muslim majority would most likely be more friendly to Hezbollah’s local rivals in the March 14 coalition. Such a regime would also have good relations with regional powers that have severe disagreements with the Hezbollah movement over sectarian and political issues.

Prof. Joseph Bahout at Sciences Po in Paris notes that, in such a situation, Hezbollah would be faced with two alternatives, if faced with waning support from Syria “will Hizballah gradually become more flexible in terms of Lebanonization and civilianization? Or, on the contrary, will it increasingly pursue a radical position and bitterly defend its share of the Lebanese system while echoing Tehran’s dictum that Assad’s rule in Syria is a red line?” Judging by Hezbollah’s stern rhetoric over the past few months, the leadership has already decided on the latter and will continue to stand by the Assad regime.

Perhaps, most dangerously, Hezbollah also play an extremely important strategic role in what has been suggested as an imminent conflict between Israel and Iran. Would Israel be capable of conducting an aerial battle with Iran at the same time as defending itself against Hezbollah, closer to home?

Ha’aretz commentator Yoel Marcus thinks not, saying that a strike on Iran would be out of Israel’s league and points to cautions issued by former Mossad chief Meir Dagan against attacking Iran, amidst concerns that such a move would drag Israel into a regional war, which would involve Hezbollah, Hamas and possibly Syria.

Tensions have been escalating between Israel and Iran for some time, recently, heightened following attacks on Israeli embassies in India, Thailand and Georgia. An official for the Israeli counter terrorism bureau, quoted in Ha’aretz warned Israelis of further attacks and noted that Nasrallah’s threats of revenge for the 2008 assassination of Hezbollah commander Imad Mughaniyeh were being taken into account.  Nasrallah categorically denied any involvement in the explosions in his speech on February 16^th.

But what would such a conflict mean for the Arab world at large? It seems unlikely that Egyptians, Jordanians or, the Palestinians, all not so embroiled in the sectarian debate, would support Israel in any conflict against Muslims whether they be in Lebanon or, in Iran. However, countries in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) might have more to gain from a weakened Iran.

The GCC have been concerned about Iran’s capabilities, behavior and intentions for a long time, but it takes on an additional importance in light of the Arab Spring. This has certainly been the case in Egypt and Bahrain, in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, possibly in Yemen, and now in Syria.

GCC countries have repeatedly accused Tehran of attempting to destabilise their internal security, and attempting to instigate sectarian strife. Iran has rejected these accusations, and pointed to the GCC’s appalling treatment of Shi’ite citizens. Particularly, concerning the brutal suppression of the largely Shi’ite uprising in Bahrain against the Sunni al-Khalifa monarchy, a struggle which was obviously covered up by Gulf sponsored media such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya.

Tensions have also been rising over Iran’s ability to developing nuclear weapons, something that is already of great concern to the GCC. Without a nuclear advantage, the Gulf far outguns Iran in terms of military capability, although, Iran is not reluctant to use its geopolitical position and has threatened to close off the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil passes, if pressured.

When placed in the context of a larger regional conflict between Israel and Iran, Hezbollah plays an absolutely crucial part as an ally of Iran, especially in the absence of Syria. Yet, when the financial might of the GCC is also turned against Iran, Hezbollah, which is ultimately a financially dependent arm of Iran, becomes inconsequential.

It is possible that Hezbollah may look to find solutions to its waning popularity, and a possible run in with the GCC, by pre-emptively launching a strike against Israel. In his speech on Feburary 16^th, Nasrallah ambiguously claimed that “We have arms and they are increasing [in number]. We have well-known weapons and there are others which are hidden and unknown. We are hiding them because we need to protect our country and prepare surprises for the Israelis.” Whilst this may be an empty threat, a Hezbollah spokesman has said that the organisation would be willing to go to war with Israel, should Syria be attacked. It seems likely that the same logic would apply if an attack were to be staged against Iran.

Prof. Juan Cole has said that, in the case of a conflict with Iran, Hezbollah would almost certainly launch a rocket attack, which would threaten up to a quarter of the Israeli population. The casualties might be even worse if Hezbollah is able to target toxic gas storage in Haifa or nuclear reactors in Dimona and Nahal Sorek. Already Israel has been taking steps to shut down these facilities, in the event of an attack.

This seems to be a departure from Nasrallah’s statement in 2006, shortly after the 34 day war between Hezbollah and Israel, when he told Lebanon’s NTV that had he would not have ordered the capture of two Israeli soldiers, had he known that this would lead to such devastation. However, six years on, the situation between Iran and Israel has escalated, and for Hezbollah this has become a battle for existence. In an earlier speech, February 7^th, Nasrallah admitted that the organisation has been completely dependent on Iran for “moral, political and financial support” since 1982.

Hezbollah has found itself in the unenviable position of choosing between its Iranian financial backer and its Arab popular support base. Ironically, Hezbollah’s only hope may be an Israelis attack on Iran, thus gaining it some support, once more, as the champion of resistance against the Zionist aggressor. But should the pressure on Iran be laid on by the Gulf states, Hezbollah will be left with no alternative but to cut its ties with Iran or, face complete irrelevance within the Arab world.

On the surface, the criteria that Obama outlined in his Libya speech are present in Syria: impending and ongoing massacres; a multilateral coalition led by America’s traditional allies; and an opportunity to side with the people in a crucial state in the Arab spring. For this reason, many liberal writers have called on the U.S. to intervene. Paul Berman has signed onto a conservative-led letter to the president asking him to intervene in Syria. The New Republic has an entire symposium with intellectuals (mostly) asking Obama to side militarily with the Syrian resistance. “Lead again from behind!” Leon Wieseltier exhorts. Especially powerful is a heartfelt plea for American help from a Syrian activist in Washington:

Pressure is building in Congress. Republican Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who both serve on the Armed Services Committee, have argued for arming the Syrian rebels. Obama’s former State Department policy planning head Anne-Marie Slaughter was among the first to call for intervention. In late January, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said it’s only “a question of time” before President Bashar al Assad falls. In December, the State Department pointman said Syria’s leader was a “dead man walking.” More recently, White House press secretary said on Tuesday that “additional measures” such as rebel-arming may need to be taken if the international community keeps dithering.

There are two significant reasons the administration has not pushed for military intervention, however. First, the international consensus that existed on Libya is not present in Syria. Russia and China vetoed a Western- and Arab-sponsored U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian government. Imagining that they would agree to a military intervention is simply fanciful.

What hasn’t been much discussed is why China and Russia vetoed the resolution. And here we circle back to Libya. The resolution authorizing military action in Libya was limited to protecting civilians in Benghazi and other areas. NATO and its allies quickly went beyond the scope of this mandate, using airpower to assist the rebels in defeating Col. Gadhafi and his forces. Such actions may have been morally justified, but they didn’t go unnoticed by the Chinese and Russians, who are extremely sensitive to infringements on state sovereignty (lest they be targeted one day). Tellingly, foes of the proposed Syria resolution explained their decision in terms of national sovereignty. Russia’s foreign minister said that “the Security Council by definition does not engage in domestic affairs of member states.” Russia’s U.N. envoy faulted the resolution for aiming at “regime change,” even though the wording of the text notably did not call for it and the Arab states explicitly rejected Western military intervention.

The second reason Libya isn’t acting as a template for Syria is one of logistics. As Middle East expert Marc Lynch has explained, “Military intervention in Syria has little prospect of success, a high risk of disastrous failure, and a near-certainty of escalation which should make the experience of Iraq weigh extremely heavily on anyone contemplating such an intervention.” The Syrian opposition, impressive and courageous as they have been, is divided, weak and controls no territory. Air power of the sort the West can provide would not be effective in preventing civilian deaths, and the fighting is taking place in densely populated cities. For these reasons and more, a Libya-style no-fly zone simply won’t fly.

Eventually, the Syrian government’s efforts to suppress the rebellion may be so bloody that the Obama administration feels compelled to intervene. But so far, the conditions that were present in Libya are not present in Syria. It may be a double standard, and one that liberal hawks are not comfortable with, but it is one with good reason.