Terrorism

Indonesia at the crossroads

The terror attack in the world's most populous Muslim nation could stir up rage against Islamic extremists, says an expert. But if the U.S. invades Iraq, all bets are off.

Last weekend’s deadly terrorist attack on the island of Bali thrust Indonesia to the forefront of the war on terrorism. Officials suspect al-Qaida played a role in the car bombing that leveled a popular tourist nightclub and killed nearly 200. It was the deadliest terrorist attack since Sept. 11, 2001.

The most populous Muslim nation in the world, Indonesia for decades has been known for its moderate population, often standing in stark contrast to Muslim countries in the Middle East. But with the ouster of longtime dictator Suharto and a succession of weak elected presidents, radical conservative Muslims led by Abu Bakar Baasyir have been crusading in recent years to establish Islamic law in Indonesia.

Repressed under Suharto’s rule, the Islamists have used Indonesia’s economic misery — and some al-Qaida-inspired terrorism — to galvanize public support. They have had scant success: Though 88 percent of Indonesians are Muslim, 1999 election returns showed radical Muslims enjoyed very little support. Still, before last weekend’s terrorist attack, Indonesia’s rulers had been reluctant to criticize the radicals for fear of stirring up resentment among the masses.

In an interview Monday, Robert Hefner, a Boston University professor, Indonesia expert and author of “Civil Islam,” dissected the Bali terrorist attack — its effect on the struggle for Indonesia, and the larger impact on the war on terrorism.

Was it an opening blast in a bloody fight for an Islamic state in Indonesia, and yet another front for al-Qaida? Or was it a miscalculation that will shock Indonesian moderates, including public officials, into action and mark the end of the Islamists’ crusade?

Hefner argues that moderate Muslims would never allow Indonesia to become an Islamic state, and that Abu Bakar Baasyir may soon be under house arrest. But he cites one complicating factor that could give Indonesian radicals political cover in coming months: likely U.S. plans to invade Iraq and the backlash it would create among Muslims in the Southeast Asian country.

What’s the significance of the weekend’s events in Bali, other than the obvious massive loss of life? How important is this as a marker in what’s unfolding in Indonesia?

It’s significant as an index of a very bitter struggle between the forces of political moderation in the Muslim community, which is very large, vs. forces of a conservative, hard-line Islamism, which has skillfully used the political and economic crisis that’s shaken Indonesia since 1998 to press its case to its advantage. This event in Bali is I think going to crystallize this intramural contest in Indonesia and force many fence-sitters in the Muslim community to decide which side they’re on. Not the side as far as U.S. international policy goes. But the more critical question in Indonesia itself is the struggle between the moderate majority and the much smaller but very effectively organized radical Islamist wing.

Wouldn’t the Bali attack create a backlash against what the radicals are trying to accomplish?

It all depends on who is revealed to be behind it. Many people — and myself as well — suspect it is al-Qaida linked to some domestic group.

Who are the likely domestic contenders?

The most likely contender by far would be some faction of the Jamaah Islamiyyah. But Jamaah Islamiyyah itself, just like al-Qaida, must be thought of as more of a coalition, and a kind of fractious coalition at that. It could well be a faction in the Jamaah Islamiyyah that has taken responsibility for this action on their own. Or it could be a like-minded group, in agreement with its broad goals, but a group decided to take initiative on its own without compromising the position of the Jamaah Islamiyyah in general.

Does Jamaah Islamiyyah want to be a viable political player in Indonesia — meaning it would want a certain amount of deniability — or are they a radical group and they don’t care if they’re tied publicly to a terrorist attack?

Certainly there are figures within the Jamaah Islamiyyah who are sufficiently extremist that they really are intent on destabilizing the country. And that includes doing great damage to the Indonesian economy on the assumption that that will eventually accelerate the pace of radical, indeed revolutionary, change. There are others who are certainly radical, but their radicalism lies in their dedication to this utopian ideal of realizing Islamic law on earth. Some of them would have misgivings about the kinds of things we’ve seen over the last few days.

It’s important to emphasize there are aboveground groups, one of which goes by the name MMI, the Council of Islamic Fighters. And some of its leaders do aspire to political office and want to form a political party. Abu Bakar Baasyir is the head of the MMI and the accused head, and I think that accusation is right, of the Jamaah Islamiyyah. A very interesting and complex man. Somebody who has a good deal of charisma and very savvy politically.

The U.S. had wanted him arrested months ago, correct?

Yes, but it’s not just the U.S., and I think that’s very important from an Asian perspective. Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines wanted him arrested too.

Was he ever close to being arrested? Was there a crystallizing event where everyone said, ‘My God, you have to arrest him for doing X and Y’? Or was it a general feeling that he was mounting something dangerous?

He has not been close to being arrested. But when you look back to December 2001, you’ll see the Indonesian minister of defense at that time had already made a number of statements that there were international terrorists in Indonesia, and that they had ties to domestic groups, and that it was time for Indonesia to take action against these domestic terrorists. What was interesting is that he failed miserably because he in effect was tarred and feathered as a stooge for the United States. And out of that incident Abu Bakar Baasyir began to rise in prominence by skillfully playing the nationalist card by arguing that the minster of defense was compromising the national integrity of Indonesia.

What was the lesson there?

There have been many people in the government who wanted to take action against terrorism in Indonesia, but have been unable to because of the weak nature of President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s government, and the vulnerability, in particular, to the accusation that it’s selling Indonesia for the interest of the United States.

Establishing Islamic law seems to be, at least symbolically, a centerpiece of the revolution, and Indonesia wrestled with that in the 1950s, right?

The debate over the role of Islamic law in Indonesia politics actually goes back to the very founding of the republic of Indonesia and the circumstance of the independence war [from the Dutch] between 1945 and 1949, which was a very bitter and costly war. It left a great legacy and sense of nationalist pride. It was an independence struggle that was divided from the start over the question of what the foundation of the nation should be. Should it be a more or less secular, nationalist republic or one in which Islam was given a central place? Ultimately it was the former, a more or less secular form of government agreed upon largely because the many Muslims were themselves deeply committed to the idea of nationhood and independence and didn’t want to compromise that.

Obviously the violence in the Bali attack was off the scale. Was everything about it different?

Yes — there had been no attacks on Westerners before it. And that’s why I think Indonesians are very shocked by this.

Who do you think was behind the bombing?

It’s either one of three groups. The first group would be Jamaah Islamiyyah. The second group, and this would be the one I give the edge, would be a like-minded group that in effect operates according to the same principle and decided it would take the initiative so as to not compromise Abu Bakar Baasyir.

To give him deniability?

Right, deniability. And then the third possibility, and this cannot be ruled out, is that this was one of those free-floating terror groups with links to al-Qaida that’s been operating across Southeast Asia. It’s not unthinkable to suggest it’s agents from outside Indonesia entirely.

Do you think anyone will claim responsibility?

No.

Why not?

My sense is that they may have gotten more than they intended. That their goal was not quite that degree of carnage. I could be wrong. And if it’s the third group, if it is a free-floating group much more directly tied to al-Qaida, then carnage was their interest and they got it.

But if it was a domestic group?

This is a prediction, but I think they’re going to see over the next few days that if they hoped to influence domestic opinion in Indonesia into a firmer anti-American stance, it was a significant mistake.

What will be the effect for Abu Bakar Baasyir?

I think he might be arrested. But he also might be subjected to a kind of political quarantine. For the Indonesian government to move effectively will depend on great international cooperation and the effect of an Iraqi invasion on the whole Muslim world. If the United States invades Iraq there will be great pressure in the Muslim world for demonstrations of solidarity. Not for physical attacks on Americans. But in effect through acts of noncooperation in the campaign on terror.

So there will be pressure on the Indonesia government to let Abu Bakar Baasyir go?

Yes.

You mentioned before Muslim fence-sitters in Indonesia. How, in theory, if you’re a conservative fence-sitter, how would the Bali attack spur you to a more conservative camp?

It won’t. It will spur you because, if I’m right and the wave of the reaction we’re seeing right now is already moving very decisively as a repugnant act of violence and an attack on Indonesia, then the fence-sitters will bolt and denounce this and in effect, at the very least, be a little less virulent in their opposition to a crackdown on terrorism.

What will happen to that internal Islamic debate you were talking about?

Unfortunately, it’s not going to be decisively resolved one way or another because politics in Indonesia is so complex and because everything is going to be complicated if and when the United States invades Iraq. If it were just al-Qaida and the U.S. war against terrorism, the bombing in Bali would have benefited the anti-al-Qaida and anti-radical camp in the Muslim community enormously, as it would have benefited those who want closer relations with the United States. But the United States administration’s continuing commitment to link the al-Qaida war with the invasion of Iraq is not selling anywhere in the Muslim world, including Indonesia. And I don’t say that with any opinion about invasion. I think if we didn’t have Iraq to consider, this would be a turning point in the Indonesian Muslim community.

Was the terrorist attack an attempt to torpedo Indonesia’s economy and create an even larger power vacuum?

That’s the biggest unknown. I think politically, from the hard-liners’ perspectives, yes, this bombing was a failure in both the short and medium term. However, the long-term situation in Indonesia is the economy still has not recovered from the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis. And this attack is gong to deal an enormous blow. It’s going to swell the ranks of the unemployed and the embittered.

How would radicals try to capitalize on that?

They recognize the mosque is one of the few havens of sociability, and places where people can go, especially young men, when you’re poor in the city. That’s part of their hope. But the other part of the hope is they feel ideologically they can use the economic decline as proof that the world order is dominated by the U.S., and globalization is a fraud and really just Americanization and American dominance.

Could the bombing cause economic collapse and eventually usher radicals into power?

I think that’s the dream of the radical right. But even if the economy collapses, I don’t think Indonesia is gong to become a radical Islamic state. I think the chances of that are almost nil. However, it could become an almost ungovernable state, and that is a great danger.

Why are the chances nil?

Because if a radical Islamic government were shoved down the population’s throat, it would be resisted with such enormous fury the government would collapse overnight. The elections of 1999 showed there was very little support for radical Islamists and that the majority of Muslims wanted a nationalist government.

What about the idea that the Bali bombing could be the beginning of the end of a radical movement in Indonesia simply because they have overplayed their hand, the government will clamp down, the U.S. will get involved with intelligence, and moderates in Indonesia will have nothing to do with them?

I don’t think it takes much to maintain radical movement of this sort. It takes a little bit of finance and a few people who are willing to give their lives.

But before last weekend, my sense was there was a certain willingness in Indonesia to look the other way at terrorist groups. If that was erased overnight, it would be much harder for these radical groups to continue with some of their rhetoric, wouldn’t it?

It would, but we’re dealing with a USSR-scale country [in size] but with an even weaker state, so it’s very easy for a few troublemakers to move around. But in terms of moral authority for these groups to sell their arguments to a small fringe of the Muslim community, [the bombing] has been a serious setback.

Eric Boehlert, a former senior writer for Salon, is the author of "Lapdogs: How the Press Rolled Over for Bush."

Police arrest artist setting up ‘I Love NY’ work

The installation included a plastic bag with a battery inside of it, hanging from a tree

(Credit: http://tmiyakawadesign.com/)

NEW YORK (AP) — An artist who was setting up an “I Love New York”-themed public art display in Brooklyn was arrested after the wired contraption was mistaken for an explosive device.

Takeshi Miyakawa, a visual artist and furniture designer, was arrested Saturday after placing the installation in two separate areas of the same New York City neighborhood. His lawyer and employer both called the arrest a misunderstanding.

The first apparatus was found Friday morning after a caller reported a suspicious package to police. It consisted of a plastic bag that contained a battery and was suspended from a metal rod attached to a tree. The bag, which had the classic “I Love New York” logo printed on it, was connected by a wire to a plastic box that contained more wires.

The area was evacuated for two hours until a bomb squad determined that the device was not dangerous.

At about 2 a.m. Saturday, a police officer discovered Miyakawa on a ladder not far from where the first contraption was found. Police said he was tying a similar “I Love New York” bag to a public lamp post.

Miyakawa was charged with two counts of first-degree reckless endangerment, two counts of placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the first degree, two counts of placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the second degree, two counts of second-degree reckless endangerment and two counts of second-degree criminal nuisance.

A judge ordered him held pending a psychiatric evaluation. His lawyer, Deborah J. Blum, said Monday that she is filing for emergency relief to have Miyakawa released. A court date was set for June 21 to review the results of the evaluation.

“He’s still being held,” Blum said Monday. “I believe that it was a gross misunderstanding and other than that I don’t have any other comment.”

Miyakawa, who was born in Tokyo and is about 50 years old, has worked for a New York-based architect Rafael Vinoly for the last 20 years and also has an independent design practice.

Vinoly’s firm released a statement Monday praising Miyakawa for his “extraordinary brand of professionalism” and said he has been a mentor to generations of young architects.

“Takeshi is a fabulous human being and a person of extraordinary talent,” Vinoly said. “We hope this misunderstanding is cleared up as quickly as possible.”

New York Civil Liberties Union Executive Director Donna Lieberman said in a statement that the charges sounded “like a wild overreaction.”

“It’s hard to understand why a light-up bag in a tree would be treated as an attempted terrorist act unless there’s more to the story than has been reported in the press thus far,” she said.

In 2007, an artist touched off a terror scare in Boston by placing electronic devices around the city as part of a marketing stunt for Cartoon Network. The city closed bridges, roads and public transit before authorities realized the signs were not bombs.

On an average day, the NYPD receives nearly 100 reports of a suspicious package. Last year, there were more than 4,000 such reports. The number generally rises following any word of terror threats in New York and around the world.

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Behind the underwear bomb

The latest airplane terror plot wouldn't have been foiled without airport security -- but not the kind we all know

Travelers line up at a TSA checkpoint at Los Angeles International Airport. (Credit: Reuters/Danny Moloshok)
Another deadly plot taken down in the planning stages. This time, thanks to the work of a CIA double agent, officials were able to infiltrate a Yemen-based al-Qaida plot to destroy a U.S.-bound jetliner using a nearly undetectable underwear bomb.The moral of the story: Airport security works!Am I being facetious?  Not necessarily.  It depends on your definition of airport security.

In my mind, the key to keeping airplanes safe is, and always has been, stopping acts of sabotage while they are still in the planning stages. Here in the age of the TSA checkpoint, with its toothpaste confiscations and obsession with pointy objects, we tend not to think this way, preoccupied instead with a kind of airport Kabuki — the tedious, fanatical screening of passengers and their carry-ons. Real airport security takes place offstage, as it were. It is the job of the folks at the CIA and the FBI, working together with foreign authorities. And while TSA has an important role here too, we can do without the spectacle of airport guards rifling through innocent people’s bags in a pathological hunt for what are effectively harmless items.

The concourse checkpoint needs to be there.  Just the same, chances are good that once an adversary has made it to the airport, he or she has engineered a way to outwit the system.  And spend as we might, there will always be a way to outwit the system.  ”Even if our technology is good enough to spot it,” said California Rep. Adam Schiff, commenting on the news of the latest underwear plot, “technology is still in human hands and we are inherently fallible.”

That’s one of the smartest things I’ve heard a politician utter in some time.

Getting a handle on this takes us all the way back to Sept. 11, 2001, the day that everything, and yet really nothing, changed.  I’ve said this before, but it bears repeating: Conventional wisdom holds that the 19 hijackers exploited a weakness in airport security by smuggling box cutters onto four Boeing jetliners. But conventional wisdom is wrong. What the men actually exploited was a weakness in our mind-set — a set of presumptions based on the decades-long track record of hijackings and how they were expected to unfold. (In prior years, a hijacking meant a diversion, perhaps to Havana or Beirut, with hostage negotiations and standoffs; crews were accordingly trained in the concept of “passive resistance.”) The presence of box cutters on 9/11 was merely incidental. The men could have used almost anything — a deadly sharp can be fashioned from a broken first-class dinner plate or a ballpoint pen — particularly when coupled with the bluff of having a bomb. The success of their plan relied not on hardware but on the element of surprise. It wasn’t a failure of airport security that allowed those men to hatch their takeover scheme. It was a failure of national security — a breakdown of communication and oversight at the FBI and CIA level.

To put it succinctly: The success of the 9/11 attacks had almost nothing to do with airport security at all — a great and painful irony, of course, to any passenger forced to endure the checkpoint rigmarole in 2012.

Not that frontline guards don’t play a deterrent role.  And, in the opinions of some, the plot uncovered in Yemen underscores the value of full-body scanners — those controversial walk-through machines that allow guards to look beneath a passenger’s clothing. It’s a compelling argument, but the way in which these scanners have — and have not — been deployed is apt to make some of us cynical. For instance, the vast majority of body scanners are found at U.S. domestic airports. Overseas, where a bomb is far likelier to originate, they are rare. Is this really about safety, we wonder, or is it about billions of dollars going into the coffers of the companies contracted to build these machines?

And although the scanners are effective, where does the arms race end?  Not long ago, the idea that passengers would be marched through body scanners and photographed naked before being allowed to board an airplane, would have seemed outrageous. Yet here we are. What might be next?  The stubborn truth is, we can turn airports into fortresses if we want (in some respects we’re well along that path), yet we’ll never be entirely safe. Airport screening alone, no matter how thorough, how expensive, and how technologically advanced, will never defeat a relentless enough, resourceful enough adversary intent on downing a plane.

That isn’t capitulation, it’s reality.  And acknowledging this reality would go a long way toward warding off panic and overreaction when the next successful attack occurs.

Regrettably, too, we often forget that commercial air travel has long been a target of terrorist extremists.  The 1970s and 1980s in particular were, as I like to describe them, a Golden Age of Air Crimes, comparatively rife with bombings, hijackings and other deadly assaults against airplanes and airports. Over one five-year span between 1985 and 1989 we can count at least six high-profile terrorist attacks, including the horrific bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772; the bombing of an Air India 747 over the North Atlantic that killed 329 people; and the incredible saga of TWA Flight 847.  And let’s not forget what might have been, such as the so-called “Project Bojinka,” the 1994 scheme masterminded by Ramzi Yousef (nephew of Kalid Sheikh Mohammad), in which impossible-to-detect (at the time) liquid explosives were to be used to simultaneously destroy a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific Ocean. Fortunately the plot unraveled and Yousef was arrested.

While we can argue, quite persuasively, that many of the current-day security measures have done little if anything to make us safer, we’ve nevertheless introduced measures that have been useful and effective, from explosives screening of checked luggage to the sorts of trans-border partnerships that broke up the most recent plot from Yemen. Whether in spite of, or because of, the attention we’ve lavished on All Things Terrorism, the past decade has seen fewer attacks against commercial air travel than any since the 1950s.What we need to remember, though, is that our success has had more to do with the security measures we don’t see than those taking place in plain view. And if our luck is to hold, we need to better rationalize and streamline our entire approach to airport security. For instance, if we’re going to have those body scanners, let’s put them where they’re needed. If this requires negotiating with foreign authorities whose airports are beyond TSA’s jurisdiction, so be it. Meanwhile, here at home, TSA’s one-size-fits-all approach, in which every single person who flies is seen as a potential threat, is simply unsustainable in a country where close to 2 million people fly daily. Things like taking snow globes from children, haggling over tiny container sizes, or confiscating a dessert fork from a uniformed, on-duty airline pilot (it happened to me) serve no useful purpose whatsoever. On the contrary, they divert valuable time and resources away from the things that could make us safer.  Let’s scale back that concourse Kabuki and retrain guards in the finer points of a more sensible, risk-based assessment of passengers and their belongings.

And lastly, if only as an aside, let’s behold for a moment the term “underwear bomb.”  That was the operative phrase in literally hundreds of articles and broadcasts over the past several days, and nowhere did it raise a snicker.  What does it say about our country, I wonder, that such a preposterous expression is instantly understood and effectively taken for granted?

Strange times indeed.

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Hiding 9/11′s last secrets

The military tribunal for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed means the American people will never know what drove him to terror

(Credit: Reuters//Brennan Linsley)

After a Navy SEAL team killed Osama bin Laden at his Pakistan hideout a year ago this week, it flew his body to the Arabian Sea, weighted it down, and slid it silently off an aircraft carrier into the watery depths.

For many Americans, the secret raid provided a measure of revenge and catharsis for the strikes of Sept. 11, 2001. But it didn’t provide the kind of justice and official reckoning that the country needs to gain real closure. Now the government has a chance to achieve that through a full, fair and open trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four co-defendants, so the world can finally see the evidence against him as the true architect of the attacks on New York and Washington. The trial kickoff — an arraignment for the men — is scheduled for this Saturday at the U.S.-run detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

This should be our Nuremburg, the defining trial of the 9/11 era and a fitting coda to it.

Unfortunately, the U.S. government appears to be on the verge of squandering this opportunity, and with it, the best, and perhaps only, chance for the public to understand not only how the attacks came to be, but why Mohammed waged a relentless war against America and how we might stop the next would-be terrorist mastermind.

The problems lie within the reformed military-tribunal system that the Obama administration put in place after losing its fight for a civilian trial in New York. Political compromises have resulted in a flawed military commissions process that from outward appearances is not only rigged against the defense, but hyper-choreographed, censored and hermetically sealed.

“The process is designed to achieve a conviction, and to do it with as little revelation as humanly possible, but with the veneer of due process and justice,’’ said one participant who said restrictive gag orders prohibited him from talking publicly. “You’re talking about the most heinous crime ever, and we’re going to afford them less due process, less discovery, less of everything than we would the guy who shoplifted a pack of gum from CVS.’’

Obama administration officials say their reformed military commissions system is a vast improvement over the Bush administration’s version, which Obama moved to shut down on his first day in office in 2009.

Defense lawyers disagree, and insist they have been hamstrung in their efforts to mount the kind of aggressive defense needed to do their jobs including full and unfettered access to evidence, witnesses and even the accused themselves.

Four of the five legal teams had so few of their key players in place in recent months that they did not file the “mitigation submissions’’ that the government said it needed to decide which of the five men should face the death penalty and other key issues, such as whether to try them together or individually. They recently filed motions asking that the charges be thrown out because of fatal flaws in the system, which they say make it impossible for them to defend their clients.

“It’s window dressing,’’ Mohammed’s defense lawyer, David Nevin, said of the government’s improvements. “I am not all satisfied that it is a fair process. In fact, it is not a fair process.’’

Many of the defense lawyers have quit out of frustration or for other personal reasons stemming from the many delays in the process. Only a few have been there long enough to even begin to understand their clients’ case, not to mention the convoluted military commission process.

And they say they will be unable to effectively challenge confessions obtained when their clients were coercively interrogated in the CIA’s black site prisons, if they can broach the subject at all. This is important for the four men accused of helping Mohammed with the logistics of the plot. Several claim they have been wrongly accused, tortured into confessing, or both.

It is also important with regard to Mohammed, who confessed to dozens of plots while being waterboarded 183 times, and has said he may plead guilty even before the trial begins. Few U.S. counterterrorism officials believe all of his often boastful confessions, and it is important for the public to hear what, exactly, evidence the government has with regard to what he did and didn’t do, and whom he might have been protecting.

The team of Defense and Justice Department officials overseeing the military commission process, and the presiding judge, should quickly address the defense lawyers’ complaints, or a proceeding that some call “The Trial of the Century’’ will be delayed further by legal wrangling — and forever tainted by accusations of being unfair.

A full, fair and transparent trial, above all, will benefit the public. There is much the public doesn’t know about Mohammed, including the details of how he devised the plot, convinced bin Laden to let him do it and then orchestrated it “from A to Z,’’ to use his own words. It was Mohammed who masterminded dozens of other plots and attacks, some while staying a step ahead of the largest-ever criminal manhunt.

Mohammed, not bin Laden, was the one who traveled the world as a kind of “Johnny Appleseed’’ of terrorism, establishing alliances and creating a network of cells and lieutenants that in some cases remains today. And it was Mohammed who personally recruited young jihadist prospects much like a baseball scout, many of them Westerners, tapping into their grievances to turn them to his cause.

The U.S. government has kept the details of what Mohammed did — and how and why he did it — hidden in its most classified files since his capture in Pakistan nine years ago. The government should set the record straight on that, because there is an important lesson to be learned from the largely untold tale of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: It isn’t some monolithic group like al-Qaida that poses a continuing threat, it’s the one intelligent and energetic person who can emerge from nowhere and orchestrate a 9/11 while the world focuses elsewhere.

To that end, the government should declassify as much evidence as possible, and explain how it obtained it. It should call numerous witnesses to testify, especially since the one who has been publicly identified, Majid Khan, claims he was tortured while in CIA custody overseas.

Instead of limiting access to a few closed-circuit TVs, it should consider televising the proceedings. It should ensure that censorship is minimized, and used only to protect intelligence sources and methods, not to save the government from embarrassment. And it should let Mohammed and the others testify at length on their behalf if they so desire.

By doing so, the Obama administration will be able to say it did its best to put on the kind of civilian trial it has wanted all along, and one with a similar outcome to that of the al Qaida members charged with blowing up two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.

Those of us who witnessed that trial in Manhattan in 2001 saw the defendants squirm in their chairs as prosecutors introduced mountains of evidence against them. We saw eyewitnesses point the finger at the accused, and surviving victims glare at them from the pews.

We heard from the terrorists themselves, and learned a lot about why they did it, about how terrorist networks operate and about what might be done to stop people like them. And when the jury convicted them, there was no question that justice was done.

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Josh Meyer is the author, with Terry McDermott, of the new book, "The Hunt for KSM: Inside the Pursuit and Takedown of the Real 9/11 Mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.’’

FBI heroically locks up ridiculous anarchists on May Day

Feds stop inept radicals from carrying out a plot feds helped them conceive and carry out

U.S. Attorney Steven Dettelbach, left, and FBI special agent in charge Stephen Anthony walk past a map showing the location of a bridge on Ohio Rt. 82. Five men, pictured on the wall behind the map, have been arrested for conspiring to blow up the bridge. (Credit: AP/Mark Duncan)

Happy May Day, fellow travelers! If you’re not currently disrupting capitalism and/or having your wrists zip-tied for exercising your right to freely assemble, you probably read about the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s latest, not-at-all suspiciously timed terror sting. The Bureau, in an inspired bit of early-20th century nostalgia, has railroaded a bunch of dangerous anarchists. (Or “dangerous” “anarchists.”) America will not waver in the face of the Galleanist threat!

Five young men from Cleveland are now in jail, accused of plotting to “blow up a bridge in the Cleveland area,” according to the FBI’s triumphant press release/criminal complaint. As is always the case with FBI terror stings, the “sting” part involved the bureau’s informant/agent provocateur mostly inventing the plot the accused have now been arrested for. In this case, the five planned to detonate smoke bombs as a distraction as they “topple[d] financial institution signs atop high rise buildings in downtown Cleveland.” But the informant (as usual, a sketchy unnamed character with a checkered past) strongly pushed the group to seriously consider different, more extreme plots. At the end, some or all of them were going to plant C-4 on the Route 82 Brecksville-Northfield High Level Bridge over the Cuyahoga Valley National Park.

So what was initially a political action aimed at financial institutions somehow morphed into a supposed attempt to destroy or damage a piece of publicly owned infrastructure in a national park. Anarchists sure do hate bridges, and parks, I guess. (No parliament of men has the authority to designate which spaces are “national parks”! The whole world is the worker’s national park!)

The FBI’s affadavit suggests that there was never actually a serious “plot.” The gang tossed around the idea of “taking out” a bridge in order to stop people from getting to work, but they also thought maybe they could use their (pretend) C4 on a Klan rally, or a neo-Nazi organization, or an oil well, or the Federal Reserve Bank. They eventually decided to maybe sink a ship. All of their many plans were super serious and well-thought out. (“To prevent capture, he suggested getting tacks that they could throw out of the back of a car if they get in a chase.”) Eventually they settled on the bridge thing, sort of, and bought fake IEDs from the guy they already suspected was a cop.

In other words, these are a bunch of dumbasses even by the standards of amateur “black bloc” dumbasses. Do you know how I know these morons weren’t serious? They planned to download the Anarchist Cookbook and follow its notoriously awful instructions. Every experienced anarchist knows that the Feds have a mole in your group house, but these guys were mainly concerned with having someone’s “hacker friend” explain to them how bitcoins work. Without the FBI’s intervention the most damage these idiots would’ve ever caused is a broken Starbucks window. So thank god they’re off the streets, and congrats to the FBI for getting this tale of dangerous, bomb-planting anarchists onto the news broadcasts on the day of Occupy’s big May Day action.

(At least the Feds are branching out from only targeting Muslims in these ridiculous “stings.” Some day all Americans, regardless of creed or color, will have their circle of friends secretly infiltrated by a paid informant.)

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Alex Pareene

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

“Oklahoma City”: The Bubba job

Two seasoned journalists explore the disturbing, unanswered questions about the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995

Debris hangs from the front of the federal building after a 1200 pound car bomb blew off the north side of the building in downtown Oklahoma City April 19 (Credit: © Jeff Mitchell Us / Reuters)

In the hours after the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, cable news breathlessly reported that authorities were searching for three Middle Eastern men supposedly seen fleeing the scene. True, this was just two years after the bombing of the World Trade Center by a Islamist cell led by Ramzi Yousef, but even so, the notion that foreign terrorists would target an ordinary office building in the middle of flyover country was far-fetched. Yet not as far-fetched, it seems, as the idea that Americans would do it, and end up killing 168 of their fellow citizens, 19 of them little children.

An FBI agent from Dallas, Danny Coulson, knew better. As Andrew Gumbel and Roger Charles relate in their impressive new book, “Oklahoma City: What the Investigation Missed — and Why It Still Matters,” Coulson jumped in his car and headed to Oklahoma City as soon as he heard about the bombing, fielding a call from a CBS correspondent along the way. She told him “everybody in Washington” said the perpetrators were Middle Eastern, but he said no way. “It’s a Bubba job,” he told her. “It’s Bubbas.”

It was Bubbas. But how many of them? Timothy McVeigh was convicted on 11 counts of murder and conspiracy and was executed for his role in the crime. Terry Nichols, who helped McVeigh construct the truck bomb, is still in federal prison serving a sentence of life without parole. A third conspirator, Mike Fortier, received a reduced sentence (and immunity for his wife, Lori) in exchange for testifying against the other two. Officially, these are all the parties responsible for the bombing, the most devastating act of terrorism committed in this country until 9/11. But many, many people are not satisfied with the official account.

Of course, a lot of these malcontents are cranks, offering paint-by-numbers scenarios in which 1) the attack really was “Middle Eastern” after all and 2) the government rigged the whole thing in order to discredit the right-wing militia movement to which McVeigh and Nichols belonged. Gumbel, an investigative journalist, and Charles, a former Marine Corps lieutenant colonel who consults with national news organizations on military and national intelligence stories, are obliged to distinguish themselves from such fantasists. Nevertheless, they assert, there are good reasons to feel “skeptical that all the perpetrators have been caught,” a sentiment they say is shared by many of their sources both outside the government and within it.

Their argument, unlike other conspiracy theories about Oklahoma City, is not outlandish. Gumbel and Charles (who also worked as an evidence analyst for McVeigh’s defense team) suspect that McVeigh had other accomplices in planning the attack, in assembling the materials for the bomb and in planting it on April 19. This help came from several nodes in a loose network of right-wing extremists — gun nuts, would-be-revolutionaries and separatist Christian sects — who have never been fully investigated or called to account.

Not a fanciful change, but at the same time a bold one, given that the multi-agency federal investigation collected a Brobdingnagian quantity of evidence: 13 million hotel and motel records, 6 million truck rental records, 28,000 interviews — an estimated 1 billion pieces of information. Yet for all this exhaustiveness, certain promising trails in the investigation went largely unexplored: over 1,000 latent fingerprints found in McVeigh’s car and motel room, for example, as well as his links to a gang of bank robbers belonging to the Aryan Republican Army, a rich gun dealer and a creepy fundamentalist compound called Elohim City.

The authors believe that federal agencies, shamed and stinging after bloody clashes with right-wing militants at Waco and Ruby Ridge, preferred not to mess with leads that might end in further confrontations. The prosecution concurred, having tried and failed in an earlier sedition trial against similar militants. They felt they’d learned not to test a jury’s ability to follow complex conspiratorial narratives with too many characters, or that asked it to believe that trash-talking backwoods paranoids could pose a serious threat to the U.S government.

“Oklahoma City” compiles a hefty collection of those unplumbed leads, some of it gleaned from newly released files and a jailhouse interview with Nichols that, they report, went into “great detail.” Given the milieus McVeigh and Nichols frequented, there are enough freak-show touches to keep an FX drama stocked for three seasons: a double-wide trailer full of snakes, a neo-Nazi with a secret life as a cross-dresser, a hot blonde with a swastika tattoo who agreed to act as an informant for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and so on. The authors refrain from milking this material for all its lurid charm, but somehow their deadpan delivery only makes it more grotesque.

They have excellent reasons for not treating this pack of alienated misfits as merely contemptible. As Gumbel and Rogers point out, McVeigh and many of his pals were veterans whose Gulf War battlefield experience left them with both military skills and emotional damage. “It is not difficult to see,” they write, “how new McVeighs could emerge from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the lingering devastation of the 2008 economic meltdown and the anti-establishment rage embodied by everyone from the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street to the violent racists threatening to put a bullet in the brain of America’s first black president.”

The book does suffer a bit from its authors’ submersion in the story. The narrative thread — so necessary for readers whose memories of the attack and investigation have faded — occasionally gets lost as they jump around chronologically to demonstrate the shakiness of some points in the government’s version of the story. Still, it’s shocking to learn that over two dozen eyewitnesses reported having seen McVeigh with at least one other person on the morning of the bombing, contradicting the prosecution’s assertion that he acted alone on that day. Eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable, but that’s a lot of people, and the ones the authors describe in detail had direct, highly memorable encounters with the bomber(s).

Perhaps the most persuasive aspect of “Oklahoma City” is its refusal of paranoia. The typical crackpot conspiracy theory relies on a masterly, Luciferian characterization of the conspirators, who are invariably depicted as puppet masters capable of pulling off elaborate illusions, feints and coverups without a hitch. As Gumbel and Rogers tell it, the bombing investigation fell short of discovering the truth because of sloppiness, failure of will, self-serving intra-office politics and, above all, idiotic and obstructive turf wars among law enforcement agencies. Now, that sounds more like the government that left us vulnerable six years later and that may well let us down again.

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Laura Miller

Laura Miller is a senior writer for Salon. She is the author of "The Magician's Book: A Skeptic's Adventures in Narnia" and has a Web site, magiciansbook.com.

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