Al-Qaida

Breaking al-Qaida

To no one's surprise, captured members of the terror organization are proving close-mouthed. How far should the U.S. go to get them to talk?

The journey of Ramzi Muhammad Abdullah bin al-Shibh began in chaos and fear when a squad of Pakistani rangers stormed his hideout in a fashionable Karachi suburb. Bullets flew, grenades exploded, one al-Qaida gunman even scrawled a paean to Allah in blood on the wall of a fifth-floor apartment. By the time the fighting ended, bin al-Shibh had been taken into custody.

From that moment on, the man believed to be a pivotal figure in the Sept. 11 attacks descended into one of the most secretive and controversial realms of the war on terrorism: the domain of detention and interrogation.

A photo of bin al-Shibh’s arrest last month shows him surrounded by an entourage of stern soldiers, his hands cuffed behind his back, his eyes blindfolded with a swath of white cloth. Dressed in a dark T-shirt, the frail-framed, 30-year-old Yemeni national was quickly ushered to an undisclosed location, where, two weeks later, the State Department said, he began to provide the United States with “valuable information.”

Bin al-Shibh’s trajectory from combatant to captive to informant may seem surprising given his die-hard religious zealotry. But he is not the only member of al-Qaida who has begun to crack. Abu Zubaydah, the highest-ranking operative in captivity, has also shared bits of information about the terrorist organization since his capture this spring. So has Omar al-Faruq, al-Qaida’s Southeast Asia point man, whose confessions three months after his arrest in June ominously portended the recent bombing of a nightclub on the Indonesian island of Bali.

How are such hardened militants made to reveal what they know? The classic interrogation scene in novels and movies features a harsh, hot light, a lone chair in a bare room, an ominous voice demanding again and again Tell us what you know. Resistance brings more severe measures — drugs, brainwashing, torture.

Which, if any, of these techniques or others the United States is using in its quest to pry information from al-Qaida members is impossible to say. The Pentagon, CIA and FBI have been highly guarded about their interrogation procedures. In an interview with Salon, an FBI spokesperson would not even verify which of the three government agencies was involved in questioning the prisoners, or whether a joint interrogation command had been established to coordinate the activities. One thing U.S. officials have said, though, is that extracting information from al-Qaida captives has been tough. In their iron dedication to their cause, which has the status of jihad or holy war, al-Qaida prisoners have proven to be disciplined and highly resilient to questioning. “They know precisely what they are doing,” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said this summer. “They are very well trained in interrogation techniques.”

If the training and dedication of al-Qaida operatives are partly responsible for their silence, so may their interrogators’ shortcomings. According to a new congressional intelligence report, the interrogation effort at Camp X-Ray on Guantánamo Bay in Cuba has been beset by a host of problems, such as inadequate training and a lack of linguistically competent interrogators. Moreover, outside experts note, the camp has failed to follow basic procedures like isolating prisoners.

With the Bali nightclub bombing and other deadly attacks this month being linked to al-Qaida, U.S. intelligence agencies are under even greater pressure to get results. And clearly, it seems, the fastest way may be to take a tougher stand in the interrogation chamber. Though no evidence suggests that the U.S. is directly engaging in torture, scattered reports corroborated by knowledgeable security experts suggest the U.S. has in some cases has helped steer captured combatants to third countries known for their brutal interrogation methods — raising the specter of U.S. complicity in torture.

While such complicity would violate both U.S. and international law, some observers have begun to make a once taboo argument: America needs to get even tougher. To prevent a deadly attack on the scale of those on Sept. 11, they say, American investigators must use the most forceful methods available to them in the interrogation chamber — including torture, if the circumstances dictate it. This view is openly espoused by only a few, but the fact that it is being discussed at all is significant.

Whatever the debate, one thing is certain: Since the last major allied offensive in Afghanistan ending in March, a fight that once took place in street skirmishes and mountain strongholds has shifted into the realm of psychology. Storming mental redoubts has become as critical as blasting through physical ones, if not more so.

One of the classic techniques used by captors to get their prisoner to talk is to subject him to isolation and disorientation. “When they took bin al-Shibh, they brought him to a place blindfolded so he had no idea where in the world he was,” Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA officer who specialized in counter-terrorism, told Salon. “There was nothing recognizable in terms of his surroundings. He couldn’t look out and see palm trees waving and feel the breeze and see the ocean lapping. They’re depriving him of awareness of his surroundings, awareness of what’s going on in the world, any access to news, for example. That was certainly the technique used with Abu Zubaydah, as well.”

This is a decades-old strategy. It was articulated as far back as 1963, in a top-secret CIA manual on counterintelligence interrogation published under the codename KUBARK: “The effect of arrest and detention, and particularly of solitary confinement, is to deprive the subject of many or most of the sights, sounds, tastes, smells, and tactile sensations to which he has grown accustomed.” The manual, recently declassified, goes on to cite the work of John C. Lilly, a psychiatrist who studied the experiences of polar explorers and lone sailors. “The symptoms most commonly produced by isolation,” Lilly found, “are superstition, intense love of any other living thing, perceiving inanimate objects as alive, hallucinations, and delusions.” The manual notes that there is no single rule of design for interrogation rooms but that the decor should generally be sparse and free of distracting items such as telephones or computers.

Although officials familiar with the interrogation process say they do not expect a hardened militant like bin al-Shibh to develop “intense love” for his enemies, the hope is that by divorcing the prisoner from everything he knows, he will eventually become psychologically reliant on the interrogator. Experts say that after numerous days of solitary confinement, a person will experience a nearly irresistible need to communicate with another human being — making isolation a key way to break a prisoner’s lockjaw silence, one of the biggest barriers in an interrogation. If the atmosphere is right, says former CIA officer Art Hulnick, who interrogated North Korean defectors after the Korean war, “the subject suddenly finds that he is comfortable with you; he develops a certain kind of affinity for you, and he becomes dependent on you.”

This can often mean beginning with a friendly gesture to develop the right rapport. But experts stress each case is different. Building dependency is only one aspect of a potentially three-pronged approach to breaking down an individual’s resistance during a hostile interrogation. The psychiatric literature referenced in the 1963 CIA manual argues that most prisoners, while under physical or psychological stress, will respond by experiencing debility, dependency and dread, otherwise known as the “DDD syndrome.” When cultivated to the appropriate level, the manual says, this syndrome can be effective in softening a subject up so that he or she is willing to share information. “If the debility-dependency-dread state is unduly prolonged, however, the arrestee may sink into a defensive apathy from which it is hard to arouse him.”

Debility, dependency and dread can be produced in a variety of ways, many short of torture. “The exploitation of the source’s emotion can be either harsh or gentle in application (hand and body movements, actual physical contact such as a hand on the shoulder for reassurance, or even silence are all useful techniques that the interrogator may have to bring into play),” explains a declassified 1987 Army field manual. “The number of approach techniques is limited only by the interrogator’s imagination and skill. Almost any ruse or deception is useable as long as the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are not violated.”

The Bush administration, in insisting that captured al-Qaida operatives are not “prisoners of war,” has tried to create for itself an escape hatch from the international law governing POW treatment. The Conventions state that a “prisoner of war” is required to tell his captors only his name, rank, military unit and serial number. “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure information from them of any kind, whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”

It’s unlikely that U.S. intelligence officers are following those rules to the letter, but experts say al-Qaida combatants in U.S. custody probably aren’t being tortured either. “No, they’re not sticking bamboo shoots under their toenails, or anything like that,” says Cannistraro, the former CIA officer. “But they are trying to play psychological games with them.” These games can be as well known as the good-cop, bad-cop routine, and as unusual as asking an aggressive but nonsensical line of questioning to disorient the subject, or playing with the prisoner’s sense of time by keeping him in rooms with clocks that give wildly different times. “They’ll say, al-Qaida is finished, your boss is dead — fairly typical stuff,” said Cannistraro. “If you want to call it psychological coercion, that’s about the extent of it.”

Of course, at some point those techniques can cross that hazy threshold where psychological coercion ends and physical coercion begins. Prolonged isolation for the sake of getting someone to talk is, by definition, physical punishment. A CIA training manual used during the early 1980s  but officially repudiated in 1985 — repeatedly advises against physical torture, but it recommends compelling an uncooperative prisoner “to maintain rigid positions such as standing at attention or sitting on a stool for long periods of time,” because “pain which is being inflicted upon him from outside himself may actually intensify his will to resist. On the other hand, pain which he feels he is inflicting upon himself is more likely to sap his resistance.”

A commonly employed approach today appears to be sleep deprivation. Although it violates the letter of the Geneva Conventions, numerous press reports state that it is being used to break al-Qaida prisoners’ will to resist. An unnamed U.S. counter-terrorism official interviewed by Time magazine, for instance, said that Omar al-Faruq, the Southeast Asia al-Qaida operative, was subjected to “three months of psychological interrogation tactics,” which included isolation and sleep deprivation. Al-Faruq remained practically silent the entire time, until he finally started talking in September.

“There are many ways to keep a prisoner awake — you can have him move from room to room, again and again, for example, or use continuous loud music,” said Mike Ritz, a former Army interrogator, who said sleep deprivation was a common technique. Anyone who avoids sleep for two straight days will begin to experience a certain involuntary shift in thinking. MRI images show that the brain, in struggling to remain alert, will desperately transfer functions from one place to another: An area that may generally handle mathematics, for instance, will begin to process verbal abilities. But even these hapless synaptic swaps prove futile. There is a breakdown point no one can avoid. “In laboratory studies, every person who remains awake for more than 44 hours shows some significant impairment,” a recent report conducted for the U.S. military observes. “This includes highly trained and motivated professionals.”

The Pentagon has studied this phenomenon for the sake of better understanding how its own troops can survive high-stress situations. But the lessons are transferable. A soldier on the field and a prisoner in the interrogation room both get tired in the same way. Prolonged lack of sleep causes “a marked reduction in motivation,” according to the scientific report, titled “Sustained Carrier Operations: Sleep Loss, Performance, and Fatigue Countermeasures”: “Army field studies involving total sleep deprivation indicate that commanders often need to resort to persuasion to keep troops performing.”

Before Sept. 11, investigators in Manchester, England, seized an al-Qaida operations manual. The manual’s cover is innocuous: intertwining floral motifs envelop its entire front surface, to which a torn label is affixed. On the label, a handwritten message in Arabic warns: “It is forbidden to remove this from the house.” The first page makes the intent of the book clear: An ink drawing shows a sword violently piercing a globe that prominently features Africa and the Middle East. The title reads, “Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants.”

This 180-page document opens with a telling quote, one demonstrating the mindset that men like bin al-Shibh are likely to bring to questioning. “The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates,” it begins. “But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon, and the machine-gun.” The passage then goes on to observe that Islamic governments have never been established by peaceful means and that the only way to do so is “by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth.”

In clinical language, the manual sets out various methods of assassination, forgery and the cultivating of poisons. Chapter 17 provides a step-by-step tutorial on how to outsmart hostile interrogators. Captured al-Qaida members are told that the first order of business is to evaluate the environment and determine the nature of their interlocutors. The imprisoned fighter is commanded to recognize that there are fundamental differences between hostile interrogations and legal questioning, and knowing the psychological terrain is critical before devising the right strategy.

For most of the recently detained al-Qaida combatants, that terrain is not a matter for much confusion. They have been seized in the mountain battles or street gunfights that have unfolded across Afghanistan and Pakistan during the past year. They do not need to determine whether they are material witnesses or criminal suspects in, say, the police or FBI roundups that have marked previous terrorism investigations. They are prisoners of war, despite Washington’s aversion to the term. Most have been corralled behind Camp X-Ray’s razor-wire-tipped fencing; their interrogations occur in one of several windowless buildings constructed from panels of unvarnished wood, located just outside the compound. In high-profile situations such as Operation Enduring Freedom, al-Qaida militants are warned, “interrogation would be more severe.” But the manual explains that severity is likely to come in phases. “In the beginning, the brother may not be treated harshly, but rather kindly. He may be offered a chair with a cup of tea, or a drink. Then he would be asked to recall information that is useful to the interrogators.” This insight mirrors U.S. interrogation training. As Robert Newman, a former Marine who questioned Iraqi soldiers during the Gulf war, explains, different situations require different approaches, but the importance of building rapport at the outset cannot be underestimated: “Be his friend and show general concern for his well-being.” The declassified CIA guidebook on interrogations also endorses this initial approach: “So simple a matter as greeting an interrogatee by his name at the opening of the session establishes in his mind the comforting awareness that he is considered a person, not a squeezable sponge.”

But the lesson to captured Islamic brethren continues by pointing out that a lack of cooperation can quickly force the interview into a less friendly atmosphere. “If the brother refuses to offer any information and denies that he knows anything, he is then treated harshly,” the manual explains. “He and his family may be cursed; he may be forced into submission by following orders such as: face the wall, don’t talk, don’t raise your voice. All of that is to frighten the brother. The brother should refuse to supply any information and deny his knowledge of the subject in question. Further, the brother should disobey the interrogator’s orders as much as he can by raising his voice, cursing the interrogator back, and refusing to face the wall. The interrogator would resort to beating the brother in order to force him to obey. Thus, that attempt would fail.”

Earning a beating may seem like a strange measure of success. But in the highly sensitive interplay of personalities and egos that make an interrogation, it can demonstrate that the prisoner is seizing control of the situation, said Ritz, who now instructs civilians in interrogation procedures at Team Delta, a private company. Army and intelligence training stress that the interrogator should never relinquish command of the interview; he should at all times prevent the prisoner from exploiting his emotions. “The interrogator should appear to be the one who controls all aspects of the interrogation to include the lighting, heating, and configuration of the interrogation room,” a declassified Army field manual advises. Losing that control means losing the opportunity to obtain vital information. “It’s a strange technique, but it kills a lot of valuable time,” said Ritz. “If an interrogator loses his detachment, it almost certainly means you have to start all over again, usually with another officer.”

Elsewhere, the al-Qaida manual warns that interrogators may plant “suspicion among the brothers” by playing them off each other. It prepares militants to gird against isolation: “Security may leave you for long periods of time without asking you any questions in order to break your will and determination.” It recommends “patience, steadfastness, and silence about any information whatsoever. That is very difficult except for those who take refuge in Allah.” It advises on how to deal with torture: “Pretend that the pain is severe by bending over and crying loudly.” And it even advocates turning the tables on one’s captors, if possible, by gleaning any worthwhile information from the situation: An interrogation can be “a major opportunity for the [Islamic] group as long as the brother is tactful, bright, and observant.” In other words, just because you have been captured, that does not mean the fight is over; that does not mean you should succumb to hopelessness or resignation. Even in prison, resistance has a purpose.

“If Qaida operatives are being trained with manuals like the one obtained in England, that makes them a force to reckon with in the interrogation booth,” says Ritz. Indeed, failures at Camp X-Ray have become so commonplace they have bestowed a certain irony to the compound’s name. Throughout the year, military and intelligence officials, by their own admission, have had difficulty penetrating the minds of Afghan and Arab prisoners held at the 45-square-mile U.S. Caribbean base.

This summer, in a report accompanying the 2003 House Intelligence Authorization Act, members of the Intelligence Committee observed that Camp X-Ray’s “interrogation efforts have been hampered by a lack of appropriate training, a dearth of language-skilled personnel, and a lack of depth and breadth of analytic expertise.” The Senate’s version of this report has yet to be released, but sources familiar with its contents say it will express similar concerns. Some outside analysts note that an additional problem is the overall structure of the compound, which doesn’t keep prisoners segregated. As already noted, this breaks a cardinal rule of interrogation: isolating the subject. Al-Qaida training puts great emphasis on teamwork, a quality deemed “God’s command” by initiates. Practically speaking, this means that combatants permitted contact with each other will most likely coordinate their stories. “They can reinforce each other,” said Cannistraro. “I don’t think that’s worked out for the investigators very well.”

Camp X-Ray officers still do not know whether members of an entire group of prisoners are Taliban or al-Qaida or belong to some other organization, Lt. Col. David Lepan, a Pentagon spokesman, told Salon. The lack of significant progress has caused some former intelligence and military officials to argue that unless intransigent combatants face “credible threats” — an admittedly ambiguous expression — they will never start sharing valuable information. “What do they have to gain by talking now? Nothing,” said Robert Baer, a former CIA field officer who spent most of his 21 years at the agency investigating terrorism. “I mean, these people are smart enough to know that they’re not going to cut a deal by admitting that they’re members of al-Qaida. They know they’ll be prosecuted whether they cooperate or not. It’s better just to keep your mouth shut and say you’re a simple aid worker in Pakistan.”

Success in gaining information from high-level operatives held in isolation has been better than with the detainees at Camp X-Ray, although it is not clear by how much. For instance, Abu Zubaydah is said to have inadvertently provided interrogators with information about a key Sept. 11 planner, a Kuwaiti named Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. But that may have been something of an exception. When Zubaydah fingered Jose Padilla, the “Dirty Bomber,” as one of al-Qaida’s men in America, many terrorism experts suspected that was simply a ploy to distract investigators. “Jose Padilla is a throwaway,” said Cannistraro. “He was not involved in any core al-Qaida operations or projects they felt a great deal of sensitivity about.”

Other top al-Qaida captives also appear to be giving modified versions of what they know — or, in some cases, what experts believe they should know. (Given the terrorist organization’s loose structure, it is difficult to judge to what extent this is out of cunning or ignorance.) Omar al-Faruq, the top al-Qaida man in Southeast Asia, had warned investigators that attacks like the Bali bombing were in the making; meanwhile bin al-Shibh, during his interrogations, has given greater details about the Sept. 11 attacks, including the possibility that a fifth hijacking was planned for that day, according to the New York Times. But experts say those, too, are small victories. Although al-Faruq spoke of the possibility of an attack in Indonesia, he clearly did not give information specific enough to prevent the bombing, which killed nearly 200 people. Likewise, bin al-Shibh has provided “only fragmentary information” about last September’s attacks and current al-Qaida activities, the Times said. From interrogations with John Walker Lindh, investigators already had suspected that al-Qaida had explored the possibility of hijacking a fifth plane.

“That’s been the general approach senior operatives appear to be taking,” said Cannistraro. “Eventually you seem cooperative, but you give your interrogators misleading information, you give them crumbs, basically throwaway information. You don’t give away the inner secrets.”

Not long after the Sept. 11 attacks, a man by the name of Mohammed Haydar Zammar boarded a plane in Germany for Morocco, where he was allegedly planning to divorce his wife. He was 41 years old, born in Syria, but a German citizen. He had woolly black hair and a prominent beard. In Germany, Zammar is said to have given fiery speeches advocating a holy war between Islam and the Western world. By last October, he had already trained in Osama bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan and was thought to be a key figure in the Hamburg al-Qaida cell, whose members included Sept. 11 hijackers Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah. His story demonstrates what may be the most complicated and ethically fraught aspects of interrogations.

Zammar arrived in Morocco the day he left Germany. But shortly thereafter, he vanished. His family filed a missing-persons report. German intelligence officials said they could not locate him, and when they pressed the Moroccan government about his disappearance, they were told Zammar had gone on to Spain. But that lead appeared to be untrue. Spanish officials said they had no records of Zammar entering the country, and for months, he was thought missing. Those who knew his whereabouts kept the information under a heavy cloak of secrecy, until news of his capture quietly emerged this summer. An unnamed American official, speaking to the Washington Post, simply said: “Zammar is not walking the streets.” Days later, German officials learned that Zammar had been arrested in Morocco and spirited to Syria, where long-standing charges were pending against him for his involvement in terrorist activities.

The extent of American participation in Zammar’s capture and transport to Syria is unclear. Unlike other arrests of high-profile al-Qaida members, this had no discernible trace of U.S. involvement. According to various press reports, for instance, Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni, an al-Qaida operative with possible connections to Richard C. Reid (the “Shoe Bomber”), was arrested in Indonesia in January and delivered from Jakarta to Egypt by a Gulfstream jet that was registered in the United States. Similarly, Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed, a Yemeni student with links to the attack on the USS Cole, was turned over from Pakistani intelligence agents to U.S. officials in Karachi last October, and like Madni, was flown from Pakistan to Jordan on a U.S.-registered airplane. Despite the registrations, it is unclear who owns the plane in either circumstance.

News reports of Zammar’s arrest do not include those telling details. But his case, like the others’, appears to reflect a process ominously known as “rendition,” a term used by U.S. officials to describe the transportation of terrorist suspects to third countries for interrogation. Terrorism experts say there are important benefits to the procedure. A prisoner may be more inclined to talk to people of his own religion or ethnicity, rather than to nonbelievers or agents with a limited knowledge of his background. But the maneuver can also have more sinister implications. Sending a suspect to a third country is a way to get around U.S. laws that bar the use of physical coercion during questioning, and it gives the United States deniability.

Zammar’s homeland, Syria, engages in “the use of torture in detention,” according to the most recent State Department report on human rights in the country. “Former prisoners and detainees report that torture methods include administering electrical shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing objects into the rectum; beating, sometimes while the victim is suspended from the ceiling; hyperextending the spine; and using a chair that bends backwards to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the victim’s spine,” it says. “Although torture occurs in prisons, torture is most likely to occur while detainees are being held at one of the many detention centers run by the various security services throughout the country, and particularly while the authorities are attempting to extract a confession or information regarding an alleged crime or alleged accomplices.”

This is precisely Zammar’s predicament. “There is no cultural gap when you turn over a Syrian to the Syrian government,” said Cannistraro. “But Syrians are not known for their genteel interrogation methods, either. I don’t know if there have been Americans or Westerners present during Zammar’s interrogations. Presumably they weren’t because I am sure they were hostile. Syrians are pretty brutal, but they do get information.” Since his capture, experts say Zammar has been an important source for corroborating the confessions of other captured terrorists. “Syria has provided actionable intelligence from interrogations of al-Qaida operatives held in Syria, most likely Zammar, that led to the disruption of at least one terrorist attack against U.S. military forces in the Gulf,” Matthew A. Levitt, a terrorism analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told a House International Relations subcommittee last month.

It appears as though Syrian agents have already “broken” Zammar, who, as a well-trained al-Qaida operative, was probably prepared to deal with torture during an interrogation. But once a person is made to start talking, experts say, no matter what his level of training, it is difficult to return to a posture of resistance. Torture does not necessarily mean the constant application of pain; often a carefully targeted threat of injury is enough to remind the prisoner that there are dire consequences for remaining silent. As the al-Qaida manual warns, succumbing to torture just once can be the beginning of the end. The operative’s “situation is just like someone who falls into a swamp: the more he tries to save himself, the deeper he sinks,” it says.

Previous terrorism dragnets demonstrate the process of “rendition” — and the application of coercive force — at work in greater relief. One vivid example is the case of Abdul Hakim Murad, a co-conspirator of Ramzi Ahmed Youssef, who was convicted in a New York district court for his participation in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Murad had been detained in the Philippines. Prior to his transfer to the United States, Filipino agents interrogated him. In court papers, Murad said the agents burnt and suffocated him. Fragments of a tape recording made during that questioning, and played at the trial, were used to show how interrogators constricted his breathing (although it is hard to say exactly how), even as he was confessing. The transcript reads:

Interrogator: What is your plan in the Philippines?

Murad: I’m telling you the truth. I don’t have any plans in the Philippines.

Interrogator: How about in, eh, the United States?

Murad: I have a lot of planning in the United States?

Interrogator: What — what are your plans?

Murad: We are planning, I am planning to explode this airplane. I have planning of — I just can’t breathe, I can’t breathe.

Interrogator: What — what more? What is your plan?

More recently, there is the case of Mohammad Saddiq Odeh, an al-Qaida operative sentenced last year to life imprisonment in the United States for his involvement in the East Africa embassy bombings. The day the buildings were attacked, on Aug. 7, 1998, Odeh flew from Kenya to Pakistan. But on his arrival in Karachi, immigration officials immediately detained him and turned him over to Pakistani interrogators, who questioned him over a period of several days. Odeh submitted a court brief, claiming “he was not permitted to sleep for long periods during his interrogation, and was at times deprived of food and water.” He said his interviewers threatened to sodomize him unless he confessed to certain information. During his trial, a video of the interrogation was submitted into evidence. “You must tell me something,” a Pakistani interrogator commands. “Tell me, otherwise this will go on and on and on — your ordeal — and they will start pulling something different. They might even get your wife on, understand.”

Ten days later, Odeh claims, this is precisely what happened — with the help of the FBI. On Aug. 16, Pakistani intelligence officers blindfolded him and put him on a plane back to Kenya, where he was taken to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Kenyan police for interrogation. There, along with several U.S. and Kenyan authorities, he met FBI agent John Anticev. “We told him he had basically three options,” Anticev later recalled during Odeh’s trial: Odeh could remain silent; he could invoke his right to an attorney; or he could talk to Kenyan and American officials, without an attorney. Odeh made a counter-offer. He said he just wanted to deal with the FBI. “At that point,” Anticev said, “we all left the room to discuss that. Remaining in the room with Mr. Odeh was a Kenyan official, and by the time I got out to the hallway, the Kenyan official came out and said he’s agreed to talk to both of us, to both authorities.”

During that brief time, Odeh says he was given a powerful incentive to change his mind: The Kenyan official had told him that if he did not cooperate, “they would take him to a forest and hang him upside down until he told them what they wanted to hear,” his lawyers said in court filings. Not long after, Odeh’s wife, who was several months pregnant, was brought down to the police department for questioning. Odeh later said that he could hear her being interrogated in a neighboring cell. He said he listened to Kenyan officials insult her and threaten to lock her up.

“One American agent told Mr. Odeh that he should cooperate so his family wouldn’t be put in jeopardy,” his lawyers claimed. As proof, they submitted into evidence a copy of an FBI note taken during the questioning. It read: “Was upset re. Wife/tell him we have wife in custody.” The tactic appeared to have been effective. “Her incarceration offended traditional Islamic religious beliefs, and the authorities knew that,” Odeh later complained. “Nevertheless, they subjected her to questioning by men and made her remove her veil. They used her to get to me in a way that was very dirty.”

Dirty or no, some terrorism experts say the stakes are too high to allow committed enemies of the United States to withhold critical information. And that even though harsh coercive measures can elicit false information, if used properly, they argue, that information can provide critical pieces to the current counter-terrorism intelligence puzzle. “Generally speaking, Americans are not good at interrogation,” said a former intelligence official with extensive experience in the Middle East. “We don’t question prisoners the way a regime whose existence is at stake might. But to get the kind of information we need, we’re going have to really put pressure on them. We’re still playing by the rules. Putting pressure on the families — as some of the people I’ve worked with have done — can be extremely effective. Even for militant Islamists. These people are still very loyal to their families and their clans. In order to get to them, you need to embarrass them; you have to have serious threats.”

Others have even suggested legalizing the use of physical coercion during interrogations by having the U.S. government issue “torture warrants” in circumstances of dire urgency — such as the “ticking bomb” scenario, when police officers might want to harm one individual to save the lives of many. Harvard professor Alan Dershowitz has been advocating just this position in his recent book and in numerous media appearances. “We can’t just close our eyes and pretend we live in a pure world,” he said on CBS’s “60 Minutes.” He believes that because torture will inevitably be used in such circumstances, it is better to place legal controls on it rather than let it occur freely outside the boundaries of the law.

That, of course, raises a whole series of moral and practical questions. Foremost among them: Can the application of economic or physical pressure on families, or the controlled use of torture in the interrogation room, seriously undermine the fight against terrorism? “It gets very tricky,” said Jamie Fellner, director of Human Rights Watch’s U.S. Program. “There are people who say you shouldn’t use torture because it’s unreliable. That’s an empirical, pragmatic argument. Torture may yield information that is good, or that isn’t good. But, in that respect, it’s a lot like any other tactic used in an investigation, which will turn up information that may or may not be good. There are other reasons to forgo torture. The United States is a nation of law, it is a nation of principles, it is a nation that should not stoop and descend and debase itself by simply picking up the techniques of lawless thugs and terrorists. Those principles have to apply not just in public speeches but also in the interrogation room. You need a bright line that can’t be crossed. Torture can’t be condoned. You have to start from that premise.”

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed gets his way

Obama officials insisted the terror mastermind receive a military tribunal this week, but their arguments are bunk

Detainees at Guantanamo Bay (Credit: Reuters)

A military guard will be on each arm of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as he is led into a courtroom on Saturday to be arraigned for a second time before a military commission at Guantanamo Bay. He went through the same process in the same courtroom on nearly the same charges almost four years ago in the closing months of the Bush administration. The fact that President Obama chooses now, six months before voters choose between him and Mitt Romney, to restart what some have dubbed “the trial of the century,” using a second-rate system of justice he had ordered stopped at a facility he had ordered closed, makes an unflattering statement about the timidity of his leadership and the malleability of his principles.

Apologists for the tarnished military commissions, like Attorney General Eric Holder and the sixth and current chief prosecutor Brigadier General Mark Martins, acknowledge that our regular federal courts are best suited for terrorism trials. Holder told an audience at Northwestern University in March:

Simply put, since 9/11, hundreds of individuals have been convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related offenses in Article III courts and are now serving long sentences in federal prison.  Not one has ever escaped custody.  No judicial district has suffered any kind of retaliatory attack. These are facts, not opinions.  There are not two sides to this story. Those who claim that our federal courts are incapable of handling terrorism cases are not registering a dissenting opinion – they are simply wrong.

After singing the praises of the federal courts – which really have been swift, severe and successful in comparison to the six and-a-half dubious trials completed over the past decade at Guantanamo – Martins and Holder pivot to polishing the image of the tarnished military commissions they argue are well-suited for a small category of cases. Martins told an audience at Harvard in April:

It is perfectly reasonable to ask why – with concurrent jurisdiction over offenses that can be characterized as both federal civilian crimes and violations of the law of war and with comparable procedural protections – we should invest great energy and resources in military trials. The answer is that there is a narrow but important category of cases in which the pragmatic and principled choice among the lawful tools available to protect our people and serve the interests of justice is a reformed military commission.

Beltway bureaucrats are prone to using buzzwords to shade the truth. For example, rather than saying “yes, it makes us look bad when we lock people away in prison for a decade without a trial,” some might soften it up by using more subtle Beltway language: “The optics are not optimal.”  The word “pragmatic” has become a favorite of the spinmeisters. In truth, being pragmatic has become a synonym for being a wuss. When a bureaucrat capitulates instead of confronting barriers standing in the way of doing the right thing, and then cites the barriers as an excuse for choosing the easier path, he is lauded for making the “pragmatic choice.” Others might say he simply wussed out. President Obama has been “pragmatic” far too often on national security choices in his first three years in office.

There is nothing pragmatic or principled about undermining America’s reputation as a champion of the rule of law and a supposed model for the world to follow. The apologists for Obama’s decision to embrace military commissions call attention to similarities between the commission rules and the rules in federal courts, and they claim those rules are essentially the same. They argue that the two systems are virtually identical and that trial observers will find trials in the two forums nearly indistinguishable. In some things, however, close is just not good enough. An O’Doul’s looks like a beer and has a beer-like flavor, but a real beer drinker would never argue that an O’Doul’s is virtually indistinguishable from a Sam Adams. Just as a near-beer is not practically the same as a real beer, neither is near-justice the equivalent of real justice. The apologists may think they are fooling the rest of the world when they say at long last military commissions do real justice, but they are wrong.

Holder and Martins justify the need for a second-rate military commission system by talking up the alleged realities of the battlefield that they say make it impracticable for troops to worry about doing rights advisements and establishing a chain of custody for evidence while in the midst of a war. Their general principle is entirely valid … but also totally irrelevant in the cases they intend to prosecute before military commissions. Few of the 779 men ever held at Guantanamo were captured by members of the U.S. armed forces and even fewer still were apprehended on the battlefield as that term is commonly understood by ordinary human beings. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, for instance, was rousted from a sound sleep and arrested in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate based on information developed by our civilian Central Intelligence Agency. Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, the alleged USS Cole bomber, was apprehended in Dubai, a bustling global business center in the United Arab Emirates that no one considers a battlefield. Hambali was arrested near Bangkok, Thailand, by Thai authorities and later turned over to the CIA. The truth is that not a single one of the 14 so-called high-value detainees was captured by members of the U.S. armed forces on a battlefield; in fact, none were even apprehended in Afghanistan. The perception of some inexperienced 19-year-old Army private trying to read Miranda rights to a captured al Qaeda fighter while hunkered down in a foxhole with bombs exploding nearby and bullets whizzing past overhead is a canard.

Military commission apologists should have the integrity to stand up and tell the public the truth about the small category of cases they believe are best-suited for the second-rate procedures of the tarnished military commissions. The truth is the reason the apologists want a second-rate military commission option is because of what we did to the detainees, not because of what the detainees did to us. This is not about the exigencies of the battlefield and the problems our soldiers face trying to fight a war; this is about torture, coercion, rendition and a decade or more in confinement without an opportunity to confront the evidence – abuses that would have us up in arms if done to an American citizen by some other country – that make the tarnished military commissions uniquely suited to try and accommodate the small category of cases where we crossed over to the dark side. A military commission may be a justice-themed theatrical production – complete with a script, actors, a sound stage and costumes that create a passable courtroom-like atmosphere – but beneath that facade is a ‘heads we win, tails you lose’ charade where, as the government admits, even if a KSM or a Nashiri is found not guilty he returns to a cell to continue serving what is likely a life sentence. That should not inspire anyone to wave the flag and shout USA! USA! in celebration of our vaunted exceptionalism.

Lloyd Cutler was the youngest member of the prosecution team in the trial of eight Nazi saboteurs captured, convicted by a military commission and executed in a span of six weeks in the summer of 1942. He wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on December 31, 2001, nearly 60 years after his military commission experience ended and 10 days before the first detainees arrived at Guantanamo Bay. Mr. Cutler said that how we prosecute alleged al Qaeda terrorists will say as much about us as it does about al Qaeda. He warned that success will be judged by our ability to show the world that justice is in fact being done.

Had we heeded Mr. Cutler’s advice back in 2001 we would not be where we are now in 2012, fumbling along more than a decade later still trying to mold a second-rate process to fit around sets of bad facts we created when we turned our backs on the law and our values.  In normal practice, cases are developed to conform to the court. Here, because of how we mistreated some of the detainees, we are trying to develop a court to conform to the cases. We are setting an example for the world, but not a good one.

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Morris Davis was chief prosecutor for the military commission at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from 2005-2007. He is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel and a member of the faculty at the Howard University School of Law in Washington, D.C.

“You Don’t Like the Truth”: Our first look at a Gitmo interrogation

A bewildered Canadian teenager goes to Guantanamo Bay in this disturbing look inside the War on Terror

A still from "You Don't Like the Truth"

In the wake of the extrajudicial killing of American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki and several other people in Yemen this week, we’re faced (once again) with the realization that the United States Constitution has become a largely meaningless totem. It gets waved around enthusiastically by people on all sides of the political spectrum whenever it seems to serve their interests, but nobody pays much attention to what it actually says. Presumably President Obama, the military-intelligence establishment and the mainstream media are declaring Awlaki a special case. Thanks to the secret provisions of secret laws, he was deprived of all the rights of citizenship and not subject to the ordinary rule of law that extends back not merely to the Constitution but to the Magna Carta (at least).

Some similar exemption must also be made for the Canadian citizen Omar Khadr, who was 15 years old when he was found, badly injured and barely alive, after a 2002 firefight between U.S. troops and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. (Khadr’s father, an al-Qaida supporter and fundraiser, had apparently dropped him off at a Taliban compound a few weeks earlier.) Based on what we see in the painful, revealing documentary “You Don’t Like the Truth: 4 Days Inside Guantánamo” — the first film to show actual interrogation footage from inside the secret American military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba — Khadr became a sort of ritual sacrifice by the Canadian government, an offering to its American allies and/or overlords. His case became a hot political issue north of the border, where Canadians pride themselves on a society that is more egalitarian, and more civilized, than that of their American neighbors.

Following a Canadian Supreme Court decision, most of Khadr’s seven-hour interrogation at Gitmo by CSIS officers — the approximate Canadian equivalent of the CIA — has been declassified, and veteran lefty documentarians Luc Côté and Patricio Henríquez use that claustrophobic, low-resolution 2003 footage as the basis for “You Don’t Like the Truth.” That sounds like something the interrogators might have said to Khadr, but it isn’t. It’s what he tells them after realizing they don’t want to hear his allegations that he was tortured by American forces, and that all his supposed confessions about knowing Osama bin Laden and attending al-Qaida barbecues were made up on the spot, to stop the pain.

You won’t see Khadr suffer physical torture on these surveillance tapes, although the interrogators rely on time-honored tactics of psychological abuse, alternately berating him and plying him with Big Macs. You will see a teenager who speaks idiomatic North American English, and who is obviously relieved to see fellow Canadians, whom he naively assumes have come to help him. And you’ll see him go through a near-total breakdown, sitting alone in the room weeping for his mother, after he realizes that no one cares about what happens to him and that he’s only interesting to his interrogators as long as he keeps making up stories about Osama and al-Qaida.

I have no idea whether Khadr actually threw a grenade that killed a U.S. Delta Force soldier, as was alleged after his capture. (Khadr has consistently denied it, and photographic evidence suggests that he had been shot through the back and was out cold before the soldier’s death.) But the Canadian interrogators barely mention it, and it feels suspiciously like an inflammatory distraction, thrown in mostly to alienate all possible North American sympathy. At best it’s an ancillary question. If Khadr was a genuine military combatant, then he can’t be prosecuted for killing an enemy soldier in battle. Furthermore, he would have to be considered a child soldier under international law, which theoretically immunizes him even for war crimes. Convicting him on such charges, as the government eventually did in a secret court on secret evidence, required the finding that he wasn’t a soldier but a civilian terrorist (even though he was supposedly linked to two organizations, al-Qaida and the Taliban, with whom the U.S. government has repeatedly said it’s at war).

Côté and Henríquez intersperse brief and highly effective interview segments between snippets of the interrogation tape, with subjects ranging from former U.S. military officers (including Khadr’s lawyer and psychiatrist) to former Guantánamo inmates (including Moazzam Begg, now a leading British activist for other detainees) to Khadr’s mother and sister (wearing full-face Islamic veils) to Damien Corsetti, the much-demonized former soldier who knew Khadr as a guard at Bagram. What comes through repeatedly is that questions of law and reason, or guilt and innocence, played no role in the case of Omar Khadr. He was a vulnerable and confused kid whose own government turned its back on him, which made him a perfect candidate to become one of the few Gitmo detainees convicted of something. He was 15 when he was captured, and will be 31 when he (supposedly) gets out.

“You Don’t Like the Truth: 4 Days Inside Guantánamo” is now playing at Film Forum in New York, with more cities and dates to follow.

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U.S. officials: Al-Qaida ops chief killed by CIA

Top Pakistani operative dead after drone strike earlier this week

A top al-Qaida operative was killed earlier this week in Pakistan’s tribal areas, U.S. and Pakistani officials said Thursday. The death landed another blow against the besieged terrorist network.

The man killed was Abu Hafs al-Shahri, whom two U.S. officials describe as al-Qaida’s chief of operations in Pakistan.

Though his name is little known beyond intelligence circles, Al-Shahri is described as dangerous by both the Pakistani and U.S. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to describe classified counterterrorist operations.

He was apparently killed by a CIA drone strike in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas, though officials would not describe the method since the program is classified. A drone strike was reported by locals on Sunday night.

The officials say al-Shahri worked closely with the Pakistani Taliban to carry out attacks inside Pakistan, and was also a contender to assume some duties of al-Qaida’s second in command, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman. Al-Rahman was killed by a CIA drone strike in late August.

U.S. officials believe they can cripple the core al-Qaida organization if they take out the top four or five figures, following the killing in May of al-Qaida chief Osama by Laden by Navy SEALs. Eight of the network’s top 20 leaders were killed this year alone, according to the Pentagon’s undersecretary for defense intelligence, Michael Vickers, in remarks this week. Vickers predicted that with sustained counterterrorist operations, “within 18-24 months, core al-Qaida’s cohesion and operational capabilities could be degraded to the point that the group could fragment and exist mostly as a propaganda arm.”

But Vickers and CIA director David Petraeus said al-Qaida’s offshoots will remain a serious threat to the U.S.

A Pakistani intelligence official says Pakistani operations chief al-Shahri was a Saudi national, who had lived in the tribal regions of Pakistan, bordering eastern Afghanistan, since 2002.

One of the U.S. officials said the same individual is No. 11 on Saudi Arabia’s top-85 most wanted terror suspects, where his full name is listed as Osama Hamoud Gharman Al-Shihri. The official said the same person is No. 68 on Interpol’s most wanted list, where his name was spelled “Al-Shehri” and his birthdate was listed as Sept. 17, 1981.

Al-Shahri engaged in liaison mainly with Pakistan’s Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan to conduct coordinated attacks against targets inside Pakistan, one of the U.S. officials said. But al-Qaida also inspired the Pakistani Taliban to undertake its first known overseas attack, when a U.S. based operative tried and failed to detonate a car bomb in Times Square last year.

Al-Shahri’s killing was first reported by NBC News.

Al-Qaida’s senior planner of global terror operations, Adnan Shukrijumah, remains at large.

AP writer Matt Apuzzo contributed from Washington, and AP writer Riaz Khan contributed to this story from Peshawar.

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U.S. accuses Iran of “secret deal” with al-Qaida

Administration says Iranian government provides money and recruits for attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan

FILE - This Monday, Aug. 3, 2009 file photo released by the official website of the Iranian Supreme Leader's office, shows Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, right, delivering a speech after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, seated at left, formally endorsed him for a second term as President during an official ceremony in Tehran, Iran. As Iran's capacity to build nuclear weapons grows, intelligence assessments from nations that follow Tehran's atomic progress discern increasing indecision and squabbling by its leadership on whether to make such arms - and if so, how overtly. Most suggest Ahmadinejad is more circumspect. But an intelligence summary shared recently with The Associated Press sees Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the more cautious of the two and says the Revolutionary Guard is benefiting from the dispute, with some of the authority normally exercised by the president devolving to it. (AP Photo/Office of the Supreme Leader, File) ** EDITORIAL USE ONLY, NO SALES ** EDITORS NOTE AS A RESULT OF AN OFFICIAL IRANIAN GOVERNMENT BAN ON FOREIGN MEDIA COVERING SOME EVENTS IN IRAN, THE AP WAS PREVENTED FROM INDEPENDENT ACCESS TO THIS EVENT(Credit: AP)

The Obama administration accused Iran on Thursday of entering into a “secret deal” with an al-Qaida offshoot that provides money and recruits for attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Treasury Department designated six members of the unit as terrorists subject to U.S. sanctions.

The U.S. intelligence community has in the past disagreed about the extent of direct links between the Iranian government and al-Qaida. Thursday’s allegations went further than what most analysts had previously said was a murky relationship with limited cooperation.

David S. Cohen, Treasury’s point man for terrorism and financial intelligence, said Iran entered a “secret deal with al-Qaida allowing it to funnel funds and operatives through its territory.” He didn’t provide any details of that agreement, but said the sanctions seek to disrupt al-Qaida’s work in Iraq and deny the terrorist group’s leadership much-needed support.

“Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world today,” Cohen said in a statement. “We are illuminating yet another aspect of Iran’s unmatched support for terrorism.”

Treasury said the exposure of the clandestine agreement would disrupt al-Qaida operations by shedding light on Iran’s role as a “critical transit point” for money and extremists reaching Pakistan and Afghanistan.

“This network serves as the core pipeline through which al-Qaida moves money, facilitators and operatives from across the Middle East to South Asia,” it said..

Treasury said a branch headed by Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil was operating in Iran with the Tehran government’s blessing, funneling funds collected from across the Arab world to al-Qaida’s senior leaders in Pakistan. Khalil, the department said, has operated within Iran’s borders for six years.

Also targeted by the sanctions is Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, appointed by Osama bin Laden as al-Qaida’s envoy in Iran after serving as a commander in Pakistan’s tribal areas. As an emissary, al-Rahman is allowed to travel in and out of Iran with the permission of government officials, the statement claimed.

The sanctions block any assets the individuals might have held in the United States, and bans Americans from doing any business with them.

No Iranian officials were cited for complicity in terrorism. The others targeted were Umid Muhammadi, described as a key planner for al-Qaida in Iraq’s attacks; Salim Hasan Khalifa Rashid al-Kuwari and Abdallah Ghanim Mafuz Muslim al-Khawar, Qatar-based financial supporters who’ve allegedly helped extremists travel across the region; and Ali Hassan Ali al-Ajmi, a Kuwait-based fundraiser for al-Qaida and the Taliban.

The action comes a day after the top U.S. commander for special operations forces said al-Qaida is bloodied and “nearing its end,” even as he warned that the next generation of militants could keep special operations fighting for a decade to come.

Navy SEAL Adm. Eric T. Olson said bin Laden’s killing on May 2 was a near-fatal blow for the organization created by bin Laden and led from his Pakistan hide out. He said the group already had lost steam because of the revolts of the Arab Spring, which proved the Muslim world did not need terrorism to bring down governments, from Tunisia to Egypt.

Treasury’s public allegations against Iran may reflect part of a strategy to expand the pressure on smaller, less well-established offshoots of al-Qaida as the weakening of the group’s leadership threatens to make its activities more disparate. Washington already has re-focused much attention on al-Qaida’s Yemen-based branch, which has attempted to bomb a U.S.-bound jetliner and cargo planes in recent years.

But the exact nature of Iran’s relationship with al-Qaida remains disputed in Washington, with different branches of the intelligence community disagreeing about whether Iran is supporting al-Qaida as a matter of policy, according to one U.S. official. The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters.

Some hardline militants backing al-Qaida, members of Islam’s majority Sunnis, see the Shiite Islam dominant in Iran as heretical, and they view Tehran’s regional ambitions as a greater threat than the West. Sunni insurgents in Iraq have used car bombs and suicide attacks against Shiite targets, killing thousands since 2003, as well as targeting Shiite militias allied to Iran.

Since 2001, Iran has appeared a somewhat reluctant host for senior al-Qaida operatives who fled there after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, keeping them under tight restrictions. After an initial period of cooperation with the West, Iran now seems to be a more comfortable haven even if it remains on the edge of al-Qaida’s orbit.

Western officials point to the release earlier this year of an Iranian diplomat who was held for 15 months after being kidnapped by gunmen in Pakistan.

In negotiations for the diplomat’s freedom, they say Iran promised better conditions for dozens of people close to Osama bin Laden who were being held under tight security. These included some of the terror chief’s children and the network’s most senior military strategist, Saif al-Adel.

Still, the life of the al-Qaida-linked exiles in Iran continues to be very much a blind spot for Western intelligence agencies. Few firm details have emerged, such as how much Iran limits their movements and contacts.

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What should we believe about al-Qaida?

Too much of what we "know" about bin Laden and the terrorist group he led comes from anonymous U.S. officials

Almost everything we learn about Al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden these days is coming from anonymous U.S. officials.

Wednesday, for instance, U.S. officials told us via The Washington Post that Al-Qaida was on the verge of being totally wiped out. The comments echoed earlier ones from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, the former C.I.A. director, who earlier said that only a couple dozen more Al-Qaida militants needed to be killed before the war was over.

Last week the officials were talking to the Wall Street Journal. They told the paper that Al-Qaida would likely be shifting the focus of its attacks to Western targets outside of the United States. They said this was because it had become too difficult for them to strike inside the United States.

The Wall Street Journal said the U.S. officials had come to this conclusion based on evidence gleaned from flash drives found in the compound where bin Laden was killed. Much of the information we are learning about bin Laden and Al-Qaida, in fact, is said (by U.S. officials) to be coming from those flash disks, as well as a computer.

It was from the computer, for instance, that U.S. officials learned that bin Laden liked porn. Everyone ran with that story. It was great story. Not only was it sure to drive traffic, combining two of the most searched items on the internet these days (porn and bin Laden), but it also tweaks the legacy of a man who claimed that a strict adherence to Islam is what guided him in his global campaign of terror.

It is reminiscent of the news, also released by U.S. officials, immediately following the raid that led to bin Laden’s death that, in a vain attempt to protect himself, bin Laden used his wife as a human shield. Not so heroic. That detail turned out to be false. As was news that bin Laden was armed.

The news that bin Laden liked porn also came from U.S. officials. They leaked it anonymously to Reuters and then everyone else reported the Reuters report (including GlobalPost). In fact, all the details about the raid, what transpired and what was found after, has come from U.S. officials.

The New York Times reported on May 6 that the details surrounding the raid and the discoveries that followed have been fluid in their accuracy. It partly blamed a ravenous media, itself included. But it also blamed a desire by the United States to spin facts in order to diminish bin Laden’s legacy.

Was the revelation that bin Laden liked porn part of that spin? What about everything else we are learning from U.S. officials? Is that spin too?

If it’s not spin, all the reports surely play into the hands of the U.S. government. Not only did the Wall Street Journal story infer that our defense measures are working but it justified our continued pursuit of Al-Qaida militants all over the world, both through the war in Afghanistan and the ramping up of drone attacks in Yemen and Somalia.

The Washington Post story, meanwhile, suggests that we have been successful in Pakistan, where drone strikes have been plentiful, but Al-Qaida remained strong in Yemen, where the U.S. plans to increase its use of unmanned drones.

Other things we learned recently about bin Laden: He was planning an attack on the 10-year anniversary of Sept. 11, he had a “direct” role in the planning of the July 7 bombings in London, a belief that runs counter to previous reports, and he was actively planning any number of other attacks as well — all according to “U.S. officials.”

If you say so.

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