Analysts agree the U.S. and its allies would likely prevail in such a fight. But in the days and weeks ahead, military commanders will be pressed to find a difficult balance: While they must use enough force to win the battle, they must limit casualties among coalition troops and Iraqi civilians or risk losing the crucial war of public opinion. Images of grief and destruction have already inflamed war opponents at home and throughout the Arab and Muslim world, and that’s come even as the allies have pulled their punches, militarily.

“It’s an extraordinary balancing act,” says Ronald Bee, a senior analyst at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation in San Diego. “We’ll win. But if we have to fight in the city, it will be a mess in terms of casualties and public opinion … Form is as important as substance. How this plays out will send all sorts of messages to our friends and political enemies.”

Although the timing for a potentially epic city battle has slipped in recent days due to the fighting in the south of Iraq, all eyes remain on the Iraqi capital — “Fortress Baghdad,” as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dubbed it. It’s a fortress Saddam and his generals may be busy prepping for a guerrilla showdown.

Before the war, a brutal urban battle was described as the Pentagon’s least favorite option. But in a campaign that has been short on momentum-changing victories, and with the planned surrender of Saddam’s high command failing to materialize, that worst-case scenario is looking more and more like an inevitability.

“Increasingly there’s no way around it,” says Patrick Garrett, senior fellow at GlobalSecurity.org. “Is it possible Saddam and his army will capitulate? Sure. Is it likely? No. If I were in his position, that’s what I would do — draw U.S. forces into the city.”

Adding to the odds that troops will have to enter the capital is the fact President Bush stated an unusually precise goal for the war: physically removing Saddam Hussein from power. That means coalition forces may have no choice but to descend upon the city of 5 million and weed out Saddam’s supporters neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block, until they finally get their hands on the dictator.

“I don’t mean to compare this to Vietnam,” says Garrett. “But similar to that conflict, the United States has staked its international credibility on achieving those military goals, which are unconditional surrender. There is no Plan B.”

For that reason, “the best-case scenario for Baghdad is that we don’t have to fight there,” says Timothy Hoyt, associate professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I. “The campaign was designed so that there would be many possibilities along the way for things to go right which would preclude us from having to go street-to-street in Baghdad. That’s the last option.”

The fear for the Pentagon is that street fighting — the underdog’s oasis — could turn into a public relations debacle if pictures of dead Iraqi civilians slumped over on curbsides are beamed around the world to an international audience already uneasy with the U.S.-led war. The Pentagon got a taste of that possible blowback on Wednesday when news broke that two errant bombs had landed in a commercial Baghdad marketplace, killing 17 civilians and wounding dozens. Whether the missile was fired by coalition or Iraqi forces was unclear, but most of the world was instantly ready to blame the United States. And if it was a wayward coalition strike, the stark images of an enormous crater in the Baghdad street surrounded by demolished cars, smoldering buildings, dead bodies and wailing women will do little to bolster the U.S. claims of a war to free Iraq, or to win the hearts and minds of angry locals, who reportedly chanted: “Oh, Saddam, we sacrifice our souls and blood to you.” They’re the same Baghdad citizens the U.S. hopes will soon rise up against Saddam.

“I worry about Baghdad,” says Judith Kipper, a Middle East analyst for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “I’m afraid Saddam has many things planned for us, that he’ll revert to his early days as a guerrilla leader. He’s homicidal, not suicidal. He’ll try to kill as many American as possible.” There’s already speculation Saddam may have laid down a red line in the sand outside Baghdad, and once coalition forces cross it Iraq will launch a chemical or biological attack. Recent reports suggest he’s following the lead of the rebels in Mogadishu who used small pickup trucks manned with machine guns to fight American soldiers, and those low-tech gunners may soon be seen racing around Baghdad. Saddam is also said to have deployed his militia throughout the city, commandeering schools, apartment buildings and shops, suggesting that he wants to place Baghdad citizens in the thick of the fight.

His goal? Creating bloody scenes that spark a worldwide uproar. “He wants to drag U.S. forces through populated sections of the city in hopes of getting the international community to step in and make it stop,” says Garrett.

Compared to the wide-open desert, the city setting would certainly give Saddam’s estimated 20,000 loyal troops embedded inside Baghdad more killing options by using buildings, rooftops and cellars as ambush platforms. Streets would turn into shooting galleries, homes and parks into battlegrounds, and intelligence would be harder to gather. The casualty rate for soldiers involved in urban battles is 30 percent, according to today’s military calculus.

“The history of urban warfare in the 20th century indicates it’s casualty-intensive,” notes Stephen Cimbala, professor of political science at Penn State University and author of “The Politics of Warfare.” “It’s grunt-and-groan warfare.”

The most famous and bloody urban battle in history was at Stalingrad, the epic, six-month World War II fight that claimed 1.5 million lives. Today, modern-day urban warfare scenarios vary from police-type actions, like skirmishes in Northern Ireland, to Israel’s more aggressive military action in the West Bank, to bombing-only campaigns such as in Kosovo, or all-out military sieges such as the Russian’s 1999 bloody bombardment of Grozny, which virtually leveled the Chechnya city.

U.S.-led forces have already gotten a taste of Iraq’s brand of urban guerrilla warfare in southern cities such as Nasariyah and Basra, where soldiers have dressed as civilians, faked surrenders, and stashed guns and ammo inside hospitals, all clear violations of international law. That kind of deadly deception would likely be rampant inside the winding streets of Baghdad, where the U.S.’s extraordinary military advantage would be at least partially offset.

That’s just one reason the Pentagon prefers to avoid city clashes. And that’s why it may be hard for most Americans to conjure up modern-day images of winning urban battles. Perhaps Panama City, Panama, 1989. But even then, Gen. Manuel Noriega was able to elude tens of thousands of U.S. troops as he drove around Panama City for three days before finally surrendering in the parking lot of a Dairy Queen.

Meanwhile, the list of America’s urban setbacks looms large: Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, during the clash depicted in the book and hit film “Black Hawk Down”; Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, when the Marine barracks were bombed; Hue, North Vietnam, in 1968, during the bloody Tet Offensive when the Viet Cong actually suffered a military loss but stunned the American public by boldly bringing the war to downtown.

Will Baghdad become another grisly backdrop? Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan says yes: “We have allowed them to cross the desert. We wish and beg that they come to Baghdad, so that we will teach a lesson to this evil administration and all who cooperate with her.”

Of course that could just be more Iraqi bravado. Before the war, there were all sorts of worst-case scenarios — Saddam launching scuds at Israel, blowing up dams along the Tigris River, firing chemical weapons, and signaling terrorists to strike America — that have not yet come to pass. So there’s a chance a U.S. strike into Baghdad could be easier than expected.

And coalition forces would still enjoy some significant military advantages. Though tanks cannot elevate their turret guns very high, the fact that Baghdad has few tall buildings will allow them to hit top stories. And thanks to assault rifles equipped with laser pointers that are visible only through night vision equipment, “the United States has unparalleled ability to fight during the night,” says Garrett. By contrast, the Russian defenders in Stalingrad used night-fighting equipment to their advantage.

“There’s a chance,” says Kipper, “that it will be relatively easy, that there’s nobody really in control in Baghdad and [coalition] troops are able to take over sections of the city one at a time and bring in food and medicine.”

And if it’s any consolation, Eric Larson, a senior policy analyst for RAND, a Pentagon-affiliated think tank, says support at home for the war would not take a major hit even if U.S. troops met stiff resistance inside Baghdad. “If Saddam’s expecting American public support to fold in light of bloody street fighting, he’s going to be disappointed,” says Larson, who studies war and public opinion. He studied the polling data and found very high support for the war’s objectives, the perceived threat the enemy poses, and the costs willing to be paid — all keystones to maintaining public backing.

Larson concedes the current polling data are vague, because people are often asked about their support for the war in the event of “high” casualties, without given a real number. But this week, for instance, retired U.S. Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey suggested a prolonged battle in Baghdad could result in 2,000 to 3,000 dead U.S. soldiers. That’s a traumatic casualty rate this country hasn’t had since the Vietnam War more than 30 years ago.

At the same time, the American public is not accustomed to inflicting casualties — especially among civilians. Traditionally, U.S. forces would contemplate unleashing a massive force of artillery and air power on the enemy’s capital, targeting infrastructure sites like power plants as well as bridges, and in the process turning portions of the city into rubble. Moreover, destruction of infrastructure like electricity and water plants would mean far greater civilian casualties. During the first Gulf War, most of the Iraqi casualties resulted from damage to the infrastructure. But it’s hard to argue you’re the liberating the locals if you end up leaving portions of their capital in ruins. U.S. troops have tried in the past to destroy villages in order to save them, and failed miserably in the process to win the hearts and minds of the people on the ground. Will Iraq prove any different?

In this unique war, it’s possible the U.S. and its coalition forces are actually more concerned than Saddam’s regime about avoiding Iraqi civilian casualties. Recent news reports from southern Iraq indicated that hardcore troops, members of the Fedayeen Saddam, were using local women and children as human shields. All along, analysts have suggested Saddam would try to use the Iraqi dead to marshal international outrage against the war. Those same analysts concede there’s no better place for him to pile up the dead - on both sides — than in a protracted firefight in downtown Baghdad.

Not that a city firefight is guaranteed. If and when coalition forces break through Saddam’s Republican Guard, camped approximately 50 miles outside of Baghdad, and charge on toward the capital, the Pentagon might just park its men on the outskirts and try to hit some more pressure points with heavy bombing in order to avoid a full-fledged invasion of the city.

“We want to apply enough pressure on the elite inside Baghdad so the regime implodes from the inside,” explains Hoyt at the U.S. Naval War College. “In that pause, I’d like to unleash another leaflet campaign over Baghdad and tell civilians to leave.”

U.S. forces might even wait for reinforcements from the Army’s high-tech, tank-heavy 4th Infantry Division, which has been stalled by Turkey’s vote that barred the U.S. from launching a northern offensive across its border with Iraq. With 16,000 4th Infantry Division troops just now shipping out from Fort Hood, Texas, it will take several weeks to get the high-tech division, complete with its hundreds of tanks and advanced digital communications, into the theater.

Without U.S. military assaults coming down from Turkey, Hoyt notes, the chances for a battle inside Baghdad have increased. That’s because the Iraqi leadership is able to focus its attention on the south, while slowly pulling back its troops toward Baghdad. Hoyt suggests that simultaneous attacks from the north and south might have added to a sense of panic and defeat, and therefore have contributed to an Iraqi surrender.

One pending option, as Rumsfeld hinted Thursday, would be for coalition forces to encircle Baghdad and lay siege to it — not let anyone in or out — and simply wait for the regime to collapse. But again, how does punishing Baghdad locals, possibly denying them food and medicine, help “free” them? And with international concern already growing about a humanitarian crisis in Iraq, pictures of a U.S.-led siege would likely spark outcries.

That’s why military planners are clinging to the hope that, faced with the show of overwhelming force and inevitable defeat, Saddam, or at least his top commanders, will give up, making an invasion or siege of Baghdad unnecessary.

“It’s a military strategy of persuasion,” says Cimbala at Penn State University. “You use precision bombing to send a message because you want to minimize civilian deaths and you don’t want to destroy the city’s infrastructure.” The strategy also explains the mantra of inevitability coming from the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department and the allied command center in Doha, Qatar. The message to the regime, says Cimbala, is simple: “This is an exercise in futility. Get yourselves together and arrange a cease-fire.”

The problem with that approach is it only works if the two sides are on the same page. “It assumes a cultural understanding,” says Cimbala. Which means the U.S. may have miscalculated how the Iraqis would respond to the persuasion campaign, and to an outside invasion.

“I’ve always said when it comes to the Middle East, the United States is culturally and linguistically handicapped,” says Kipper. She notes that’s one reason the Pentagon shouldn’t hold its breath waiting for paranoid Baghdad citizens to rise up against the regime, because they’re not going to respond to the “Western, Judeo-Christian” notion of liberators coming in to set them free from tyranny. “They won’t do a thing,” she explains,” until they’re absolutely sure Saddam has been found or killed.”

And so, as long as he’s alive and at liberty, Saddam is likely to exercise powerful control over his people, even those who hate him. “I don’t see Saddam Hussein capitulating,” says Garrett. “He’s come to the conclusion he’s not going to make it out alive, and now he wants a larger chapter in the history book. He’ll fight until the bitter end.”

Now that Mitt Romney has won the Republican nomination, two key features prevail over the 2012 campaign — and both were also plainly evident in 2004. First, the incumbent president’s reelection fortunes are far from certain; and, second, the incumbent faces a decent but nevertheless weak challenger who is further hampered by internal problems within his party’s coalition.

Because incumbents can’t run for reelection promising “change,” and because “hope” during a lingering recession was also off the menu, the Obama campaign’s 2012 theme of  “forward” — a word that often follows “plow,” mind you — was the best available alternative. That said, and substituting the economy for terrorism, Obama is implicitly if not explicitly advancing the same theme Bush did in 2004: America suffered a tough blow, but the situation could have been worse and, more to the point, under my stewardship the nation is steadily regaining its footing.

This counterfactual campaign theme — vote for me not because of what happened, but what might have but didn’t — is a common thread for Bush and Obama. It’s not an uplifting message, but it sufficed in 2004 and Obama is counting on it working again in 2012.

Politics 101 further dictates that when an incumbent’s reelection is in doubt, he must go negative against the challenger. Obama political operatives in the White House and at the Democratic National Committee long ago made it abundantly clear they were willing to do just that. Team Obama may not go negative against Romney to the degree the Bush camp did against John Kerry in 2004. (By mid-summer 2004, 75 percent of Bush’s TV ads were negative attacks on Kerry.) But don’t be surprised if attacks on Romney’s record and even character are plentiful, harsh and relentless. In 2008, America saw candidate Obama’s toothy grin; four years later, expect to see President Obama’s fangs.

Expect the Obama camp to emphasize two major critiques of Romney: that he is a flip-flopper willing to say anything or reverse any position to win; and that he is an economic royalist whose personal and public life suggest a person incapable of understanding the lives and struggles of average Americans. Again — note the unusual parallels with 2004.

Although Romney is a Republican former governor and Kerry was at the time his state’s Democratic junior U.S. senator, the two Massachusetts pols make for similar targets. Each man is an extraordinarily rich preppie and Ivy Leaguer. Each represents the liberal wing of his respective party. Each has shown a propensity for ruining an otherwise valid point with sloppy, backfiring language. And each has a reputation for lacking political spine.

The flip-flop frame is candidate character assassination of the first order. Like the lone negative number in a string of multiplied positives, the critique that nobody can trust any statement or claim made by a politician has the potential to negate every accomplishment or promise. If it sticks, it can be fatal, as Kerry learned in 2004.

Obama and the Democratic National Committee know their electoral history and, sure enough, last November — a year before the election and two full months before a single Iowan had caucused — the DNC released a four-minute “Mitt vs. Mitt” ad and its accompanying website with the damning tag line, “the story of two men trapped in one body.” The site is a brilliant homage to the Bush campaign’s 2004 windsurfer attack ad and the devastating, 11-minute ad the Republican National Committee produced chronicling Kerry’s “evolution” on Iraq.

And then there is what might be called “the Willard factor”: Romney as Richy Rich, the Monopoly Guy with the Bain Capital background and the Swiss bank account. His bio would be political gold to Romney’s opponent any election cycle, but it’s gold-plated platinum in the first full presidential campaign following the biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression, the rise of the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the long overdue national debate over income inequality.

Again, the wealth-personified line of attack mirrors the out-of-touch, Martha’s Vineyard yoke the Bush team put around Kerry’s neck in 2004. Right on cue, in the first public event of his reelection campaign, last week Obama attacked Romney by name and invoked the economic disconnect card with relish. “He sincerely believes that if CEOs and wealthy investors like him make money the rest of us will automatically prosper as well,” said Obama of Romney, adding that “corporations aren’t people – -people are people.” (For the record, Kerry is actually wealthier than Romney, who would become one of the richest men ever to occupy the White House, should he win.)

Obama will also try to shift the national debate toward areas of strength, as Bush did. Historically, this meant the same strategy, but with inverse implications for each party: The so-called mommy party Democrats would encourage voters to focus on more favorable kitchen-table economy issues — healthcare, jobs, education — and away from less favorable “daddy party” Republican issues surrounding foreign wars abroad and culture wars. Because Obama is net-positive in foreign policy approval and net-negative on the economy, rather than mirroring by inversion, Obama will try to duplicate Bush’s shift-in-emphasis in 2004. GOP complaints that Obama is politicizing the killing of Osama bin Laden reveal Republican fears that Obama is going to play the terrorism card in 2012 just like Bush did eight years ago.

The 2004 parallels extend beyond message. Obama will be amply resourced and enjoy a field technology by virtue of his campaign’s state-of-the-art Web, donor, volunteer and social media innovations. Remember the Bush reelection campaign’s vaunted “72-hour” voter turnout model? That seems like an Edsel compared to the Ferrari the Obama team will be sporting this summer and fall. Among the perquisites modern presidential incumbents enjoy is the option to test-drive the best mobilization machines before anyone else.

Finally, what most connects Obama 2012 to Bush 2004 is the stability of the electoral map itself. Only three states — two net to Bush — flipped from one party to the other between 2000 and 2004; only nine states flipped between 2004 and 2008. Split the difference and a good, back-of-the-napkin over-under for number of states likely to flip between 2008 and 2012 is six. And thus, like the lead sailboat during a windless race, Obama doesn’t need or want conditions to change much from 2008: He merely has to replicate the map that swept him into office, with the burden of figuring out how to shake up the Electoral College falling to Romney, just as it did for Kerry against Bush. Even Karl Rove’s mapping of the 2012 election concedes this reality.

The 2008 election was memorable; to borrow the title of one best-selling chronicle, it was a “game changer.” But 2012 will not be. In many respects, it will be a game repeater, with Obama playing Bush to Romney’s Kerry of 2004. The president may be asking Americans to look “forward” in 2012, but the best preview of his reelection campaign can be found by looking backward eight years.

Republicans lost their popularity on security issues for one reason: George W. Bush’s foreign policy was a disaster. And yet, the party’s nominee, Mitt Romney, has assembled a foreign-policy team composed almost exclusively of individuals with the same war-always mentality and ideology that served Bush — and the United States — so poorly. In some cases, the exact same men responsible for Bush’s catastrophic national security policies are advising Romney. The former Massachusetts governor could have included some of the pragmatists and realists from the George H.W. Bush administration. Instead, a Romney presidency seems like it would be Bush 43 all over again.

Richard Grenell, who served as United Nations spokesman under Bush, may be gone from the Romney campaign after an uproar over his sexuality, but there are plenty more former Bushies. First off, there are Romney’s “special advisors.” There’s Michael Chertoff, W.’s Homeland Security director. Chertoff oversaw DHS’s failures during Hurricane Katrina, and amassed unprecedented powers of secrecy. Next up is Eliot Cohen, counselor to the State Department for Bush’s last two years and on the Defense Policy Advisory Board for the president’s entire term. Cohen was an adamant supporter of the Iraq War and advised Bush directly on the issue. Or take Cofer Black, the man who infamously said to Bush in September 2011 about al-Qaida that “When we’re through with them they will have flies walking across their eyeballs.” Black went on to become chairman of Blackwater, where he resigned after the company illegally bribed Iraqi officials.

Then there are the 13 “working groups” composed of equally worrisome individuals. The Middle East and North Africa Working Group is co-chaired by Bush’s Assistant Secretary of Defense Mary Beth Long, and Meghan O’Sullivan, Bush’s special assistant and deputy national security advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. The remaining co-chair is Walid Phares, who never worked for Bush but advised Lebanese warlords in the 1980s. Romney has reportedly promised Phares a top job in his administration, despite his virulently anti-Islamic views.

All told, Romney lists 37 holdovers from the George W. Bush administration — the very same administration he and all other Republican candidates barely referenced during their many debates because it was so discredited and toxic, even to the Republican base.

It didn’t have to be this way. There are, in fact, people in Republican circles who are sensible on international affairs. The Cato Institute, in particular, has experts that could dramatically change the direction of American foreign policy. Men like Justin Logan and Christopher Preble were prescient on Iraq and a host of other issues. Similarly, the Center for the National Interest (formerly the Nixon Center) has a host of solid scholars, including ones like Dimitri Simes and Geoffrey Kemp, who have valuable government experience in the Nixon and Reagan administrations, respectively, and a history of perceptive analysis. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, would have been another good pick.

So why aren’t guys like this being tapped? Why is the GOP sticking with a discredited foreign-policy approach rather that looking to its own past for wiser counsel? “Most of the realists and pragmatists have simply been driven out of the Republican Party,” says Stephen Walt, who writes a blog at Foreign Policy and teaches at Harvard. “The neoconservatives have been driving the agenda since Bush was elected and they remain well-entrenched.”

Another factor is that the Republican Party’s base remains strongly militaristic and reluctant to recognize limits on American power. Jon Huntsman’s failed presidential campaign illustrated that problem. The good news is that nobody seems to be calling for nation-building and occupying foreign countries in the mold of Iraq and Afghanistan. But that’s the only lesson that seems to have been learned from the last decade of foreign-policy debacles.

Finally, it may just be that the United States has too much power to change course. While the Unites States has undoubtedly made disastrous decisions in the last decades, it is so powerful that it is largely insulated from the consequences of them. If Romney’s foreign-policy advisor list is anything to go by, a Romney administration would have to teach the U.S. all over again about the problems with trying to police the world. Prepare for Bush redux.

Based on published histories and his firsthand observations, and adapted from a lecture delivered in November, the article calls the administration’s rationale for its use of torture — which he nonetheless insists only on calling “extreme interrogation” and “coercive methods” — “radical,” “an amazing contention,” “untenable and extreme,” “unsustainable,” “an unprecedented program of coolly calculated dehumanizing abuse and physical torment,” and, finally, simply a “mistake.” He concludes: “This was a collective failure of American public leadership, in which a number of officials and members of Congress (and staffers) of both parties played a part, endorsing a CIA program of physical coercion without any precedent in U.S. history.”  In fact, “The only defense against criminal prosecution would be that officials acted in good faith reliance on the advice of their government lawyers.”

Part of what makes Zelikow’s analysis so damning and definitive is its judiciousness. The article is deeply empathetic of the uniquely fearful situation under which the Bush administration was initially operating. Zelikow calls the Sept. 11 attacks a “collective trauma” and a “shoc[k] to mass beliefs.” He notes that Bush and others spent time in burn units, morgues and with survivors of the attacks. One traumatic experienced often overlooked — overlooked because it appeared in Stephen Hayes’ stenographic biography of Dick Cheney — was that the vice-president’s daughter was (falsely, it turns out) told that her house with her children in it had tested positive for anthrax. Similarly, Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice were told that they and others had been exposed to an extremely lethal toxin in a particular area of the White House — and might soon die as a result. “The alarms did not stop and they too were not abstract … The pressure on Bush and his senior advisers was so direct because so much of the response had to be invented and improvised,” the article reads.

An additional factor in the power of the article is Zelikow’s credibility and history. Before entering government, he was a civil rights lawyer in Texas battling the Ku Klux Klan and then a highly esteemed Harvard historian specializing in U.S. foreign policy — he co-authored one book with Rice. He then served on the National Security Council under President George H.W. Bush and directed the 9/11 Commission before becoming counselor to Rice at the State Department from 2005 to 2007. He currently volunteers part-time on the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board under President Obama.

Such bipartisan, establishment credentials render the breakdown and conclusion of this article all the more damning. He believes that what should have been a political and moral question — should the United States torture captives? — became strictly a legal matter left up to government lawyers, few of whom had any experience with these issues, and who had to take the necessity of extreme measures as a given. “These lawyers then became secular priests, granting absolution to the supplicant policymakers,” Zelikow writes.

The problems began when the Office of the Vice President and the CIA took central roles in policymaking. Cheney felt himself above the rest of the National Security Council, bypassing Rice and other traditional channels of national security policymaking. Ad-hoc decision-making and improvisation became “a habit of thought,” which seemed initially to pay off in the security of the nation, as well as in Bush’s political standing and self-confidence.

With Cheney and CIA head George Tenet “the key entrepreneurs in setting codes of conduct for the War on Terror,” it was essentially left to their obsequious lawyers to decide, in secret, on the interrogation methods America should employ. Bush even told the Senate’s Intelligence Committee chairman that “the vice president should be your point of contact … [He] has the portfolio for intelligence activities.” Decisions were made to jettison international treaties. By December 2001, the CIA was already interested in reverse-engineering methods “heretofore used only to treat Americans to resist enemy torture.” When a senior al-Qaida member was captured in March 2002, the prototype for the administration’s torture policies was already developed. “So, for the first time in American history, leaders of the U.S. government carefully devised ways and means to torment enemy captives.”

Zelikow notes that “None of the policy or moral issues connected with these choices appear to have been analyzed in any noticeable way.” Perhaps worst of all, no serious consideration was given to weighing the costs of benefits of the torture program, with reference to relevant historical precedents and/or examinations of the respective French, British and Israeli experiences in dealing with captured terrorists. “Bush and Rice should have insisted on this,” Zelikow writes.

The 52-page article observes the successes of Obama’s counterterrorism policies after repudiating the use of torture. On the basis of the empirical evidence then, “[t]here is no evident correlations between intelligence success and the available of extreme interrogation methods,” no matter what Bush and Cheney claim. Finally, “The program’s costs — which include the high-level effort expended in order to establish, maintain, and defense the program — appear on the evidence so far to have well outweighed any unique value the program might have had as a method of counterterrorism intelligence collection.” This is apart from the damage to America’s international standing and corrosion of its traditional values.

Zelikow concludes his analysis by arguing that, although the Obama administration has the right to wage war and use extralegal methods to defeat al-Qaida, its claim of that authority to defeat “associated forces” is unwarranted. “The U.S. government should publish and explain any overarching policy and legal documents that guide and confine the conduct of deadly operation against its foreign enemies … the executive branch of the U.S. government has a duty to articulate the scope of its warfare to the Congress and the public.” The Bush administration’s unprecedented elevation of torture to national policy may be history, but the job to get U.S. foreign policy in line with its constitutional and moral obligations is far from over.

That’s quite a fall for a man who frequently spoke of his Christian faith and family values when asked to comment on the mammoth success of his brand in the early 2000s. “When I got saved, God became my art agent,” Kinkade explained in a 2004 video. He went from a childhood in Placerville, Calif. (invariably characterized as “hard-scrabble”) to an apprenticeship selling his work in supermarket parking lots to his apotheosis as the nation’s “most profitable” artist, the Painter of Light™, and multimillionaire. He was profiled in the New Yorker by Susan Orlean.

I first learned about the dark side of the Painter of Light™ — sorry, couldn’t resist that one — when I reviewed “his” novel, “Cape Light,” in 2002. The novel, first in a series, was produced much as his paintings are: by a semi-industrial process in which low-level apprentices embellish a prefab base provided by Kinkade. He wasn’t the only artist to work in this way; he wasn’t even the only novelist. To the best of my knowledge, his novels — heartwarming, fuzzily pious tales of small-town life — have been coming out ever since, one more facet of a lifestyle brand that, at its most ambitious, included an entire Thomas Kinkade-themed housing development.

My review was just a goof intended to amuse Salon’s readers, but after it appeared, I began to receive emails from people who had sunk their life savings in Thomas Kinkade Signature Galleries (essentially, mall and shopping-district outlets for his prints) and been fleeced. I didn’t really understand how the financial architecture of Kinkade’s gallery empire worked, and I sure didn’t share their taste in wall art, but these people struck me as decent and sincere. They’d believed in Thomas Kinkade — not just in the man or the company, but in the ethos supposedly represented by his work, one in which (to quote Kinkade’s introduction to “Cape Light”) “people have the time to savor life’s simple pleasures” and lead “deep, satisfying lives.”

My conversations with these victims made me uneasy. Was there some relationship between the franchisees’ naivete, perhaps even their willful self-delusion, and their terrible taste? Was it hopelessly snobby to wonder that? What about Kinkade himself? He seemed to be at best a hypocrite and at worst a crook. Was there a meaningful connection between his bad conscience and his bad art? German thinkers of the 1930s would have said so, and they had plenty of opportunity to observe bad fascist art up close. Hermann Broch maintained that someone who chooses to make kitsch is “ethically depraved, a criminal willing radical evil.” The novelist Milan Kundera believes kitsch to be the natural expression of totalitarianism. That’s a lot of moral weight to place on a bunch of garish cottage paintings, but Kinkade was always the first to present his work as a form of ideology.

I felt compassion for the ripped-off gallery operators, and at the same time I was aware that quite a few of them had probably also fallen for the similarly sanctimonious, bogus folksiness of George W. Bush, thereby subjecting our nation to one of the worst presidents in its history. Kinkade and Bush struck me as of a piece, probably because they had both borrowed from Ronald Reagan in promising that we could get back to a better way of life that never existed in the first place. In nearly every encounter with the press, Kinkade delivered a diatribe against the art-world “establishment” that had shut him out. They were “elites” touting unfathomable, downer junk to hardworking people who needed uplift instead. Art snobs were the aesthetic counterparts of the so-called liberal elites, a group that surely included me.

At the same time, I must admit that I, too, like a cottage. Granted, I like the stylized, art-deco kind painted on bone china, rather than the insanely detailed and phosphorescently lit specimens in Kinkade’s pictures. And I’m in little danger of equating my new teacup with a Brancusi just because it’s cheerier. Nevertheless, I suspect that my idea of what’s pleasing about a cottage isn’t too different from that of Kinkade’s fans: an aura of harmless coziness, of modest domestic beauty and comfort not too cut off from the past. It’s as if we’re speaking the same word, but in different languages.

I suspect this is why Kinkade’s paintings have exerted their weird, hypnotic effect on me. They are so preposterous (especially the stream-side ones; he really needed to sit down with an architect and go over the basics of drainage), so awful. And yet I can still detect — beneath that cacophony of hollyhocks and cobblestones and snapdragons — the whisper of something intelligible. I’m pretty sure I know why the hordes of Kinkade collectors love his work, even if I don’t like it myself. Kinkade’s paintings are irredeemably false, like all kitsch, but through them you can just barely glimpse the honest desires they seek to exploit, sinking under the dreck.

Kundera defined kitsch as “the absolute denial of shit,” meaning it offers an airbrushed, sterilized, sentimentalized view of the world. From that, it doesn’t necessarily follow that art wallows in shit, but art doesn’t exist for the primary purpose of denying it, either. Kitsch is, first and foremost, a lie; its very existence is founded on bad faith.

Kinkade, like Bush, peddled a falsely simplified image of the world — one without mildew or flooded basements, for one thing — which, no surprise, turned out to be plastered over a whole lot of stinky stuff. The true believers, the ones who bought into these men the most during the 2000s, ended up paying some of the highest prices, from the Kinkade acolytes who invested in his gallery Ponzi scheme to the working-class red-staters who sent off their kids to die in a pointless war. Bad taste, harmless as it may seem, can end up costing you a lot.

Further reading

Los Angeles Times obituary for Thomas Kinkade

Susan Orlean’s 2001 profile of Thomas Kinkade for the New Yorker

A 2006 Los Angeles Times story documenting Kinkade’s business problems

Salon’s Janelle Brown visits Hiddenbrooke, a Kinkade-theme housing development in Northern California

Laura Miller reviews “Cape Light,” a novel by Thomas Kinkade and Katherine Spencer