George W. Bush

The next war: Bush and the Supreme Court

With William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O'Connor considering retirement, activists on all sides are preparing for a firefight over Bush's next high-court nominee.

Jane Doe was 17 and pregnant. She wanted an abortion, but she knew that her antiabortion parents wouldn’t approve. So she did what the law in Texas said she could do: She asked the courts to let her end her pregnancy without telling her parents first.

Jane Doe won her case. In June 2000, the Texas Supreme Court held that she had the right to an abortion without parental notification or consent. At the time, the decision was seen as at least a minor battlefield victory in the war for abortion rights. But now, three years later, it appears that the win may have come at a substantial cost. If the religious right has its way, “In re Jane Doe” will prevent George W. Bush from nominating to the U.S. Supreme Court the man who might — might — save legalized abortion in America: former Texas Supreme Court Justice and current White House Counsel Albert Gonzales.

The landmark Roe vs. Wade abortion ruling was unexpectedly on center stage Thursday as the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in another Texas case — this one reversing a state law that outlawed private gay sexual acts between consenting adults. The majority relied on the 1973 abortion ruling in holding that gay sex falls within a protected zone of human liberty; in a scathing, mocking dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that Roe vs. Wade was a mistake that should be overturned.

In the coming days, advocates and pundits will rail and rage over the court’s decision in the gay sex case and its implications for the future of Roe vs. Wade. But the more direct and immediate threat to abortion rights will be in decisions not yet made, or not yet announced: the possible retirement plans of two current Supreme Court justices, and whether President Bush will nominate Gonzales to replace one of those justices.

With the end of the Supreme Court’s 2002-2003 term Thursday, the retirement watch officially begins. Chief Justice William Rehnquist is 78 and in up-and-down health. Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor is 73 and apparently anxious to return home to Arizona. Rehnquist and O’Connor are both Republicans. If they want to let a Republican president name their replacements — and if they want to avoid the specter of a Supreme Court confirmation fight in the middle of an election year — they must either step down now or hang on and hope for the best until the summer of 2005.

It is possible that both of them will decide to wait, but most court observers expect at least one of the two — Rehnquist, probably — to retire.

“I suppose it’s possible that Chief Justice Rehnquist will surprise us and decide that [the political climate] is just too contentious at this point, and that if Bush is reelected by a landslide in 2004 then the American people will have spoken and he can step down and Bush can get his hard-right people on the court,” said Sheldon Goldman, a University of Massachusetts political science professor who studies judicial nominations. “But on the other side of the coin, Rehnquist might feel that he really does want to step down. He’s had some health problems; he’s getting on in years; he wants to enjoy the grandchildren or whatever, and he knows that it would be an impossibility to step down during a presidential election year.”

The time may be right for the chief justice, and it may be even better for the president. “If I were George W. Bush, I’d be looking for it to happen this summer,” said Nan Aron, president of the Alliance for Justice, a left-leaning public policy group that is closely tracking Bush’s judicial nominations. “He’s popular. He’s just off of having waged a successful war. He’s feeling his oats. And it’s not an election year.”

That’s the good news for Bush. The bad news is that he may not be able to produce a nominee to replace Rehnquist — or O’Connor - who will satisfy his right-wing base and still make it through the Senate. Hard-line conservatives have been enraged by this week’s Supreme Court decisions that rejected a Texas law against sodomy and that for the first time firmly upheld the principle of affirmative action; Bush will certainly feel intense pressure from that quarter to nominate someone inclined to reverse those decisions along with Roe vs. Wade. Liberals and progressives, meanwhile, have effectively focused their energy and resources to block extremist appellate court nominees like Miguel Estrada, Priscilla Owen and William Pryor. And they’ve signaled that they’re prepared to mount a powerful campaign if Bush nominates a hard-line conservative to the nation’s high court.

Advocates on both ends of the political spectrum — and, for the moment at least, everyday Americans — are paying close attention to the judicial branch. If Rehnquist or O’Connor steps down in the days ahead, and if Bush can’t find a Supreme Court nominee who will appease both the left and the right, this summer may bring a searing confirmation battle that touches every raw nerve in the body politic.

If either Rehnquist or O’Connor retires now, the odds-on favorite as a replacement will be White House counsel Alberto Gonzales. For the president, Gonzales is the complete package. At 47, he is young enough to stay on the court for decades. As a Hispanic, he represents a part of the ethnic geography where Republicans would like to make inroads. And as a relatively quiet conservative, he is someone the Democrats will have a hard time “branding as hardcore, right-wing ideologue,” says David Yalof, a University of Connecticut political science professor who studies judicial nominations.

That distinguishes Gonzales from the hard-swinging right-wingers thought to populate the rest of Bush’s short list. If Bush carries through with his campaign promise to nominate justices in the Scalia-Thomas mold — say, federal appellate Judge Michael Luttig — Senate Democrats could filibuster the nomination through the 2004 presidential election. But if Bush sends up the ostensibly more moderate Gonzales, Democrats may be willing to confirm his nomination, if only as the lesser of a lot of other evils.

There is a catch, however, and the Texas courts called her Jane Doe.

There are nine justices on the Texas Supreme Court. When Jane Doe’s case reached the court in 2000, all nine of those justices were Republicans. One was Priscilla Owen, the staunch conservative whose nomination to the U.S. Court of Appeals Senate Democrats are currently filibustering. Another was Alberto Gonzales.

“In re Jane Doe” required Owen, Gonzales and their colleagues to interpret the Texas Legislature’s Parental Notification Act. Like similar laws in a number of other states, the Texas act prohibits a young woman under 18 from obtaining an abortion without first notifying her parents unless she can establish in court that she is mature and “sufficiently well informed” to make the decision to abort on her own; that notifying a parent would not be in her best interest; or that notifying a parent might lead to physical, sexual or emotional abuse.

The girl known as Jane Doe claimed to meet the first of these tests — that is, she argued that she was mature and “sufficiently well informed” to make a decision to end her pregnancy without first telling her parents. Six of the nine justices agreed. Alberto Gonzales was one of them; Priscilla Owen was not.

Gonzales joined the majority’s opinion and also wrote separately to stress that he was simply applying the law the Texas Legislature had created. The law allowed for minors to seek abortions without parental consent through a procedure called a “judicial bypass,” and Gonzales said the court could not arbitrarily declare otherwise. “To construe the Parental Notification Act so narrowly as to eliminate bypasses, or to create hurdles that are not to be found in the words of the statute, would be an unconscionable act of judicial activism,” he wrote. Gonzales made it clear that he was personally unhappy that Jane Doe would be having an abortion without parental consent — he said he found it “personally troubling to me as a parent” — but he said he was bound to apply the law “without imposing my moral view on the decisions of the Legislature.”

Priscilla Owen apparently felt no such constraints. In her dissent, Owen launched an ad hominem attack on Jane Doe, suggesting that she simply wished to extract car payments, college tuition and living expenses out of them before springing the news about her abortion. Owen then set about adding additional antiabortion hurdles to ones she had attempted to erect in earlier opinions on the Parental Notification Act. Owen had previously argued that a girl should be denied an abortion unless she could prove to the courts that she could understand all the objections one might have to abortion — including those based on religious belief. This time around, Owen said the girl would also have to prove that she had a detailed understanding of adoption procedures and that she had sought advice about abortion from “a source who was inclined to thoroughly explore with her the adverse emotional and psychological impact that an abortion may have.”

Owen’s opinion has made her a hero for the hard right — so much so that Bush has now nominated her twice for the U.S. Court of Appeals and continues to fight for her confirmation in the face of the Democrats’ filibuster. But where Owens has won political support for dissenting from her Republican colleagues, Gonzales may soon find that joining with the Texas court’s majority — and exercising the judicial restraint so often trumpeted by the GOP — has blocked the way for his own future on the bench. Seizing exclusively on his opinion in the Jane Doe case, antiabortion activists have declared unequivocally that Gonzales is “pro-choice” and therefore unacceptable. In the process, what Gonzales actually wrote in the case has been distorted beyond recognition; antiabortion advocates have taken to calling Gonzales “pro-choice,” and one commentator even went so far as to claim that, in the Jane Doe case, Gonzales had “voted to strike down a mere parental-notification bill.”

Aside from “In re Jane Doe,” Gonzales was a reliable conservative vote on the Texas Supreme Court, often siding with corporate defendants and advocating a narrow view of the powers of government. As White House counsel, Gonzales has shown his Bush-Cheney bona fides on any number of matters — by helping select right-wing judicial nominees, by backing the administration’s intrusive anti-terror policies, and by supporting at every turn the president’s and vice president’s penchants for secrecy in government.

Liberal interest groups are concerned about Gonzales, especially over his role in the war on terror and the judicial selection process, but their criticism of him is noticeably more muted than the harsh words they have to say about many other candidates believed to be on Bush’s short list. Aron complains that much of what Gonzales has “done, initiated or promoted has been to tilt the law in this country in a rightward fashion,” but she acknowledges that “there are those who consider him the moderate candidate.”

Elliot Mincberg, legal director for People for the American Way, predicts immediate and intense opposition if Bush nominates a hard-righter like Luttig — a friend and supporter of Clarence Thomas who, like Thomas, was named to the federal appellate court at an age when most lawyers are just coming into their own — but a more slow-simmering reaction if Gonzales gets the bid. Mincberg said Gonzales’ record “raises troubling questions in a whole range of areas,” but he added that People for the American Way has not “looked at his record thoroughly enough” to form a complete opinion about him. “With someone like Gonzales, who does not have a record in so many areas, hearings would be very important.”

For Democrats awaiting a nominee from the Bush administration, an unknown quantity may be the best they can expect. When the choice is a proven hard-right jurist or a pig in a poke, the pig begins to look pretty attractive. But that same uncertainty is unacceptable to the activists on the right. For many of them, winning the presidency was merely a step along the way to the real prize: control of the Supreme Court, and the decisive vote to overturn Roe vs. Wade. Thus, while Bush presumably won’t appoint Gonzales unless he has been assured that his pick won’t come back to haunt him, activists on the right may not be willing to take any chances. They remember the last time a Republican appointed a “trust me” candidate. The President was George Herbert Walker Bush and the nominee was David Souter, who has turned out to be one of the more liberal members of the court. Stop in on a Republican-right Web site this month, and you’re likely to see the words: “Gonzales is Spanish for Souter.”

So what will Bush do? It probably depends on who retires.

The stakes are high whenever a Supreme Court justice retires and a president nominates a replacement. That said, some nominations are more important than others. When a president replaces a retiring justice with a like-minded nominee, he merely maintains the status quo. But when the Supreme Court is closely divided — as it is now — and a justice who leans one way may be replaced by a president who leans the other, the changing of the guard can result in a dramatic change in the country.

By that standard, the retirement of Sandra Day O’Connor is much more important — at least for progressives — than that of William Rehnquist. Richard Nixon named Rehnquist to the court in 1971, and Ronald Reagan elevated him to chief justice in 1986. While Rehnquist seldom engages in the verbal fireworks of an Antonin Scalia — and has not been a lightning rod for liberal complaint like Clarence Thomas — his votes and opinions over the years have been unrelentingly conservative.

He voted with the 5-4 majority in Bush vs. Gore, he has repeatedly voted to uphold the death penalty and to limit the power of the federal government, and in 1973 he was one of only two justices to dissent in Roe vs. Wade. On Thursday, Rehnquist joined in Scalia’s dissent in the Texas sodomy case. In that dissent, Scalia sharply attacked Roe, mocking the 1992 decision that affirmed Roe and arguing that the rationale that the majority used Thursday to uphold the right to engage in gay sex also should lead the court to revisit — and presumably reverse — Roe.

For Republicans, Sandra Day O’Connor has been a much more vexing justice. Although she was nominated in 1981 by conservative icon Ronald Reagan, O’Connor has been an unreliable vote on some of the issues that matter most to Republicans. Over the course of the last decade, O’Connor has been the swing vote on social issues such as race and abortion, frequently — but not always — siding with Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter to create a 5-4 majority over Rehnquist, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas. Just this week, O’Connor’s swing vote determined the outcome in a California criminal case, a Georgia voting-rights case and the Michigan affirmative action case.

“Replacing Rehnquist with another like-minded conservative changes nothing,” said the University of Connecticut’s Yalof. “But replacing O’Connor with a more consistent conservative changes everything. That is the kind of calculus that is very much in the minds of Senate Democrats.”

Of course, the calculus shifts depending on who resigns and when. If only Rehnquist steps down this summer, Bush could nominate a hard-line conservative in his place but throw a bone to Democrats by elevating O’Connor to the Chief Justice position at the same time. It would be a low-cost, largely symbolic move for the White House. Having O’Connor as chief justice rather than associate justice wouldn’t change any Supreme Court vote counts, and her tenure in the position would likely be short in any event. But by elevating her, Bush could deflect much of the criticism that would come with the hard-right nominee by trumpeting the fact that he had named the first female chief justice — and a relatively moderate one at that.

But if only O’Connor steps down this summer, even this sort of symbolic compromise may prove impossible. For both Republicans and Democrats, O’Connor’s seat is the prize. Republicans desperately want it, and Democrats can’t give it up.

“Democrats see Sandra Day O’Connor as a vote for Roe vs. Wade,” Goldman explained. “They will pull out all the stops to prevent an anti-Roe person from replacing her. And they might be able to energize the vast middle that doesn’t want to see the possibility of the option of a woman being able to have an abortion taken away.”

If Bush concludes that he can’t offend his base with Gonzales and that he can’t get any of the other shortlist hard-liners confirmed to replace O’Connor, he may look to jam the Democrats with a choice they find harder to refuse. He could do that with race, naming — as his father did — a conservative African-American such as Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson or California Supreme Court Justice Janice Brown. Or he could do it with personal politics, naming Utah Republican Sen. Orrin Hatch. Hatch might be as hardcore a nominee as any Bush could send up, but his status as one of the Senate’s own would likely lead to his confirmation.

“I think Orrin would be approved by the Senate,” said retired Democratic Sen. Paul Simon, who helped lead the charge against Clarence Thomas’ nomination and has since written a book on the judicial selection process. “The Senate club feature has diminished over the years, but it is still a factor, and it really does carry some weight.”

Simon and a handful of other Democrats met with President Bush the day after he was inaugurated. Bush wanted to know how to reach out to Democrats; Simon said he advised Bush to work cooperatively on judicial appointees, particularly on appointments to the Supreme Court. Bush took some notes and said, “Interesting,” Simon said.

While Bush may have taken notes, he clearly hasn’t taken the advice. “Just about everybody would have hoped for a more consensual process,” said an aide to one Democratic member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. While it’s possible Bush will work more closely with Democrats on a Supreme Court nominee than he has with lower-court candidates, Democrats in the Senate aren’t counting on it. “There will be a desire to uphold the president’s nomination,” the aide said, but not “if the president is provocative and divisive in who he selects.”

And given Bush’s track record to date — with Owen, with Miguel Estrada, with William Pryor and others — there is considerable reason to believe that any Bush nominee to the Supreme Court will fit that bill.

“There’s no question that Bush might have some interest in tacking a bit more moderately as people approach the 2004 elections,” said Mincberg of People for the American Way. “But judicial selection is an issue where, at least so far, Bush has shown that his philosophy is ‘dance with the one who brung ya.’ He has stuck with the philosophy of looking at judges who are like Scalia and Thomas.”

That history would suggest that Bush will choose someone like Judge Emilio Garza of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals or either Luttig or J. Harvie Wilkinson III from the conservative 4th Circuit. Luttig and Wilkinson are friends and rivals, parrying back and forth in intellectual exchanges from the right end — at least figuratively speaking — of the 4th Circuit bench. Luttig can be heavy-handed with both his colleagues and the law; he hounds his fellow judges when he doesn’t think their opinions measure up to his own exacting standards. Wilkinson goes for a lighter touch, even if he is, by some measures, even more conservative than Luttig is. In the cynical world where nominees’ personal histories become selling points, Luttig has something to offer: His father was murdered, and Luttig moved his chambers from Alexandria, Va., to Texas for the duration of the killer’s trial.

But if the Senate Democrats hold firm — and so far, they have shown that they can — Bush may not be able to get any of these shortlisters confirmed, at least not as a one-for-one replacement for O’Connor. But if both Rehnquist and O’Connor step down this summer, Bush will have two seats to fill and more room to maneuver. Bush could appoint a proven conservative to Rehnquist’s seat and Gonzales to O’Connor’s. “The strategy is to go for a home run with one and try to be more politically moderate with the other,” Yalof explained, citing the precedent Richard Nixon established in 1971 when he appointed the conservative Rehnquist together with Lewis Powell, who was at least nominally a Democrat. Rehnquist was confirmed 68-26, Powell, 89-1.

While no one expects Bush to appoint a Democrat, nominal or otherwise, Alberto Gonzales may be close enough to make the strategy work. But it only works if Bush can play on the uncertainty over Gonzales’ views to his advantage, leaving both Republicans and Democrats thinking that they are getting a nominee they can tolerate. If Republicans can see in him a trusted Bush loyalist, and Democrats can see in him a hope for protecting abortion rights, both sides might be able to live with him, at least if he is packaged at the same time with a more palatable antiabortion nominee.

“Sometimes conflicting perceptions based on different perspectives and different sources of research can result in the parties’ having very different views of the same candidate,” Yalof said. “It can result in a political explosion, but it can also result in a marriage of convenience. That may be what the Republicans are thinking now: Can we find somebody we love that they won’t hate?”

In the end, that may not be easy to do. As a candidate, Bush offered words of praise for Scalia and Thomas, telling the Weekly Standard at one point that he admired Scalia in particular for “the judicial philosophy he defends.” If Scalia and Thomas are Bush’s models, there simply may be no room for compromise, and the battles over appellate court nominees like Owen and Estrada will have been only the warm-up for a summer smackdown to come. Interest groups on both sides are preparing for the fight, and they each want to be ready to throw the first punch.

“What’s going to be very important for progressives, including us, is to try to be able, very quickly upon a nomination, to articulate concerns and problems,” said Mincberg. Advocacy groups were successful in making their concerns known out of the box when Reagan nominated Robert Bork to the court in 1987, but not as successful when the first President Bush nominated Clarence Thomas four years later. The Senate rejected Bork 58-42 but confirmed Thomas 52-48. Getting out front with a message this time is “an important thing for us to do,” Mincberg said.

It also may be an easier thing to do this time around. While lower-court nominations are usually the stuff of inside politics, issues surrounding Owen and Estrada — and, more recently, William Pryor — have begun to catch the public’s attention. People are beginning to form opinions about the kinds of candidates Bush nominates, and the ways in which the Democrats respond.

“Never before, or at least not in the past several decades, have judicial nominations taken on such visible role,” Aron said. “They’re a front-burner issue now, and the public spotlight has been on judicial nominations for months. You have more people interested, many more organizations involved in the process, and that means the stakes are that much higher and the battle will be that much more energetic and visible than it ever has been before.”

Tim Grieve is a senior writer and the author of Salon's War Room blog.

Using Bush’s playbook

"Karl Rove politics" aren't quite dead: Obama's strategy in 2012 will mirror W's in 2004

George W. Bush and Barack Obama (Credit: Reuters/Larry Downing)

Barack Obama’s presidency was born from nothing so much as his repudiation of George W. Bush’s administration — its policies and politics, its style and tone. One of Obama’s most effective 2008 stump speech refrains was his promise to end the era of “Scooter Libby justice, ‘Brownie’ incompetence and Karl Rove politics.”

But the political dynamics for winning a second presidential term often differ markedly from winning the first. So don’t be surprised by many eerie parallels between Obama’s 2012 reelection bid and Bush’s 2004 campaign. The president may not rely upon “Karl Rove politics” in the strictest sense, and nobody would confuse David Axelrod with Rove. But Obama’s reelection route and rhetoric may bear more than a few Rovian hallmarks.

Now that Mitt Romney has won the Republican nomination, two key features prevail over the 2012 campaign — and both were also plainly evident in 2004. First, the incumbent president’s reelection fortunes are far from certain; and, second, the incumbent faces a decent but nevertheless weak challenger who is further hampered by internal problems within his party’s coalition.

Because incumbents can’t run for reelection promising “change,” and because “hope” during a lingering recession was also off the menu, the Obama campaign’s 2012 theme of  “forward” — a word that often follows “plow,” mind you — was the best available alternative. That said, and substituting the economy for terrorism, Obama is implicitly if not explicitly advancing the same theme Bush did in 2004: America suffered a tough blow, but the situation could have been worse and, more to the point, under my stewardship the nation is steadily regaining its footing.

This counterfactual campaign theme — vote for me not because of what happened, but what might have but didn’t — is a common thread for Bush and Obama. It’s not an uplifting message, but it sufficed in 2004 and Obama is counting on it working again in 2012.

Politics 101 further dictates that when an incumbent’s reelection is in doubt, he must go negative against the challenger. Obama political operatives in the White House and at the Democratic National Committee long ago made it abundantly clear they were willing to do just that. Team Obama may not go negative against Romney to the degree the Bush camp did against John Kerry in 2004. (By mid-summer 2004, 75 percent of Bush’s TV ads were negative attacks on Kerry.) But don’t be surprised if attacks on Romney’s record and even character are plentiful, harsh and relentless. In 2008, America saw candidate Obama’s toothy grin; four years later, expect to see President Obama’s fangs.

Expect the Obama camp to emphasize two major critiques of Romney: that he is a flip-flopper willing to say anything or reverse any position to win; and that he is an economic royalist whose personal and public life suggest a person incapable of understanding the lives and struggles of average Americans. Again — note the unusual parallels with 2004.

Although Romney is a Republican former governor and Kerry was at the time his state’s Democratic junior U.S. senator, the two Massachusetts pols make for similar targets. Each man is an extraordinarily rich preppie and Ivy Leaguer. Each represents the liberal wing of his respective party. Each has shown a propensity for ruining an otherwise valid point with sloppy, backfiring language. And each has a reputation for lacking political spine.

The flip-flop frame is candidate character assassination of the first order. Like the lone negative number in a string of multiplied positives, the critique that nobody can trust any statement or claim made by a politician has the potential to negate every accomplishment or promise. If it sticks, it can be fatal, as Kerry learned in 2004.

Obama and the Democratic National Committee know their electoral history and, sure enough, last November — a year before the election and two full months before a single Iowan had caucused — the DNC released a four-minute “Mitt vs. Mitt” ad and its accompanying website with the damning tag line, “the story of two men trapped in one body.” The site is a brilliant homage to the Bush campaign’s 2004 windsurfer attack ad and the devastating, 11-minute ad the Republican National Committee produced chronicling Kerry’s “evolution” on Iraq.

And then there is what might be called “the Willard factor”: Romney as Richy Rich, the Monopoly Guy with the Bain Capital background and the Swiss bank account. His bio would be political gold to Romney’s opponent any election cycle, but it’s gold-plated platinum in the first full presidential campaign following the biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression, the rise of the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the long overdue national debate over income inequality.

Again, the wealth-personified line of attack mirrors the out-of-touch, Martha’s Vineyard yoke the Bush team put around Kerry’s neck in 2004. Right on cue, in the first public event of his reelection campaign, last week Obama attacked Romney by name and invoked the economic disconnect card with relish. “He sincerely believes that if CEOs and wealthy investors like him make money the rest of us will automatically prosper as well,” said Obama of Romney, adding that “corporations aren’t people – -people are people.” (For the record, Kerry is actually wealthier than Romney, who would become one of the richest men ever to occupy the White House, should he win.)

Obama will also try to shift the national debate toward areas of strength, as Bush did. Historically, this meant the same strategy, but with inverse implications for each party: The so-called mommy party Democrats would encourage voters to focus on more favorable kitchen-table economy issues — healthcare, jobs, education — and away from less favorable “daddy party” Republican issues surrounding foreign wars abroad and culture wars. Because Obama is net-positive in foreign policy approval and net-negative on the economy, rather than mirroring by inversion, Obama will try to duplicate Bush’s shift-in-emphasis in 2004. GOP complaints that Obama is politicizing the killing of Osama bin Laden reveal Republican fears that Obama is going to play the terrorism card in 2012 just like Bush did eight years ago.

The 2004 parallels extend beyond message. Obama will be amply resourced and enjoy a field technology by virtue of his campaign’s state-of-the-art Web, donor, volunteer and social media innovations. Remember the Bush reelection campaign’s vaunted “72-hour” voter turnout model? That seems like an Edsel compared to the Ferrari the Obama team will be sporting this summer and fall. Among the perquisites modern presidential incumbents enjoy is the option to test-drive the best mobilization machines before anyone else.

Finally, what most connects Obama 2012 to Bush 2004 is the stability of the electoral map itself. Only three states — two net to Bush — flipped from one party to the other between 2000 and 2004; only nine states flipped between 2004 and 2008. Split the difference and a good, back-of-the-napkin over-under for number of states likely to flip between 2008 and 2012 is six. And thus, like the lead sailboat during a windless race, Obama doesn’t need or want conditions to change much from 2008: He merely has to replicate the map that swept him into office, with the burden of figuring out how to shake up the Electoral College falling to Romney, just as it did for Kerry against Bush. Even Karl Rove’s mapping of the 2012 election concedes this reality.

The 2008 election was memorable; to borrow the title of one best-selling chronicle, it was a “game changer.” But 2012 will not be. In many respects, it will be a game repeater, with Obama playing Bush to Romney’s Kerry of 2004. The president may be asking Americans to look “forward” in 2012, but the best preview of his reelection campaign can be found by looking backward eight years.

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The Bushies are back

Missed the neocons? Don't worry: Mitt Romney's getting the band together again

(Credit: Reuters/Win McNamee)

There was good reason for Republicans to cry foul over the Obama campaign’s advertisement highlighting the president’s killing of Osama bin Laden; the GOP has lost its decades-long edge on national security. According to a Washington Post poll, “By a margin of more than 2 to 1, Americans say the president’s handling of terrorism is a major reason to support rather than oppose his bid for reelection.”

Republicans lost their popularity on security issues for one reason: George W. Bush’s foreign policy was a disaster. And yet, the party’s nominee, Mitt Romney, has assembled a foreign-policy team composed almost exclusively of individuals with the same war-always mentality and ideology that served Bush — and the United States — so poorly. In some cases, the exact same men responsible for Bush’s catastrophic national security policies are advising Romney. The former Massachusetts governor could have included some of the pragmatists and realists from the George H.W. Bush administration. Instead, a Romney presidency seems like it would be Bush 43 all over again.

Richard Grenell, who served as United Nations spokesman under Bush, may be gone from the Romney campaign after an uproar over his sexuality, but there are plenty more former Bushies. First off, there are Romney’s “special advisors.” There’s Michael Chertoff, W.’s Homeland Security director. Chertoff oversaw DHS’s failures during Hurricane Katrina, and amassed unprecedented powers of secrecy. Next up is Eliot Cohen, counselor to the State Department for Bush’s last two years and on the Defense Policy Advisory Board for the president’s entire term. Cohen was an adamant supporter of the Iraq War and advised Bush directly on the issue. Or take Cofer Black, the man who infamously said to Bush in September 2011 about al-Qaida that “When we’re through with them they will have flies walking across their eyeballs.” Black went on to become chairman of Blackwater, where he resigned after the company illegally bribed Iraqi officials.

Then there are the 13 “working groups” composed of equally worrisome individuals. The Middle East and North Africa Working Group is co-chaired by Bush’s Assistant Secretary of Defense Mary Beth Long, and Meghan O’Sullivan, Bush’s special assistant and deputy national security advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. The remaining co-chair is Walid Phares, who never worked for Bush but advised Lebanese warlords in the 1980s. Romney has reportedly promised Phares a top job in his administration, despite his virulently anti-Islamic views.

All told, Romney lists 37 holdovers from the George W. Bush administration — the very same administration he and all other Republican candidates barely referenced during their many debates because it was so discredited and toxic, even to the Republican base.

It didn’t have to be this way. There are, in fact, people in Republican circles who are sensible on international affairs. The Cato Institute, in particular, has experts that could dramatically change the direction of American foreign policy. Men like Justin Logan and Christopher Preble were prescient on Iraq and a host of other issues. Similarly, the Center for the National Interest (formerly the Nixon Center) has a host of solid scholars, including ones like Dimitri Simes and Geoffrey Kemp, who have valuable government experience in the Nixon and Reagan administrations, respectively, and a history of perceptive analysis. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, would have been another good pick.

So why aren’t guys like this being tapped? Why is the GOP sticking with a discredited foreign-policy approach rather that looking to its own past for wiser counsel? “Most of the realists and pragmatists have simply been driven out of the Republican Party,” says Stephen Walt, who writes a blog at Foreign Policy and teaches at Harvard. “The neoconservatives have been driving the agenda since Bush was elected and they remain well-entrenched.”

Another factor is that the Republican Party’s base remains strongly militaristic and reluctant to recognize limits on American power. Jon Huntsman’s failed presidential campaign illustrated that problem. The good news is that nobody seems to be calling for nation-building and occupying foreign countries in the mold of Iraq and Afghanistan. But that’s the only lesson that seems to have been learned from the last decade of foreign-policy debacles.

Finally, it may just be that the United States has too much power to change course. While the Unites States has undoubtedly made disastrous decisions in the last decades, it is so powerful that it is largely insulated from the consequences of them. If Romney’s foreign-policy advisor list is anything to go by, a Romney administration would have to teach the U.S. all over again about the problems with trying to police the world. Prepare for Bush redux.

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Jordan Michael Smith writes about U.S. foreign policy for Salon. He has written for the New York Times, Boston Globe and Washington Post.

Bush aide blasts torture

Philip Zelikow tried to warn Bush on interrogations. Now he's penned an authoritative article on how he was ignored

(Credit: Reuters/Jim Young)

The Bush administration hasn’t heard the last from Philip Zelikow. After the rediscovery last week of his long lost 2006 anti-torture memo, Zelikow, a former State Department official, has written arguably the most damning article yet about U.S. government’s interrogation policies from 2001 to 2009. The article, called “Codes of Conduct for a Twilight War,” will be released in a forthcoming issue of the Houston Law Journal, and was obtained exclusively by Salon. Says Zelikow in an email: “I’m not aware of other accounts that combine historical, policy and legal approaches to” the subject of the Bush administration’s interrogation methods.

Based on published histories and his firsthand observations, and adapted from a lecture delivered in November, the article calls the administration’s rationale for its use of torture — which he nonetheless insists only on calling “extreme interrogation” and “coercive methods” — “radical,” “an amazing contention,” “untenable and extreme,” “unsustainable,” “an unprecedented program of coolly calculated dehumanizing abuse and physical torment,” and, finally, simply a “mistake.” He concludes: “This was a collective failure of American public leadership, in which a number of officials and members of Congress (and staffers) of both parties played a part, endorsing a CIA program of physical coercion without any precedent in U.S. history.”  In fact, “The only defense against criminal prosecution would be that officials acted in good faith reliance on the advice of their government lawyers.”

Part of what makes Zelikow’s analysis so damning and definitive is its judiciousness. The article is deeply empathetic of the uniquely fearful situation under which the Bush administration was initially operating. Zelikow calls the Sept. 11 attacks a “collective trauma” and a “shoc[k] to mass beliefs.” He notes that Bush and others spent time in burn units, morgues and with survivors of the attacks. One traumatic experienced often overlooked — overlooked because it appeared in Stephen Hayes’ stenographic biography of Dick Cheney — was that the vice-president’s daughter was (falsely, it turns out) told that her house with her children in it had tested positive for anthrax. Similarly, Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice were told that they and others had been exposed to an extremely lethal toxin in a particular area of the White House — and might soon die as a result. “The alarms did not stop and they too were not abstract … The pressure on Bush and his senior advisers was so direct because so much of the response had to be invented and improvised,” the article reads.

An additional factor in the power of the article is Zelikow’s credibility and history. Before entering government, he was a civil rights lawyer in Texas battling the Ku Klux Klan and then a highly esteemed Harvard historian specializing in U.S. foreign policy — he co-authored one book with Rice. He then served on the National Security Council under President George H.W. Bush and directed the 9/11 Commission before becoming counselor to Rice at the State Department from 2005 to 2007. He currently volunteers part-time on the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board under President Obama.

Such bipartisan, establishment credentials render the breakdown and conclusion of this article all the more damning. He believes that what should have been a political and moral question — should the United States torture captives? — became strictly a legal matter left up to government lawyers, few of whom had any experience with these issues, and who had to take the necessity of extreme measures as a given. “These lawyers then became secular priests, granting absolution to the supplicant policymakers,” Zelikow writes.

The problems began when the Office of the Vice President and the CIA took central roles in policymaking. Cheney felt himself above the rest of the National Security Council, bypassing Rice and other traditional channels of national security policymaking. Ad-hoc decision-making and improvisation became “a habit of thought,” which seemed initially to pay off in the security of the nation, as well as in Bush’s political standing and self-confidence.

With Cheney and CIA head George Tenet “the key entrepreneurs in setting codes of conduct for the War on Terror,” it was essentially left to their obsequious lawyers to decide, in secret, on the interrogation methods America should employ. Bush even told the Senate’s Intelligence Committee chairman that “the vice president should be your point of contact … [He] has the portfolio for intelligence activities.” Decisions were made to jettison international treaties. By December 2001, the CIA was already interested in reverse-engineering methods “heretofore used only to treat Americans to resist enemy torture.” When a senior al-Qaida member was captured in March 2002, the prototype for the administration’s torture policies was already developed. “So, for the first time in American history, leaders of the U.S. government carefully devised ways and means to torment enemy captives.”

Zelikow notes that “None of the policy or moral issues connected with these choices appear to have been analyzed in any noticeable way.” Perhaps worst of all, no serious consideration was given to weighing the costs of benefits of the torture program, with reference to relevant historical precedents and/or examinations of the respective French, British and Israeli experiences in dealing with captured terrorists. “Bush and Rice should have insisted on this,” Zelikow writes.

The 52-page article observes the successes of Obama’s counterterrorism policies after repudiating the use of torture. On the basis of the empirical evidence then, “[t]here is no evident correlations between intelligence success and the available of extreme interrogation methods,” no matter what Bush and Cheney claim. Finally, “The program’s costs — which include the high-level effort expended in order to establish, maintain, and defense the program — appear on the evidence so far to have well outweighed any unique value the program might have had as a method of counterterrorism intelligence collection.” This is apart from the damage to America’s international standing and corrosion of its traditional values.

Zelikow concludes his analysis by arguing that, although the Obama administration has the right to wage war and use extralegal methods to defeat al-Qaida, its claim of that authority to defeat “associated forces” is unwarranted. “The U.S. government should publish and explain any overarching policy and legal documents that guide and confine the conduct of deadly operation against its foreign enemies … the executive branch of the U.S. government has a duty to articulate the scope of its warfare to the Congress and the public.” The Bush administration’s unprecedented elevation of torture to national policy may be history, but the job to get U.S. foreign policy in line with its constitutional and moral obligations is far from over.

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Jordan Michael Smith writes about U.S. foreign policy for Salon. He has written for the New York Times, Boston Globe and Washington Post.

Thomas Kinkade, the George W. Bush of art

The rise and fall of Thomas Kinkade, the Painter of Light™ in a decade of bad faith

News of Thomas Kinkade’s death arrived on the same day I received in the mail a vintage teacup on which I had spent a ridiculous amount of money. It has a cottage painted on it. Kinkade, whose work has long exerted a morbid fascination for me (to the concern of all my friends), specialized in cottages. So some part of me understands the appeal, I guess, but, damn: Those paintings make my corneas hurt. And yet, I could barely stop looking at them.

Kinkade was only 54, and his family told the media that he died of “natural causes.” This comes after years of reports of drunken public misbehavior: cursing at people who tried to save him from falling off bar stools, heckling Siegfried & Roy, grabbing a woman’s breasts at a publicity event and, most memorably, urinating on a Winnie the Pooh statue at the Disneyland Hotel while proclaiming, “This one’s for you, Walt!” There were DUI arrests. Also, his manufacturing company declared bankruptcy two years ago, and former franchisees of the once-ubiquitous Thomas Kinkade Signature Galleries won settlements against him for fraud.

That’s quite a fall for a man who frequently spoke of his Christian faith and family values when asked to comment on the mammoth success of his brand in the early 2000s. “When I got saved, God became my art agent,” Kinkade explained in a 2004 video. He went from a childhood in Placerville, Calif. (invariably characterized as “hard-scrabble”) to an apprenticeship selling his work in supermarket parking lots to his apotheosis as the nation’s “most profitable” artist, the Painter of Light™, and multimillionaire. He was profiled in the New Yorker by Susan Orlean.

I first learned about the dark side of the Painter of Light™ — sorry, couldn’t resist that one — when I reviewed “his” novel, “Cape Light,” in 2002. The novel, first in a series, was produced much as his paintings are: by a semi-industrial process in which low-level apprentices embellish a prefab base provided by Kinkade. He wasn’t the only artist to work in this way; he wasn’t even the only novelist. To the best of my knowledge, his novels — heartwarming, fuzzily pious tales of small-town life — have been coming out ever since, one more facet of a lifestyle brand that, at its most ambitious, included an entire Thomas Kinkade-themed housing development.

My review was just a goof intended to amuse Salon’s readers, but after it appeared, I began to receive emails from people who had sunk their life savings in Thomas Kinkade Signature Galleries (essentially, mall and shopping-district outlets for his prints) and been fleeced. I didn’t really understand how the financial architecture of Kinkade’s gallery empire worked, and I sure didn’t share their taste in wall art, but these people struck me as decent and sincere. They’d believed in Thomas Kinkade — not just in the man or the company, but in the ethos supposedly represented by his work, one in which (to quote Kinkade’s introduction to “Cape Light”) “people have the time to savor life’s simple pleasures” and lead “deep, satisfying lives.”

My conversations with these victims made me uneasy. Was there some relationship between the franchisees’ naivete, perhaps even their willful self-delusion, and their terrible taste? Was it hopelessly snobby to wonder that? What about Kinkade himself? He seemed to be at best a hypocrite and at worst a crook. Was there a meaningful connection between his bad conscience and his bad art? German thinkers of the 1930s would have said so, and they had plenty of opportunity to observe bad fascist art up close. Hermann Broch maintained that someone who chooses to make kitsch is “ethically depraved, a criminal willing radical evil.” The novelist Milan Kundera believes kitsch to be the natural expression of totalitarianism. That’s a lot of moral weight to place on a bunch of garish cottage paintings, but Kinkade was always the first to present his work as a form of ideology.

I felt compassion for the ripped-off gallery operators, and at the same time I was aware that quite a few of them had probably also fallen for the similarly sanctimonious, bogus folksiness of George W. Bush, thereby subjecting our nation to one of the worst presidents in its history. Kinkade and Bush struck me as of a piece, probably because they had both borrowed from Ronald Reagan in promising that we could get back to a better way of life that never existed in the first place. In nearly every encounter with the press, Kinkade delivered a diatribe against the art-world “establishment” that had shut him out. They were “elites” touting unfathomable, downer junk to hardworking people who needed uplift instead. Art snobs were the aesthetic counterparts of the so-called liberal elites, a group that surely included me.

At the same time, I must admit that I, too, like a cottage. Granted, I like the stylized, art-deco kind painted on bone china, rather than the insanely detailed and phosphorescently lit specimens in Kinkade’s pictures. And I’m in little danger of equating my new teacup with a Brancusi just because it’s cheerier. Nevertheless, I suspect that my idea of what’s pleasing about a cottage isn’t too different from that of Kinkade’s fans: an aura of harmless coziness, of modest domestic beauty and comfort not too cut off from the past. It’s as if we’re speaking the same word, but in different languages.

I suspect this is why Kinkade’s paintings have exerted their weird, hypnotic effect on me. They are so preposterous (especially the stream-side ones; he really needed to sit down with an architect and go over the basics of drainage), so awful. And yet I can still detect — beneath that cacophony of hollyhocks and cobblestones and snapdragons — the whisper of something intelligible. I’m pretty sure I know why the hordes of Kinkade collectors love his work, even if I don’t like it myself. Kinkade’s paintings are irredeemably false, like all kitsch, but through them you can just barely glimpse the honest desires they seek to exploit, sinking under the dreck.

Kundera defined kitsch as “the absolute denial of shit,” meaning it offers an airbrushed, sterilized, sentimentalized view of the world. From that, it doesn’t necessarily follow that art wallows in shit, but art doesn’t exist for the primary purpose of denying it, either. Kitsch is, first and foremost, a lie; its very existence is founded on bad faith.

Kinkade, like Bush, peddled a falsely simplified image of the world — one without mildew or flooded basements, for one thing — which, no surprise, turned out to be plastered over a whole lot of stinky stuff. The true believers, the ones who bought into these men the most during the 2000s, ended up paying some of the highest prices, from the Kinkade acolytes who invested in his gallery Ponzi scheme to the working-class red-staters who sent off their kids to die in a pointless war. Bad taste, harmless as it may seem, can end up costing you a lot.

Further reading

Los Angeles Times obituary for Thomas Kinkade

Susan Orlean’s 2001 profile of Thomas Kinkade for the New Yorker

A 2006 Los Angeles Times story documenting Kinkade’s business problems

Salon’s Janelle Brown visits Hiddenbrooke, a Kinkade-theme housing development in Northern California

Laura Miller reviews “Cape Light,” a novel by Thomas Kinkade and Katherine Spencer

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Laura Miller

Laura Miller is a senior writer for Salon. She is the author of "The Magician's Book: A Skeptic's Adventures in Narnia" and has a Web site, magiciansbook.com.

The memo Bush tried to destroy

A document advising the Bush administration against torture has resurfaced, despite his best efforts to hide it

George W. Bush in 2006 (Credit: AP/Ron Edmonds)

In February of 2006, Philip Zelikow, counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, authored a memo opposing the Bush administration’s torture practices (though he employed the infamous obfuscation of “enhanced interrogation techniques”). The White House tried to collect and destroy all copies of the memo, but one survived in the State Department’s bowels and was declassified yesterday in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive.

The memo argues that the Convention Against Torture, and the Constitution’s prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, do indeed apply to the CIA’s use of “waterboard[ing], walling, dousing, stress positions, and cramped confinement.” Zelikow further wrote in the memo that “we are unaware of any precedent in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, or any subsequent conflict for authorized, systematic interrogation practices similar to those in question here, even when the prisoners were presumed to be unlawful combatants.” According to the memo, the techniques are legally prohibited, even if there is a compelling state interest to justify them, since they should be considered cruel and unusual punishment and “shock the conscience.”

Chillingly, the memo notes that “corrective techniques, such as slaps,” may be legally sustained, as might be “[C]ontrol conditions, such as nudity, sleep deprivation, and liquid diets…depending on the circumstances and details of how these techniques are used.” However much distress Zelikow’s memo caused the White House, it was not an ACLU briefing paper.

“I’m pleased the memo is now part of the historical record and available for study,” Zelikow wrote Salon in an email. The White House had determined that the memo — which was not binding since Zelikow’s was a bureaucratic position without legal authority — was too dangerous to exist. “I later heard the memo was not considered appropriate for further discussion and that copies of my memo should be collected and destroyed,” he said in a May 2009 congressional hearing.

At that hearing, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Zelikow said he had “no view on whether former officials should be prosecuted,” a decision he thinks should be left to “institutions.” However, he did call for a thorough inquiry and a public report examining how the U.S. came to employ torture.

Of course, no such inquiry was ever launched. The Obama administration declined to revisit the U.S. employment of torture, with the president saying he didn’t want to “look back.” Zelikow believes this was a mistake. “I still believe an inquiry would be useful, though less so as time passes and more information becomes available, especially after the 9/11 trials conclude, hopefully this year,” he says in an email.

During his congressional testimony, Zelikow declined to say whether Department of Justice lawyers acted improperly or immorally, conceding only that their opinions were “unsound, even unreasonable.” But in a 2007 lecture in Houston, he had no problem saying “the cool, carefully considered, methodical, prolonged, and repeated subjection of captives to physical torment, and the accompanying psychological terror, is immoral.”

The importance of the memo lies in its revelation that there was real, serious debate inside the Bush administration about how to interrogate captured terrorist suspects. The members of the White House declined to enter that debate — indeed, they did their best to squash it. The destruction of Zelikow’s carefully reasoned memo suggests the White House did not want any record of alternative views even existing, lest they be considered reasonable or people get the idea that the torture policies were thought controversial even by members of the administration.

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Jordan Michael Smith writes about U.S. foreign policy for Salon. He has written for the New York Times, Boston Globe and Washington Post.

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