George W. Bush

Banished from the American dream

The Kesbehs were a hardworking immigrant family with a successful business and deep roots in Houston. But after 9/11, the U.S. kicked them, along with thousands of other Arab and Muslim families, out of the country. Now, in a land the children barely know, they wonder why their life has been shattered.

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Banished from the American dream

Sharif Kesbeh has just heard that America is deporting his eldest son to Jordan, and he’s beaming. “The family will hopefully be reunited today, inshallah, after exactly one year,” he says. Twenty-year-old Alaa had called his parents from the Detroit airport that morning to give them the news — he was being freed from detention and would soon be put on a plane bound for Amman, the last of the Kesbehs to be expelled from the United States. “We prefer to live a miserable life anywhere rather than be detained,” says Sharif as he and his family set off for Amman’s Queen Alia International Airport to welcome Alaa home to a country where he’s never lived before.

At 9:30 p.m., though, three hours after the plane lands, there’s still no sign of the boy. Sharif, his wife, Asmaa, their five daughters and youngest son slump in their metal chairs, looking very small in the dim, gray expanse of the waiting room. Anticipation gives way to anxiety. Maybe, they worry, the Americans took Alaa back to jail. Or maybe he’s being detained by the Jordanian security services, who might want to know why he’s been thrown out of the country where he and his family made their home for 11 years.

When the rest of the Kesbehs arrived in Amman a year ago from their home in Houston, they were questioned for hours by police incredulous at their story. The Jordanians could scarcely believe that an entire family would be kicked out of the United States with nothing but what they could carry unless they had committed some great crime.

The Kesbeh’s kids, with their Texas accents and elementary Arabic, were also bewildered, though they’d known what was coming. Except for the youngest, Afnan, an American citizen, they all have Jordanian passports like their parents, but they’d never lived in the country before, and until the very last moment, they were sure that some miracle would keep them at home in the United States. “The first day here, my kids could not believe it that they are not in America,” says Sharif.

A year later at the same airport, waiting for their brother, the Kesbeh kids are still dreaming of elsewhere.

“Imagine that we’re here because we’re going back to Houston,” says 19-year-old Sondos. With her long, loose hair, tight pink pants and black high heels, she stands in defiant contrast to the majority of Jordanian women in their hijabs, or Islamic head scarves.

“I wish,” says 17-year-old Hadeel, her curly, blond-streaked hair pulled back in a ponytail.

“We left everything sweet behind,” says their mother, 40-year-old Asmaa, who, with her head scarf and embroidered robe, is the only woman in the family who blends in in Amman.

“Here,” says 21-year-old Noor, “everything is bitter.”

At the airport, a security guard presses his face to a nearby Plexiglas window, staring intently at these young women with their lip gloss and, except for Noor and Asmaa, uncovered heads. Hadeel stares angrily, unflinchingly back. “Have you noticed how guys here stare at you?” she asks, a hard twang in her voice. “And they’ll say things, too. They’ll hit a girl. It’s a very corrupt society.” When he finally looks away, she smirks. “I won,” she says.

Speaking quietly, Noor, a lithe, doe-eyed woman who looks younger than 21 but acts older, says she’s worried about her younger sisters’ alienation from their new home. “The problem is they think they’ll be coming back to Houston soon,” she says. “They still haven’t unpacked everything.”

Right now, though, the Kesbehs have little chance of returning to Texas. They’ve joined the thousands of other Arab and Muslim immigrants deported from America since Sept. 11, in one of the largest mass expulsions in American history. In the weeks and months after the terrorist attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft launched a series of crackdowns aimed specifically at illegal immigrants from Muslim countries. Thousands were rounded up and detained, often for months, and around 20,000 were put into deportation proceedings. More are being added every day.

Many of them have children who are American citizens, forcing them into a brutal choice: Either uproot their kids, or leave them behind. “It’s very common,” says Sam Quiah, community organizer for the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, a nonprofit whose attorneys have represented many post-9/11 deportees. “Families are being torn apart.”Once the government began treating immigration violations as a corollary of terrorism, there was little room to take individual circumstances into account. The Kesbehs, parents and children alike, were from the Middle East, and they were in the United States illegally. It didn’t matter that they’d broken no other law, that Sharif always paid taxes on his business (much of which involved, of all things, selling American flags). It didn’t matter that the kids knew no home but Houston.

They still feel like aliens in their new city, a sprawl of inelegant sand-colored buildings linked by streets that often lack sidewalks. Built on seven hills, Amman was once the Roman city of Philadelphia, and it still boasts an ancient amphitheater in the city center, but over the centuries it declined into a mere village. Only in the last few decades has it been built up again, constructed in the style of Los Angeles, without souqs and promenades where one can easily enter into the life of the place. On many streets there are more armed policemen than pedestrians. Everywhere — suspended over roads, posted in the windows of dingy shawarma stands, greeting arrivals at the airport — are photos of Jordan’s pudgy-cheeked King Abdullah. It is illegal to criticize him, something that still strikes the American-educated Kesbeh kids as very strange.

Sharif, a lumbering 55-year-old man given to eloquent lamentations and dramatic hyperbole, speaks about his family’s calamity as if it were unique in all the world, but there are others like them. A 45-minute drive from the Kesbeh’s apartment in crowded East Amman live the Abu-Shabayeks, a Palestinian family of nine ejected from America, where they’d lived for a dozen years in North Carolina, near Raleigh. Five of their seven children are American citizens. The eldest two had to drop out of their Jordanian high schools because they barely speak Arabic, and the youngest five are struggling in every subject except English. Their new neighborhood is a barren place on the edge of the city’s sprawl where herds of goats and long brown Bedouin tents are interspersed with low concrete housing blocks. They have no friends here.

Hanan Abu-Shabayek, 17, looks Jordanian with her hijab and long gray robe, but she speaks with a honeyed Southern accent. “We just feel that the world…”

“Is falling apart,” her Bronx-born 13-year-old sister, Haneen, finishes her sentence.


Noor Kesbeh

In the year after the 2002 pre-dawn raid that ended their American idyll, the Kesbeh family tried everything imaginable to remain in the United States. They enlisted the media, briefly becoming a cause célèbre in Houston, where protesters held vigils on their lawns and local churches offered to shelter them from the immigration authorities. Democratic Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee introduced a bill in the House that would have granted them legal residency. Republican Rep. Daryl Issa, an Arab-American from California, spoke out on their behalf, and Massachusetts Sen. Ted Kennedy reportedly intervened with immigration to delay their deportation.

In post-9/11 America, though, it proved impossible for a family of illegal Arab immigrants to garner enough political support to stay. So on March 28, 2003, they were put on a plane bound first for Amsterdam, Netherlands, and then for Amman. Noor and her father swear that the immigration agents, after battling the Kesbehs for so long, high-fived each other as they sent them off.

Only one remained behind — the oldest son, Alaa, still a teenager. At 1 a.m. the night before their flight, he fled to a friend’s house, hoping he could go to another state and disappear. By the end of the year, he’d be a convict versed in the relative iniquities of the U.S. justice system.

The mass deportations that have marooned so many in unfamiliar homelands happened in several overlapping stages. The first occurred immediately after Sept. 11, when hundreds of Arab and Muslim men were rounded up by the FBI, interrogated, imprisoned, often for months without charges, and then put on planes back to their own countries.

Khaled Abu-Shabayek, Hanan and Haneen’s 40-year-old father, was caught up in the tail end of these sweeps. On April 18, 2002, Abu-Shabayek, an electrician, stopped by a Walgreens on his way back home to North Carolina from a job in Tennessee. As he pulled into the parking lot, 20 or 30 policemen surrounded him. They arrested him and took him to a Tennessee jail, where he was interrogated by the FBI, something that would happen seven or eight times as he was moved from prison to prison for the next four months and 25 days.

“They ask me about bin Laden, if I know him,” Abu-Shabayek recalls, peering behind thick glasses in his living room’s harsh artificial light. “Then they ask me about Hamas, or the jihad, or the people who make Sept. 11.” Like many other Palestinian detainees, Abu-Shabayek reports being questioned extensively about his feelings toward Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. “They ask me about Sharon, ‘Do you like Sharon or not? What do you think about the Sharon visit to the Aqsa Mosque — what’s your opinion?’” Abu-Shabayek says. “They ask me, ‘If we send you to Jordan, do you think to go to Israel and make trouble?’”

Still, he says, the interrogators weren’t that bad. It’s the guards who were cruel. “Let me say, the people who make the question, they are fair. The people who deal with us in the jail, they are very tough, especially with Muslim people.” At one point, he was put in the hole for 21 days. He says he still doesn’t know why.

The roundups were just the beginning. In November 2002, the Justice Department instituted the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, or special registration, which required men from most Arab or Muslim countries to report to immigration officials to be fingerprinted, photographed and interviewed. Of the 85,000 men who came forward to register, more than 13,000 were either deported or put into deportation proceedings. In December 2003, the administration suspended much of the program, but no relief was given to those it had already ensnared.

In between the start of post-9/11 sweeps and the beginning of special registration, there was the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, a Justice Department program to crack down on the 314,000 immigrants who remained in the country despite their deportation orders. As the Washington Post reported on Feb. 8, 2002, “Justice Department and FBI officials have said that the operation would focus first on about 6,000 immigrants from countries identified as al Qaeda strongholds, though the vast majority of absconders are Latin American.”

It was the absconder initiative that ultimately led eight armed agents to burst into the Kesbehs’ Houston house before daybreak on March 29 of that year. It led to Sharif and Alaa Kesbeh spending six months in prison together, and then to Alaa spending more time in prison alone. And it led to the fluorescent-lit, two-bedroom apartment in a conservative section of East Amman where today the Kesbehs try to figure out how to restart their lives.

It’s not an easy place to be a newcomer, especially for Noor and her sisters. Boys play in the Kesbehs’ potholed street, but girls stay inside. There’s nowhere in their neighborhood to walk to except jumbled corner stores and butcher shops where skinned lambs hang whole outside. Many of the stores’ concrete walls are decorated with photos of Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the recently assassinated Hamas leader whose white-bearded face stares toward heaven on posters all over the poorer parts of the city.

Asmaa, who hardly ever goes out anymore, speaks longingly about America’s parks, about the strangers who said hello as they jogged by. “Here, you cannot run,” she says. “Oh my God, you cannot even walk.”

The American government, of course, has the legal right to deport illegal immigrants, and has been doing so for years. Many of the provisions currently being used to arrest and deport the undocumented aren’t even new — they were enacted as part of the 1996 anti-terrorism law, passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombing. That terrorist attack had nothing to do with foreigners, but the government still responded to it by expanding the grounds on which immigrants can be deported and by removing much of the discretion that, in the past, might have allowed judges to issue waivers for people who, like the Kesbehs, had deep ties to their communities.

After 1996, says Lucas Guttentag, director of the Immigrants Rights Project at the American Civil Liberties Union, “there was a restriction or elimination of the ability or the willingness of the government to consider cases on an individual basis and to exercise discretion to decide who should be prosecuted. Traditionally, with immigration laws, because of their severe consequences, there has always been a recognition that there ought to be an element of discretion.”

The little discretion that remained disappeared almost entirely after Sept. 11, when Ashcroft made the persecution of Arab and Muslim immigrants official policy.

“What’s happened since 9/11, there’s been a specific targeting of particular communities, Muslim and Arab communities, to enforce immigration and visa violations that have traditionally not been enforced, and still are not enforced against other immigrants,” says Guttentag. The arrests and deportations have slowed in recent months, but they haven’t stopped, says Ahmad Tansheet, community outreach coordinator for the Muslim Civil Rights Center, a Chicago group that closely follows the issue. “We are receiving one or two complaints every day,” he says.

Ashcroft has been explicit about using the immigration laws to target people from countries associated, if only tangentially, with terrorism. “Let the terrorists among us be warned,” he said on Oct. 25, 2001. “If you overstay your visa — even by one day — we will arrest you.”

Happily ensconced in Houston, the Kesbehs didn’t think such warnings applied to them. “This family is the most peaceful family, maybe in the world,” says Sharif. “All we’d been doing is concentrating on our kids, our business and trying to stay away from all troubles.” Sharif made his living in America wholesaling flags — American flags, Confederate flags, even Israeli flags. After Sept. 11, his business, SLS International, donated hundreds of American flags to a community he considered his own.

Indeed, despite the fact that Sharif spent six months in prison without criminal charges, despite the fact that they’ve lost their business and now live in a section of Amman that Noor describes as “like, so ghetto,” even though Alaa’s exact whereabouts and condition were for months a mystery to them, the Kesbehs still love the country that expelled them. They call themselves Americans without papers. They just want to go home.


Noor, Batool and Hadeel Kesbeh

There’s something sitcom-like about the five Kesbeh daughters, who now share a single bedroom in their boxy, scarcely furnished 2nd floor apartment. All of them are very pretty and very different, as if they’d each been cast as easily discernible types in a broadly drawn script.

Noor, the oldest, is the responsible, intellectually curious one, who devours books like Greg Palast’s “The Best Democracy Money Can Buy,” sent to her by an American friend named Abraham. She had wanted to study medicine, something she can’t afford to do in Jordan. Now she works six days a week as an assistant production manager in a factory that makes gold jewelry. It’s located in a dusty industrial park on the edge of Amman. The bus ride there takes over an hour each way. She earns 200 J.D. a month, the equivalent of $280.

Sondos, 19, is the glamorous one. She found a job in an upscale cosmetics store — also paying 200 J.D. a month — and a moneyed but jealous boyfriend who constantly calls the cellphone he gave her. According to Noor, Sondos tells people she lives in Abdoun, an area of large new stone houses fronted by elaborate topiary and streets full of BMWs.

Hadeel, 17, is tough — though she’s given to cute pink T-shirts and precisely applied makeup, the rage at her new situation seems to crackle right under her skin. Batool, 14, is sunnier, a straight-A student and former athlete who still has a 2001 certificate honoring her academic achievements that was signed by Texas’s former governor, George W. Bush. Afnan, 11, is the baby, with a huge stuffed Tweety Bird on her bed. When her sisters tease her, she sticks out her tongue and says that someday she, the family’s only American, will be going back.

The Kesbeh’s youngest son, Muhannad, a shy, lanky 16-year-old, stays in the background, playing hour after hour of “Grand Theft Auto: Vice City” on the family’s old computer. The family treasures the computer, their firmest link to the West.

And Alaa? Well, before he went on the lam, before he went to jail, he was a computer science student. He wanted to be an American soldier, but was twice turned away from the Navy because of his immigration status.

“This boy is a great boy,” Sharif says about his son as he walks out the apartment door on his way to the airport. “He doesn’t deserve this kind of treatment. America should be proud of him and give him immediate residency and send him to the best college in America.”

The kids’ interrupted ambitions weigh heavily on Sharif because he knows it’s all at least partly his fault. “They used to go to Starbucks, they used to go to Pizza Hut, they used to go to the mall,” he says. “Now we have no income even to buy them any clothes. We don’t know what to do. I don’t know what to tell my kids.”

His children try to ease his conscience, but in moments of frustration, Noor says, she blames him for everything. “Sometimes I take it out on him,” she says. “I was a minor. I didn’t know how to fix my status.”

But before Sept. 11, Sharif says, immigration lawyers told him that the authorities weren’t interested in prosecuting people like him and his family. “We felt very safe,” he says. “We’d been told by many attorneys that as long as you don’t do any kind of violation, no one will come and bother you.”

Anyway, Sharif didn’t think they had anywhere else to go, having been chased from his home by politics three times already.

He was born in a town near Ramallah in the West Bank, but his family was forced to flee during the 1948 war that attended the birth of Israel. His parents settled in the Qalandia refugee camp, and Sharif went to high school in Ramallah. On the day of his final exams in 1967, the Six-Day War began, and his family fled again. This time they settled in Baqaa, a refugee camp north of Amman, Jordan.

After studying agricultural engineering in Egypt, Sharif got a job in Jordan’s Ministry of Planning, and in 1979, the government sent him to study at Texas Tech in Lubbock, where he earned an M.A. and fell in love with America.

Still, he returned to Jordan and worked at the ministry for another three years, meeting and marrying Asmaa, who had been studying Islamic literature at the University of Jordan.

In the 1980s, the promise of a fat paycheck lured them to Saudi Arabia. After working first for the American defense contractor Vinnell and then for the Saudi Prince Muqren, Sharif left to form his own company, a transportation firm that would deliver fertilizer from neighboring countries to Saudi farms. He imported 50 trailers from Houston.

Then Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, “and all my dreams go with the wind,” Sharif says. With Saudi Arabia’s borders closed, the trailers were left sitting on the ground in Riyadh, and his income froze. Saddam lobbed bombs at the city, destroying Noor’s elementary school. Meanwhile, the Saudi government began discriminating against Palestinians, who were thought to be loyal to the Iraqi dictator.

Feeling that his life was becoming untenable, Sharif says he decided to visit America to “evaluate the situation.” His brothers were already there, working in the flag trade.

On Aug. 16, 1992, the Kesbehs arrived in the United States on a six-month tourist visa. Deciding they wanted to stay, Sharif went to the immigration office in Houston and received a one-year work permit, which he renewed the next year, and the next. The Kesbeh kids enrolled in public school, where they became honor-roll students. Little by little, Sharif Kesbeh built up the flag business that his brothers had started, eventually taking it over when they moved to other parts of the country.

“We had excellent relations with the community, Arab, Muslim, Christians and Jews,” Sharif says. When a local Holocaust museum wanted flags, the Kesbehs donated them.

Meanwhile, though, the family wasn’t having any luck getting green cards, which they’d applied for based on their status as Palestinian refugees. They finally hit a wall in 1997, when an immigration judge, ruling that the family wouldn’t suffer unduly if they returned to Jordan, denied their last appeal and refused to renew Sharif’s work permit. On June 15, 1998, the district director for Immigration and Naturalization Services in Houston issued a warrant of deportation for Sharif, Asmaa and six of their seven children. Only Afnan, who was born in Texas, was spared.

By then, though, the Kesbehs had roots in Houston.

“After six or seven years working hard to stand on our feet, if we leave the U.S., our family life will be destroyed,” says Sharif. “To leave your only source of income, to take the kids from an American school to an Arabic system school, means the destruction of the family.”

So the family did what thousands of others do when given an order to leave the country: They ignored it. No one from immigration ever tried to enforce the deportation — before Sept. 11, they rarely did. Sharif hoped that, after a few years, the government would declare an amnesty.

The kids were only intermittently conscious of being illegal. It surfaced in small ways — like when Alaa tried to join the military after high school and the Navy recruiter, at first delighted at the prospect of a smart, upstanding, Arabic-speaking young man, had to turn him down. It meant that Noor, Alaa and Sondos were ineligible for scholarships and had to attend an affordable community college, though they planned to transfer to university after two years.

Mostly, though, the kids grew up as average Texas teenagers. Legal residency “was something we needed,” says Sharif, “but it was not something we needed badly.”

Then came Sept. 11, “with all the tragedy to America and the world,” says Sharif. “We felt so sad when we saw this tragedy. We never realized that we, the Kesbeh family, will be a victim of this tragedy.”

Still, he says, “the moment they announced this act was done by Muslims, every Muslim on American soil got scared.”


Batool, Hadeel and Asmaa Kesbeh

For a few months, nothing happened. Then the Kesbehs suffered a smaller tragedy, one that may have intersected with the larger one to end their lives in America.

“On March 2, 2002, we received a phone call that made my wife almost die,” says Sharif. There had been an accident on Jordan’s Dead Sea Highway. Asmaa’s mother, father, younger sister and 3-year-old nephew were killed.

People throughout their community heard what had happened and gathered to offer condolences. The Kesbehs are convinced that this huge gathering of local Arabs and Muslims brought them to the FBI’s attention.

The raid happened four weeks later. Before sunrise on March 29, eight officers brandishing guns and flashlights barged into the house. At first, Asmaa thought they were robbers. They burst into the kids’ rooms, and when Noor asked if she could put on her head scarf before going with them, one officer sniggered, “Make sure you bring your Quran with you when you’re deported.”

As Asmaa sat terrified in the living room, one of the agents demanded to know why so many Muslims were coming to her house. She says he asked her: “Are you preparing for another attack?”

In the end, the agents left Noor at home to look after Afnan and Batool. Sharif and the rest of the family were driven to the immigration office in separate vans. Once there, they were all fingerprinted. Muhannad, Asmaa and her daughters were released on probation, pending deportation. Sharif and Alaa were put in jail.

Hysterical, Asmaa demanded to know why they were locking up her son, an 18-year-old who could hardly be blamed for his parents’ immigration violations. “He’s an innocent son, he never violated any laws,” she cried.

According to Asmaa, the immigration officer responded, “The people who destroyed the Trade Center, all of them were his age.” This, of course, wasn’t true. “They came from Saudi Arabia like your son,” the man continued. “He’s Arab, Muslim, and illegal.”

At home, a desperate Noor, wracking her brain for someone who could save them, thought of Marvin Zindler, the consumer investigator on Houston’s Channel 13 news. “He’s always helping people,” she says. “He’s always exposing restaurants that have roaches.” She called him, and he came and did a segment on the Kesbehs’ plight.

Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee saw the family on TV, and a week later, she made a public statement praising them as the embodiment of America’s values. Soon, there were stories in the Houston Chronicle about the “Palestinian Cleavers” and reports on Amy Goodman’s radio show “Democracy Now.” Lee introduced a resolution in Congress that would have granted the family legal residency.

Meanwhile, Sharif and Alaa languished behind bars.

Today, sitting on a floor cushion in his Amman living room after Asmaa served a lunch of stuffed grape leaves, squash and salad, the voice of the Kesbeh patriarch chokes and his eyes tear as he talks about being locked up with his eldest son. “He’s a boy,” says Sharif, fingers clicking a string of black worry beads. “He just turned 18 years old when they arrested him. He was a kid. I had to wake up him when they offered breakfast at 5 in the morning. He was patient. He was patient, but sometimes he asked, ‘Dad, why are they holding us?’”

They slept in a dorm with about 45 people, most of them also held on immigration violations. Nearly half their roommates were Arab or Muslim. “It was so miserable to see this tremendous number of people, Arab and Muslim, who have lives, who are productive, being deported, separated from their wives and children in this uncivilized way in the most advanced and civilized country in the world,” Sharif says. “The people they used to bring, when they locked the door, they’d collapse crying.”

After six months, though, the Kesbehs still hadn’t been deported, and things began to look up. Under pressure from New Jersey’s Arab community, Democratic U.S. Sen. Robert Torricelli agreed to introduce a companion bill to Jackson Lee’s in the Senate, and Sen. Edward Kennedy intervened with immigration to have Sharif and Alaa released while the legislation was pending. The family’s deportation was stayed for six more months.

Asmaa was in the hospital waiting to go into surgery for a hernia when Noor told her that their bill had found a sponsor in the Senate, and that they might be able to stay. She fell to the floor, thanking God and crying with happiness and relief.

But Torricelli, in the midst of an ethics scandal, withdrew from the Senate race at the end of September. After that, the Kesbehs were unable to find another champion in the chamber.

The publicity their case had generated began to backfire, with the right seizing on their story as an example of Democratic squishiness on illegal immigration. Michelle Malkin, the caustic conservative author of the book “Invasion: How America Still Welcomes Terrorists, Criminals, and Other Foreign Menaces to Our Shores,” wrote a syndicated column called “Lawmakers Who Love Lawbreakers,” which excoriated those politicians who’d risen to the Kesbehs’ defense. Senators that initially had seemed sympathetic backed away.

By the time their stay of deportation expired in March, the family had exhausted all their options.

On March 27, Asmaa stayed up all night trying to decide what to take and what to leave. They were allowed only about 44 pounds each of luggage, meaning most of what they owned would have to stay behind. That night there was a candlelight vigil at a local church, which offered to shelter the family against federal agents. Supporters camped out on their front lawn holding signs and banners. One said, “America Was Built by Immigrants. Stop Deporting Them.” Another read, “Houston Loves the Kesbeh Family.” In pictures taken that night, Noor is wearing an American flag hijab. Someone asked Sharif how he felt. He said it was the worst day of his life.

Early on the morning of March 28, 2003, a year after the pre-dawn raid on their house, the Kesbehs prepared to surrender themselves to the Houston immigration office. They were told to be there by 7 a.m.

Alaa, though, was gone. Late the previous night, his friends had called. “Stay with us,” they said. “We’ll find a way for you to go to Canada.” He went to his friend’s house and turned off his cellphone. He became a fugitive.

At the immigration office, the rest of the family was locked inside a bus that took them to the airport. While they waited for their flight, a man sat next to Noor. “So what do you think of Bush?” he asked her. Then he asked her religion, and when she said Muslim, he asked, “So what do you think of Saddam? What do you think about the war in Iraq?”

“I told him I don’t really care. I have my own problems,” she says.

The man rose and began whispering to an immigration agent. “We were shocked,” says Hadeel, “because we thought he was waiting for his plane.”

Even when the family had to board the plane that would take them first to Amsterdam and then to Jordan, they still expected to be saved. “My husband was waiting for them to say, ‘Kesbeh family, you are legal, come back,’ like in an American movie,” says Asmaa.

But the plane took them, as planned, to Jordan. Sharif and Asmaa hadn’t lived there for 22 years. The kids hadn’t lived there ever.

The apartment the Kesbehs moved into is owned by Sharif’s brother, who lives downstairs in a richly furnished flat. He and his family disapprove of their impious girl cousins, who sometimes go out unescorted to drink coffee in Abdoun’s trendy Blue Fig Cafe or to stroll in Mecca Mall, a somewhat cheap imitation of an American-style shopping center on the outskirts of Amman. “My cousins beat their sisters if they go out,” says Noor. “In the States we used to stay out. Here, the whole neighborhood expects you to be back at 7. Many people think that I’m an infidel because I’m taking salsa lessons.”

Sharif isn’t working. He receives a $150 monthly pension from the Agricultural Engineering Association, to which he paid dues for many years. A family friend is looking after the flag business back in Houston, but it is no longer profitable, having fallen into the red while Sharif was in prison. Because it’s failing, it’s hard to sell. The Kesbehs’ friends held a garage sale for them, unloading the things they left behind in their Houston home, but it only brought in around $1,000. The home itself was a rental. The family, then, is living largely on the 400 J.D. that Noor and Sondos bring in each month.

Much more than that is needed to send Afnan, Batool, Muhannad and Hadeel to the Abdul Hamid Sharaf school, a private, K-12 English-language academy that costs 2,700 J.D., or $3,800 a year, for each of them. According to principal Sue Dahdah, there’s been an influx of new students this year coming from the United States — enrollment is up 10 percent. She suspects many of them are deportees like the Kesbehs, though most would rather not admit it. There’s a stigma, after all, to being thrown out of America.

The kids complain about the school — the teachers, say Hadeel, spend the whole class writing notes on the board, which students are supposed to copy down verbatim. But Abdul Hamid Sharaf also may be their last hope for the futures they once imagined for themselves. “Mo, he is in 10th grade,” Sharif says of his younger son. “He studies Arabic at a 2nd grade level. If he has to go to Arabic school, he is going to be 27 years old when he finishes high school.”

This year’s tuition, though, still hasn’t been paid. “We keep telling them, ‘next month, next month,’” says Sharif.

Across town, a visit with the Abu-Shabayeks offers a glimpse of what may await the Kesbeh kids if they’re forced to leave private school. The Abu-Shabayeks can’t afford to send any of their children to English academies. Thus their two eldest aren’t going to school at all.

Seventeen-year-old Hanan Abu-Shabayek, a Jordanian citizen like her 18-year-old brother, Hassan, finished 9th grade in Raleigh. She maintained an average in the 90s, and dreamed of going to Duke or Chapel Hill. “Being a lawyer, that’s what I wanted the most,” she says.

Hanan is sitting in her family’s living room, near a small space heater — spring in Amman can be quite cold. Her mother, face drawn and thin, sits next to her, beneath a framed picture of Mecca on a cracking white wall. The family’s four youngest boys sprawl on a cheap rug with tigers printed on it and watch a disaster movie on TV — the Abu-Shabayeks treasure Channel 2, the American station, which Hanan says they leave on “24/7.”

“I’m supposed to be in school right now,” Hanan says. “But I didn’t know the Arabic. Over here, if you don’t know the Arabic, they can’t help you.”

Hassan had the same problem. Both of them dropped out. The younger kids have stayed in school, but they’re miserable, especially about their teachers’ liberal use of corporal punishment.

Khaled tries to get his shy 10-year-old son, Hazem, to talk. “What do you like better,” he asks the boy, “Jordan or America?”

Hazem smiles, revealing a cracked tooth. “America,” he says. “Over there in America, they don’t hit us.”

Hassan now works in a bakery near the family’s house, while Hanan waits for her June wedding. She agreed to the marriage with the 23-year-old taxi driver after realizing that she had to let go of her old life, because unlike her younger siblings, she’s not an American, even if she feels like one. “I don’t have a chance of going back to America, and I have to learn Arabic,” she says. “I think it’s the best thing for me to do right now.”

She describes her fiancé, who doesn’t speak English, as nice but “actually pretty strict.”

“I can go to a movie theater as long as I’m with him,” she says. “Me by myself, that’s not allowed. I’m starting to accept it, I guess. I think it’s wrong, but we have to live like the people here are living. If you can’t beat them, join them.”

The Kesbehs have never met the Abu-Shabeyeks, or even heard of them. But sitting on a cushion on her own living room floor in East Amman, Noor feels the same pressures as Hanan, though she’s resisting them. “My dad tells me just get married, it will solve your problems,” she says.

Asmaa, who wants something more for her daughters, shakes her head and says, “In this country, a lot of girls get married at 15.”

“It’s because they have no other choice,” says Noor.


Alaa and Asmaa Kesbeh embrace at the airport in Amman, Jordan, as Hadeel, Batool and Sondos look on.

By 9 p.m. on the night Alaa is supposed to return, the Kesbeh girls’ excitement has dissipated. They eat Pringles and M&Ms and watch the minutes pass and the cities change on the airport’s big black departure screens. No one in the family knows what to expect if and when Alaa walks through the gate. He was barely able to communicate with them while he was in prison. They’re still not sure how he ended up there, or what it did to him.

A year before, trying to save his American life, Alaa fled Houston on a Greyhound bus. Instead of going to Canada, he went to Asmaa’s younger brother’s house in Columbus, Ohio. Once again, he tried to join the Navy, but the recruiting officer was forced to reject him because of his immigration status.

So his uncle put him to work remodeling houses, and for a few months he earned a living by laying tiles and painting walls. After weeks of laying low, he started to get comfortable. His uncle gave him a car, and he applied for an Ohio’s driver’s license.

On Aug. 23, 2003, he went to Sam’s Club, the discount store, with his uncle and his uncle’s American girlfriend, who wandered off to a nearby hunting and fishing shop. As they were leaving, they were pulled over — the owner of the hunting and fishing store had seen the girlfriend shoplifting.

Running their I.D.s through a computer, the police discovered that Alaa was wanted on a federal warrant, and he was taken to jail.

Other details of that day are in dispute. The uncle’s girlfriend, who’d been found with more than $1,800 in stolen property, blamed Alaa; she said he’d masterminded the whole thing. She was given three months’ probation in return for testifying against him. Alaa insisted he had nothing to do with it. His lawyer argued that the girlfriend’s story was absurd — why would a 36-year-old woman take orders from a 20-year-old kid?

Alaa was given the chance to plead guilty to a misdemeanor and be sentenced to time served, but he refused, not wanting a black mark on his record that might imperil future immigration appeals. So he sat in jail, awaiting trial.

In the end, a jury convicted him. The judge, though, let him off with probation, and on Nov. 20, 2003, he was turned over to immigration.

For the next four months, Alaa was moved from jail to jail as he awaited deportation. In Houston, he had been housed with other immigration detainees, but on the East Coast he was locked up with ordinary state inmates, many of them violent felons.

Sharif has faith in his son, but as he waits in the airport, he can’t help worrying about the influence of the environment he’s been trapped in. “We’ve been raising our kids to be the best citizens of America and the world,” he says. “They are trying to destroy all our hard work. Even professional criminals, they try to fix them and make them good citizens. Because our kids are Arab and Muslim, they’re trying to make them criminals.”

It’s past 10 p.m. at Queen Alia when, suddenly, Alaa appears. He’s gaunt and gray in baggy khakis, his face sprinkled with stubble. His black eyes look enormous. As his parents suspected, he was being questioned by security. The reunion is strangely subdued, without shrieks or laughter. Asmaa can’t hide her shock. “He’s very skinny and unhealthy,” she whispers.

“I did not recognize my son,” says Sharif. “He was strong and healthy and he used to play sports and basketball.”

Only Batool lights up. “It’s like a dream,” she says.

As for Alaa himself, his long-awaited freedom hardly seems to register. Stepping out into the Amman night, he just looks numb.

A few days later, in early April, Alaa is still trying to straighten out his status in Jordan. He’s had five meetings with various security services, each of whom wanted to know why he was thrown out of America if he isn’t involved in crime or terrorism. His cousins have begun to show him Amman, and in certain ways the adjustment is easier for him than for his sisters. The boys aren’t that different from him, he says — they dress the same and listen to hip-hop, and are patient with his bad Arabic. Soon he’s going to go look for a job in one of the big hotels, where his perfect English will be an asset.

Prison hasn’t made him an angry man, at least not overtly. When he was locked up, he says, he learned patience, and he’s determined not to let his ordeal scar him forever. “Eventually I’ll get over it,” he says. “There’s a lot of people worse off than me.”

He’s given up on America, though. “One of my biggest fears is if I go back there, the same thing can happen again,” he says. “I’d like to go back to Canada to finish my studies.”

Noor, meanwhile, is desperately trying to convince the American embassy to grant her a visa so she can return to the country to complete her education. If that doesn’t work, she’ll try Canada, England or Australia — anywhere but here. Failing that, she hopes the embassy might give her a job — it’s the only place she really wants to work in Jordan.

While she waits, she seeks out Amman’s pockets of America. With her sisters she splurges at Blue Fig, an airy restaurant with high ceilings and plate glass windows, where the generically international food — pizzas topped with tandoori chicken or feta cheese, Caesar salad — reminds them of Houston. Dinner for four there costs nearly a quarter of her monthly salary.

One night each week she takes salsa classes at the Arthur Murray School, which, according to a banner hanging proudly on one studio, is “The First Salsa School in the Arab World.” Several of the other students are expats; most of the rest are Christians. Noor moves easily — she’s the best dancer in the class. Twirled by a tall boy in jeans and a green sweat shirt, she could be anywhere.

“I try to forget that I’m in Jordan,” she says.

In the morning, there will be a bus ride to the jewelry factory to remind her.

Michelle Goldberg is a frequent contributor to Salon and the author of "Kingdom Coming: The Rise of Christian Nationalism" (WW Norton).

Using Bush’s playbook

"Karl Rove politics" aren't quite dead: Obama's strategy in 2012 will mirror W's in 2004

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Using Bush's playbookGeorge W. Bush and Barack Obama (Credit: Reuters/Larry Downing)

Barack Obama’s presidency was born from nothing so much as his repudiation of George W. Bush’s administration — its policies and politics, its style and tone. One of Obama’s most effective 2008 stump speech refrains was his promise to end the era of “Scooter Libby justice, ‘Brownie’ incompetence and Karl Rove politics.”

But the political dynamics for winning a second presidential term often differ markedly from winning the first. So don’t be surprised by many eerie parallels between Obama’s 2012 reelection bid and Bush’s 2004 campaign. The president may not rely upon “Karl Rove politics” in the strictest sense, and nobody would confuse David Axelrod with Rove. But Obama’s reelection route and rhetoric may bear more than a few Rovian hallmarks.

Now that Mitt Romney has won the Republican nomination, two key features prevail over the 2012 campaign — and both were also plainly evident in 2004. First, the incumbent president’s reelection fortunes are far from certain; and, second, the incumbent faces a decent but nevertheless weak challenger who is further hampered by internal problems within his party’s coalition.

Because incumbents can’t run for reelection promising “change,” and because “hope” during a lingering recession was also off the menu, the Obama campaign’s 2012 theme of  “forward” — a word that often follows “plow,” mind you — was the best available alternative. That said, and substituting the economy for terrorism, Obama is implicitly if not explicitly advancing the same theme Bush did in 2004: America suffered a tough blow, but the situation could have been worse and, more to the point, under my stewardship the nation is steadily regaining its footing.

This counterfactual campaign theme — vote for me not because of what happened, but what might have but didn’t — is a common thread for Bush and Obama. It’s not an uplifting message, but it sufficed in 2004 and Obama is counting on it working again in 2012.

Politics 101 further dictates that when an incumbent’s reelection is in doubt, he must go negative against the challenger. Obama political operatives in the White House and at the Democratic National Committee long ago made it abundantly clear they were willing to do just that. Team Obama may not go negative against Romney to the degree the Bush camp did against John Kerry in 2004. (By mid-summer 2004, 75 percent of Bush’s TV ads were negative attacks on Kerry.) But don’t be surprised if attacks on Romney’s record and even character are plentiful, harsh and relentless. In 2008, America saw candidate Obama’s toothy grin; four years later, expect to see President Obama’s fangs.

Expect the Obama camp to emphasize two major critiques of Romney: that he is a flip-flopper willing to say anything or reverse any position to win; and that he is an economic royalist whose personal and public life suggest a person incapable of understanding the lives and struggles of average Americans. Again — note the unusual parallels with 2004.

Although Romney is a Republican former governor and Kerry was at the time his state’s Democratic junior U.S. senator, the two Massachusetts pols make for similar targets. Each man is an extraordinarily rich preppie and Ivy Leaguer. Each represents the liberal wing of his respective party. Each has shown a propensity for ruining an otherwise valid point with sloppy, backfiring language. And each has a reputation for lacking political spine.

The flip-flop frame is candidate character assassination of the first order. Like the lone negative number in a string of multiplied positives, the critique that nobody can trust any statement or claim made by a politician has the potential to negate every accomplishment or promise. If it sticks, it can be fatal, as Kerry learned in 2004.

Obama and the Democratic National Committee know their electoral history and, sure enough, last November — a year before the election and two full months before a single Iowan had caucused — the DNC released a four-minute “Mitt vs. Mitt” ad and its accompanying website with the damning tag line, “the story of two men trapped in one body.” The site is a brilliant homage to the Bush campaign’s 2004 windsurfer attack ad and the devastating, 11-minute ad the Republican National Committee produced chronicling Kerry’s “evolution” on Iraq.

And then there is what might be called “the Willard factor”: Romney as Richy Rich, the Monopoly Guy with the Bain Capital background and the Swiss bank account. His bio would be political gold to Romney’s opponent any election cycle, but it’s gold-plated platinum in the first full presidential campaign following the biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression, the rise of the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the long overdue national debate over income inequality.

Again, the wealth-personified line of attack mirrors the out-of-touch, Martha’s Vineyard yoke the Bush team put around Kerry’s neck in 2004. Right on cue, in the first public event of his reelection campaign, last week Obama attacked Romney by name and invoked the economic disconnect card with relish. “He sincerely believes that if CEOs and wealthy investors like him make money the rest of us will automatically prosper as well,” said Obama of Romney, adding that “corporations aren’t people – -people are people.” (For the record, Kerry is actually wealthier than Romney, who would become one of the richest men ever to occupy the White House, should he win.)

Obama will also try to shift the national debate toward areas of strength, as Bush did. Historically, this meant the same strategy, but with inverse implications for each party: The so-called mommy party Democrats would encourage voters to focus on more favorable kitchen-table economy issues — healthcare, jobs, education — and away from less favorable “daddy party” Republican issues surrounding foreign wars abroad and culture wars. Because Obama is net-positive in foreign policy approval and net-negative on the economy, rather than mirroring by inversion, Obama will try to duplicate Bush’s shift-in-emphasis in 2004. GOP complaints that Obama is politicizing the killing of Osama bin Laden reveal Republican fears that Obama is going to play the terrorism card in 2012 just like Bush did eight years ago.

The 2004 parallels extend beyond message. Obama will be amply resourced and enjoy a field technology by virtue of his campaign’s state-of-the-art Web, donor, volunteer and social media innovations. Remember the Bush reelection campaign’s vaunted “72-hour” voter turnout model? That seems like an Edsel compared to the Ferrari the Obama team will be sporting this summer and fall. Among the perquisites modern presidential incumbents enjoy is the option to test-drive the best mobilization machines before anyone else.

Finally, what most connects Obama 2012 to Bush 2004 is the stability of the electoral map itself. Only three states — two net to Bush — flipped from one party to the other between 2000 and 2004; only nine states flipped between 2004 and 2008. Split the difference and a good, back-of-the-napkin over-under for number of states likely to flip between 2008 and 2012 is six. And thus, like the lead sailboat during a windless race, Obama doesn’t need or want conditions to change much from 2008: He merely has to replicate the map that swept him into office, with the burden of figuring out how to shake up the Electoral College falling to Romney, just as it did for Kerry against Bush. Even Karl Rove’s mapping of the 2012 election concedes this reality.

The 2008 election was memorable; to borrow the title of one best-selling chronicle, it was a “game changer.” But 2012 will not be. In many respects, it will be a game repeater, with Obama playing Bush to Romney’s Kerry of 2004. The president may be asking Americans to look “forward” in 2012, but the best preview of his reelection campaign can be found by looking backward eight years.

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The Bushies are back

Missed the neocons? Don't worry: Mitt Romney's getting the band together again

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The Bushies are back (Credit: Reuters/Win McNamee)

There was good reason for Republicans to cry foul over the Obama campaign’s advertisement highlighting the president’s killing of Osama bin Laden; the GOP has lost its decades-long edge on national security. According to a Washington Post poll, “By a margin of more than 2 to 1, Americans say the president’s handling of terrorism is a major reason to support rather than oppose his bid for reelection.”

Republicans lost their popularity on security issues for one reason: George W. Bush’s foreign policy was a disaster. And yet, the party’s nominee, Mitt Romney, has assembled a foreign-policy team composed almost exclusively of individuals with the same war-always mentality and ideology that served Bush — and the United States — so poorly. In some cases, the exact same men responsible for Bush’s catastrophic national security policies are advising Romney. The former Massachusetts governor could have included some of the pragmatists and realists from the George H.W. Bush administration. Instead, a Romney presidency seems like it would be Bush 43 all over again.

Richard Grenell, who served as United Nations spokesman under Bush, may be gone from the Romney campaign after an uproar over his sexuality, but there are plenty more former Bushies. First off, there are Romney’s “special advisors.” There’s Michael Chertoff, W.’s Homeland Security director. Chertoff oversaw DHS’s failures during Hurricane Katrina, and amassed unprecedented powers of secrecy. Next up is Eliot Cohen, counselor to the State Department for Bush’s last two years and on the Defense Policy Advisory Board for the president’s entire term. Cohen was an adamant supporter of the Iraq War and advised Bush directly on the issue. Or take Cofer Black, the man who infamously said to Bush in September 2011 about al-Qaida that “When we’re through with them they will have flies walking across their eyeballs.” Black went on to become chairman of Blackwater, where he resigned after the company illegally bribed Iraqi officials.

Then there are the 13 “working groups” composed of equally worrisome individuals. The Middle East and North Africa Working Group is co-chaired by Bush’s Assistant Secretary of Defense Mary Beth Long, and Meghan O’Sullivan, Bush’s special assistant and deputy national security advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. The remaining co-chair is Walid Phares, who never worked for Bush but advised Lebanese warlords in the 1980s. Romney has reportedly promised Phares a top job in his administration, despite his virulently anti-Islamic views.

All told, Romney lists 37 holdovers from the George W. Bush administration — the very same administration he and all other Republican candidates barely referenced during their many debates because it was so discredited and toxic, even to the Republican base.

It didn’t have to be this way. There are, in fact, people in Republican circles who are sensible on international affairs. The Cato Institute, in particular, has experts that could dramatically change the direction of American foreign policy. Men like Justin Logan and Christopher Preble were prescient on Iraq and a host of other issues. Similarly, the Center for the National Interest (formerly the Nixon Center) has a host of solid scholars, including ones like Dimitri Simes and Geoffrey Kemp, who have valuable government experience in the Nixon and Reagan administrations, respectively, and a history of perceptive analysis. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, would have been another good pick.

So why aren’t guys like this being tapped? Why is the GOP sticking with a discredited foreign-policy approach rather that looking to its own past for wiser counsel? “Most of the realists and pragmatists have simply been driven out of the Republican Party,” says Stephen Walt, who writes a blog at Foreign Policy and teaches at Harvard. “The neoconservatives have been driving the agenda since Bush was elected and they remain well-entrenched.”

Another factor is that the Republican Party’s base remains strongly militaristic and reluctant to recognize limits on American power. Jon Huntsman’s failed presidential campaign illustrated that problem. The good news is that nobody seems to be calling for nation-building and occupying foreign countries in the mold of Iraq and Afghanistan. But that’s the only lesson that seems to have been learned from the last decade of foreign-policy debacles.

Finally, it may just be that the United States has too much power to change course. While the Unites States has undoubtedly made disastrous decisions in the last decades, it is so powerful that it is largely insulated from the consequences of them. If Romney’s foreign-policy advisor list is anything to go by, a Romney administration would have to teach the U.S. all over again about the problems with trying to police the world. Prepare for Bush redux.

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Jordan Michael Smith writes about U.S. foreign policy for Salon. He has written for the New York Times, Boston Globe and Washington Post.

Bush aide blasts torture

Philip Zelikow tried to warn Bush on interrogations. Now he's penned an authoritative article on how he was ignored

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Bush aide blasts torture (Credit: Reuters/Jim Young)

The Bush administration hasn’t heard the last from Philip Zelikow. After the rediscovery last week of his long lost 2006 anti-torture memo, Zelikow, a former State Department official, has written arguably the most damning article yet about U.S. government’s interrogation policies from 2001 to 2009. The article, called “Codes of Conduct for a Twilight War,” will be released in a forthcoming issue of the Houston Law Journal, and was obtained exclusively by Salon. Says Zelikow in an email: “I’m not aware of other accounts that combine historical, policy and legal approaches to” the subject of the Bush administration’s interrogation methods.

Based on published histories and his firsthand observations, and adapted from a lecture delivered in November, the article calls the administration’s rationale for its use of torture — which he nonetheless insists only on calling “extreme interrogation” and “coercive methods” — “radical,” “an amazing contention,” “untenable and extreme,” “unsustainable,” “an unprecedented program of coolly calculated dehumanizing abuse and physical torment,” and, finally, simply a “mistake.” He concludes: “This was a collective failure of American public leadership, in which a number of officials and members of Congress (and staffers) of both parties played a part, endorsing a CIA program of physical coercion without any precedent in U.S. history.”  In fact, “The only defense against criminal prosecution would be that officials acted in good faith reliance on the advice of their government lawyers.”

Part of what makes Zelikow’s analysis so damning and definitive is its judiciousness. The article is deeply empathetic of the uniquely fearful situation under which the Bush administration was initially operating. Zelikow calls the Sept. 11 attacks a “collective trauma” and a “shoc[k] to mass beliefs.” He notes that Bush and others spent time in burn units, morgues and with survivors of the attacks. One traumatic experienced often overlooked — overlooked because it appeared in Stephen Hayes’ stenographic biography of Dick Cheney — was that the vice-president’s daughter was (falsely, it turns out) told that her house with her children in it had tested positive for anthrax. Similarly, Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice were told that they and others had been exposed to an extremely lethal toxin in a particular area of the White House — and might soon die as a result. “The alarms did not stop and they too were not abstract … The pressure on Bush and his senior advisers was so direct because so much of the response had to be invented and improvised,” the article reads.

An additional factor in the power of the article is Zelikow’s credibility and history. Before entering government, he was a civil rights lawyer in Texas battling the Ku Klux Klan and then a highly esteemed Harvard historian specializing in U.S. foreign policy — he co-authored one book with Rice. He then served on the National Security Council under President George H.W. Bush and directed the 9/11 Commission before becoming counselor to Rice at the State Department from 2005 to 2007. He currently volunteers part-time on the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board under President Obama.

Such bipartisan, establishment credentials render the breakdown and conclusion of this article all the more damning. He believes that what should have been a political and moral question — should the United States torture captives? — became strictly a legal matter left up to government lawyers, few of whom had any experience with these issues, and who had to take the necessity of extreme measures as a given. “These lawyers then became secular priests, granting absolution to the supplicant policymakers,” Zelikow writes.

The problems began when the Office of the Vice President and the CIA took central roles in policymaking. Cheney felt himself above the rest of the National Security Council, bypassing Rice and other traditional channels of national security policymaking. Ad-hoc decision-making and improvisation became “a habit of thought,” which seemed initially to pay off in the security of the nation, as well as in Bush’s political standing and self-confidence.

With Cheney and CIA head George Tenet “the key entrepreneurs in setting codes of conduct for the War on Terror,” it was essentially left to their obsequious lawyers to decide, in secret, on the interrogation methods America should employ. Bush even told the Senate’s Intelligence Committee chairman that “the vice president should be your point of contact … [He] has the portfolio for intelligence activities.” Decisions were made to jettison international treaties. By December 2001, the CIA was already interested in reverse-engineering methods “heretofore used only to treat Americans to resist enemy torture.” When a senior al-Qaida member was captured in March 2002, the prototype for the administration’s torture policies was already developed. “So, for the first time in American history, leaders of the U.S. government carefully devised ways and means to torment enemy captives.”

Zelikow notes that “None of the policy or moral issues connected with these choices appear to have been analyzed in any noticeable way.” Perhaps worst of all, no serious consideration was given to weighing the costs of benefits of the torture program, with reference to relevant historical precedents and/or examinations of the respective French, British and Israeli experiences in dealing with captured terrorists. “Bush and Rice should have insisted on this,” Zelikow writes.

The 52-page article observes the successes of Obama’s counterterrorism policies after repudiating the use of torture. On the basis of the empirical evidence then, “[t]here is no evident correlations between intelligence success and the available of extreme interrogation methods,” no matter what Bush and Cheney claim. Finally, “The program’s costs — which include the high-level effort expended in order to establish, maintain, and defense the program — appear on the evidence so far to have well outweighed any unique value the program might have had as a method of counterterrorism intelligence collection.” This is apart from the damage to America’s international standing and corrosion of its traditional values.

Zelikow concludes his analysis by arguing that, although the Obama administration has the right to wage war and use extralegal methods to defeat al-Qaida, its claim of that authority to defeat “associated forces” is unwarranted. “The U.S. government should publish and explain any overarching policy and legal documents that guide and confine the conduct of deadly operation against its foreign enemies … the executive branch of the U.S. government has a duty to articulate the scope of its warfare to the Congress and the public.” The Bush administration’s unprecedented elevation of torture to national policy may be history, but the job to get U.S. foreign policy in line with its constitutional and moral obligations is far from over.

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Jordan Michael Smith writes about U.S. foreign policy for Salon. He has written for the New York Times, Boston Globe and Washington Post.

Thomas Kinkade, the George W. Bush of art

The rise and fall of Thomas Kinkade, the Painter of Light™ in a decade of bad faith

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Thomas Kinkade, the George W. Bush of art

News of Thomas Kinkade’s death arrived on the same day I received in the mail a vintage teacup on which I had spent a ridiculous amount of money. It has a cottage painted on it. Kinkade, whose work has long exerted a morbid fascination for me (to the concern of all my friends), specialized in cottages. So some part of me understands the appeal, I guess, but, damn: Those paintings make my corneas hurt. And yet, I could barely stop looking at them.

Kinkade was only 54, and his family told the media that he died of “natural causes.” This comes after years of reports of drunken public misbehavior: cursing at people who tried to save him from falling off bar stools, heckling Siegfried & Roy, grabbing a woman’s breasts at a publicity event and, most memorably, urinating on a Winnie the Pooh statue at the Disneyland Hotel while proclaiming, “This one’s for you, Walt!” There were DUI arrests. Also, his manufacturing company declared bankruptcy two years ago, and former franchisees of the once-ubiquitous Thomas Kinkade Signature Galleries won settlements against him for fraud.

That’s quite a fall for a man who frequently spoke of his Christian faith and family values when asked to comment on the mammoth success of his brand in the early 2000s. “When I got saved, God became my art agent,” Kinkade explained in a 2004 video. He went from a childhood in Placerville, Calif. (invariably characterized as “hard-scrabble”) to an apprenticeship selling his work in supermarket parking lots to his apotheosis as the nation’s “most profitable” artist, the Painter of Light™, and multimillionaire. He was profiled in the New Yorker by Susan Orlean.

I first learned about the dark side of the Painter of Light™ — sorry, couldn’t resist that one — when I reviewed “his” novel, “Cape Light,” in 2002. The novel, first in a series, was produced much as his paintings are: by a semi-industrial process in which low-level apprentices embellish a prefab base provided by Kinkade. He wasn’t the only artist to work in this way; he wasn’t even the only novelist. To the best of my knowledge, his novels — heartwarming, fuzzily pious tales of small-town life — have been coming out ever since, one more facet of a lifestyle brand that, at its most ambitious, included an entire Thomas Kinkade-themed housing development.

My review was just a goof intended to amuse Salon’s readers, but after it appeared, I began to receive emails from people who had sunk their life savings in Thomas Kinkade Signature Galleries (essentially, mall and shopping-district outlets for his prints) and been fleeced. I didn’t really understand how the financial architecture of Kinkade’s gallery empire worked, and I sure didn’t share their taste in wall art, but these people struck me as decent and sincere. They’d believed in Thomas Kinkade — not just in the man or the company, but in the ethos supposedly represented by his work, one in which (to quote Kinkade’s introduction to “Cape Light”) “people have the time to savor life’s simple pleasures” and lead “deep, satisfying lives.”

My conversations with these victims made me uneasy. Was there some relationship between the franchisees’ naivete, perhaps even their willful self-delusion, and their terrible taste? Was it hopelessly snobby to wonder that? What about Kinkade himself? He seemed to be at best a hypocrite and at worst a crook. Was there a meaningful connection between his bad conscience and his bad art? German thinkers of the 1930s would have said so, and they had plenty of opportunity to observe bad fascist art up close. Hermann Broch maintained that someone who chooses to make kitsch is “ethically depraved, a criminal willing radical evil.” The novelist Milan Kundera believes kitsch to be the natural expression of totalitarianism. That’s a lot of moral weight to place on a bunch of garish cottage paintings, but Kinkade was always the first to present his work as a form of ideology.

I felt compassion for the ripped-off gallery operators, and at the same time I was aware that quite a few of them had probably also fallen for the similarly sanctimonious, bogus folksiness of George W. Bush, thereby subjecting our nation to one of the worst presidents in its history. Kinkade and Bush struck me as of a piece, probably because they had both borrowed from Ronald Reagan in promising that we could get back to a better way of life that never existed in the first place. In nearly every encounter with the press, Kinkade delivered a diatribe against the art-world “establishment” that had shut him out. They were “elites” touting unfathomable, downer junk to hardworking people who needed uplift instead. Art snobs were the aesthetic counterparts of the so-called liberal elites, a group that surely included me.

At the same time, I must admit that I, too, like a cottage. Granted, I like the stylized, art-deco kind painted on bone china, rather than the insanely detailed and phosphorescently lit specimens in Kinkade’s pictures. And I’m in little danger of equating my new teacup with a Brancusi just because it’s cheerier. Nevertheless, I suspect that my idea of what’s pleasing about a cottage isn’t too different from that of Kinkade’s fans: an aura of harmless coziness, of modest domestic beauty and comfort not too cut off from the past. It’s as if we’re speaking the same word, but in different languages.

I suspect this is why Kinkade’s paintings have exerted their weird, hypnotic effect on me. They are so preposterous (especially the stream-side ones; he really needed to sit down with an architect and go over the basics of drainage), so awful. And yet I can still detect — beneath that cacophony of hollyhocks and cobblestones and snapdragons — the whisper of something intelligible. I’m pretty sure I know why the hordes of Kinkade collectors love his work, even if I don’t like it myself. Kinkade’s paintings are irredeemably false, like all kitsch, but through them you can just barely glimpse the honest desires they seek to exploit, sinking under the dreck.

Kundera defined kitsch as “the absolute denial of shit,” meaning it offers an airbrushed, sterilized, sentimentalized view of the world. From that, it doesn’t necessarily follow that art wallows in shit, but art doesn’t exist for the primary purpose of denying it, either. Kitsch is, first and foremost, a lie; its very existence is founded on bad faith.

Kinkade, like Bush, peddled a falsely simplified image of the world — one without mildew or flooded basements, for one thing — which, no surprise, turned out to be plastered over a whole lot of stinky stuff. The true believers, the ones who bought into these men the most during the 2000s, ended up paying some of the highest prices, from the Kinkade acolytes who invested in his gallery Ponzi scheme to the working-class red-staters who sent off their kids to die in a pointless war. Bad taste, harmless as it may seem, can end up costing you a lot.

Further reading

Los Angeles Times obituary for Thomas Kinkade

Susan Orlean’s 2001 profile of Thomas Kinkade for the New Yorker

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Laura Miller

Laura Miller is a senior writer for Salon. She is the author of "The Magician's Book: A Skeptic's Adventures in Narnia" and has a Web site, magiciansbook.com.

The memo Bush tried to destroy

A document advising the Bush administration against torture has resurfaced, despite his best efforts to hide it

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The memo Bush tried to destroyGeorge W. Bush in 2006 (Credit: AP/Ron Edmonds)

In February of 2006, Philip Zelikow, counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, authored a memo opposing the Bush administration’s torture practices (though he employed the infamous obfuscation of “enhanced interrogation techniques”). The White House tried to collect and destroy all copies of the memo, but one survived in the State Department’s bowels and was declassified yesterday in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive.

The memo argues that the Convention Against Torture, and the Constitution’s prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, do indeed apply to the CIA’s use of “waterboard[ing], walling, dousing, stress positions, and cramped confinement.” Zelikow further wrote in the memo that “we are unaware of any precedent in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, or any subsequent conflict for authorized, systematic interrogation practices similar to those in question here, even when the prisoners were presumed to be unlawful combatants.” According to the memo, the techniques are legally prohibited, even if there is a compelling state interest to justify them, since they should be considered cruel and unusual punishment and “shock the conscience.”

Chillingly, the memo notes that “corrective techniques, such as slaps,” may be legally sustained, as might be “[C]ontrol conditions, such as nudity, sleep deprivation, and liquid diets…depending on the circumstances and details of how these techniques are used.” However much distress Zelikow’s memo caused the White House, it was not an ACLU briefing paper.

“I’m pleased the memo is now part of the historical record and available for study,” Zelikow wrote Salon in an email. The White House had determined that the memo — which was not binding since Zelikow’s was a bureaucratic position without legal authority — was too dangerous to exist. “I later heard the memo was not considered appropriate for further discussion and that copies of my memo should be collected and destroyed,” he said in a May 2009 congressional hearing.

At that hearing, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Zelikow said he had “no view on whether former officials should be prosecuted,” a decision he thinks should be left to “institutions.” However, he did call for a thorough inquiry and a public report examining how the U.S. came to employ torture.

Of course, no such inquiry was ever launched. The Obama administration declined to revisit the U.S. employment of torture, with the president saying he didn’t want to “look back.” Zelikow believes this was a mistake. “I still believe an inquiry would be useful, though less so as time passes and more information becomes available, especially after the 9/11 trials conclude, hopefully this year,” he says in an email.

During his congressional testimony, Zelikow declined to say whether Department of Justice lawyers acted improperly or immorally, conceding only that their opinions were “unsound, even unreasonable.” But in a 2007 lecture in Houston, he had no problem saying “the cool, carefully considered, methodical, prolonged, and repeated subjection of captives to physical torment, and the accompanying psychological terror, is immoral.”

The importance of the memo lies in its revelation that there was real, serious debate inside the Bush administration about how to interrogate captured terrorist suspects. The members of the White House declined to enter that debate — indeed, they did their best to squash it. The destruction of Zelikow’s carefully reasoned memo suggests the White House did not want any record of alternative views even existing, lest they be considered reasonable or people get the idea that the torture policies were thought controversial even by members of the administration.

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Jordan Michael Smith writes about U.S. foreign policy for Salon. He has written for the New York Times, Boston Globe and Washington Post.

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