Republican Party

“Americans have not been energized”

Historian James Chace talks about the presidential campaign of 1912 and how its spirit of progressive reform could energize the 2004 election.

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James Chace’s “1912: Wilson, Roosevelt, Taft and Debs — The Election That Changed the Country,” to be published by Simon and Schuster next week, is an account of the election that defined the Progressive era, crystallized the agenda of reform that had been largely thwarted by reactionary forces for decades, and changed the political parties, especially the Republican Party, in such a way that its impact is still felt in the election of 2004.

Chace is best known for his brilliant biography “Acheson,” about Dean Acheson, the secretary of state who was the ultimate “wise man” in the foreign policy of the American century. Chace is an incisive and original analyst of international affairs, author of numerous books on the subject and former managing editor of Foreign Affairs. He was also an editor at the New York Times Book Review and editor of World Policy Journal. Chace is currently professor of government and public law and administration at Bard College. In “1912,” he exercises his skill as a historian to bring to life the most important campaign of the early 20th century. Salon spoke to Chace this week on the personalities and underlying currents of that contest and their continuing influence on today’s politics.

There are a number of critical elections in the 20th century — 1932, 1960, 2000 come to mind. What drew you to 1912?

Interestingly enough, what drew me to 1912 was the “what if” of history. I’ve spent my whole life writing articles and books on foreign policy, and yet this election had nothing whatsoever to do with foreign policy. It was almost completely on domestic issues of the Progressive period. But the implications for foreign policy were profound. Had Theodore Roosevelt been nominated by the Republican Party — and he would have been had he not been cheated out of the votes he had gained in the primaries — he would have been president in 1912 and Woodrow Wilson would have lost. This would have meant that Roosevelt would have continued to make the Republican Party a party of reform, which is what he stood for at the time, indeed, almost radical reform. In terms of foreign policy he might very well have brought the United States into the First World War after the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, in which case the war might have ended far sooner and certainly with a less drastic peace than the one imposed on Germany. This might well have changed the course of the 20th century.

I gather from your comments that you have a somewhat more charitable view of Roosevelt than historians had once upon a time. By and large it seems that you take a more jaundiced view of Wilson and a more charitable view of Roosevelt. What brought you to that kind of favorable opinion?

I think that Roosevelt was a man who really grew in office. When he was president from 1901 to 1909, he changed in many respects. He came in as president after the assassination of President McKinley, whose vice president he had been. At that time he was what I would call a patrician reformer; that is to say, he’d been police commissioner of New York City, he’d been governor of New York State and he’d always been for certain kinds of reforms because of the greedy behavior of the great trusts and the very bad state that most workers found themselves in. Roosevelt wanted to make things better. He also wanted people to rise above their own sort of sectarian interests.

What do you mean by that?

He saw America as a country that should have both the businessmen and the workers working together in a kind of community and so to rise above the factionalism and to end the terrible treatment that many of the unions received at the hands of the capitalists of that period. Nonetheless, he was not someone at that time who understood the importance of such issues as women’s suffrage. But he grew in office to the extent that he dropped to a certain degree his imperialist longings. He regretted that America had taken the Philippine Islands. In his foreign policy as president he became a mediator in some very important disputes in the world. For example, he received a Nobel Peace Prize for his mediation in 1907 of the Russo-Japanese war. Later he also acted as mediator in the so-called Tangier crisis, when France and Germany might have come to blows over Morocco. He wanted the United States, above all, to play the role of a great power in the world, to make America’s growing economic strength give America a military and naval power and a diplomatic role to play.

He grew in other respects, too. By 1912 he had embraced women’s suffrage; he called for broad health insurance for everybody; he spoke out very strongly to get rid of child labor, to get decent working conditions. His views toward black Americans became more pronounced. He realized they must be allowed to vote, and he wanted to use the authority of the federal government to make sure that they were able to vote. So, in many ways, he grew as a man. The boisterous, brash Roosevelt, who was a fiery imperialist, and the man who was for reform, but very modest reform, became radicalized through those years.

Well, we know that Roosevelt was capable of the kind of cynical maneuvers that politicians use. Let’s reconsider the notion of getting votes for the blacks. In the South those blacks who were able to vote generally voted Republican. So his aim in this was to make sure more of them could vote. But this meant continuing to cede the white South to the Democrats.

It was definitely a problem in 1912. The South was very much a Democratic stronghold. Blacks did traditionally vote for Republicans, the heritage of Lincoln. What Roosevelt wanted to do was retain the black vote, which would normally go to Republicans, but also get whites, who had traditionally voted for Democrats, to vote for radical Republicanism. And that he was not able to accomplish. For one thing, the Southern whites never forgave Roosevelt for having had a very distinguished black American for dinner in the White House shortly after he became president. Booker T. Washington dined in the White House, and the Southerners never let him forget that.

Of course, your book actually focuses not just on personalities but on the election of 1912, and I suspect that after spending a long time studying that election there are certain features that must have struck you. Would you like to share with us some of the more, shall we say, amusing or interesting facets of the election?

There were, of course, four people running. It is very important to understand that this book is not just about Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson — the two most prominent men — but also William Howard Taft, who was president after Roosevelt’s first two terms; in fact, he was put in as president because Roosevelt really wanted him to carry on with Roosevelt’s work. Then there was Eugene V. Debs. Debs ran a number of times for president as a candidate of the Socialist Party. In 1912 he received the greatest percentage of votes that the Socialist Party ever had in this county, almost a million votes. That was almost solely due to the power and personality of Debs. And finally, of course, there’s Wilson, who won because Roosevelt and Taft split the vote of the Republican Party.

Let me say a few more words if I may about the other men. William Howard Taft came from a very distinguished family in Ohio, and became a great friend of Theodore Roosevelt’s when he served as Roosevelt’s secretary of war and as governor-general of the Philippines. He was a very decent man. His politics were moderately conservative Republicanism; he was not against reform, but he was not a person who wanted to rock the boat too much, whereas Roosevelt was only too willing to rock the boat. Basically, Taft was a perfect lieutenant. When Roosevelt announced in 1904 that he would not run for a third term, he tried to find someone who he believed would carry on the policies of reform he had started, and Taft seemed to him finally the logical man to do that.

Taft himself never wanted to be president. He had always hoped to someday be on the Supreme Court, but his wife was an ambitious woman and she very much wanted her husband to become the president of the United States. Twice Taft turned down offers by Roosevelt for nomination to the Supreme Court and finally agreed to run for president. What happened was that Taft was not able to manage things the way Roosevelt was. Roosevelt was able to handle the archconservatives, which Taft was unable to do. Roosevelt found that the policies he urged were not being carried out the way he had hoped for.

So there was a deep split between them that got increasingly bitter. I might also add that Roosevelt liked power. He was only 50 years old when he left the presidency, the youngest man ever to serve, and he missed the power that he had had as the president of the United States. That definitely added to the bitterness he felt at betrayal by Taft.

Woodrow Wilson was a conservative Southern Democrat. He had been president of Princeton University and was picked by the political bosses of New Jersey as the perfect person to run for governor of the state. They thought he was reliable, he was reasonably conservative, but he was honest and moderately reformist. Wilson therefore was elected governor, but then turned on the bosses and put through a highly reformist program in New Jersey. He became increasingly one of the most likely candidates for the nomination by the Democratic Party in 1912 because, as I say, he adopted many of the reforms, some of which had been Roosevelt’s reforms, although not as radical as Roosevelt’s. And after an incredibly tense convention that went to 46 ballots in Baltimore, where at one point he tried to withdraw his name, thinking he would not get the nomination, he finally secured it through the machinations of Democratic war horse William Jennings Bryan, who had been the Democratic nominee three times before.

Roosevelt now sought the Republican nomination in 1912. It was the first time the primary system became really important, and he won a number of the primaries with enough delegates behind him to secure the nomination. But at the Republican Convention in Chicago the party regulars managed to disqualify something like 80 delegates — voting delegates for Roosevelt — and hand the nomination to Taft.

Roosevelt then helped to form a new party, the Progressive Party, known in history as the Bull Moose Party. This was a party made up of middle-class reformers, schoolteachers, well-meaning intellectuals, some populists, a lot of people supporting women’s suffrage like Jane Addams, and municipal reformers, particularly those who were fed up with the bossism that reigned in the great cities of the United States. Roosevelt became their standard-bearer. In his opening speech he declaimed, “We stand at Armageddon to do battle for the Lord.” Roosevelt was invigorated in this campaign, and it was a very, very lively and strong campaign that he ran.

The fourth man was Eugene Debs, an extraordinary figure in history — American labor history, certainly. He grew up in Terre Haute, Ind.; he worked on a railroad as a fireman, but was a decently well-educated man, read French and German. Eventually he joined the Socialist Party, but the greatness of Debs lay in the fact that he never lost sight of the goal of what was called industrial unionism. The only powerful organization when Debs came around was the American Federation of Labor, but that was a craft union. You had to be a skilled worker with a skilled craft to be in that union. The ordinary, unskilled worker was excluded from the union. Debs saw that what was needed was a broad-based unionism, a unionism where the skilled craftsman would join with the unskilled laborer in one great strong union. Throughout all of that period he himself was the dominant national figure of the Socialist Party and of organized labor.

It seems clear that 1912 as an election with major issues and colorful candidates would tell us something about the quality of electioneering. Could you just talk about some of the election strategies and the quality of public presentations that the candidates made?

This was the period before television and radio, so what you had in this period were orators. You would speak for an hour — two hours was not at all unusual. People came out in droves to see the candidates, but they expected to be entertained. It was also really the beginning of whistle-stopping campaigns, where you get on a railroad and just go from town to town with the candidate speaking from the rear platform of the train. The two most gifted orators were Debs and Roosevelt.

One of the most noteworthy things that happened in that campaign occurred in the late stages in October, when Roosevelt was campaigning in the Middle West. He came out of his hotel and went to get in his car and a man tried to assassinate him. A man picked up a pistol and shot at him, and Roosevelt’s life was saved only because he had a 50-page speech in the pocket of his coat. He was bleeding and the bullet went through the speech into his chest. Nonetheless, he insisted on going on to make his speech, against the advice of the doctors. No one could stop Roosevelt: He got up and walked onto the platform in front of about 5,000 to 10,000 people, opened his coat where he was still bleeding and said, “It takes more then a bullet to kill a Bull Moose.” And he spoke for another 45 minutes with a bullet in his chest. It was one of the most extraordinary performances in American electoral history. He then went to a hospital, where he spent the next couple of weeks. All the other candidates stopped campaigning until he was able to recover.

One reason that 1912 was so important was that it was the beginning of the idea of the direct primary system. States — not all of them, but many states — were beginning to have primaries, so the parties couldn’t simply be left solely in the hands of the political bosses, although they nonetheless remained powerful. So you had to really get to the people in a way you might not have had to in an earlier period. You had to get out, get to the people and get them to vote for you.

I’m a little bit surprised. Maybe it was just an oversight, but you mentioned Debs and Roosevelt as orators. I would have thought that Wilson was a better speechmaker. Maybe Roosevelt was a better stump speaker?

The point about Wilson is that he was extremely eloquent in his speeches. He wasn’t, however, a stemwinder kind of speaker. In other words, if you read the speeches, or if you listened carefully to them, there was no question he was extremely eloquent. Wilson’s father was a preacher. As a boy Wilson would sometimes spend time in front of a mirror practicing speaking well. But Debs and Roosevelt would whip up the crowd. Taft, by the way, made almost no speeches whatsoever during the campaign. He used the organization of the Republican Party to get the nomination. But that he ran at all was because he was so angry at Roosevelt for the things that Roosevelt had said about him and their then broken friendship.

Perhaps you could say a little something about the legacies of the election. What happened because of the election? What would you highlight as significant changes either in public policy, or in the parties, or in the strategies of campaigning?

Between them Roosevelt and Wilson really invented the modern presidency. By this I mean the strong use of executive power to get their programs through. From roughly right after the Civil War to the McKinley presidency, the presidency as a whole was really a weak presidency. The presidents themselves believed that Congress should play a dominant role, and it certainly did so. But when Roosevelt came in, he had to find ways in which he could assert executive power legally. And he found various loopholes, and executive orders, where he could do certain things. Most of the lands that he saved from destruction by loggers or others were done by executive orders, rather then votes by Congress. So this was a strong assertion of executive power — and that has been the dominant role of presidencies in the United States in the 20th and 21st century. Wilson himself also used executive power strongly when he became president.

The other thing is that because the spirit of reform was so strong in the Progressive period, Wilson adopted many of Roosevelt’s radical ideas. The result was that the first two years of Wilson’s first term resulted in a great deal of very important legislation: the income tax, the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank, better hours for workers. He pursued a number of policies that probably never would have passed had they not been prepared for by the strength of progressivism that Roosevelt and Debs espoused.

The other reason why this election changed the country was the split in the Republican Party. Of course, there had always been people who were more liberal or more conservative in the Republican Party, as there are in all parties. The difference in 1912 was that the split between Taft and Roosevelt polarized the party very, very deeply. And that split has never really been healed. With the coming of Ronald Reagan to the White House, and now of course with George W. Bush, it seems that the conservative wing is now in control of the party.

As for the inheritor of the policies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, it was, of course, Franklin D. Roosevelt. The New Deal in 1933 picked up the programs that Theodore Roosevelt espoused — the use of strong executive power to curb corporate excesses and promote social justice. Theodore Roosevelt used to say he wanted to use “Hamiltonian means to achieve Jeffersonian ends.” What he meant was that Alexander Hamilton believed in strong use of executive power, and that it should be used to make a stronger democracy throughout the country. That was certainly what Franklin Roosevelt felt. And Franklin Roosevelt had served with Wilson as his assistant secretary of the Navy and had married the niece of Theodore Roosevelt, so he had learned from both men. Wilson, however, was a kind of warning to him because Wilson had been unable to get the League of Nations approved, largely because he had refused to compromise with some of the reservations that the Senate wanted to put on the Treaty of Versailles, which were not all that serious. There was a deep stubborn streak in Wilson, which was finally very self-defeating.

Any last thoughts you have about this election and its import for those of us in this election year who turn to “1912″ in hope that there is a lesson for us?

I think the most important lesson is the need for reform. The masses of Americans today have not been energized toward the kind of reformers that they had in 1912. You need dynamic candidates to articulate the issues, to stir up the people — just as these men at the beginning of the 20th century were trying to deal with the inequities of industrial capitalism and, in Roosevelt’s case, to regulate the thing. In Wilson’s case he wanted to break the trusts so there would be more competition. We now are facing monopolies and a need for universal healthcare and better education — progressive policies — a century later. Masses of people were mobilized and energized in 1912 to create an America committed to social justice and economic opportunity for everybody.

Mark Lytle is a history professor at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.

The new face of “Democrats are the real racists!”

The National Review's lame attempt at revisionist political history

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The new face of (Credit: Library of Congress)

Apparently it is a great big lie — an “utter fabrication with malice and forethought” — to say that the Democrats lost their longtime hold over the old Confederacy because their support for civil rights legislation drove white Southerners away. That’s according to the National Review’s Kevin Williamson, who wrote a big National Review piece about how mad this lie makes him, when the secret truth is that Republicans have always been, and will always be, the single most pro-civil rights party ever.

The piece is largely an attempt to add a patina of respectability to the ancient, brainless comment thread talking point about how Robert Byrd was in the Klan, but lots of Republicans voted for the Civil Rights Act, so therefore Democrats are the real racists. (In this respect, the piece is an homage to Jonah Goldberg’s “Liberal Fascism,” which attempted to expand “Nazi stands for National Socialist” to book length, without pictures.) The only problem is that the “lie” he’s arguing against is 100 percent true, except when he states it in such a way that it no longer resembles what anyone has ever actually claimed.

So: It’s true, and no one denies this, that Republicans used to be very good on civil rights and Democrats used to be super racist. It’s true that Woodrow Wilson was a bigot and (Northern, liberal) Republican senators were better than (Southern, conservative) Democratic senators on civil rights in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. Williamson’s argument seems to be that Republicans couldn’t have taken advantage of a Democratic split over civil rights by appealing to racist white Southern voters because Republicans were too uniformly pro-civil rights, themselves. (This great big lie he’s debunking is one that Nixon and Lee Atwater and Ronald Reagan happily signed on to — they were thrilled when the Democrats fractured the New Deal coalition by eventually embracing civil rights!)

Williamson would, I guess, call it revisionist history, but he has revised all of the history out of it.

Even if the Republicans’ rise in the South had happened suddenly in the 1960s (it didn’t) and even if there were no competing explanation (there is), racism — or, more precisely, white southern resentment over the political successes of the civil-rights movement — would be an implausible explanation for the dissolution of the Democratic bloc in the old Confederacy and the emergence of a Republican stronghold there. That is because those southerners who defected from the Democratic party in the 1960s and thereafter did so to join a Republican party that was far more enlightened on racial issues than were the Democrats of the era, and had been for a century.

Oh, did they? It’s dubious to argue that the party that nominated Barry Goldwater for president was “far more enlightened” than the one that nominated Kennedy, but Johnson was a big ol’ Texas racist, so sure, fine, pretend Nelson Rockefeller cancels out Barry. But the segregationists didn’t all wake up and decide to vote for Republicans starting in 1965 — they revolted. George Wallace started a third party. They continued fighting for racism within the party, and they eventually lost. But it wasn’t until the conservative movement had finished fully taking over the Republican Party that the great shift finished.

After devoting a lot of words to LBJ’s very real history of being a loud-mouthed racist, Williamson explains that Johnson’s dumb, loud-mouthed racism was just a reflection of the whole of Democratic Party philosophy and belief since time immemorial.

Johnson did not spring up from the Democratic soil ex nihilo. Not one Democrat in Congress voted for the Fourteenth Amendment. Not one Democrat in Congress voted for the Fifteenth Amendment. Not one voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Eisenhower, as a general, began the process of desegregating the military, and Truman, as president, formalized it, but the main reason either had to act was that President Wilson, the personification of Democratic progressivism, had resegregated previously integrated federal facilities. (“If the colored people made a mistake in voting for me, they ought to correct it,” he declared.) Klansmen from Senator Robert Byrd to Justice Hugo Black held prominent positions in the Democratic Party — and President Wilson chose the Klan epic Birth of a Nation to be the first film ever shown at the White House.

Johnson himself denounced an earlier attempt at civil-rights reform as the “nigger bill.” So what happened in 1964 to change Democrats’ minds? In fact, nothing.

What is the funniest part of this: How it basically makes one brief stop in between 1875 and the mid-20th century in its exhaustive history of Democratic racism? Or how Williamson is clearly annoyed at having to even slightly, obliquely credit Harry Truman (Democrat!) for desegregating the armed forces, a thing (Democrat) Harry Truman did? Like, maybe what happened in 1964 was the eventual result of an intraparty battle that was happening in 1948 when Democrat Harry Truman desegregated the armed forces (and Strom Thurmond, future Republican, threw a big fit about it)?

The 1964 Civil Rights Act, and Lyndon Johnson’s role in ensuring its passage, was one major victory in a years-long effort by the party’s liberals to make the Democratic Party the civil rights party, and it worked so well that the racists were effectively no longer welcome. They responded by changing their positions or changing sides. It wasn’t an overnight change, because politics is slow, but it happened: Robert Byrd and even George Wallace changed their positions on black civil rights and apologized. Those who couldn’t adapt, or those for whom bigotry was more genuine belief than political opportunism, left the party. Strom Thurmond became a Republican. Lester Maddox launched a third-party presidential bid against Jimmy Carter and eventually endorsed Republican Pat Buchanan in 1992. Maddox was also a charter member of the Council of Conservative Citizens, the white supremacist paleoconservative group that once counted Trent Lott, Thurmond and Jesse Helms as members. These guys are the heirs to the conservative white Southern Democrat tradition. I’m not really sure they themselves would consider it a pernicious lie to say as much.

What would have been much, much more entertaining would have been if, instead of writing this piece about “Democrats” and “Republicans,” Williamson had written it about liberals and conservatives. Barry Goldwater and George Wallace both used conservative rhetoric to justify their segregationist beliefs — and so did William F. Buckley. Both parties at the time had liberal and conservative wings, and in each of those parties it was the liberal wing that was right on civil rights.

There was really only one American political party with a solid record on civil rights in the first half of the 20th century, and it was the American Communist Party. But “in praise of the liberal Northeastern Republicans who stood with the communists on civil rights and who were eventually driven from the party by conservatives like the ones who founded this magazine” would not go over well in the National Review, I imagine.

Williamson goes on to argue that the white South didn’t go Republican because of civil rights, it went Republican because of … the New Deal. So while the change happened too slowly and gradually to be ascribed to racism, it can happily be pinned on a series of popular economic programs that had been enacted 30 years prior to 1964. (Programs so popular that Southern racists and blacks joined together in a political coalition that lasted until liberals began … winning civil rights victories.)

But let’s not also forget to blame hippies and welfare:

The Republican ascendancy in Dixie is associated with the rise of the southern middle class, the increasingly trenchant conservative critique of Communism and the welfare state, the Vietnam controversy and the rise of the counterculture, law-and-order concerns rooted in the urban chaos that ran rampant from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, and the incorporation of the radical Left into the Democratic Party. Individual events, especially the freak show that was the 1968 Democratic convention, helped solidify conservatives’ affiliation with the Republican Party.

In other words, it was literally everything that was going on in the 1960s besides civil rights issues that made white Southerners eventually fully embrace the Republican Party. (And blacks continue to support the Democrats because Democrats lied about what happened in the 1960s and because Johnson promised them free government money forever, apparently.)

I mean it’s obviously true that the shift didn’t happen purely because of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but it’s just as obviously true that it’s a hilarious and deeply stupid misreading of history to pretend that the Republican Party has always and will always be the champion of civil rights.

[Thanks to, and please also read: Adam Serwer, Jonathan Chait, Mark Schmitt, Clay Risen, and Jonathan Bernstein.]

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Alex Pareene

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

How to cure the crazy

The return of Donald Trump forces the question: Is there anything the GOP can do to recover from insanity?

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How to cure the crazyDonald Trump (Credit: Reuters/David Moir)

One thing when writing about the Republican Party and the crazy – you can always be certain that it’ll generate new examples. So just when the news that a member of the House accused dozens of Democrats in Congress of being Communists seemed to be going stale, along comes Donald Trump – who is scheduled to appear at a fundraiser with Mitt Romney next week – to spout birther nonsense.

For those of us who believe that there’s something seriously wrong with the Republican Party (and see Tom Mann and Norm Ornstein’s new book; see also my argument that the problem is not about how “conservative” they are, but about their radical style), the big question is whether anything can be done about it. American democracy needs two strong, solid political parties, but currently one of the parties is just a mess – incapable of making coherent policy when it’s in office, and dangerously obstructionist when it’s out of office.

So how can a party recover? I think there are three ways, but two are unfortunately quite unlikely, and the third is at best uncertain.

Some talk about the possibility that the electorate will punish Republicans for their radicalism. Unfortunately, I think that’s unlikely. Note that consecutive blowouts in 2006 and 2008 certainly didn’t make things better. Part of the problem here, too, is that elections generally don’t work that way. It’s true that the impression of ideological extremism can be costly, as Barry Goldwater and George McGovern learned the hard way, but we’re talking here about 2 or 3 percentage points in a presidential election. Direct action by the voters just isn’t enough to do it. After all, as voters, they can only choose between the nominees that they’ve been offered, and if anything voters are more partisan than ever; they’re not likely to defect just because a candidate embraces the crazy, even if they don’t like it, because they would still have a strong preference for that candidate otherwise.

A second possibility is that they’ll wind up with a successful president who sets a strong example of sane conservativism and who is strong enough within the party that he or she can push a lot of the crazies to the fringes and beyond. That could work. Presidents have limited influence in general, but one thing that a popular president can do is to define normality for his or her own party. They can reward some and punish — or at least avoid rewarding — others, creating real and meaningful incentives that can be very different from what came before. The obvious analogy is Dwight Eisenhower’s maneuverings against Joe McCarthy. The problem is that for this strategy to work it takes a skilled and popular president who decides to try it, but Republicans might have to wait a long time before they get another Ike.

So the first method probably can’t work, and the second one is unlikely to happen. That leaves one other possibility: that the Republican coalition itself might demand change. Specifically, that Republican-aligned interest groups – perhaps business, national security or others – might become upset enough with the crazy, or worried enough that the crazy will impede their ability to get things done, that they’ll push to end it. After all, part of the problem with the crazy is that it truly is random; you really never know what nonsense Limbaugh or the Breitbart sites are going to be up to next, and there’s every possibility that it could interfere with groups within the party pursuing their interests. Even worse: Politicians who believe they were elected because their most valuable allies convinced the electorate that the president was a radicalized foreigner are going to be responsive to those supporters, and not to organized party groups. Those groups have enough troubles as it is, since in the current free-for-all campaign finance environment they have to compete with random billionaires who might have all sorts of unorthodox policy preferences.

We’ve seen a little bit of this already. During the healthcare debate, many normally Republican-leaning groups chose to work with the Obama administration and cut their best deal, rather than sticking with the rejectionist GOP. Several companies quit the conservative state lobbying organization ALEC when it became controversial by lobbying for ideological and partisan goals. On the national security side, a break has emerged between the Department of Defense and movement conservatives; both conservatives who care about national security and (on some issues) businesses might choose to stick with the Pentagon. And it’s not quite the same thing, but there’s been a small but steady stream of defectors from the movement.

Nevertheless, something like this would likely play out in nomination politics, with party-aligned groups insisting on candidates who are willing to fight for their interests while rejecting the crazy, and there certainly isn’t any sign of that yet. Will it in 2014 and 2016 if Romney falls short this fall and the crazy gets even worse? I have no idea – but that’s the only path out of this that I can imagine.

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Jonathan Bernstein writes at a Plain Blog About Politics. Follow him at @jbplainblog

GOP to modernity: Stop

For House Republicans, the less we know about our country and our planet, the better

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GOP to modernity: Stop House of Representatives Republican leadership (Credit: AP)

Watching the antics of the House GOP, you get the very strong sense that if the class of Republicans elected in 2010 were offered a chance to repeal the Enlightenment, they would leap at the opportunity. The great flowering of science and philosophy that reached critical mass in the 17th century employed human reason to batter away at the dogmas of blind faith. But as far as the Tea Party seems to be concerned, that was just one big wrong turn.

The most recent evidence that the current incarnation of the Republican Party just can’t handle the truth arrived this month when House Republicans voted to get rid of the American Community Survey. The ACS is an annual information-gathering effort that’s part of the U.S. Census. Every year, a randomized sample of 3 million Americans is surveyed for data on “demographic, housing, social and economic characteristics.” In one form or another, the U.S. government has been carrying out similar surveys since 1850 — the current version is the fourth major iteration.

Most sensible people consider the ACS to be extremely useful, the kind of thing that government is really well equipped to carry out. That is not, or at least did not used to be, a partisan statement. Both private and public sector policymakers use ACS data to make important decisions. The federal government allocates $450 billion annually according, in part, to information derived from the ACS. Businesses also consider the ACS vital, which explains why the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, rarely a fan of government spending, is opposed to the House action.

Even conservative economists are leery: The clearest evidence that the House GOP has gone completely beyond the pale can be seen in a Businessweek article reporting that representatives of the American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation and Cato Institute all declared their support for government data gathering. If you don’t understand what’s going on in the U.S. economy on a granular level, you’re flying blind. This should not be a controversial statement.

Even the Wall Street Journal is appalled — although the lead sentence of its editorial criticizing the funding cuts required some remarkable calisthenics before reaching the point of disapproval.

With the contempt of the Washington establishment raining down on House Republicans for voting on principle, every now and then the GOP does something that feeds the otherwise false narrative of political extremism.

Marvelous! In one sentence, the Journal’s editorial writer manages to deny, not once, but twice, the self-evident fact that the current crop of House Republicans occupies the nethermost regions of right-wing extremism, while at the same time admitting that, yeah, well, in this one case they are indeed bonkers.

There’s been no end of media chatter focusing on the importance of the data gathered by the ACS. We’ve also heard how the Constitution specifically enjoins Congress to gather demographic information “in such a manner as they shall by law direct.” And, in fact, the current form of the ACS follows the mandate set forth by a Republican Congress in 2005.

The sponsor of the House measure, the freshman Florida Republican Daniel Webster, claims that ACS questions are too “intrusive” and “the very picture of what’s wrong in D.C.” He seems to be projecting. The very picture of what’s wrong with D.C. is exquisitely captured by daily demonstration that one of our leading political parties is dedicated to the proposition that the less we know about what is going on in our economy or on our planet, the better. If science tells us that one of the consequences of human activity is an overheated planet, then the answer is to defund climate research. If data gathered by the ACS gives us a better understanding of where poverty may be growing as a result of economic policies put into place over the past few decades, best to just to close our eyes and ignore it.

Which brings us back to the 17th century. It’s no stretch to argue that both representative democracy and the Industrial Revolution flourished in large part through the application of Enlightenment principles. The founders of the United States were very much a product of Enlightenment ideals. Looking for an Enlightenment avatar? Think Ben Franklin. Progress is built on the accumulation of knowledge, and ideological rigidity shouldn’t be able to compete against the truth that derives from a better understanding of our universe. And yet that’s where we are today — watching as one of the two major political parties in our country becomes not just more and more distrustful of science, but also opposed to the very notion of information-gathering — and governs accordingly.

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Andrew Leonard

Andrew Leonard is a staff writer at Salon. On Twitter, @koxinga21.

Mitt’s favorite new dodge

Romney and the GOP insist the economy is more important than social issues. Why can't we address both?

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Mitt's favorite new dodgeMitt Romney (Credit: AP/Carlos Osorio)

One of the most overused metaphors in a writer’s arsenal is the one about “walking and chewing gum at the same time.” As a hiker and Big League Chew enthusiast, I particularly hate this cliché. Nonetheless, I feel it is fitting right now because it so perfectly summarizes the argument being made by Republicans. They now insist that America cannot simultaneously walk the walk on equal rights and also chew economic gum.

In the last week, Colorado was the testing ground for this talking point. At the presidential level, Republican nominee Mitt Romney criticized a Denver television reporter for daring to ask about his position on, among other issues, same-sex marriage. Before restating his opposition, he scoffed at the question, asking: “Aren’t there issues of significance that you’d like to talk about [like] the economy? The growth of jobs? The need to put people back to work?”

At the same time, Colorado’s Republican House Speaker Frank McNulty twice blocked a vote on a bill to legalize civil unions. His rationale? “We should not be spending time on divisive social issues when unemployment remains far too high and [when] far too many Coloradans remain out of work,” he said. Echoing that sentiment, the shadowy Republican front group Compass Colorado financed an automated telephone call telling thousands of voters that the push for civil unions was unacceptable because it is “promoting [a] divisive social agenda over Colorado job creation.”

Obviously, it’s perplexing to see the Republican Party allege that social issues are insignificant and “divisive.” This is, after all, the party whose most recent presidential nominating contest was dominated by attacks on contraception — the same GOP whose politicians have made an art out of riding a “guns, god and gays”-focused agenda to electoral victory.

But while such naked hypocrisy is enraging, the substance of the Republican rhetoric about gay rights is downright offensive. Essentially, conservatives are asserting that we cannot extend equal rights to all Americans and fix the economy. In the process, they are deliberately insinuating that the twin goals are somehow contradictory.

Well, you might ask, do they have a point? History says no. Our country’s story is the story of multitasking — a tale of extending the franchise to women while passing progressive legislation to deal with crushing economic inequality, a tale of both passing civil rights legislation and creating Medicare.

In light of such achievements, would anyone retroactively argue that America should have opposed the campaign to let women vote because the economy was so bad in the early 20th century? Would anyone insist that lawmakers should have halted civil rights legislation in the 1960s because there was a simultaneous need for a War on Poverty? Probably not, because most of us recognize such arguments for what they are: diversionary non sequiturs whose real goal is to preserve institutional bigotry and prejudice.

That’s the same objective of today’s GOP when it comes to rights for same-sex couples. For proof, just consider the abruptness of the shift: the Republican Party that spent the last decade insisting that we should simultaneously cut taxes, prosecute foreign wars and fight to limit a woman’s right to choose an abortion now suddenly says we can’t even discuss equal rights because of a recession.

The language changed not because the new “can’t walk and chew gum” mantra makes sense (seriously — would any sane person really claim that a bad economy justifies continued persecution of lesbians, gay, bisexual and transgender people?). It changed because the cause of equal rights is involved. And, clearly, that cause is what today’s Republicans are now most committed to stopping — no matter how much their flawed logic indicts their credibility.

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David Sirota

David Sirota is a best-selling author of the new book "Back to Our Future: How the 1980s Explain the World We Live In Now." He hosts the morning show on AM760 in Colorado. E-mail him at ds@davidsirota.com, follow him on Twitter @davidsirota or visit his website at www.davidsirota.com.

Jon Huntsman for New York City mayor?

Yes, please. It would be very funny to see him lose

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Jon Huntsman for New York City mayor?

Yes, Jon Huntsman should definitely run for mayor of New York, because I never tire of watching Jon Huntsman get rejected by voters. The best part of a Jon Huntsman campaign is when his well-heeled supporters very sincerely and tragically argue that the fact that no one wants to vote for Jon Huntsman is a sign that the Republic itself is in peril. They would get so sad and melodramatic when he got 10 percent of the vote.

Now, there is no evidence that Jon Huntsman is planning for run for mayor of New York City, but one of his annoying daughters tossed this one out there last night:

Why not? I mean sure he has never lived in New York and has no connection to the city, but why not?

Of course, now that this idea is floating around, very rich and well-connected morons just might set about trying very hard to make it a reality. Jon Huntsman is a creature of the sort of oblivious center-right rich folk who bankrolled the hilarious failed New York campaigns of Harold Ford Jr. and Reshma Saujani. They would like very much to see another one of their class be the mayor of their city, after Bloomberg ends his term (if he ends his term). The Republicans have essentially no candidate. (I still wouldn’t put it past Police Commissioner and professional harasser-of-minorities Ray Kelly to mount a run, but at the moment he’s sounding disinclined to.) And Jon Huntsman is the sort of nationally prominent “independent” candidate all three major New York newspapers would love (the Daily News would love him the most, obviously, but the Post would love him because he is secretly not actually that moderate).

Jon Huntsman — whose tax plan called for the complete elimination of taxes on capital gains and dividends, as well as the elimination of the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Reagan-era tax benefit for poor people that used to be the sole form of welfare that conservatives supported, and who also wholeheartedly supported the Paul Ryan plan to fix the deficit by eliminating Medicare and not making rich people pay taxes — was of course beloved by the press and labeled a reasonable moderate when he ran for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination. He was mistaken for a political moderate primarily because he does not believe that God created cavemen and dinosaurs at the same time, roughly 4,000 years ago. Huntsman, who supports the complete repeal of Dodd-Frank and is strictly antiabortion and anti-gay marriage and anti-healthcare reform and pro-gun, is now essentially a symbol of the dignity and sagacity of the “radical center,” even though he is a conservative Republican.

So obviously New Yorkers would be thrilled to vote for this guy. I endorse this.

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Alex Pareene

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

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