So far, media coverage of the 9/11 commission report has been dominated by story lines out of John le Carré novels. We’ve learned that the CIA failed to penetrate al-Qaida in the Middle East and capture the deadly hijackers, how the FBI gave short shrift to an internal memo warning that suspected terrorists were taking flight lessons in the United States, and how President Bush let slide a daily briefing that an emboldened bin Laden planned to attack American shores.
The focus on the wrenching series of failures among intelligence groups is important and justified. But all of the international intrigue, not to mention partisan sniping over what president or government agency was at fault, has deflected attention from the one culprit that gets a universal thrashing in the 9/11 report: the Federal Aviation Administration.
Still more troubling, the 9/11 report portrays the successor to the beleaguered FAA, the Transportation Security Administration, as infected with a host of similar problems — a charge amplified by a host of former FAA security analysts and aviation security experts.
“Look at security measures before 9/11 and look at them after 9/11,” says Michael Boyd, president of the Boyd Group, an aviation consultant firm based in Colorado. “The flaws are still there.”
The FAA — the guardian of American skies and airports, with a special writ to protect travelers from criminal acts, including terrorism — should have been the last line of defense. Instead, 19 terrorists slipped through its porous shield.
Here are just a few ways the 9/11 report gives the FAA an unequivocal thumbs-down:
Each layer of the FAA “relevant to hijackings — intelligence, passenger prescreening, checkpoint screening, and onboard security — was seriously flawed.”
Jane Garvey, who guided the FAA from 1997 to 2002, did not review daily intelligence. As a result, she was “unaware of a great amount of hijacking threat information from her own intelligence unit.”
Although government watchlists contained the names of tens of thousands of known terrorists, the FAA’s own “no-fly” list contained names of just 12 terrorist suspects (including mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed).
In a rare moment of hyperbole, the report calls the discrepancy between the extensive terrorist roster and the meager FAA list, the one that airline clerks perused, an “astonishing mismatch.”
Indeed, reading how the hijackers slipped through cracks in security on Sept. 11 is astonishing. Four of the five hijackers on American Flight 11, the first jet to hit the World Trade Center, were flagged as suspect by airline clerks at check-in counters; their luggage was examined, no explosives were found, and they were sent on their way. Two of the hijackers on American Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon, set off the security gate alarm — but the screeners didn’t bother to resolve what caused the buzz. The hijackers were hand-wanded, cleared and allowed to march onto the planes.
And that’s just the airports. Revelations abound about what happened in the sky, beginning with the first chapter, “We have some planes,” a reference to the first thing an FAA controller overheard a hijacker say on Flight 11. Thirty minutes passed before the controller figured out the significance of that statement. Things could have gone very differently had officials realized immediately that more than one plane was in the hands of terrorists.
Then there’s this exchange. When the Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Virginia, which oversees the entire airspace, discovered that United Flight 93 — which crashed in Pennsylvania — was hijacked, it contacted FAA headquarters. A command center controller then wondered aloud whether they should ask the military to launch (“scramble”) jets for assistance.
Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?
FAA Headquarters: Oh, God, I don’t know.
Command Center: Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna have to make probably in the next ten minutes.
FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.
To most readers, the 9/11 report’s indictment of the FAA may seem thorough and impressive. But to aviation security experts, both in government and in the private sector, the report doesn’t get to the core of the FAA’s problems. They argue that the report pulls its punches on the crucial point: that airline security was sacrificed to the bottom line and that old standby, keeping the customers satisfied.
To its credit, the 9/11 report does assert that the FAA and its self-interested partner, the airline industry, exerted “great pressures” on the Department of Transportation (FAA’s boss) to “control security costs” and “concentrate on its primary mission of moving passengers and aircraft.” But don’t be misled by the government-speak, says Boyd, who previously worked for American Airlines and Braniff International. “The FAA and airlines didn’t care if security worked or didn’t work. All they care about is no lines for passengers. And no flight delays.”
Steve Elson was an FAA special agent for security from 1992 to 1999. He worked for the administration’s covert “Red Team,” which analyzed airport security by, among other things, placing suspicious objects in luggage and carting them through check-in gates — nine times out 10 without detection. A former Navy SEAL and Drug Enforcement Administration rep in South America, Elson is not a timid man.
“I’d give the commission a ‘D’ for investigating the FAA,” he declares. To Elson, the FAA was the very embodiment of a stagnant, insular bureaucracy. Due to its cozy relationship with the airline industry — which is now in debt to the U.S. government for billions of tax dollars spent to bail it out it perpetually suppressed critical reports.
“The commissioners knew a lot more than they included in the 9/11 report,” he says. “They sold out.”
Elson sent five of the commissioners his own “White Paper.” In 24 single-spaced pages, Elson details decades of what he sees as the FAA’s ineptness. He quotes internal FAA memos, government reports, his own conversations with countless Congress members, former colleagues, and his own Red Team experiences in breaching airport security.
Elson’s paper is intemperate in tone, a sustained rant. Yet it’s nevertheless a damning portrait of a government agency riddled with arrogance, inefficiency and distrust of its own employees.
“The FAA always talked about maintaining ‘layers of security,’” Elson says. “But it was layers of bullshit and facade. It was chary of doing anything that would cost the airlines money. We in the field knew it but couldn’t ever get anything done about it at headquarters.”
Since Elson quit the FAA — “I was convinced they were going to kill people and didn’t want to be part of it” — he’s become a professional pain in the ass, seldom passing up a chance to blame the FAA’s incompetence for the 9/11 attacks. And perhaps his outrage sounds moot now, as it’s not going to bring 3,000 people back to life.
But Elson’s criticism is significant because he charges that the same problems now infect the agency that took over airport security from the FAA, after Sept. 11, the Transportation Security Administration or TSA.
TSA’s annual budget is a staggering $5.3 billion. But in the past two years, the media has gone hog wild broadcasting how airport security is no better than it was before Sept. 11. Throughout 2003, Elson, usually with TV news cameras in tow, waltzed through security gates of the nation’s major airports with objects (blow dryers and oranges) that resemble guns and explosives — by hiding them beneath lead-shield film bags — 135 times. In each instance, despite seeing a black blob on x-ray monitors, screeners didn’t bother to look beneath the film bags for anything else.
But it’s not just Elson and other independent critics who are firing serious barbs at TSA; it’s government officials themselves.
Currently, five U.S. airports are testing whether airport screeners, hired by private companies, perform more effectively than TSA federal screeners. In April, Inspector General Clark Kent Ervin of the Department of Homeland Security (TSA’s boss), testified before Congress that both groups performed about the same, “which is to say, equally poorly.”
The TSA, based on its own commissioned study, concurred, saying “there is no evidence that any of the five privately screened airports performed below the average level of federalized airports.” TSA chief Rear Adm. David M. Stone, a George W. Bush appointee, stated “that all screeners — federal and private — meet the same demanding hiring requirements, pass the same rigorous training regimen, and follow the same standard operating procedures.”
But Boyd argues that it doesn’t matter which group gets better marks, for screeners, while often the central focus of security, are merely one link in a chain that has countless other weak spots. Airports and commercial jets are vulnerable in many other ways. Terrorists could easily load weapons or bombs onto planes, Boyd says, with a little help from a wide range of people — caterers, mechanics, baggage handlers; anyone who has access to jets before they take off.
Boyd goes so far as to say that could be just the kind of help the hijackers had on Sept. 11. Perhaps the screeners really did find no weapons on the hijackers, he says. “I firmly believe there were things ferreted away on those airplanes. I firmly believe there were guns involved. I had one mechanic call me two weeks after 9/11 and say a 767 just pulled into the maintenance overhaul base and they found a couple of box cutters taped under certain seats.”
Tom Burnett, a passenger on Flight 93, did tell his wife, Deena, that one of the hijackers had a gun. But the 9/11 report states that no trace of a gun was found at the crash site; it adds that “if the hijackers had possessed a gun, they would have used it in the flight’s last minutes as the passengers fought back.”
That doesn’t deter Boyd. “What I’m saying is there was a larger conspiracy. They had to have had help by people on the other side of security. They had to have had help by people working at that airport. Mohamed Atta, after planning all this, wasn’t going to risk getting caught by some stupid screener, saying, ‘Oh, you have a box cutter?’ After spending all this money, scoping out Boston Logan Airport for months, would you risk this by putting a box cutter in your bag or pocket? They had to know all this.”
Boyd’s assertion that the hijackers thoroughly researched the airports and the type of jets they would commandeer is, in fact, supported by the 9/11 report.
Otherwise, though, when it comes to co-conspirators at work in the airports, the commission report doesn’t go there. Elson too says he hasn’t seen any evidence of Boyd’s conspiracy. But that’s not the point. What is, Elson says, is that “you and I could get together, sit down and make a plan tomorrow to get on airfields. It’s a piece of cake. We could get on planes with virtually 100 percent of success, plant a bomb, get off, and then blow the planes up. And the chances of getting caught are close to zero percent. That should make you feel good, huh?”
TSA spokesperson Amy Von Walter responds that screeners are just one part of airport and airline security. “That’s why we have a layered security system,” she says. “We now have federally trained, federally hired screeners. We’ve got thousands of federal air marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, and federal flight deck officers, or armed pilots.”
Von Walter stresses that installing secure gates and fences around airport perimeters, and making sure that all areas of the airport are guarded, is a top priority for TSA officials. She points to a recent TSA plan that outlines how airport security firms and local law enforcement, including the police and FBI — “who have the day-to-day responsibility of enforcing the perimeter” — should protect all vulnerable areas, from hangars to restaurants.
In every way, Von Walter says, air travelers today are safer than they were prior to Sept. 11. “Absolutely,” she says. “No question about it.”
But in fact there is a question about it. The 9/11 commission itself declares that the TSA has no “forward-looking strategic plan” in place to correct past problems and “major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general aviation security.”
Other federal officials go further. In a General Accounting Office report this June, the government penny-pinchers slighted TSA’s recent airport perimeter plan, calling the agency’s security efforts “fragmented rather than cohesive,” and hardly enough to justify the program’s cost.
Actually, look a little deeper into the bowels of government reports, and you find that our representatives on Capitol Hill are not happy at all with how things are going at TSA. In 2002, a House Appropriations Committee averred that TSA is “seemingly unable to make crisp decisions … unable to work cooperatively with the nation’s airports; and unable to take advantage of the multitude of security-improving and labor-saving technologies available.”
The next year, a Senate Appropriations Committee chimed in that TSA was “characterized by arrogance and disregard of the public’s views. This is particularly troubling given the fact that the agency’s core mission is to reassure the public as to the safety of the nation’s transportation system.”
For Elson, the TSA is quite simply a train wreck. “The fact is, TSA has proven itself to be a reckless, profligate, self-serving organization that can’t solve the most basic, rudimentary, fundamental elements of screening.”
Von Walter responds that TSA has been its own harsh critic. “As we continue to develop as an agency,” she says, “we continue to assess, evaluate and make adjustments.”
One wants to believe it. But inside the TSA itself is one of the world’s foremost aviation security experts, and he begs to differ. In fact, his voice is probably the most sober and frightening one you will hear regarding the current safety of our skies.
His name is Bogdan Dzakovic and his résumé is awfully impressive. He was an officer in the Coast Guard, a criminal investigator with the Navy, a U.S. air marshal and a leader of the FAA’s covert Red Team.
Dzakovic is as earnest as Elson is brash. Yet he has been every bit as fearless as Elson, first within the FAA, and then the TSA, in pinpointing failures in security and broadcasting them to his managers and Congress members. He paid the price for his outspokenness: Today, the 50-year-old Dzakovic is biding his time until retirement as an inconsequential security inspector in TSA. He is a man who fought the law and the law won.
But fight he has. Before the 9/11 commission, he testified that his Red Team breached airport security 90 percent of the time — prior to Sept. 11 — but that FAA managers suppressed his findings and in some cases prevented his team from retesting airports that were particularly bad offenders. “The more serious the problems in aviation security we identified, the more FAA tied our hands behind our backs and restricted our activities,” Dzakovic testified.
TSA was designed to be more open to criticism. Has it been? “TSA is worse than FAA,” Dzakovic says flatly. “Nobody bothered to learn from the shortcomings leading up to Sept. 11. TSA is not only making the same mistakes but they’ve taken things to a new depth of ineptness. And they’re spending 20 or 30 times more money doing it.”
Dzakovic’s own detailed report of security failings at the FAA, and his subsequent claim that his work was being covered up, earned him official whistleblower status by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, which essentially means, yes, he was telling the truth, and yes, findings from the elite Red Team were “grossly mismanaged.”
Like many FAA employees, Dzakovic was transferred to the TSA, where despite his whistleblower status he was given a lackey gig in TSA’s airport inspection division. After a year, a TSA manager asked him to prepare a “lessons learned” report about his manifold experiences in the FAA. And he did. “I wasn’t just spouting off my theories either,” he said. “I was saying here is the evidence why this will work and why you shouldn’t do this.” Ten days later, Dzakovic was demoted even further by being assigned to TSA’s general aviation area, where he was given computer fix-it jobs that “any kid in high school could do on a work studies program.”
Dzakovic himself doesn’t give the 9/11 commission report high marks. It’s redolent of the political cronyism and craven policies that marred FAA and now TSA, he says. He offered the commission his 500-page whistleblower report, which proved that “FAA security operated in a manner that was a gross threat to public safety,” and yet, he says, the commission turned him down.
“The more I read the 9/11 report, the angrier I get,” Dzakovic says. “I keep reading how the intelligence agencies didn’t have any imagination. But they had too much imagination. They were so disconnected from the real world that they were in la-la land. Now they say the answer is having the agencies talk better to one another. But having one ineptly run agency talk to another ineptly run agency doesn’t exactly fix the problem.”
What should have been corrected, Dzakovic continues, “is the one thing that should have happened in every agency — the FBI, CIA, FAA. And that’s the people on the bottom level of each of the respective agencies did their jobs. We recognized that the terrorist threat was increasing, we knew that security in aviation was a joke, we reported this to our chain of command, and they did nothing. If we would have been allowed to continue with what we were working on, and had the agencies made changes based on what we were doing, 9/11 wouldn’t have happened.”
Dzakovic has some specific ideas for fixing the TSA, such as placing rigorously trained TSA employees throughout airports, rather than having a TSA manager strolling around with a clipboard, trying to organize myriad security guards and law enforcement agencies, the result being that no one is clear who’s actually in charge. But it’s pointless to offer recommendations, he says. So he stays in his office, doing his work.
“One of my first assignments from the division manager was to go through an old FAA operations manual,” he says. “Every time I saw the word ‘FAA,’ I was to scratch it out and put ‘TSA.’”
Another deadly plot taken down in the planning stages. This time, thanks to the work of a CIA double agent, officials were able to infiltrate a Yemen-based al-Qaida plot to destroy a U.S.-bound jetliner using a nearly undetectable underwear bomb.The moral of the story: Airport security works!Am I being facetious? Not necessarily. It depends on your definition of airport security.
In my mind, the key to keeping airplanes safe is, and always has been, stopping acts of sabotage while they are still in the planning stages. Here in the age of the TSA checkpoint, with its toothpaste confiscations and obsession with pointy objects, we tend not to think this way, preoccupied instead with a kind of airport Kabuki — the tedious, fanatical screening of passengers and their carry-ons. Real airport security takes place offstage, as it were. It is the job of the folks at the CIA and the FBI, working together with foreign authorities. And while TSA has an important role here too, we can do without the spectacle of airport guards rifling through innocent people’s bags in a pathological hunt for what are effectively harmless items.
The concourse checkpoint needs to be there. Just the same, chances are good that once an adversary has made it to the airport, he or she has engineered a way to outwit the system. And spend as we might, there will always be a way to outwit the system. ”Even if our technology is good enough to spot it,” said California Rep. Adam Schiff, commenting on the news of the latest underwear plot, “technology is still in human hands and we are inherently fallible.”
That’s one of the smartest things I’ve heard a politician utter in some time.
Getting a handle on this takes us all the way back to Sept. 11, 2001, the day that everything, and yet really nothing, changed. I’ve said this before, but it bears repeating: Conventional wisdom holds that the 19 hijackers exploited a weakness in airport security by smuggling box cutters onto four Boeing jetliners. But conventional wisdom is wrong. What the men actually exploited was a weakness in our mind-set — a set of presumptions based on the decades-long track record of hijackings and how they were expected to unfold. (In prior years, a hijacking meant a diversion, perhaps to Havana or Beirut, with hostage negotiations and standoffs; crews were accordingly trained in the concept of “passive resistance.”) The presence of box cutters on 9/11 was merely incidental. The men could have used almost anything — a deadly sharp can be fashioned from a broken first-class dinner plate or a ballpoint pen — particularly when coupled with the bluff of having a bomb. The success of their plan relied not on hardware but on the element of surprise. It wasn’t a failure of airport security that allowed those men to hatch their takeover scheme. It was a failure of national security — a breakdown of communication and oversight at the FBI and CIA level.
To put it succinctly: The success of the 9/11 attacks had almost nothing to do with airport security at all — a great and painful irony, of course, to any passenger forced to endure the checkpoint rigmarole in 2012.
Not that frontline guards don’t play a deterrent role. And, in the opinions of some, the plot uncovered in Yemen underscores the value of full-body scanners — those controversial walk-through machines that allow guards to look beneath a passenger’s clothing. It’s a compelling argument, but the way in which these scanners have — and have not — been deployed is apt to make some of us cynical. For instance, the vast majority of body scanners are found at U.S. domestic airports. Overseas, where a bomb is far likelier to originate, they are rare. Is this really about safety, we wonder, or is it about billions of dollars going into the coffers of the companies contracted to build these machines?
And although the scanners are effective, where does the arms race end? Not long ago, the idea that passengers would be marched through body scanners and photographed naked before being allowed to board an airplane, would have seemed outrageous. Yet here we are. What might be next? The stubborn truth is, we can turn airports into fortresses if we want (in some respects we’re well along that path), yet we’ll never be entirely safe. Airport screening alone, no matter how thorough, how expensive, and how technologically advanced, will never defeat a relentless enough, resourceful enough adversary intent on downing a plane.
That isn’t capitulation, it’s reality. And acknowledging this reality would go a long way toward warding off panic and overreaction when the next successful attack occurs.
Regrettably, too, we often forget that commercial air travel has long been a target of terrorist extremists. The 1970s and 1980s in particular were, as I like to describe them, a Golden Age of Air Crimes, comparatively rife with bombings, hijackings and other deadly assaults against airplanes and airports. Over one five-year span between 1985 and 1989 we can count at least six high-profile terrorist attacks, including the horrific bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772; the bombing of an Air India 747 over the North Atlantic that killed 329 people; and the incredible saga of TWA Flight 847. And let’s not forget what might have been, such as the so-called “Project Bojinka,” the 1994 scheme masterminded by Ramzi Yousef (nephew of Kalid Sheikh Mohammad), in which impossible-to-detect (at the time) liquid explosives were to be used to simultaneously destroy a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific Ocean. Fortunately the plot unraveled and Yousef was arrested.
While we can argue, quite persuasively, that many of the current-day security measures have done little if anything to make us safer, we’ve nevertheless introduced measures that have been useful and effective, from explosives screening of checked luggage to the sorts of trans-border partnerships that broke up the most recent plot from Yemen. Whether in spite of, or because of, the attention we’ve lavished on All Things Terrorism, the past decade has seen fewer attacks against commercial air travel than any since the 1950s.What we need to remember, though, is that our success has had more to do with the security measures we don’t see than those taking place in plain view. And if our luck is to hold, we need to better rationalize and streamline our entire approach to airport security. For instance, if we’re going to have those body scanners, let’s put them where they’re needed. If this requires negotiating with foreign authorities whose airports are beyond TSA’s jurisdiction, so be it. Meanwhile, here at home, TSA’s one-size-fits-all approach, in which every single person who flies is seen as a potential threat, is simply unsustainable in a country where close to 2 million people fly daily. Things like taking snow globes from children, haggling over tiny container sizes, or confiscating a dessert fork from a uniformed, on-duty airline pilot (it happened to me) serve no useful purpose whatsoever. On the contrary, they divert valuable time and resources away from the things that could make us safer. Let’s scale back that concourse Kabuki and retrain guards in the finer points of a more sensible, risk-based assessment of passengers and their belongings.
And lastly, if only as an aside, let’s behold for a moment the term “underwear bomb.” That was the operative phrase in literally hundreds of articles and broadcasts over the past several days, and nowhere did it raise a snicker. What does it say about our country, I wonder, that such a preposterous expression is instantly understood and effectively taken for granted?
Strange times indeed.
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The other day at Bergstrom Airport in Austin, Texas, I witnessed a striking manifestation of the new American plutocracy. Along with getting a photo at the Department of Motor Vehicles and sitting in a jury pool, standing in line at airport security with a mob of other people, miserable though it is, remains one of the few examples of civic equality in our increasingly oligarchic republic. Much airport security, of course, is theater, designed to provide alibis for bureaucrats and politicians in the event of a terrorist attack. But while we can debate what a rational airport security system would look like, no rational system would discriminate among passengers on the basis of ability to pay.
That is what makes the policy of Delta Airlines so shockingly un-American. In Austin, Delta had not one but two lines that fed into the Transportation Security Administration checkpoint area. One line was mixed race, mixed class and mixed age. The other line was usually empty. Now and then a white, middle-aged man would appear in the second line and the first line would be halted as he went directly into the TSA checkpoint.
“Who are those guys?” I asked a TSA officer, when I reached the front of the second-class citizen line.
“Delta has total control over the passenger line all the way up to here,” the officer answered. “They’ve decided to let priority passengers as well as pilots and steward staff go through ahead of others.”
“So that’s the rich white guy line?” I asked.
The TSA officer laughed. “On our side of the line, everybody is equal.”
Now I would be the first to concede that what Delta and other airlines do beyond the government security checkpoint at the gates that lead to airplanes is their business. At the moment, the model of America’s pathetic, predatory, deteriorating airline industry seems to be eking out nickels and dimes by playing crudely on the snobbery of their customers, with the use of two separate lines at the terminal gates, one for priority passengers — labelled, by various airlines, Gold, Platinum, Elite and so on.
The priority line, needless to say, goes to exactly the same door and entry ramp and does not get the “elite” to its destination one second earlier. Neither de Toqueville, who commented on the contrast between the status obsessions of Americans and their professed democratic egalitarianism, nor Veblen, who coined the term “conspicuous consumption,” would have been surprised by this method of showing off. Such silliness is a matter for satire, not lawsuits or protest marches.
But going through airline security is different. It is not a choice, like belonging to an airline’s frequent flier points club. Security screening is an onerous civic duty. Like other civic duties, it should be shared equally by rich and poor alike. Remember the motto of Jacksonian populism? “Equal rights for all, special privileges for none.”
Nearly all the airlines now allow well-heeled passengers to pay for the privilege of cutting ahead of the rest of us at the TSA checkpoint. At many airline checkpoints there are two lines. The long line looks like America; the short line is made up mostly of affluent white men.
Is this the future we Americans want: two lines at all airline security checkpoints, one for the privileged 1 percent and the other for the 99 percent, who have to stand aside to let the people with lots of money pass? Alas, it appears that making economic apartheid formal in U.S. civil aviation is a bad idea whose time has come. The TSA is experimenting with a “precheck” program with built-in class discrimination, including the government’s crony-capitalist invitation of frequent fliers from private U.S. airline programs, but not other American citizens, to participate:
If you are a United States citizen and are currently a member of CBP’s eligible Trusted Traveler programs (Global Entry, SENTRI, NEXUS), you are automatically qualified to participate in the TSA Pre ™ pilot as long as you are flying on a participating airline at a participating airport. (If you’re a more frequent flyer with Delta or American, you must opt in to the program by responding to the communication sent to you, which is why it’s important to find that email and follow the directions in it.)
In other words, if you do not fly frequently — and most low-income and middle-income Americans cannot afford to — you would not be allowed to take part in this public government program. In true crony capitalist fashion, the precheck program blurs the line between the government’s security function and the airlines’ purely commercial frequent flier programs.
The precheck program is advertised as an experimental program, holding out the possibility that after a period in which they are subject to more scrutiny than affluent business travelers, low-income grandmothers traveling to visit their grandchildren at last will be able to take part. More likely, the precheck program would never be extended to the masses rather than the classes. It would simply become another permanent perk of the elite, whose members would have no incentive to lobby for democratizing the program — rather the contrary.
But wouldn’t it help an overburdened airport security system to reduce the number of people to be rigorously screened by TSA? Not if it means more screening for low-income grandmothers and less for frequent business travelers. Indeed, as anti-terrorist measures, trusted traveler programs allowing affluent people who are frequent international travelers to be subjected to fewer security procedures might well backfire. Osama bin Laden and Mohamad Atta were members of the affluent social and educational elites in their countries who lived abroad and traveled frequently.
These “trusted traveler” systems will not make America safer. Their unacknowledged purpose is to create yet another area of American society that is privatized and segregated by class, to the benefit of the mostly white economic overclass.
Very well then. Why don’t we just make the new class-based discrimination official? Instead of leaving it to airlines and other corporations to construct the new apartheid piecemeal and informally, let the government issue a Premium Elite Citizen Card, valid for multiple purposes. For the right price, a price carefully calculated to be unaffordable by the majority of Americans, those willing and able to pay would be allowed to cut in line, not only at airports, but everywhere: at taxi stands, movie theaters, restaurants. All they would have to do is flash their Premium Elite Citizen Card to force the rabble to step aside and make way. The degeneration of America’s democracy into a banana republic would be complete, once the Land of the Free became the Land of the Free Points With Membership.
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When I wrote last week about the 2-year-old girl who, along with her whole family, was kicked off a JetBlue flight for having a tantrum, I expected an outpouring of responses. What I hadn’t imagined was how much of it would be in favor of sedating kids as a practical means of getting them from point A to point B. “You know how I traveled with toddlers?” the stay-at-home mother of two tweeted to me. “Benadryl. Works like a charm.”
I’ll admit that I was initially stunned to see how apparently commonplace the practice is. I’d never given my two daughters Benadryl or anything else to calm them down when they were young travelers, and the thought of doing so seemed wrong to me. It would have felt like a violation of their trust, a willful introduction of something unnecessary into their bodies for my own convenience.
In fairness, though, my kids have barely ever flown, and when they have, they’ve been reasonably chill. And after getting an earful from other parents both on Twitter and via email, I began to wonder if doing something that could make a child comfortable — and one’s fellow travelers considerably less inconvenienced – was such a big deal.
“I’ve totally given Benadryl as a way to get the kids to go to sleep when they were littler,” says my friend Collette, whose sons are now tweens like mine. “I think I did it about a month ago even. I would do it on a flight if I thought it would make them less freaked out.” But, she admits, “I’ve never made it a habit.”
And my friend Ted, who has two school-age daughters, regaled me with the story of flying to Florida a few years ago, “crouched down behind the row of seats in the departure lounge, feeding my perfectly healthy kids cough syrup so they will sleep, and looking guiltily around to see if I am going to be caught. Down at the other end of the long row of benches, I catch the eye of another parent doing the same thing to her daughter. All our kids rack out and we sit and laugh about it — and other kid realities — for the whole flight.”
It’s not as if this generation’s parents invented the idea of taking the edge off for our kids. We learned from the masters – our own parents. Ted says, “My parents did the same to us when we were on long road trips. We had a VW van with the back seat removed and a platform put in covered with mattresses and sleeping bags and we drove everywhere — out to the Midwest, down to Florida, New Mexico. My mother fed the three of us cough meds as we left a few times and after that it was Pavlovian — we’d all get in the car and immediately crash. I still fall asleep if I’m not driving.” Collette says that her mother used to give her whiskey in hot milk. And Monica, a mom in the Bay Area, recalls a cross-country trip with her brothers in the ’70s, when the kids “made little beds in the back of my parent’s Buick LaSabre and slept constantly.”
“It was strange to wake up and two states had gone by, or it was afternoon and suddenly it was midnight and we were checking into a hotel,” she says. “My mom was always giving us ‘vitamins’ from a tincture. I remember us all standing in the entry of our hotel room while she gave us little drops — like little birds getting a worm. Years later my mom told me what she did. She had gone to the doctor before the trip and gotten some kind of sleep aid/tranquilizer for us.”
But nothing in life, not even relaxing, over-the-counter allergy medication, is a sure thing, recalls Melissa, a mom who learned that the hard way. “We gave our newly adopted 14-month-old a dose on a flight home from China. She wound up climbing the walls, hyper-awake and restless. Never touched the stuff again.”
And Darshak Sanghavi, a pediatrician and author of “A Map of the Child: A Pediatrician’s Tour of the Body,” says, “According to a good randomized trial of Benadryl to promote sleep in infants, the drug didn’t really work any better than a placebo. So I first tell parents that it’s not really clear that Benadryl really works like many parents might think. Second, there are occasional case reports of Benadryl poisoning. Granted, those are highly unlikely, but my opinion is that parents traveling with infants should generally stay away from trying to sedate them with Benadryl, and instead focus on comforting them with feeding during takeoff and landing (may improve ear pressure equalization). Flying with infants is almost always torture,” he admits, “and unfortunately, medicating an infant isn’t going to change that.”
Yet when you’re facing a cross-country flight and a cranky kid, sometimes you’re willing to try anything. My own former pediatrician, Brooklyn’s Dr. Philippa Gordon, advises parents to be guided by equal measures of caution and instinct. “It’s a question that toggles between the pragmatic and what we find uncomfortable,” she says. “Is it a kid who has a known disorder or you know is going to have a terrible time on a flight? Or is it really more for the control of their symptoms than the comfort of other passengers? Are you medicating them for behaving like normal, developmentally appropriate children? We shouldn’t use medications just for the comfort of adults. Remember that Benadryl is an antihistamine. I try not to use over-the-counter drugs for children and toddlers, and certainly not for unintended results.” But she adds that it’s “a judgment call,” and ultimately “a relatively benign intervention.”
But my friend Helen, an advanced practice nurse specializing in maternal addiction in Philadelphia, sees it differently. “I think putting a chemical into your child’s brain in lieu of substituting appropriate comforting parenting behaviors is shameful,” she says. “Whatever happened to games, singing, soothing? I work with addicts for a living and this is the disease to its core: Can’t cope? Head for the dope! If other people on the plane get annoyed at a fussy child, then dose THEM.”
Even those of us who’ve never sedated our kids can cop to moments when we’ve considering it. I’ve certainly enjoyed a few of my children’s drowsier afternoons after they’ve had vaccinations or medication. And my friend Ava recalls a pediatrician handing her two bottles of medicine, “with instructions to be careful to give the one at night, as it would make my 8-month-old baby sleepy,” and wondering, “Just at night? When I’ve considered the tension and fighting and probable bad mothering that took place in a carful of kids on a 12-hour road trip, I’ve wondered more than once just how bad it would have been if I’d given them that night-time cold medicine. I didn’t, but I wouldn’t judge a mother who did.”
I’m still glad I got out of my children’s meltdown years without dosing them – because that feels like the right and consistent approach for our family. I still shudder at the automatic “Haven’t you ever heard of Benadryl?” response from callous adults who think any child out in public should be silent and sleepy. There’s also a world of difference when you’re dealing with a colicky baby, a tantrum-tossing toddler or a bored kindergartner, and you need to consider your options in age-appropriate ways. But in the past few days, I’ve been reminded that parenting is very much a make-it-up-as-we-go-along adventure, and that most of us really are endeavoring to do right by our children and the innocent bystanders who have to put up with them. As my writer-friend Stella says, “There are so many things you say you’ll never do/say to your kids. But any parent will tell you that raising children is all about doing the best you can with what’s at hand. Excepting actual physical injury or emotional trauma, I would never deign to judge the parental decisions someone else makes. Parenting is hard. Full stop. And you do what you can.”
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The scourges of modern-day air travel.
I can think of a few: TSA, delayed flights, garbage in your seat pocket. Screaming kids and misdirected luggage. “CNN Airport News.”
Or, how about the blizzard of cardboard placards that hotel chains insist on littering their rooms with? I spend a quarter of my life in hotel rooms, and I resent having to spend the first five minutes of every stay gathering up an armful of this diabolical detritus and heaving it into a corner where it belongs. Attention, innkeepers: This is fundamentally bad business. One’s first moments in a hotel room should be relaxing. The room itself should impart a sense of welcome. It shouldn’t put you to work.
And here’s another one: the ever-expanding collection of electronic cords, adapters, chargers and gadgets I’m obliged to haul around with me. You know what I’m talking about. Anybody who travels regularly knows what I’m talking about. All of this, supposedly, to keep us “connected.” To make our lives easier and more productive.
Does it?
Don’t get me wrong. Riding the subway out to Logan, I love being able to pop in my earbuds and catch a few cuts from the Wedding Present, the Jazz Butcher or the Velvet Underground. And my MacBook Air is as essential for travel as a change of socks. But there is, or was, something to be said for that unplugged, disconnected age of not so long ago. If nothing else, our carry-ons were lighter, with more room for clothes.
The photo above shows the assortment of electronic gadget and gizmos I take with me pretty much every time I hit the road, be it for work or pleasure. As recently as a decade ago I owned none of this. I didn’t even have a cellphone until 2006.
Clockwise-ish, from upper left:
– That black case contains the camera that I used to take this picture. I currently use a Panasonic DMC-LX3. It’s a decent point-and-shoot with a Leica lens and super-long battery life. (The more recent pictures in my Flickr archives were taken with this camera.) I bring it with me on most, though not all, of my layovers and holidays.
– Earbuds. I recently upgraded to a pair of Klipsch and retired this Apple set.
– 32GB flash drive. For my backup files, and for transferring to and from my “master” computer at home.
– USB connector for camera (optional).
– Ethernet cord. Useful in those (too many) hotels where Wi-Fi is weak and a wired connection runs more robustly. Hotel-supplied Ethernet cords are often broken.
– Power adapter for laptop.
– AC adapter set. Essential when traveling overseas. One problem is, if I’m assigned to reserve status I often don’t know if I’ll be heading overseas until the last minute, so I’ve always got this with me.
– iPhone 4. Product unplug: Am I the only person who despises — and I mean really despises — the iPhone’s messaging keypad? Because the special function keys — caps, space bar, backspace and return — are so close to the normal character keys, I’m constantly capitalizing, spacing and backspacing when I don’t mean to. This happens in either the vertical or horizontal layout, and it’s especially annoying for those of us with fat fingers. It takes me five attempts to complete the simplest sentence.
– USB charger for iPhone.
– USB-to-AC connector thing for iPhone (optional, but a good thing to have).
– USB-to-Ethernet adapter (see Ethernet cord above).
And, in the middle of it all, my beloved MacBook Air.
All together, we’re looking at roughly five pounds of technology that, for all intents and purposes, is mandatory carry-on. Sometimes it’s slightly less, other times slightly more. Not shown, for instance, is my Flip video camera, which I bring on longer trips. ( Flip brought you this, among other works of directorial art.)
Thus the real must-have gadget is a decent case or container in which to consolidate all of this crap. For me, most of the more wiry components above fit nicely into an old business class amenities kit, which keeps them out of the way and avoids tangles. (How frustrating is it, meanwhile, that so many electronic devices require their own proprietary charging cord or adapter? Imagine if every lamp took a different kind of light bulb.)
The amenities case, together with the laptop, camera and phone, fit snugly into either of my larger carry-ons. Now that my flight case has been retired — a milestone previously detailed here — I typically go to work with two pieces of luggage:
The first is a custom crew roll-aboard from Luggage Works. At the moment I use the 26-inch LW with the plastic frame, which is much lighter than the more popular metal frame version. To make it even lighter, I’ve retrofitted the stainless steel retractable handle with an aluminum one.
I don’t know what “custom crew” means. I just thought it sounded cool. Over 95 percent of LW users are airline crew members, but anybody can order one.
A number of my colleagues use Travelpro bags (I’ve owned a couple of Travelpros over the years), but on the whole that brand is more popular with flight attendants than with pilots.
For a long time pilots resisted using roll-aboards at all. The thinking was that rolling your belongings was, like, too effeminate for the macho pilot (take me, for example). And so pilots would hand-haul their 40-odd pounds of personal luggage and pilot gear through the airport, toning their tough-guy biceps and making many a chiropractor happy.
By the way, have you ever heard somebody refer to roll-aboard bags as “roller board” bags? I was on a plane a few weeks ago and the flight attendant made an announcement reminding people to stow their “roller boards” handle-first into the bins.
My smaller bag, hung from my roller board using a hook that I designed myself, is a $300 Tumi briefcase that I bought about six months ago and quickly learned to hate, with its useless, miniature exterior pockets that I can barely squeeze my fingers into.
I’m something of a pro when it comes to short-notice, multi-climate packing. Here’s a tip: Go with lightweight clothing. What a concept, I know, but I’m amazed by how many people travel with heavy cotton jeans — even to hot climates. I own a lot of fast-dry synthetics. They’re not stylish, but when have I ever been? On the other hand I can launder a pair of pants in the hotel room bathtub and they’re dry before morning.
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GO-AROUNDS
Re: The Funniest Thing Ever Written
Several readers emailed demanding that I immediately scan and post copies of the 1988 “Guide to Harvard University Dining Services” booklet that I wrote about last week. A great idea, but the thing is 38 double-sided pages long. Tell you what: I’ll do it, but not for free. My price is $5, sent to my PayPal account. I figure if 20 people are interested, that’s $100, which makes it worth my trouble. Once I hit a hundred bucks I’ll send scans of every page to anybody who wants to see them, or else I’ll post them somewhere on my home site. If I don’t hit the $100 mark within the next 10 days I’ll refund your donations. (I really don’t expect to bring in much beyond that, as people will be waiting for the early birds to cover the cost.)
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