In 1967, the Israelis, at war with Egypt, captured this coastal strip, 40 kilometers long and 10 kilometers wide (about 25 by 6 miles). Shamalach draws a rough diagram in the sand to show where his eggplant plantation was back then. “First the Israeli army occupied government land,” he says, drawing a straight line to indicate the enemy. “But then the settlers came, the Israeli zones were expanded and we lost our land.” As he continues to draw in the sand, more and more circles representing settlers begin to encroach on his plantation.

Finally, in January 2000, Shamalach was forced to abandon his fields in the now Israeli settlement of Nezarim. “But now we return,” he says, pulling his old documents from their protective plastic wrap.

Israeli withdrawal just around the corner

In mid-August, the Israelis will embark on their historic withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. For more than three decades, 21 Israeli settlements, together with their fortified apartment buildings, greenhouses and community centers, kept expanding into the Gaza Strip. Despite massive and occasionally violent protests earlier this week by Israelis protesting the withdrawal, they will soon be gone.

But as Palestinians gradually prepare for their return, there is little evidence of triumph.

On the southern outskirts of Rafah, a Palestinian town directly on the Egyptian border, Samir Kishta, 45, cautiously steps onto a devastated street. He’s been away from his old neighborhood for an entire year. “The Israelis really don’t want to leave,” he says. But despite his trepidations, he’s returned to take a look at an area that could become the nucleus of a future Palestinian state.

A few birds chirp in the dreary emptiness of gutted apartment buildings on the outskirts of the town, and a cellphone rings, sounding the opening bars of the Beethoven standard, “Für Elise.” In the shadows of rusted steel beams and concrete shells, Kishta walks to his former house. It was here, just a few steps from the border, that the Israelis demolished many Palestinian houses, officially in an effort to put a stop to weapons smuggling from Egypt.

Kishta doesn’t exactly have high hopes for a new era in Palestine. He has learned little else but to despise the Israelis. Ironically, it’s precisely for this reason that he trusts the Palestinians’ fiercest enemy, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

“There is only one reason why I believe that the settlers will withdraw — because Sharon promised that they would,” he says, as a twisted piece of metal clatters into the interior of the devastated shop he once owned. “Sharon keeps his promises.”

The combination of helplessness and poverty among the Palestinians living in Rafah provides an ideal recruiting ground for extremists, and Hamas has been quick to take advantage of conditions there. But the Israeli withdrawal could break the recurring pattern of terror and retaliation in the region. When the Israelis leave, Hamas’ enemy will also disappear. What happens then?

Yearning for martyrdom

In August, when Israeli troops and Jewish settlers withdraw from the Gaza Strip, they’ll leave behind a society shattered by the occupation and by the powerlessness of its own leadership. “Thirty-six percent of all boys between the ages of 12 and 14 want to be martyrs by the time they’re 18,” says psychoanalyst Iyad al-Sarraj, author of a study on the occupation’s emotional impact on Palestinians. For many young Palestinians — children who refused to remain as helpless as their fathers — becoming a suicide bomber was seen as their only option.

Sarraj sits in the shade of oleander bushes and palm trees in his lush, green garden, looking forward to a time when the enemy will have disappeared from his country. “If Palestinians fail to recognize justice and the rule of law as the new supreme order, violence will increase again, even without the Israelis,” he says. Sarraj has observed how, in the past few years, violence has become an outlet for Palestinian frustration, leading to dramatic increases in crime, rape and domestic violence in Gaza.

While Sarraj discusses his statistics, the energetic voice of an imam chanting the Friday prayers booms into the garden from a mosque next door. Muslim imams are worried that as political optimism grows in the Gaza Strip, Palestinians will gradually lose their sense of religious humility. Islamist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad are also struggling to define their roles after the Israeli withdrawal. When forced to deal with the daily business of reconstruction in a peaceful Gaza, they could lose their credibility as alternatives to both the corrupt Fatah Movement led by Yasser Arafat and now by Mahmoud Abbas, and of the Israeli occupation.

“Everyone will be euphoric and will celebrate on the first day of the Israeli withdrawal,” says economist Salah Abd al-Shafi, 43, “but the next day Palestinians will want jobs, they’ll want investments, and they’ll want results.”

The social and economic reality of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip isn’t exactly uplifting: 1.4 million people living on 365 square kilometers makes it one of the world’s most densely populated regions. Well over half the population lives below the poverty level. Four-fifths of all Palestinians, who used to be able to find work in Israel, have now lost their livelihood as a result of frequent border closings, usually after terrorist attacks.

Palestinians will have to rely on themselves

To make matters worse, the World Bank cites a 93 percent decline in foreign investment in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank between 1999 and 2002. And when the Israeli settlers and soldiers are gone, Palestinians will increasingly direct their demands and expectations at their own people.

Hatim Abu al-Tayif, 31, insists that the Gaza Strip must become a success story. The young architect sits in the office of a city official in Chan Junis, gazing at maps on the wall, where cross-hatched sections identify the locations of Jewish settlements. “We have no idea what the Israelis will be turning over to us,” says the urban planner. Streets, hotels, apartment buildings, greenhouses — Abu al-Tayif says he can only guess what lies behind the walls and fences of areas, off-limits until now, that will soon belong to the Palestinians. Even the aerial photographs the city purchased to facilitate its planning efforts were censored — the sections that would have shown Jewish settlements were simply cut out.

And so local officials plan to begin the post-withdrawal era by first addressing their community’s most pressing needs. In Chan Junis — a city in southern Gaza Strip — 800 houses were destroyed during the occupation, while another 3,000 were left severely damaged. The most important task for officials is to find shelter for those left homeless by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

“The city is completely overtaxed,” says Abu al-Tayif. But despite this bleak outlook, the architect has already committed some of his colorful dreams to paper: a recreation zone on the Chan Junis seashore, complete with a beachfront promenade lined with hotels and restaurants. Al-Tayif is wildly enthusiastic about his ideas, but adds: “Of course, all of this can only happen once we have improved the city’s infrastructure, installed a water supply system, and completed the resettlement program.”

But many Palestinians believe that the Israeli withdrawal, far from presenting a great opportunity, could turn out to be a trap. If internal disputes erupt once the settlements have been turned over, or if corruption continues unabated, it would represent a triumph for those who despise the Palestinians, both in Israel and other parts of the Arab world.

An Israeli trick?

The city officials in Chan Junis are already gearing up their police force to prevent looting and illegal house occupation in the settlements on the day after the withdrawal. “By withdrawing from the Gaza Strip, Sharon simply wants to prove how incapable the Palestinians are,” says Khaled Al-Yazji, 43, of the Palestinian Foundation for Culture, Science and Development, implying that the withdrawal is nothing but a trick designed to encourage internal unrest among the Palestinians.

There is little sense of anticipation for the withdrawal of the Jewish settlers. Every night, Kamal Abu al-Ajin, 42, makes his way to the Erez border crossing to Israel, where he joins a line of tired men standing in the dark, waiting for a green, white and red metal gate to slowly open and close again.

After passing through the gate, the Palestinian workers walk through a 250-meter covered passageway of steel, barbed wire and surveillance cameras to reach the Israeli checkpoint, where automated equipment searches them for explosives or weapons. The Israelis have replaced the human inspectors with electronic sensors. Invisible soldiers shout commands over loudspeakers while the Palestinians pass through the checkpoint, a series of revolving doors and metal detectors.

“We’re constantly afraid of losing our jobs, because the Israelis close the checkpoint so frequently,” says Abu al-Ajin. “I manage to work about three months in an entire year — the rest of the time I’m locked out, or rather, locked into Gaza.” A baked goods vendor adds his two cents to the conversation: “You will see,” he says, “that the withdrawal of the settlers will be completely meaningless when Sharon closes the borders afterwards.” The other men nod quietly. “Then we’ll be locked in,” the vendor adds, “and we’ll suffocate.”

Gaza needs links to West Bank

A World Bank analysis conducted in December 2004 reaches a similar conclusion: The withdrawal of the settlers will not promote peace if the government in Jerusalem refuses to guarantee residents of the Gaza Strip access to Israel and the West Bank. Without freedom of movement, says the analysis, the economy in Gaza will be incapable of developing.

Currently about half of Gaza’s exports depend on the link to the West Bank. “Gaza would fall apart without the West Bank,” says Yazji, the official with the Palestinian Foundation for Culture, Science and Development.

The Palestinians seem to have lost the ability to hope. Hardly anyone perceives the upcoming Israeli withdrawal as a gift or as a victory. Instead, many see it as an act of overdue justice — one that comes too late, in light of the losses of the past years; is too small, in light of Palestinian poverty; and is too insignificant, in light of the obstacles Palestinians continue to face in their efforts to achieve an independent state.

Ahmed Muheisin, 65, also refuses to yield to the hope that peace could soon come to the region. He says that he was blinded by optimism once before, and that it cost him the ability to see his son Sharif.

In September 2000, Sharif was accepted by Birzeit University near Ramallah, across Israel in the West Bank. The boy planned to commute once a week between the university and his family’s home in the Gaza Strip. But Sharif never returned, says his father. Ever since the Intifada began, a few days after Sharif had left for Ramallah, he was barred from visiting his father and 13 siblings.

Sharif continues his studies at Birzeit, occasionally sending pictures to his father in the other part of Palestine. Muheisin, wearing a suit and tie, sits on his sofa and says, sadly: “Now that would be a real peace process, if I could be permitted to visit my child at the university.”

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

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This article has been provided by Der Spiegel through a special arrangement with Salon. For more from Europe’s most-read newsmagazine, please visit Spiegel Online at http://www.spiegel.de/ international or subscribe to the daily newsletter.

The newspaper account of the debate in The Hill just reinforced the Republican spin, highlighting the Democrats’ decision to make people spend more money on the hated TSA and downplaying the actual existing Republican alternative to the proposal, which was not “spend less on the hated TSA” but rather “raise money for the hated TSA by slashing needed aid to states.” The Democrats won, or “won,” and now they will earn the fruits of that victory: well-deserved scorn from everyone. And Ben Nelson (D-Troll Town) voted with the Republicans. (Though surely having users pay the fees for supposedly necessary security measures is perfectly conservative, isn’t it? Am I missing something here? I mean besides the fact that the two sides in this debate weren’t actually “liberal” and “conservative” but rather “people who want to come up with a way of paying for the oppressive and useless national security state” versus “people who want there to be an oppressive national security state but hate government spending on feeding and sheltering impoverished people.”)

I don’t know of anyone not employed by the TSA or some other arm of Homeland Security that believes the TSA does a good job and deserves its massive budget, but everyone in Washington apparently feels differently (and is terrified of being blamed for “voting to cut TSA funding” if there is another terrifying and deadly underwear bomber, of course). This is why everyone hates politics and Congress and Washington. This and Iraq. And the drug war.

The area was evacuated for two hours until a bomb squad determined that the device was not dangerous.

At about 2 a.m. Saturday, a police officer discovered Miyakawa on a ladder not far from where the first contraption was found. Police said he was tying a similar “I Love New York” bag to a public lamp post.

Miyakawa was charged with two counts of first-degree reckless endangerment, two counts of placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the first degree, two counts of placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the second degree, two counts of second-degree reckless endangerment and two counts of second-degree criminal nuisance.

A judge ordered him held pending a psychiatric evaluation. His lawyer, Deborah J. Blum, said Monday that she is filing for emergency relief to have Miyakawa released. A court date was set for June 21 to review the results of the evaluation.

“He’s still being held,” Blum said Monday. “I believe that it was a gross misunderstanding and other than that I don’t have any other comment.”

Miyakawa, who was born in Tokyo and is about 50 years old, has worked for a New York-based architect Rafael Vinoly for the last 20 years and also has an independent design practice.

Vinoly’s firm released a statement Monday praising Miyakawa for his “extraordinary brand of professionalism” and said he has been a mentor to generations of young architects.

“Takeshi is a fabulous human being and a person of extraordinary talent,” Vinoly said. “We hope this misunderstanding is cleared up as quickly as possible.”

New York Civil Liberties Union Executive Director Donna Lieberman said in a statement that the charges sounded “like a wild overreaction.”

“It’s hard to understand why a light-up bag in a tree would be treated as an attempted terrorist act unless there’s more to the story than has been reported in the press thus far,” she said.

In 2007, an artist touched off a terror scare in Boston by placing electronic devices around the city as part of a marketing stunt for Cartoon Network. The city closed bridges, roads and public transit before authorities realized the signs were not bombs.

On an average day, the NYPD receives nearly 100 reports of a suspicious package. Last year, there were more than 4,000 such reports. The number generally rises following any word of terror threats in New York and around the world.

The concourse checkpoint needs to be there.  Just the same, chances are good that once an adversary has made it to the airport, he or she has engineered a way to outwit the system.  And spend as we might, there will always be a way to outwit the system.  ”Even if our technology is good enough to spot it,” said California Rep. Adam Schiff, commenting on the news of the latest underwear plot, “technology is still in human hands and we are inherently fallible.”

That’s one of the smartest things I’ve heard a politician utter in some time.

Getting a handle on this takes us all the way back to Sept. 11, 2001, the day that everything, and yet really nothing, changed.  I’ve said this before, but it bears repeating: Conventional wisdom holds that the 19 hijackers exploited a weakness in airport security by smuggling box cutters onto four Boeing jetliners. But conventional wisdom is wrong. What the men actually exploited was a weakness in our mind-set — a set of presumptions based on the decades-long track record of hijackings and how they were expected to unfold. (In prior years, a hijacking meant a diversion, perhaps to Havana or Beirut, with hostage negotiations and standoffs; crews were accordingly trained in the concept of “passive resistance.”) The presence of box cutters on 9/11 was merely incidental. The men could have used almost anything — a deadly sharp can be fashioned from a broken first-class dinner plate or a ballpoint pen — particularly when coupled with the bluff of having a bomb. The success of their plan relied not on hardware but on the element of surprise. It wasn’t a failure of airport security that allowed those men to hatch their takeover scheme. It was a failure of national security — a breakdown of communication and oversight at the FBI and CIA level.

To put it succinctly: The success of the 9/11 attacks had almost nothing to do with airport security at all — a great and painful irony, of course, to any passenger forced to endure the checkpoint rigmarole in 2012.

Not that frontline guards don’t play a deterrent role.  And, in the opinions of some, the plot uncovered in Yemen underscores the value of full-body scanners — those controversial walk-through machines that allow guards to look beneath a passenger’s clothing. It’s a compelling argument, but the way in which these scanners have — and have not — been deployed is apt to make some of us cynical. For instance, the vast majority of body scanners are found at U.S. domestic airports. Overseas, where a bomb is far likelier to originate, they are rare. Is this really about safety, we wonder, or is it about billions of dollars going into the coffers of the companies contracted to build these machines?

And although the scanners are effective, where does the arms race end?  Not long ago, the idea that passengers would be marched through body scanners and photographed naked before being allowed to board an airplane, would have seemed outrageous. Yet here we are. What might be next?  The stubborn truth is, we can turn airports into fortresses if we want (in some respects we’re well along that path), yet we’ll never be entirely safe. Airport screening alone, no matter how thorough, how expensive, and how technologically advanced, will never defeat a relentless enough, resourceful enough adversary intent on downing a plane.

That isn’t capitulation, it’s reality.  And acknowledging this reality would go a long way toward warding off panic and overreaction when the next successful attack occurs.

Regrettably, too, we often forget that commercial air travel has long been a target of terrorist extremists.  The 1970s and 1980s in particular were, as I like to describe them, a Golden Age of Air Crimes, comparatively rife with bombings, hijackings and other deadly assaults against airplanes and airports. Over one five-year span between 1985 and 1989 we can count at least six high-profile terrorist attacks, including the horrific bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772; the bombing of an Air India 747 over the North Atlantic that killed 329 people; and the incredible saga of TWA Flight 847.  And let’s not forget what might have been, such as the so-called “Project Bojinka,” the 1994 scheme masterminded by Ramzi Yousef (nephew of Kalid Sheikh Mohammad), in which impossible-to-detect (at the time) liquid explosives were to be used to simultaneously destroy a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific Ocean. Fortunately the plot unraveled and Yousef was arrested.

While we can argue, quite persuasively, that many of the current-day security measures have done little if anything to make us safer, we’ve nevertheless introduced measures that have been useful and effective, from explosives screening of checked luggage to the sorts of trans-border partnerships that broke up the most recent plot from Yemen. Whether in spite of, or because of, the attention we’ve lavished on All Things Terrorism, the past decade has seen fewer attacks against commercial air travel than any since the 1950s.What we need to remember, though, is that our success has had more to do with the security measures we don’t see than those taking place in plain view. And if our luck is to hold, we need to better rationalize and streamline our entire approach to airport security. For instance, if we’re going to have those body scanners, let’s put them where they’re needed. If this requires negotiating with foreign authorities whose airports are beyond TSA’s jurisdiction, so be it. Meanwhile, here at home, TSA’s one-size-fits-all approach, in which every single person who flies is seen as a potential threat, is simply unsustainable in a country where close to 2 million people fly daily. Things like taking snow globes from children, haggling over tiny container sizes, or confiscating a dessert fork from a uniformed, on-duty airline pilot (it happened to me) serve no useful purpose whatsoever. On the contrary, they divert valuable time and resources away from the things that could make us safer.  Let’s scale back that concourse Kabuki and retrain guards in the finer points of a more sensible, risk-based assessment of passengers and their belongings.

And lastly, if only as an aside, let’s behold for a moment the term “underwear bomb.”  That was the operative phrase in literally hundreds of articles and broadcasts over the past several days, and nowhere did it raise a snicker.  What does it say about our country, I wonder, that such a preposterous expression is instantly understood and effectively taken for granted?

Strange times indeed.

This should be our Nuremburg, the defining trial of the 9/11 era and a fitting coda to it.

Unfortunately, the U.S. government appears to be on the verge of squandering this opportunity, and with it, the best, and perhaps only, chance for the public to understand not only how the attacks came to be, but why Mohammed waged a relentless war against America and how we might stop the next would-be terrorist mastermind.

The problems lie within the reformed military-tribunal system that the Obama administration put in place after losing its fight for a civilian trial in New York. Political compromises have resulted in a flawed military commissions process that from outward appearances is not only rigged against the defense, but hyper-choreographed, censored and hermetically sealed.

“The process is designed to achieve a conviction, and to do it with as little revelation as humanly possible, but with the veneer of due process and justice,’’ said one participant who said restrictive gag orders prohibited him from talking publicly. “You’re talking about the most heinous crime ever, and we’re going to afford them less due process, less discovery, less of everything than we would the guy who shoplifted a pack of gum from CVS.’’

Obama administration officials say their reformed military commissions system is a vast improvement over the Bush administration’s version, which Obama moved to shut down on his first day in office in 2009.

Defense lawyers disagree, and insist they have been hamstrung in their efforts to mount the kind of aggressive defense needed to do their jobs including full and unfettered access to evidence, witnesses and even the accused themselves.

Four of the five legal teams had so few of their key players in place in recent months that they did not file the “mitigation submissions’’ that the government said it needed to decide which of the five men should face the death penalty and other key issues, such as whether to try them together or individually. They recently filed motions asking that the charges be thrown out because of fatal flaws in the system, which they say make it impossible for them to defend their clients.

“It’s window dressing,’’ Mohammed’s defense lawyer, David Nevin, said of the government’s improvements. “I am not all satisfied that it is a fair process. In fact, it is not a fair process.’’

Many of the defense lawyers have quit out of frustration or for other personal reasons stemming from the many delays in the process. Only a few have been there long enough to even begin to understand their clients’ case, not to mention the convoluted military commission process.

And they say they will be unable to effectively challenge confessions obtained when their clients were coercively interrogated in the CIA’s black site prisons, if they can broach the subject at all. This is important for the four men accused of helping Mohammed with the logistics of the plot. Several claim they have been wrongly accused, tortured into confessing, or both.

It is also important with regard to Mohammed, who confessed to dozens of plots while being waterboarded 183 times, and has said he may plead guilty even before the trial begins. Few U.S. counterterrorism officials believe all of his often boastful confessions, and it is important for the public to hear what, exactly, evidence the government has with regard to what he did and didn’t do, and whom he might have been protecting.

The team of Defense and Justice Department officials overseeing the military commission process, and the presiding judge, should quickly address the defense lawyers’ complaints, or a proceeding that some call “The Trial of the Century’’ will be delayed further by legal wrangling — and forever tainted by accusations of being unfair.

A full, fair and transparent trial, above all, will benefit the public. There is much the public doesn’t know about Mohammed, including the details of how he devised the plot, convinced bin Laden to let him do it and then orchestrated it “from A to Z,’’ to use his own words. It was Mohammed who masterminded dozens of other plots and attacks, some while staying a step ahead of the largest-ever criminal manhunt.

Mohammed, not bin Laden, was the one who traveled the world as a kind of “Johnny Appleseed’’ of terrorism, establishing alliances and creating a network of cells and lieutenants that in some cases remains today. And it was Mohammed who personally recruited young jihadist prospects much like a baseball scout, many of them Westerners, tapping into their grievances to turn them to his cause.

The U.S. government has kept the details of what Mohammed did — and how and why he did it — hidden in its most classified files since his capture in Pakistan nine years ago. The government should set the record straight on that, because there is an important lesson to be learned from the largely untold tale of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: It isn’t some monolithic group like al-Qaida that poses a continuing threat, it’s the one intelligent and energetic person who can emerge from nowhere and orchestrate a 9/11 while the world focuses elsewhere.

To that end, the government should declassify as much evidence as possible, and explain how it obtained it. It should call numerous witnesses to testify, especially since the one who has been publicly identified, Majid Khan, claims he was tortured while in CIA custody overseas.

Instead of limiting access to a few closed-circuit TVs, it should consider televising the proceedings. It should ensure that censorship is minimized, and used only to protect intelligence sources and methods, not to save the government from embarrassment. And it should let Mohammed and the others testify at length on their behalf if they so desire.

By doing so, the Obama administration will be able to say it did its best to put on the kind of civilian trial it has wanted all along, and one with a similar outcome to that of the al Qaida members charged with blowing up two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.

Those of us who witnessed that trial in Manhattan in 2001 saw the defendants squirm in their chairs as prosecutors introduced mountains of evidence against them. We saw eyewitnesses point the finger at the accused, and surviving victims glare at them from the pews.

We heard from the terrorists themselves, and learned a lot about why they did it, about how terrorist networks operate and about what might be done to stop people like them. And when the jury convicted them, there was no question that justice was done.

Five young men from Cleveland are now in jail, accused of plotting to “blow up a bridge in the Cleveland area,” according to the FBI’s triumphant press release/criminal complaint. As is always the case with FBI terror stings, the “sting” part involved the bureau’s informant/agent provocateur mostly inventing the plot the accused have now been arrested for. In this case, the five planned to detonate smoke bombs as a distraction as they “topple[d] financial institution signs atop high rise buildings in downtown Cleveland.” But the informant (as usual, a sketchy unnamed character with a checkered past) strongly pushed the group to seriously consider different, more extreme plots. At the end, some or all of them were going to plant C-4 on the Route 82 Brecksville-Northfield High Level Bridge over the Cuyahoga Valley National Park.

So what was initially a political action aimed at financial institutions somehow morphed into a supposed attempt to destroy or damage a piece of publicly owned infrastructure in a national park. Anarchists sure do hate bridges, and parks, I guess. (No parliament of men has the authority to designate which spaces are “national parks”! The whole world is the worker’s national park!)

The FBI’s affadavit suggests that there was never actually a serious “plot.” The gang tossed around the idea of “taking out” a bridge in order to stop people from getting to work, but they also thought maybe they could use their (pretend) C4 on a Klan rally, or a neo-Nazi organization, or an oil well, or the Federal Reserve Bank. They eventually decided to maybe sink a ship. All of their many plans were super serious and well-thought out. (“To prevent capture, he suggested getting tacks that they could throw out of the back of a car if they get in a chase.”) Eventually they settled on the bridge thing, sort of, and bought fake IEDs from the guy they already suspected was a cop.

In other words, these are a bunch of dumbasses even by the standards of amateur “black bloc” dumbasses. Do you know how I know these morons weren’t serious? They planned to download the Anarchist Cookbook and follow its notoriously awful instructions. Every experienced anarchist knows that the Feds have a mole in your group house, but these guys were mainly concerned with having someone’s “hacker friend” explain to them how bitcoins work. Without the FBI’s intervention the most damage these idiots would’ve ever caused is a broken Starbucks window. So thank god they’re off the streets, and congrats to the FBI for getting this tale of dangerous, bomb-planting anarchists onto the news broadcasts on the day of Occupy’s big May Day action.

(At least the Feds are branching out from only targeting Muslims in these ridiculous “stings.” Some day all Americans, regardless of creed or color, will have their circle of friends secretly infiltrated by a paid informant.)