Afghanistan

Blood and betrayal

After four years of the badly botched "war on terror," are we ready to hear the hard words of Robert Fisk -- a gutsy war correspondent who says the West has wronged the Middle East?

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Blood and betrayal

The wreckage of the World Trade Center was still burning when the British correspondent Robert Fisk weighed in with a piece titled “The Awesome Cruelty of a Doomed People.” “[T]his is not the war of democracy versus terror that the world will be asked to believe in the coming hours and days,” Fisk wrote. “It is also about American missiles smashing into Palestinian homes and U.S. helicopters firing missiles into a Lebanese ambulance in 1966 and American shells crashing into a village called Qana a few days later and about a Lebanese militia — paid and uniformed by America’s Israeli ally — hacking and raping and murdering their way through refugee camps.”

In the face of America’s righteous rage, Fisk was one of the few commentators who dared to posit that America’s policies had something to do with the attacks. And he did so with brutal honesty. “There will be those swift to condemn any suggestion that we should look for real historical reasons for an act of violence on this world-war scale,” Fisk wrote — and he didn’t know the half of it. He was immediately savaged. Critics called him an appeaser, a traitor, an American-hater, an ally of Saddam, an enemy of Israel, an anti-Semite.

This was nothing new for Fisk: For 30 years, the Beirut-based correspondent for the British newspaper the Independent has been an outspoken, even savage critic of America and Israel’s Middle East policies, a stance that has made him public enemy No. 1 for conservatives and supporters of Israel. The neoconservative strategist Richard Perle called him “execrable.” Right-wing bloggers have spent so much time attacking Fisk that they actually named a verb after him: To “fisk” something is to tear it apart. Some of them would like to tear him apart. When he was almost killed by an enraged mob of Afghan refugees during the American invasion, Fisk wrote a column saying if he had been in their shoes he too would have attacked any Westerner he saw, which led some readers to send him Christmas cards expressing their disappointment that the Afghans hadn’t “finished the job.” This sentiment was more or less echoed by the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal, which ran an article bearing the subhead “A self-loathing multiculturalist gets his due.” The right-wing columnist Mark Steyn wrote of Fisk’s column, “You’d have to have a heart of stone not to weep with laughter.”

In the aftermath of 9/11, when large sections of the American intelligentsia moved to the right — proving the truth of the old adage about conservatives being liberals who had been mugged — even some leftists parted company with Fisk. One editor who was against the war told me he thought Fisk had gone off the deep end — his writings were too strident, tendentious and reflexively anti-U.S. “Fisk is a legend, he has enormous experience and respect,” one Middle East-based journalist told me recently. “But it’s like he sees the Iraq war through the perspective of his experiences in Lebanon, through the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. And that isn’t really adequate to describe what’s going on in Iraq.”

Now this polarizing figure has written an enormous book, “The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East.” It is an extraordinarily ambitious undertaking, an attempt to do nothing less than combine 30 years of war reporting from conflicts all over the region with a historical analysis of the Middle East from World War I to the present and, for good measure, a personal narrative about his father. Fisk had already written an epic book “Pity the Nation,” a classic 1990 work about the Lebanese war. But his new work aims to go it one better. In its scope and sheer size — it runs 1,107 pages — “The Great War for Civilisation” is Fisk’s magnum opus, the culmination of his professional career.

Inevitably, this Herculean task falls short of complete success. There is simply no way that any writer can tie together the Armenian genocide, the Iran-Iraq war, the Russian war in Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Gulf War I, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the current Iraq war, and the Algerian civil war. Much of “The Great War for Civilisation” consists of more or less free-standing chapters of war reportage, often-brilliant work informed by Fisk’s critical intelligence and keen historical sense, but nonetheless essentially on-the-spot dispatches. (Much of the book seems to consist of repurposed pieces, but Fisk has edited it smoothly enough that you don’t notice.) What holds his book together is less a unifying historical narrative — for no such narrative exists — than his corrosive skepticism toward the powerful and his revulsion at war. But skepticism and revulsion, however justified, do not always make for coherent historical analysis. In particular, they do not help us choose among the bad alternatives that exist in the real world. Fisk excels at pointing out the lies and sins of the powerful, but he offers few suggestions of his own: His moral outrage can make the perfect the enemy of the good. He is not a consistent political thinker; his anger leads him to embrace positions that are problematic and even self-contradictory.

Yet despite its flaws, “The Great War for Civilisation” is a magisterial achievement. It largely succeeds in its audacious double mission, to show and to explain the bloody tragedies that have afflicted the Middle East. Fisk’s eyewitness reports from the killing fields are more than just bang-bang accounts: They are implacable and indispensable documents, grim reminders of what actually happens when nations go to war. And his devastating analysis of the reasons for those wars exposes the sins not just of the West, but of the Arab world as well. Fisk is a polemicist, but his anger derives from a Swiftian humanism. He is appalled by official lies and hypocrisy and driven to show, in nightmarish detail, the human suffering and death that results from them. And if he emphasizes and perhaps at times overemphasizes the culpability of the powerful — in particular of America and Israel — that perspective is not just excusable, but much needed in an intimidated intellectual climate in which received positions have gone largely unchallenged.

Timing is everything. Four years ago, Fisk was a virtual pariah. But as America begins to realize that its self-righteous “war on terror” has gone terribly wrong, perhaps his passionate, unrelenting voice will finally be heard. (The fact that Fisk’s new book is published by Knopf, one of the most prestigious houses in the country, may be a sign that he has become more respectable.)

Fisk has come by his knowledge and his cold, clarifying outrage honestly. Few, if any, Middle East correspondents can match his résumé: He’s been everywhere and seen everything — and he’s done his historical homework, too. He opens his book with intense accounts of his three interviews with Osama bin Laden, moves on to a harrowing description of the Russian debacle in Afghanistan, then writes at length about the 20th century’s forgotten war, Saddam Hussein’s endless, pointless war on Iran that may have cost a million lives — and which the U.S. abetted. There follows a devastating excursus on the Armenian genocide, which he convincingly argues deserves to be called the first Holocaust, and the largely successful Turkish campaign to deny it. Fisk then relates the long history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, starting with the dismembering of the Ottoman Empire and the secret Sykes-Picot agreement that betrayed Arab nationalist hopes, and moving on through Oslo and the second intifada. There follows a ghastly chapter on the savage Algerian civil war, in which a bloody-handed regime confronted even more bloodthirsty Islamists; the first Gulf War; and the Jordanian and Syrian regimes. He closes with the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

With the exception of the Armenian genocide, Fisk was present at all of these conflicts, and rarely in the rear. An intrepid reporter — he was one of the only journalists to remain in Beirut during the terrifying kidnapping epidemic of the mid-to-late 1980s — he throws himself into the middle of the action again and again. During the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, when fierce fighting was raging on the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the Fao peninsula, a tough AP reporter sums up Fisk’s proclivities neatly while telling him what they’ll be covering that day: “Well, Fisky, I’m told it’s a briefing at the usual bunker then a little mosey over the Shatt and a tourist visit to Fao. Lots of gunfire and corpses — should be right up your street.” Fisk is a first-rate writer, and his vivid accounts of being under fire capture the terror, the confusion and the very dangerous detachment that he says occasionally comes over someone in the face of imminent death.

Some of what makes this book compelling and, yes, entertaining (though there are long, hideous stretches that only a sadist could find enjoyable) is simply Fisk’s full-throttle account of the life of a war correspondent. He does not deny that he was drawn to it in part because of the dangerous romance of the profession, and he conveys that romance without being enthralled by it — or by himself. “Like so many journalists in time of war, we had been desperate to get to the front line — and even more desperate to find a reason to avoid going,” he writes. Fear vied with the adrenaline rush of danger and the addictive sense of being present at huge events. “Didn’t John Kifner and I admit that we had enjoyed those heart-stopping, shirt-tearing, speed-gashing rides up the wadis and over those hundreds of burned-out tanks?,” he writes. “Wasn’t that what being a foreign correspondent was all about? Going into battle and getting the story and arriving home safe and sound and knowing you wouldn’t have to go back the next day?”

During a particularly suicidal visit to a muddy causeway in Basra, surrounded by corpses and under artillery and small-arms fire, Fisk had enough. He told his minder, a crazed and fearless Iranian Revolutionary Guard named Mazinan, that he wanted to leave. When Mazinan angrily roars, “Why?,” Fisk writes what he was thinking. “Because we are cowards. Go on, say it, Fisk. Because I am shaking with fear and want to survive and live and write my story and go back to Beirut and invite a young woman to drink fine red wine on my balcony.”

Like all foreign correspondents, Fisk has a thousand amazing stories, which he tells with gusto. Some of them are hilarious, like his account of the time when, under fire from a Soviet helicopter, he dived through a doorway into an Afghan home to find himself staring at a terrified family. Needing to assure them he wasn’t Russian — to be identified as Russian was a death sentence — he racked his brain for the Pushtu word for journalist and triumphantly announced, “Za di inglisi atlasi kahzora yem!” But the family, far from being reassured, became even more afraid. Fisk realized that he had told them “I am an English satin bag.” In addition to thinking he was an infidel and an intruder, he writes, they were now convinced he was insane.

Then there are stories of journalistic derring-do. As Russian troops poured into Afghanistan in January 1980, Fisk and a BBC film crew — one of the only ones to make it into the country — went undercover, driving around the country in a battered yellow Peugeot taxi, “its front and back windows draped in plastic flowers and other artificial foliage behind which we thought we could hide when driving past Soviet or Afghan military checkpoints … Packed into Mr. Samadali’s cramped Peugeot, we were recording history. Steve and Geoff sat in the back with Mike sandwiched between them, hugging the camera between his knees as Gavin and I watched the Soviet troops on their trucks. The moment we knew that no one was looking at us, I’d shout ‘Go!’ and Gavin — he was, after all, the boss of our little operation — cried ‘Picture!’ At this point, he and I would reach out and tear apart the curtain of plastic flowers and greenery, Mike would bring up the camera — the lens literally brushing the sides of our necks in the front — and start shooting through the windscreen. Every frame counted. This was the biggest Soviet military operation since the Second World War and Mike’s film would not only be shown across the world but stored in the archives forever. The grey snow, the green of the Soviet armor, the dark silhouettes of the Afghans lining the highway, these were the colors and images that would portray the start of this invasion. A glance from a Russian soldier, too long a stare from a military policeman, and Gavin and I would cry ‘Down!,’ Mike would bury his camera between his legs and we would let the artificial foliage flop back across the inside of the windscreen.”

But autobiography and the romance of being a foreign correspondent play only minor roles in this book. The ironies of history, the follies of governments and the endless, stupefying tragedy of war are its major themes. Describing the sublime vista of the mountains of China as he and the film crew descend into the Valley of the Indus, Fisk writes, “We felt, we young men, on top of the world.” But then he goes on: “The tragedy of this epic had not yet gripped us. How could I know that 17 years later I would be standing on this very same stretch of road as Osama bin Laden’s gunmen prayed beneath that fiery comet? How could I know, as I stood with Gavin on that hillside, that bin Laden himself, only twenty-two years old, was at that very moment only a few miles from us, in the very same mountain chain, urging his young Arab fighters to join their Muslim brothers at war with the Russians?” The “fearful tragedy” of Afghanistan, Fisk notes, “would last for more than a quarter of a century and cost at least a million and a half innocent lives, a war that would eventually reach out and strike at the heart, not of Russia but of America.”

The real moving force in “The Great War for Civilisation” is history. It is history — made by men — that ushered in the Middle East’s nightmares. For the people of the Middle East, Fisk notes, history has never gone away — they live it, and die it, every day. The book’s ironic title derives from a medal Fisk’s father was awarded for his service in World War I — the first of those “great wars for civilization,” of which the latest is being enacted in Fallujah and Ramadi today. World War I plays a key and recurring role in Fisk’s book in two ways. It provides the frame for an exploration of his problematic father Bill’s life, in particular an enigmatic incident in which Fisk the elder refused to command a firing squad to execute a condemned man — the one moment when Fisk felt his father acted in accord with the humanistic principles the younger man embraced. And, more important, it was the Great War, and the betrayals of Western promises made to the Arabs that followed it, that created the modern Middle East.

“My father, the old soldier of 1918, read my account of the Lebanon war but would not live to see this book,” Fisk writes. “Yet he would always look into the past to understand the present. If only the world had not gone to war in 1914; if only we had not been so selfish in concluding the peace. We victors promised independence to the Arabs and support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Promises are meant to be kept. And so those promises — the Jews naturally thought that their homeland would be in all of Palestine — were betrayed, and the millions of Arabs and Jews of the Middle East are now condemned to live with the results.”

Fisk writes that “I have witnessed events that, over the years, can only be called ‘an arrogance of power.’ The Iranians used to call the United States ‘the center of world arrogance,’ and I would laugh at this, but I have begun to understand what it means. After the Allied victory of 1918, at the end of my father’s war, the victors divided up the lands of their former enemies. In the space of just seventeen months, they created the borders of Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia and most of the Middle East. And I have spent my entire career — in Belfast and Sarajevo, in Beirut and Baghdad — watching the people within those borders burn.”

The most crucial and incendiary borders are those that mark out the state of Israel. As Fisk observes, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict “is an epic tragedy whose effects have spread around the world and continue to poison the lives of not only the participants but of our entire Western political and military policies towards the Middle East and the Muslim lands.” Yet this crucial conflict is a subject very few Americans, including journalists, want to bring up. (It is much less taboo in Europe and, ironically, in Israel itself.) Passions run too high, and it is too interminable and complicated; better to say nothing and accept the status quo. As anyone who has spoken out on this subject knows, there is little reward for doing so.

Fisk has been accused of being obsessed with Israeli injustices against the Palestinians. If he is, the terrible events he witnessed in 1982 go a long way to explaining his obsession. At the heart of his book about the Lebanese war, “Pity the Nation,” is a long and nightmarish account of the Sabra and Shatila massacre, in which hundreds or perhaps thousands of unarmed Palestinian refugees — men, women and children — were slaughtered by the Lebanese Phalangist allies of the invading Israeli army. Fisk, who was one of the first journalists on the scene, reported, and an official Israeli investigation confirmed, that Israeli troops knew about the massacre but made no real efforts to stop it. This episode is seared into Fisk’s mind. In “The Great War for Civilisation,” Fisk describes his repeated and vain attempts to draw the world’s attention to the massacre, and to the Palestinian plight in general. “[F]ollowing [the Palestinians'] travail, the task of reporting their hopeless political leadership, their victimisation — most cruelly demonstrated when they were turned into the aggressors by an all-powerful Israel and, later, an even more hegemonic United States — and their pathetic, brave, and often callous attempts to seek the world’s sympathy has been one of the most depressing experiences in journalism,” he writes. “The more we wrote about the Palestinian dispossession, the less effect it seemed to have and the more we were abused as journalists.” Fisk’s passion on the subject cannot be understood without considering both what he saw, and what he has not been able to communicate.

In his new book, Fisk is clearly trying to be heard by those who come to the subject from an opposite perspective. He tells the strange story of Haji Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the first Palestinian leader, whose desperate search for allies led him to travel to Nazi Germany and embrace Hitler — an act often cited by supporters of Israel, and one that Fisk condemns. As in “Pity the Nation,” Fisk writes eloquently not just about the Palestinians who were driven or fled from their homes in 1948, but also about the Jews who took over those homes — Jews who in many cases survived the Holocaust.

But if he is sympathetic to those on both sides, he refuses to ignore the historic injustice visited on 750,000 innocent Palestinians, whose lives were shattered by a chain of events set in motion by a letter written by a British statesman in 1917. Like Edward Said, Fisk asks why the Palestinians should have had to answer first for Britain’s fateful colonial decision, and then for Germany’s sins. “Why did the Palestinians have to bear the fate of Britain’s First World War promise to a people whose ancestors lived on their land two thousand years before? Why did this new flood of Muslim refugees have to pay this price, then — like the Armenians — be told that they were the aggressors, and those who dispossessed them the victims? For in the decades to come, the Palestinians would be the ‘terrorists’ and those who took their lands would be the innocent, the representatives of a Phoenix rising from the ashes of Auschwitz. In the eyes of the world — especially in 1948, in a world grown weary of war and familiar with the millions of refugees who had washed across Europe — what was the lot of 750,000 Palestinian refugees when measured against the murder of six million Jews?”

Fisk offers a depressing account of the incompetent Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, who agreed to the fatally flawed Oslo “peace process” — which Western pundits stridently insisted would resolve the conflict. In fact, as Fisk and many others have noted, Oslo never had a chance because it postponed the critical issues, and because during the Oslo years Israeli expansion in the occupied territories was greatly accelerated. “More than any other event, this huge colonial expansion proved to Palestinians that Oslo was a sham, a lie, a trick to entangle Arafat and the PLO into the abandonment of all that they had sought and struggled for for over a quarter of a century, a method of creating false hope in order to emasculate the aspiration of statehood.” For Fisk, the key difference between the two sides boils down to this: “The Arabs wanted their land back and then they wanted peace with Israel. The Israelis wanted peace but wanted to keep some of the Arab land.” This was a recipe for the deadlock that exists to this day.

Fisk does not condone Palestinian terrorism, but he places it in historical context and addresses its causes — the kind of dispassionate analysis rarely found in America, especially after 9/11 and under the angrily moralistic leadership of George W. Bush. Instead of thinking clearly, Fisk writes, we twitch to the knee-jerk word “terrorism.” “‘Terrorism’ is a word that has become a plague on our vocabulary, the excuse and reason for state-sponsored violence — ourviolence — which is now used on the innocent of the Middle East ever more outrageously and promiscuously,” he writes. “Terrorism, terrorism, terrorism. It has become a full stop, a punctuation mark, a phrase, a speech, a sermon, the be-all and end-all of everything that we must hate in order to ignore injustice and occupation and murder on a mass scale.”

Fisk makes the obvious point that when the Bush administration signed off on such injustice and occupation by approving the illegal Israeli settlement of the West Bank — a departure from long-standing U.S. policy — it gave an enormous boon to the very terrorists it is fighting. “Every claim by Osama bin Laden, every statement that the United States supports Zionism and supports the theft of Arab lands, had now been proven true to millions of Arabs, even those who had no time for bin Laden. What better recruiting sergeant could bin Laden have than George W. Bush? Didn’t he realize what this meant for young American soldiers in Iraq? Or were Israelis more important than American lives in Mesopotamia?”

Like Ariel Sharon, George W. Bush has promiscuously invoked “terror,” even coining a phrase, the “war on terror,” for his apparently endless crusade against “evil.” Fisk saves his most caustic prose for Bush’s war on Iraq, which in a memorable phrase he calls “frivolous and demented.” He dismisses not only the official American explanations for the war, but any possible moral justification it might have. Fisk never took seriously the idea that the Bush administration launched the war to destroy weapons of mass destruction, which was how the war was sold to the American people. Nor did he buy the fallback reason, thrust forward when the WMD proved nonexistent, that America had suddenly discovered its moral duty to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime. Nor the fallback after the fallback, the claim that the war would spread democracy in the region. Those were, he writes, familiar, official lies. This was a war, he writes, to redraw the map of the Middle East — an imperial war, driven by irrational rage after 9/11, to control oil, protect Israel, and impose our will on the world.

Of course, the war did remove Saddam Hussein — whose crimes Fisk had documented decades ago, when most Americans still thought of him, if at all, as a strongman ally. Some American liberals, like George Packer, author of “The Assassin’s Gate,” still cling to the hope that America’s war on Iraq, however unsavory and hypocritical in its motivations and flawed in its execution, might nonetheless prove down the road to be morally justified. Fisk never addresses this argument directly, but it seems clear that he would regard it as obscene. War is not an instrument that can be used to achieve desired ends; violence begets violence, and at the end the noble ideals are gone and a heap of corpses remains. For Fisk, who has spent his career recording its hideous consequences, “war is not primarily about victory or defeat but about death and the infliction of death. It represents the total failure of the human spirit.” Some wars, of course, are justifiable. Fisk seems to acknowledge that Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait could not be allowed to stand. But the Iraq war, an illegal war of choice launched by a callous superpower with a dreadful track record in the region, is not one of them. America’s hands are too dirty, its goals too selfish and it is too despised throughout the region.

Moreover, Fisk points out that the moral arguments put forward by the war’s supporters are nakedly hypocritical. The “evil tyrant” Saddam had been our friend and ally just 15 years earlier, when he launched a brutal war against Iran that killed perhaps a million people, as our policymakers looked on in approval. Crimes against humanity? Weapons of mass destruction? “Iraq was already using gas to kill thousands of Iranian soldiers when Donald Rumsfeld made his notorious 1983 visit to Baghdad to shake Saddam’s hand and ask him for permission to reopen the American embassy.” Fisk points out that we knew he was using gas, as did the rest of the world, including the Arab states, which said nothing because they too wanted to smash Iran. Our outrage was selective and self-serving: When the Iraqis dropped cyanide gas on the Kurdish town of Halabja, the U.S. tried to blame Iran and paid little attention to it — the incident only became worthy of our attention when Bush wanted to drum up reasons to invade Iraq. The Bush administration cited Saddam’s failure to comply with U.N. resolutions as a casus belli, but it ignored Israel’s flagrant defiance of them.

How could anyone take America’s moral claims seriously, Fisk asks, when we had imposed sanctions on Iraq that may have killed 500,000 children — an appalling policy, still grossly underreported, that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright defended, saying, “We think the price was worth it”? Who could believe we were suddenly deeply concerned about the suffering of the Iraqi people, when we had never paid the least attention to the miserable fate of the Palestinians, or of the millions throughout the region oppressed, tortured and killed by despots whom America props up because they serve our purposes?

And if the war in Iraq was so highly moral, Fisk asks, why has the United States refused to make any attempt to record civilian casualties in Iraq, which by some estimates, including nonviolent fatalities caused by the war, could amount to 100,000? (This week, Bush acknowledged that about 30,000 Iraqis had been killed.)

Fisk takes it as a virtual given that the invasion was doomed from the beginning to turn into a classic war of attrition between an occupying power and a guerrilla army. He advances some original and compelling reasons why the Iraqis turned against the Americans and proved such effective guerrillas. Describing the effect of the Iran-Iraq war, Fisk writes that the endless war and the terrible U.S. sanctions created an entire generation of Iraqi men filled with hatred of Iran, Saddam and the U.S., men who had come to “regard war — rather than peace — as a natural element in their lives. If ever the day came when Saddam was gone, what would these lieutenants and captains and their comrades from the trenches do if they ever faced another great army? What would they be capable of achieving if they could use their own initiative, their own imagination, their own courage — if patriotism and nationalism and Islam rather than the iron hand of Baathism was to be their inspiration?”

Fisk’s predictions of a broad-based Iraqi insurgency, which he issued within days of the American conquest of Baghdad — and which seemed tendentious, even offensive, at the time when many Americans, including this writer, were celebrating what seemed to be a “liberation day” — proved accurate. And yet, even for those of us who were bitterly opposed to this war, it is hard to escape the impression that Fisk’s justified anger at America, and well-founded skepticism about its motives, has prevented him from seeing the Middle East in general, and the Iraq war in particular, in their full complexity. History does not follow a moral chart. And dubious intentions can sometimes have unexpected results.

For example, one can accept the legitimacy of all Fisk’s charges, acknowledge American hypocrisy, callousness and self-interest, and still argue that the war could have ended well. What if we had sent 200,000 troops, as Gen. Shinseki recommended before he was unceremoniously retired? What if we prevented the looting that destroyed Iraqi confidence in U.S. intentions and competence? What if we had not disbanded the Iraqi army? Perhaps none of this would have made a difference. But Fisk never even considers it, as if even to imagine a positive outcome would be to confer approval. Fisk aspires to be both a polemical journalist and a historian. But the mode of analysis is not always the same. The polemicist is allowed to have his thumb on the scales. The historian is not.

Another example of how Fisk’s ideological slant can distort his analysis is his coverage of the Iraqi insurgency. While he acknowledges its multifaceted nature, he tends to treat it as a classic nationalist guerrilla war against an occupying army. Yet, as Paul Starobin has argued convincingly in a detailed analysis of Iraq’s civil war, this view is reductive. “[B]y the end of 2003, close observers of Iraq were seeing in the conflict a localized, sectarian element that was separate and apart from Arab or Iraqi nationalist stirrings against the United States as occupier,” Starobin writes. Fisk is not unaware of the sectarian dangers facing Iraq — he lived through a hellish sectarian war in Lebanon — but his view of the U.S. as quasi-colonialist occupier leads him to paint the opposition in overly simplistic colors.

Fisk’s account of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan also suffers from ideological rigidity. Fisk clearly regards the invasion as unjustified. As with Iraq, he focuses on U.S. misdeeds, on failure: civilians killed by U.S. bombs and bullets, refugees, starvation, the return of opium production, the rise of brutal warlords, etc. Indeed, Fisk does little to distinguish between the two wars. Yet there are compelling arguments that this war, unlike the Iraq disaster, was necessary. Fisk never even addresses the possibility that police action, apparently his preferred mode of fighting al-Qaida, would have been ineffective against the Taliban. (It is difficult to know exactly what Fisk would have recommended: Throughout the book, he is better at criticizing than coming up with solutions.) And although he unflinchingly reports on the Taliban’s barbarism — to his credit, Fisk never makes excuses or tries to ameliorate horror, whoever perpetrates it — he seems too quick to posit that the U.S.-backed Karzai regime represents no improvement on it. Again, Fisk’s crystal ball may prove to be correct — Afghanistan is in a fragile state, and things could collapse there. But simply because the U.S. is an arrogant superpower with a bad record of meddling in the region does not make that outcome inevitable — or this war necessarily evil.

In fact, Fisk has difficulty accepting the concept of the lesser of two evils. Yes, war is dreadful. But there are times when war is necessary to prevent other, worse wars, or to prevent massive injustice. It is true that few of the wars that have wracked the Middle East fall into that category: “The Great War for Civilisation” is a record of appalling, pointless loss of life. But Fisk is so averse to pious official cant about “great wars for civilisation” and other such lofty phrases that he tends to flatten out moral distinctions.

Yet Fisk’s weaknesses are inseparable from his strengths. His evil eye for “the arrogance of power” leads him to courageously report on issues that governments — and sometimes the media — want to cover up. His account of the U.S. cruiser Vincennes’ shooting down of an Iranian passenger jet over the Gulf in 1988, killing 289 innocent people, is a masterpiece of reporting — and one that resulted in Fisk’s resigning from the Times of London. The paper’s editor ripped apart Fisk’s story without his consent, removing the reporting that proved that U.S. incompetence was to blame for the tragedy. Rupert Murdoch had taken over the Times, and did not want to print a story critical of the U.S. Fisk left and went to work for the Independent.

Of that sorry episode, Fisk writes, “When we journalists fail to get across the reality of events to our readers, we have not only failed in our job; we have also become a party to the bloody events that we are supposed to be reporting. If we cannot tell the truth about the shooting down of a civilian airliner — because this will harm ‘our’ side in a war or because it will cast one of our ‘hate’ countries in the role of victim or because it might upset the owner of the newspaper — then we contribute to the very prejudices that contribute to wars in the first place.”

These are words that should be read by every “embedded” reporter and every “patriot” working at Fox News. Perhaps a few journalists at the New York Times — which Fisk blasts as “gutless” — could profit from them as well.

Critics have accused Fisk of not being objective. It’s a valid charge — but it’s equally valid to note that no reporter, editor or historian is objective. Why is one story written and not another? Why does one appear on Page One, another on Page 18? Why does the New York Times have a reporter in Jerusalem, but not in Ramallah? Why are “anonymous government officials” acceptable sources in stories about Saddam Hussein’s WMD, but not other stories? All too many “balanced” pieces are simply covers for intellectual laziness, for an unwillingness to challenge conventional wisdom. Fisk would argue that such pieces are not in fact “balanced” at all: They are de facto apologies for the status quo. The letter of “objectivity” can kill.

Fairness, however, is quite another matter — it is indispensable to a journalist. And like him or not, Fisk is fair. He presents both sides. Whether he believes both sides is something else entirely.

In the book’s preface, Fisk writes that “we journalists try — or should try — to be the first impartial witnesses to history. If we have any reason for our existence, the least must be our ability to report history as it happens so that no one can say: ‘We didn’t know — no one told us.’” Fisk then describes a conversation he had with Amira Hass, the great reporter for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz whose reports on the occupied Palestinian territories, he accurately notes, “have outshone anything written by non-Israeli reporters.” “I was insisting that we had a vocation to write the first pages of history but she interrupted me. ‘No, Robert, you’re wrong,’ she said. ‘Our job is to monitor the centers of power.’ And I think, in the end, that is the best definition of journalism I have heard: to challenge authority — all authority — especially so when governments and politicians take us to war, when they have decided that they will kill and others will die.” That this credo probably sounds extreme to many American journalists today is a sad commentary on the state of the profession.

But along with monitoring the powerful, Fisk is determined never to let us forget the powerless. He speaks up for the victims — the small people, the ignored, the voiceless. Even those who disgree with some or all of his ideological convictions should be moved by his courage and tenacity in telling these stories. Beyond politics, he stands up for fairness and compassion in a world that sees too little of it.

One could choose from dozens of characters and episodes in the book to illustrate this point. But for me, three stick in the mind.

During the Iraq-Iran war, as Fisk staggers under fire down the beach at Fao, he sees a body in a gun-pit, “a young man in the foetal position, curled up like a child, already blackening with death but with a wedding ring on his finger. On this hot, spring morning, it glitters and sparkles with freshness and life.” At the very end of the book Fisk again recalls the ring on that young man’s hand, a symbol and memory of the waste of war, one death standing for the thousands he has seen.

Then there is an Iranian man of about 30, the brother of an Iranian soldier on trial in one of Khomeini’s hanging courts, who furtively approached Fisk outside the courtroom. “‘Do you think this is a fair trial?’ he asked. ‘My brother has no defense counsel … This court has killed every prisoner it has tried.’ There was a sad pause while the man tried to stop himself from weeping. ‘My brother has a little boy. He has told the other children at his school that he will kill himself if the court killed his father.’” Soon afterward, Fisk learns that the soldier was executed. We do not learn what happened to his little boy.

And finally, there is the story of Raafat al-Ghossain, a beautiful 18-year-old artist who was killed when American planes bombed Tripoli in an attempt to get rid of Ghadafi. She was killed when the wall of the TV room where she was sleeping collapsed on her. Her mother, Saniya, treasures two crumpled pieces of paper she found in the destroyed villa. Papers containing the last brooding thoughts and dreams of an innocent teenager, they bear a poignant resemblance to the diary kept by another doomed young girl, a Jewish girl from Holland killed in a Nazi concentration camp more than 60 years ago.

“People are only faces, images, masks worn by each one of them to deceive the other … Meanwhile, I am here watching, trying to survive, among a group of actors who try to show as if they understand it all but really have understood nothing, [the] hypocrites. Life is a game, a gamble, and people are its victims, its players … I hope that one day I shall find that stream of light, that breath of life which will open my soul up and let [me] go FREE, FREE, FREE to eternity.”

“At the bottom of the letter,” Fisk writes, “Raafat has drawn the wings of four great white birds.”

History has vindicated Fisk. As he predicted, George W. Bush used the 9/11 attacks to declare a war between good and evil — between the blameless Americans and those, in Bush’s infantile phrase, who “hate our freedom.” As he also predicted, that war went terribly wrong, and has resulted in America being less safe, not more. Yet Fisk is accorded precious little respect for his prescience. Even liberals attack him for his excessive zeal, his unseemly frankness. In his review of “The Great War for Civilisation” in the Sunday New York Times Book Review, Geoffrey Wheatcroft wrote, “Fisk’s condemnations, and his tone of voice, are so sweeping as to damage his own case.” Citing Fisk’s piece arguing that the 9/11 attacks did not just emanate from pure evil but also had to do with “American missiles smashing into Palestinian homes,” Wheatcroft writes, “He still feels sorry for himself about the torrent of abuse he received, unable to see that, although there is a great deal to be said in criticism of American policy in the Middle East, Sept. 12, 2001, might not have been the best day to say it.”

Yes, Sept. 12 was perhaps a little early to ask Americans to search their souls about their nation’s foreign policy. But what is more important — sounding an urgent alarm about matters of life and death, or tiptoeing around our delicate sensibilities? Is there a polite way to scream that someone’s house is burning down? In fact, the point Fisk tried to make is scarcely being heard even now. When will it be?

Fisk is cantankerous and angry and tendentious. But as America sleepwalks through a self-destructive “war on terror,” his cold-blooded clarity is essential. In this blinkered and timorous age, we need more Robert Fisks.

Gary Kamiya is a Salon contributing writer.

Memorial Day’s lessons in amnesia

If nothing else, the holiday allows us to reflect on our commitment to forgetting bloody conflicts

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Memorial Day's lessons in amnesia (Credit: Carly Rose Hennigan via Shutterstock)
This piece originally appeared on TomDispatch.

It’s the saddest reading around: the little announcements that dribble out of the Pentagon every day or two — those terse, relatively uninformative death notices: rank; name; age; small town, suburb, or second-level city of origin; means of death (“small arms fire,” “improvised explosive device,” “the result of gunshot wounds inflicted by an individual wearing an Afghan National Army uniform,” or sometimes something vaguer like “while conducting combat operations,” “supporting Operation Enduring Freedom,” or simply no explanation at all); and the unit the dead soldier belonged to.  They are seldom 100 words, even with the usual opening line: “The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Enduring Freedom.” Sometimes they include more than one death.

They are essentially bureaucratic notices designed to draw little attention to themselves.  Yet cumulatively, in their hundreds over the last decade, they represent a grim archive of America’s still ongoing, already largely forgotten second Afghan War, and I’ve read them obsessively for years.

Into the Memory Hole

May is the official month of remembrance when it comes to our war dead, ending as it does on the long Memorial Day weekend when Americans typically take to the road and kill themselves and each other in far greater numbers than will die in Afghanistan.  It’s a weekend for which the police tend to predict rising fatalities and news reports tend to celebrate any declines in deaths on our roads and highways.

Quiz Americans and a surprising number undoubtedly won’t have thought about the “memorial” in Memorial Day at all — especially now that it’s largely a marker of the start of summer and an excuse for cookouts.

How many today are aware that, as Decoration Day, it began in 1865 in a nation still torn by grief over the loss of — we now know – up to 750,000 dead in the first modern war, a wrenching civil catastrophe in a then-smaller and still under-populated country?  How many know that the first Decoration Day was held in 1865 with 10,000 freed slaves and some Union soldiers parading on a Charleston, South Carolina, race track previously frequented by planters and transformed in wartime into a grim outdoor prison?  The former slaves were honoring Union prisoners who had died there and been hastily buried in unmarked graves, but as historian Kenneth Jackson has written, they were also offering “a declaration of the meaning of the war and of their own freedom.”

Those ceremonies migrated north in 1866, became official at national cemeteries in 1868, and grew into ever more elaborate civic remembrances over the years.  Even the South, which had previously marked its grief separately, began to take part after World War I as the ceremonies were extended to the remembrance of all American war dead.  Only in 1968, in the midst of another deeply unpopular war, did Congress make it official as Memorial Day, creating the now traditional long holiday weekend.

And yet, when it comes to the major war the United States is still fighting, now in its 11th year, the word remembrance is surely inappropriate, as is the “Memorial” in Memorial Day.  It’s not just that the dead of the Afghan War have largely been tossed down the memory hole of history (even if they do get official attention on Memorial Day itself).  Even the fact that Americans are still dying in Afghanistan seems largely to have been forgotten, along with the war itself.

As the endlessly plummeting opinion polls indicate, the Afghan War is one Americans would clearly prefer to forget — yesterday, not tomorrow.  It was, in fact, regularly classified as “the forgotten war” almost from the moment that the Bush administration turned its attention to the invasion of Iraq in 2002 and so declared its urge to create a Pax Americana in the Greater Middle East.  Despite the massive “surge” of troops, special operations forces, CIA agents, and civilian personnel sent to Afghanistan by President Obama in 2009-2010, and the ending of the military part of the Iraq debacle in 2011, the Afghan War has never made it out of the grave of forgetfulness to which it was so early consigned.

Count on one thing: there will be no Afghan version of Maya Lin, no Afghan Wall on the National Mall.  Unlike the Vietnam conflict, tens of thousands of books won’t be pouring out for decades to come arguing passionately about the conflict.  There may not even be a “who lost Afghanistan” debate in its aftermath.

Few Afghan veterans are likely to return from the war to infuse with new energy an antiwar movement that remains small indeed, nor will they worry about being “spit upon.”  There will be little controversy.  They — their traumas and their wounds — will, like so many bureaucratic notices, disappear into the American ether, leaving behind only an emptiness and misery, here and in Afghanistan, as perhaps befits a bankrupting, never-ending imperial war on the global frontiers.

Whistling Past the Graveyard of Empires

If nothing else, the path to American amnesia is worth recalling on this Memorial Day.

Though few here remember it that way, the invasion of Afghanistan was launched on a cult of the dead.  These were the dead civilians from the Twin Towers in New York City.  It was to their memory that the only “Wall” of this era — the 9/11 Memorial at Ground Zero in lower Manhattan — has been built.  Theirs are the biographies that are still remembered in annual rites nationwide.  They are, and remain, the dead of the Afghan War, even though they died before it began.

On the other hand, from the moment the invasion of Afghanistan was launched, how to deal with the actual American war dead was always considered a problematic matter.  The Bush administration and the military high command, with the Vietnam War still etched in their collective memories, feared those uniformed bodies coming home (as they feared and banishedthe “body count” of enemy dead in the field).  They remembered the return of the “body bags” of the Vietnam era as a kind of nightmare, stoking a fierce antiwar movement, which they were determined not to see repeated.

As a result, in the early years of the Afghan and then Iraq wars, the Bush administration took relatively draconian steps to cut the media off from any images of the returning war dead.  They strictly enforced a Pentagon ban, in existence since the first Gulf War, on media coverage and images of the coffins arriving from the war fronts at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware.  At the same time, much publicity was given to the way President Bush met privately and emotionally — theoretically beyond the view of the media — with the families of the dead.

And yet, banned or not, for a period the war dead proliferated.  In those early years of Washington’s two increasingly catastrophic wars on the Eurasian mainland, newspapers regularly produced full-page or double-page “walls of heroes” with tiny images of the faces of the American dead, while their names were repeatedly read in somber tones on television.  In a similar fashion, the antiwar movement toured the country with little “cemeteries” or displays of combat boots representing the war dead.

The Pentagon ban ended with the arrival of the Obama administration.  In October 2009, six months after the Pentagon rescinded it, in an obvious rebuke to his predecessor, President Obama traveled to Dover Air Base.  There, inside a plane bringing the bodies of the dead home, he reportedly prayed over the coffins and was later photographed offering a salute as one of them was carried off the plane. But by the time the arrival of the dead could be covered, few seemed to care.

The Bush administration, it turns out, needn’t have worried.  In an America largely detached from war, the Iraq War would end without fanfare or anyone here visibly giving much of a damn.  Similarly, the Afghan War would continue to limp from one disaster to the next, from an American “kill team” murdering Afghan civilians “for sport” to troops urinating on Afghan corpses (and videotaping the event), or mugging for the camera with enemy body parts, or an American sergeant running amok, or the burning of Korans, or the raising of an SS banner.  And, of course, ever more regularly, ever more unnervingly, Afghan “allies” would turn their guns on American and NATO troops and blow them away.  It’s a phenomenon almost unheard of in such wars, but so common in Afghanistan these days that it’s gotten its own label: “green-on-blue violence.”

This has been the road to oblivion and it’s paved with forgotten bodies.  Forgetfulness, of course, comes at a price, which includes the escalating long-term costs of paying for the American war-wounded and war-traumatized.  On this Memorial Day, there will undoubtedly be much cant in the form of tributes to “our heroes” and then, Tuesday morning, when the mangled cars have been towed away, the barbeque grills cleaned, and the “heroes” set aside, the forgetting will continue.  If the Obama administration has its way and American special operations forces, trainers, and advisors in reduced but still significant numbers remain in Afghanistan until perhaps 2024, we have more than another decade of forgetting ahead of us in a tragedy that will, by then, be beyond all comprehension.

Afghanistan has often enough been called “the graveyard of empires.”  Americans have made it a habit to whistle past that graveyard, looking the other way — a form of obliviousness much aided by the fact that the American war dead conveniently come from the less well known or forgotten places in our country.  They are so much easier to ignore thanks to that.

Except in their hometowns, how easy the war dead are to forget in an era when corporations go to war but Americans largely don’t.  So far, 1,980 American military personnel (and significant but largely unacknowledged numbers of private contractors) have died in Afghanistan, as have 1,028 NATO and allied troops, and (despite U.N. efforts to count them) unknown but staggering numbers of Afghans.

So far in the month of May, 22 American dead have been listed in those Pentagon announcements.  If you want a little memorial to a war that shouldn’t be, check out their hometowns and you’ll experience a kind of modern graveyard poetry.  Consider it an elegy to the dead of second- or third-tier cities, suburbs, and small towns whose names are resonant exactly because they are part of your country, but seldom or never heard by you.

Here, then, on this Memorial Day, are not the names of the May dead, but of their hometowns, announcement by announcement, placed at the graveside of a war that we can’t bear to remember and that simply won’t go away.  If it’s the undead of wars, the deaths from it remain a quiet crime against American humanity:

Spencerport, New York

Wichita, Kansas

Warren, Arkansas

West Chester, Ohio

Alameda, California

Charlotte, North Carolina

Stow, Ohio

Clarksville, Tennessee

Chico, California

Jeffersonville, Kentucky

Yuma, Arizona

Normangee, Texas

Round Rock, Texas

Rolla, Missouri

Lucerne Valley, California

Las Cruses, New Mexico

Fort Wayne, Indiana

Overland Park, Kansas

Wheaton, Illinois

Lawton, Oklahoma

Prince George, Virginia

Terre Haute, Indiana.

As long as the hometowns pile up, no one should rest in peace.

Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project and the author of ”The American Way of War: How Bush’s Wars Became Obama’s“ as well as ”The End of Victory Culture,” runs the Nation Institute’s TomDispatch.com. His latest book is ”The United States of Fear“ (Haymarket Books). To listen to Timothy MacBain’s latest Tomcast audio interview in which he discusses what Americans should consider remembering on Memorial Day, click here or download it to your iPod here.

[Note on Further Reading: For those interested in exploring the history of Memorial Day, there’s no better place to visit than the always fascinating website History News Network.  For carefully put together records on American and NATO deaths in Afghanistan, visiticasualties.org.  Simply to keep up on American war news, not always the easiest thing in the mainstream media these days, make sure to visit Antiwar.com (as I do daily).]

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Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. His latest book, "The United States of Fear" (Haymarket Books), has just been published.

Where the wounded are

Wars don't just cause casualties among soldiers, they drain medical staff. I traveled to see the costs firsthand

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Where the wounded areA soldier is prepared for an operation at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. (Credit: Reuters/Kai Pfaffenbach)

The weather’s getting warmer in Afghanistan and the war there is heating up again. That means – as it has meant every year for more than a decade — that the pace will quicken at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany. More casualties will be brought to this largest American military hospital outside the United States. The Critical Care Air Transport teams and their C-17 Globemasters will fly in from “downrange,” as they call the Afghan battleground, and the injured will be brought by ambulance bus from nearby Ramstein Air Force Base to the hospital front door.

I spent a few days at Landstuhl recently, one of a group of writers from the Writers Guild Initiative, part of the Writers Guild of America, East Foundation (Full disclosure and just to add to the confusion: I’m president of the Writers Guild, East, the union with which the foundation’s affiliated).

For the last four years, the foundation has been conducting writing workshops. The project began with professional writers from stage, TV and movies mentoring veterans from the Iraq and Afghan wars, working with them on writing exercises and projects ranging from memoirs and blogs to children’s books, screenplays and sci-fi novels. Recently, in collaboration with the Wounded Warrior Project, the foundation started similar workshops with caregivers, the loved ones of veterans helping them through the aftermath of catastrophic injuries.

Now, Wounded Warrior had asked some of us to come to Landstuhl to meet with the medical staff there. Some 3,000 strong, military and civilian, they work ceaselessly in what has become one of the busiest trauma centers in the world, helping between 20,000 and 30,000 patients a year (not just from the battlefield, but also military and their dependents from all over Europe, Africa and much of Asia).

Landstuhl is where the victims of the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marines Corps barracks in Beirut were brought; Bosnian refugees from the Sarajevo marketplace bombing in 1994, too, wounded from the American embassy bombing in Kenya in 1998 and the 2000 attack on USS Cole. During the first Gulf War, more than 4,000 service members were treated at Landstuhl, as have been men and women fighting in the Balkans and Somalia. Since 9/11, the hospital has treated coalition troops from 44 different countries.

They compare this hospital to the center of an hourglass; it’s the midpoint between a combat injury and treatment in the field and then subsequent care back in the States or other home country. Or it’s where a service member is treated and then sent back into battle.

The staff at Landstuhl sees the wounded at their worst. Many who arrive suffer from multiple injuries – “polytrauma” so extensive that several teams of surgeons with different specialties – neurological, thoracic, ear and eye, facial reconstruction and orthopedic, among others — may work on an individual patient, often simultaneously. Bodies are blown apart or crushed by IEDs, grenades and suicide bombs, but so skillful are the medical teams there, so advanced the techniques and technology, Landstuhl’s survival rate runs as high as 99.5 percent. (The survival rate among American wounded in World War II was 70 percent.)

But all that success takes a toll. One of the little discussed but potent side effects of war is what’s called combat and occupational stress Rreaction or secondary traumatic stress disorder. Compassion fatigue.

After all the years of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, many of the doctors, nurses and other staff at Landstuhl are exhausted or worse. Given what they’ve seen — the horrific wounds and amputations, the infection, agony and grief – some walk around “like zombies,” one therapist said. Feelings of empathy and kindness yield to loneliness, despair and burnout.

Many of the compassion fatigue symptoms are similar to post-traumatic stress disorder  – physical effects like headaches, gastrointestinal problems, reproductive troubles, as well as mental  — nightmares, flashbacks, anxiety, emotional distance, isolation and more.

Working with physically damaged men and women who are so deeply traumatized rubs off. The emotional rawness is contagious. A hospital handout on PTSD understatedly reads, “When life-changing events occur, perceptions about the world may change. For example, before soldiers experience combat trauma, they may think the world is safe. Following combat, a soldier’s perceptions may change — a majority of the world may now seem unsafe.”

That’s why returning vets may reflexively search alongside a U.S. interstate highway for roadside bombs, only shop at Walmart at 3 in the morning, or worry to excess that their children’s school will be attacked by terrorists. And it’s why after hearing the stories of their patients, reliving the horrors of war, watching them endure pain and sometimes countless operations, medical practitioners can suffer from the same fears — whether it’s the surgeon who heals the wounds, the psychiatrist who probes the mind for the source of anguish or even the clean-up staff decontaminating and removing the blood from surgical tools.

Combine that with homesickness, the high operational tempo of Landstuhl, the low tolerance for mistakes, the downtime when the mind takes over and remembers every awful experience. It’s a dangerous, often unhealthy mix.

And so, on a Saturday morning, we writers sat down with a bunch of men and women who work at Landstuhl and other nearby medical facilities. There were 14 of us and t32 or so of them. We broke into small groups – two writers working with a group of two to four hospital staff.

My colleague Susanna and I mentored four – a male Army nurse and a female Navy nurse, a physical therapist and a developmental pediatric psychiatrist. We weren’t there to interview or pry; they would tell us what they wanted us to know when they wished, their stories slowly emerging from conversation and the brief writing exercises we gave them.

The male nurse had been in Special Ops, the Navy, Marines and Army; he was reluctant to talk of what he had experienced but wanted to examine themes of good and evil in an epic novel. The physical therapist told us she wanted to explore the mind-body connection, perhaps with a blog; the Navy nurse spoke of her feelings for the soldiers she took care of from the Republic of Georgia, the former Soviet state, now independent. (By the end of the year, Georgia, aiming at membership in NATO, will have some 1,500 troops in Afghanistan.) She had learned how to bake for them the Georgian national dish, khachapuri, a cheese-filled bread; now she wants to write a cookbook.

For two days, we talked and they wrote, we recommended books and movies, they told us about the ones they loved. Tears were shed as stories and memories came to the surface, many too private to relate here. Over the coming weeks and months, we’ll stay in touch via email and meet again; trying to be of assistance as they write to express their thoughts and feelings, to tell their stories.

Do the workshops help? Hard to measure, but intuitively it feels as if they do, that in the talking and writing comes self-awareness and some measure of equanimity. And selfishly, for those of us who serve as writer-mentors, the benefits are enormous and fulfilling.

But the statistics are alarming. According to NBC News, “The Pentagon counts more than 6,300 American dead and 33,000 wounded in action in Iraq and Afghanistan. A Rand Corp study estimates that as many as 300,000 post-9/11 veterans suffer from PTSD or major depression, and about 320,000 may have experienced traumatic brain injuries, mainly from bombs.” The number of civilian fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan remains uncertain but a Brown University study last year reported at least 132,000.

Meanwhile, there are still nearly 90,000 American troops in Afghanistan.  More will die and be wounded. President Obama has pledged their complete departure in 2014.

But even after that, the work at Landstuhl will go on. There are still nearly 300,000 American military personnel overseas, plus family members. Landstuhl will take care of many of them. And, says one of the hospital’s surgeons, with a sigh of resignation, “There will always be the Middle East.”

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Michael Winship is senior writing fellow at Demos and a senior writer of the new series, Moyers & Company, airing on public television.

NATO invites Pakistan to summit

A sign that Islamabad is ready to reopen its western border to NATO troops on their way to Afghanistan

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NATO invites Pakistan to summitOil tankers, which were used to transport NATO fuel supplies to Afghanistan, are parked at a compound in Karachi, Pakistan, Tuesday, May 15, 2012. NATO on Tuesday invited Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to the alliance's summit in Chicago, after signs that the country could be moving to reopen its Afghan border to NATO military supplies. (AP Photo/Shakil Adil)(Credit: AP)

ISLAMABAD (AP) — NATO on Tuesday invited Pakistan’s president to the upcoming Chicago summit on Afghanistan, the strongest sign yet that Islamabad is ready to reopen its western border to U.S. and NATO military supplies heading to the war in the neighboring country.

Pakistan blocked the routes in November after American airstrikes killed 24 of its troops on the Afghan border. The attack sent ties between Washington and Islamabad to new lows, threatening regional cooperation needed for negotiating an end to the Afghan war.

The U.S. expressed regret for the airstrikes and has been quietly pressing Pakistan to reopen the routes over the last two weeks. Washington and NATO stepped up those efforts in recent days by making it clear Islamabad would not be welcome at the two-day summit beginning Sunday in Chicago unless it did so.

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen phoned President Asif Ali Zardari on Tuesday afternoon to invite him to the meeting, according to a statement from the Pakistan government and NATO.

“This meeting will underline the strong commitment of the international community to the people of Afghanistan and to its future,” NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu said in Brussels, where the alliance is based. “Pakistan has an important role to play in that future.”

In Islamabad, Zardari’s spokesman Farhatullah Babar said the president would consider the invitation, which he said was not linked to any reopening of the supply lines.

The invite came hours ahead of a meeting in Pakistan of civilian and military leaders to discuss the supply line blockade. A lawmaker said participants would consider reopening the routes. Their recommendations would be sent to the Cabinet, which will meet on Wednesday to formally approve the decision, he said on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive matter.

A NATO diplomat in Brussels, also speaking condition of anonymity for the same reason, said the invitation to Zardari was meant as an inducement to the Pakistani government to reopen the borders.

By maintaining the blockade, Pakistan’s teetering economy risked missing out on millions of dollars in international development and loans, as well military aid. It was also facing the prospect of being left out of discussions on the future of Afghanistan.

The blockade forced NATO to reorient its logistics chain to more expensive routes across Russia and Central Asia. While the war effort has not suffered, the Pakistani routes will be more important in coming months as NATO begins to pull out of Afghanistan, with a 2014 deadline for the withdrawal of all foreign combat troops.

Pakistan sought to use the deadly American air strikes in November to extract new terms from the United States in what has always been a tense and largely transactional relationship. The government has said it wants more money from the U.S. and NATO for hosting the supply routes, something Washington has indicated it could do.

The country’s parliament also demanded an apology from Washington for the border incident, and an end to America’s drone strike campaign against militants in northwestern Pakistan, but neither appears likely, U.S. officials say. Negotiators from both countries have been discussing the drone strikes, which are unpopular in Pakistan, but Washington has said it will not stop them because they are vital to keeping al-Qaida on the defensive.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar said Monday that Islamabad had made the right decision to close the border, but strongly suggested that it was time to reopen it, saying that Pakistan couldn’t afford to alienate the world for much longer.

Pakistan has some bargaining power of its own because its cooperation is seen as important to striking a peace deal with the Taliban and their allies in Afghanistan that would allow foreign troops to withdraw without sending the nation into further chaos.

The weak government risks some backlash from nationalist and Islamist groups, as well as militants, by reopening the supply lines. But the powerful army, which has influence over much of the country’s media and some of its most firebrand politicians and clerics, is likely to tamp down the outrage.

More than 50 heads of state will attend the meeting in Chicago, including President Barack Obama who will be speaking in his hometown.

In Kabul, Afghanistan’s deputy foreign minister Jawed Ludin said there are “some positive signs from Pakistan.”

“It may be resolved today or tomorrow, but as it stands, it’s still unresolved,” Ludin told reporters on Tuesday.

___

Lekic reported from Brussels. Associated Press writers Deb Riechmann in Kabul and Munir Ahmed in Islamabad contributed to this report.

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Afghanistan, I can’t quit you

My mom pushed me to join the Marines. Now that she's gone, I'm still drawn to war zones

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Afghanistan, I can't quit youA child flies a kite in Kabul on Tuesday Mar. 27, 2012. (Credit: Geoffrey Ingersoll)

The heat. That’s what I remember most. Shimmery and bright. Blinding. Stifling. Heeee-eeaat.

The kind that’s not just on you, wrapped around you, but balled up and pulsing inside you — a desert blanket with teeth. It’s a type of heat that makes your skin cry and your eyeballs sweat, even in the shade; heat like a predator you can’t run away from.

I notice it right as I get off the plane — not just the degrees but also the dust. Dust you can smell, kicked up by a thousand years of struggle. In a region this old, I’m sure each breath carries a dose of unintended history: Inhale, Alexander the Great; exhale, the Ottoman Empire; inhale, the USSR; exhale, the Taliban.

And now, at 90,000 troops, it’s America’s turn.

I have my own history.

A week from now, it’ll be a year since my mother passed. Horrific car accident, traumatic brain injury. It wasn’t the first TBI I’d seen, but I hope it’s the last.

She’s the reason I and my brothers joined the Marines.

The last time I was in a war zone, though, it was Iraq. Anbar. Operation Iraqi Freedom. I was also a journalist — Marine combat correspondent, a Private Joker, like Full Metal Jacket.

“Get rid of that peace pin and get with the winning team, kid,” the Colonel says to Joker.

Yeah that was me, Raptor Man and Joker rolled into one person, hopping around the combat zone with a camera. By the end, I could tell you the type of helicopter approaching just from the sound alone.

I remember we were all terrified of roadside bombs. Nothing could rip the life out of you as quick as an improvised explosive device. Practically invisible. Pressure plates. Propane tanks. Shaped charges and command det. Incendiary bombs frying the flesh right off your bones, and tank mines turning tons of Humvee steel into an indistinguishable mess, quick as a red-light-running SUV.

Mom’s car was like that, nearly indistinguishable. Her crimson “Marine Mom” plate was bent and hanging from the front. In the backseat, purchased moments before impact, was a mangled case of Rolling Rock, the beer we all loved to drink together when the boys and I were home. When it happened, Mom was getting ready for us to come home again. The green glass from the bottles spread around the demolished Ford at a scarred Pennsylvania crossroad.

She told me once that she had cried every night during my first deployment in 2006. I deployed again in 2008. Long before I even went to bootcamp, though, she had told me she always pictured me living out of a backpack in some foreign country, carrying around a camera and a notepad.

I land in Kabul with a bit more than that. I have a pelican case of camera gear, a backpack, a duffel bag and an old Corps Alice pack. Double of everything; redundancy is key.

The big difference here is that I don’t have the Marine Corps to back me up. I’m alone in my own zone, no Conex box full of extra camera bodies, batteries and lenses. What I have is what I got.

I’m used to freedom. During deployments as a combat correspondent, or “CC,” I had an almost insane amount of freedom. I could be in Baghdad on Sunday, Ramadi on Wednesday, and Mosul by the weekend. I was one of a very select group of “non-rate” entry level Marines who could justifiably look in a colonel’s eye and ask, “Why?”

Also, I had a top-down, bottom-up view of the battlefield. I was included in high-viz command briefs as well as presence patrols.

The only problem was the multilevel public affairs web, a dicey bureaucracy hell-bent on “happy glad” editing and stories that reflect rosily on the command staff. It’s like the scene in “Full Metal Jacket,” written by a former combat correspondent in a short story called “Short Times”:

“So you didn’t see any enemy bodies, no casualties?” says the public affairs officer.

“They must have carried them all away,” says Joker.

“No blood trails?”

“It was raining.”

“Well, throw in one casualty, say, a dead officer; grunts love to read about dead officers,” says the PAO.

“How ’bout a General?”

Yes, I’ll admit, Military Public Affairs was a spin machine I desperately wanted to be free of. Full of “command messages,” clever omissions and helpful little edits.

Criticism at all was out of the question. I guess the idea was that we got enough of that from the civilian side of coverage. But to even call what we did “coverage” would be a bit of a misnomer. It was more like public relations with a journalism arm.

It’s like this. Ribbon cuttings: The General stands there smiling in front of a new clinic, and I take the standard big-scissor picture — snap. He and some Iraqi leader shake hands then — snap snap — and everyone’s happy right? But there are no details about how much we paid and how long it took to finish the project. I can’t even mention that there’s no electricity or acknowledge the smell of shit in the air, wafting from a waterless outhouse just meters from the building.

I saw a little boy come running out of it, smiling, excited the Americans came to visit, and I walk over to take a look inside. A huge pile of human shit intermixed with, strangely enough, pages from prominent American magazines. A smeared Vogue cover; I think I see Esquire, too, and then Johnny Depp peers at me from between turds, flies kissing his face like teenage girls probably do to their posters back home.

It was all so very strange, ignoring details like this, simply because “civilian journalists” don’t want to reflect harshly on command or the military, in general.

Don’t get me wrong, though, I’m not here to pull the rug out from anyone’s feet. I’m not looking for a runaway general, or a hard-hitting expose.

See, I understand that despite what the news media, pundits and commanding generals say, the reality of war is wall-to-wall gray. It may look cut and dry, good and evil, right and wrong, but on the ground, the moral abyss that stretches between weapon sights and targets contextualizes even the most distilled aspect of human struggle: Kill or be killed.

Death, like a black hole, distorts everything around it.

Speaking of death, once I arrive in Kabul city, what I’m wishing for is a little more security. As an independent operator, I’m not as comfortable as I once was rolling around with 50 well-armed 19-year-old Marines.

My travel isn’t so structured. Sit. Stand. Sleep. Get the bags off the truck, Private. Move the bags over here. Now over there. Eat. Form up. Go away. Get together. Load up. Strap in. I said: Strap. In. A C130 from Kuwait, and then you’re in the shit.

Not so now. I land in Kabul a disoriented mess. I’m not with DynCorp or Raytheon. I’m not a former SEAL with Blackwater. There’s no burly white guy waiting at the gate with a sign bearing my name.

I’m a freelance journalist. I have to rely on some tiny, jumpy Afghan who’s looking to make a quick buck to help me get my bags, fill out forms and register with the government. Then my “fixer,” a journalist facilitator, shows up with his driver and car.

Still, they are Afghans, it is not a Humvee and I am not surrounded by armed service members who are eager to dispatch my enemies.

I’ve come a long way from being that aimless college grad living in his mom’s basement. I remember I had recently become a Teach for America reject. She called me upstairs not long after I got the rejection letter. It was the afternoon. I probably still had bed hair, my breath a mixture of cold pizza and coffee.

I’ll never forget her ultimatum: “Either you go back to school …”

With my habit for whiskey? No. No more school.

“you get your teaching credentials and teach down by your father …”

In South Carolina, nah, I’ll pass. What’s the last one?

“or you enlist in the Marines.”

What? Really?

“I know a recruiter …” — undoubtedly from her days as a high school front desk secretary — “Gunnery Sergeant Fannel. You can call him right now if you want.”

Hmmm … “What’s the number?”

Years later, seeing me as a success, my two brothers would follow suit.

When I do finally meet a service member in Kabul to pick up my media credentials from the local base, he drives out of the entry control point in a lumbering “hard skin” vehicle (one that looks like a regular SUV except it’s armored).

He gets no farther than about 50 feet from the ECP, parks and gets out. He’s totally covered in protective equipment.

I see now how ridiculous we Americans sometimes look to the locals. Obsessed with protection to the point that the protection itself actually makes us slower and more apt to trip, stumble, or get caught up — in a lot of ways more vulnerable.

Also, it acts as a very ostentatious barrier between us and the Afghans.

This is not the first time I get the perspective of the locals. Another big difference this time is that I’ve given myself a week in the mix before I have to meet up for my flight out to Camp Leatherneck and the Marine units with whom I’ll embed.

So I have a week to tool around Afghanistan, free as a bird flapping in the breeze, and my perspective is not solely limited to that of the military. It’s important, I believe, to talk to the people and get to know them. I think the Marines would agree that talking to the people was no small part of their success in Anbar during the “Awakening” in ’07 and ’08. I hope it will be a part of my success as a reporter, this time on the civilian side.

The first time I was in Iraq, I’ll admit that I hated all of them. A deep, scornful hatred, like black syrup pumping thick through my heart. A hawk that eats foreign policy hawks for breakfast, I wanted to glass the whole country.

Second time around, tasked with transition teams, I got to know a lot of Iraqis. Picked up a little Arabic. I began to understand them as a people, their generational struggle to exist beneath the iron arm of Saddam’s royal tyranny.

You can Monday-morning-quarterback the shit out of our operation — whether it was legal or not, how it was handled, etc. But in between the lines of the opinion sections of the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, it’s prudent to understand that real people with families, mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, dreams and nightmares — actual human beings — are trying to exist and cope with a never-ending cycle of trauma.

The Iraqis used to laugh at the American concept of post-traumatic stress disorder. Actually laugh. They’d say, “PTSD? Look at our children; they’ve grown up with PTSD.”

The Afghans are no different. In fact, they’re worse.

I cruise out west, to Kunduz, to the farms and the bazaars. I talk to farmers, fishermen and kids. Inside the city, I talk to prominent businessmen and city officials. In the park, I talk to regular citizens and even senior citizens as they play chess.

I go up into the mountain slums and give bubblegum to the children. I ask them what they want to be when they grow up, what they learn at school, and who their heroes are.

“John Cena!” Yells one kid, scrunching into a wrestler pose and smiling.

What amazes me is the amount of hope. It’s understandable when a kid in New Jersey tells you he wants to be a firefighter or a doctor. Every kid here either wants to be a doctor or an engineer. It strums a chord of sorrow in me so deep that it takes all I can to ignore it; as I watch a toddler paw through an open sewer, it takes all I have to keep a straight face while I carry on a conversation with children who have lived nothing but war.

The city scene is what we would think of as post-apocalyptic. So is most of the countryside and suburbs, all the bazaars and farms. There is tinge of post-apocalypse everywhere. Not like Iraq, though. In Iraq, in Baghdad, they remembered once that their city was beautiful.

Here it is not so much post-, but also during, maybe even pre-. Even the parents of those children grew up in war. The Russians held ground in the ’80s. The Taliban ran a regime of fire in the ’90s. Now unfinished, unoccupied buildings dot the landscape as proof (alongside the looming U.S. withdrawal deadline) that the crooked fingers of 2008′s economic apocalypse reach even into the darkest depths of war.

And once we go, where does that leave them? Most of them think Pakistan or Iran will take over. The optimists hope Russia or China will gain influence. Either way, the vast majority want the U.S. to stay.

It’s funny, they refer to their country as the football field where armies come to compete for global dominance.

Regardless, I find they are a proud, strong and courteous people. They are also willing to fight for their country, which I find out once I get to Delaram II, a Marine base in Helmand.

After spending a week in Kabul and the surrounding area, I meet up with my military liaison and catch a flight south, to Camp Leatherneck and then down to Delaram II, to embed with a Marine Advisory Team.

I realize things are really different once a Marine — one who would have drastically outranked me –calls me “sir.”

“You don’t have to call me sir, dude. Geoff will do just fine.”

I realize I’ve just called a Gunnery Sergeant “dude.” Yes, as opposed to being a guy in uniform with a camera, now I’m just a guy with a camera. The distance, regardless of my history, is palpable, typified by an intelligence lieutenant who stammers through an interview, unsure exactly of what to divulge.

Finally, for me, it begins to sink in that the phrase, “Once a Marine, always a Marine,” is literally just that: a phrase.

The unit here is “advising” a brigade of the Afghan National Army. My first day there, the Afghan army simultaneously repels an enemy assault and finds some IEDs. They do both to a degree satisfactory to Marine standards, except they bring the IEDs back on the base, sending the Marines into a tizzy.

Marine explosive ordinance disposal appears to take care of the bombs (it turns out, they were inert anyway), and I find myself an interpreter so that I can talk to the Afghan chain of command. I think I’m going to focus on them more than the Marines, who are due to leave in the next two years anyway.

Inside the Afghan command center, I am alone, aside from the interpreter. No Marine Gunny. No PAO.

So there is freedom, and there is also more of a degree of objectivity, but objectivity is a relative concept. I know I have more latitude, but I also have more time. There’s no quota. I can focus on whatever I want (there’s a motorcycle-riding General here whom I’ve pretty much pegged for my next piece).

I guess that just leaves the question: Why? Why did I come back?

I’ve wondered that myself quite often. I remember on that last plane ride out, after my second deployment, there was a soul-deep sigh when the bird finally left the ground. Thank God, I thought, I have all my fingers and all my toes, all my limbs, all my skin, and I’m out. I don’t ever have to come back.

But here I am. Again.

Maybe I want action. Or maybe it’s that writers write what they know. It could even be that I miss the Corps. But that’s not quite right.

I know that I want to offer a voice to voiceless people. I know that I want to see the truth — report the truth — in depth. And I know that, if not for anyone but my little brothers, I want to tell the stories of 19-year-old Marines — Americans who were as old as those Afghan children when the planes took down our towers.

The truth is I don’t really know why. It could be many things.

It could even be my mother, whom I still see in my dreams, and the drive to be the man she dreamed me to be. I wish the nearest Rolling Rock wasn’t 4,000 miles away.

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Geoffrey Ingersoll is a freelance journalist, documentarian, writer, photographer, and veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He is the recipient of the Sam Stavisky Award for Combat Reporting.

What Obama didn’t mention in Kabul

Just outside the Afghan capital, the Taliban is in control and preparing for a wider war

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What Obama didn't mention in KabulPresident Barack Obama addresses troops at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, Wednesday, May 2, 2012. (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)(Credit: AP)
This article originally appeared on GlobalPost.

MAHMUD RAQI, Afghanistan — The office of Kapisa’s governor sits high on a hilltop overlooking the provincial capital, Mahmud Raqi. It has a beautiful view of the river below and the mountains, trees and fields that stretch into the distance.

Global PostBeneath the tranquil surface, however, lies a grim truth. Just outside town roadside bombs are planted to target NATO convoys.

This is one of Afghanistan’s forgotten battlegrounds, a place quietly unraveling as Washington debates the future of the war. Behind the calm facade is a strategically vital part of the country with a fragile security situation that shows every sign of worsening.

Kapisa is barely an hour’s drive north of Kabul, yet two of its seven districts have been in insurgent hands for years, according to local residents, politicians and officials. One is Tagab, where the Taliban stop and search vehicles, run a shadow judicial system and stage regular attacks on foreign and Afghan troops.

“The government does not have control there. I am the representative of the people and I cannot go without employing very heavy security,” said Al Haj Khoja Ghulam Mohammed Zamaray, deputy leader of the provincial council.

Conditions are arguably even more extreme in Alasay. A June 2009 U.S. embassy cable published by WikiLeaks described the militants as having “relative freedom of movement well inside putative secure areas” there. With NATO having since left the district, that has not changed. Elders and members of parliament all insist the Taliban walk openly in the local bazaar.

Similar situations can be found across rural Afghanistan, but history shows events in Kapisa are of particular concern. Guerrillas resisting the Soviet occupation in the 1980s traveled here from safe havens in Pakistan, via the provinces of Kunar and Laghman. It put them within striking distance of the Afghan capital and Bagram air base — then an important Russian facility and now a huge U.S. installation — as well as the main highways connecting Kabul to the north and east of the country.

Speaking to GlobalPost, Abdul Jabar Farhad, a former mujahideen commander serving in the security forces, said “it’s the same story today” and the insurgents are now establishing crucial forward positions in Kapisa in preparation for a wider war.

Attempts to stop them have proved ineffective so far. In September 2010 the government launched the High Peace Council nationwide to help negotiate with rebel groups and persuade their men to lay down arms in exchange for financial aid and vocational training. It finally opened an office in Kapisa earlier this year. The man hired as the local head was Mawlawi Abdul Momin Muslim, who once fought against the Taliban regime. He must now convince his old enemies to accept the constitution.

He admitted people here often have more faith in the rebels than the corrupt government. “The Taliban will sit with them, issue serious orders and solve their problems,” Muslim said.

Initial efforts to win over local residents have also backfired. When NATO delivered leaflets to villages announcing his appointment, insurgents called him to complain that the propaganda was written like a military decree, rather than an offer of reconciliation.

It is a common grievance among Afghans that foreign soldiers have never understood their culture. In a spectacular example, U.S. troops stationed at Bagram in February burned copies of the Quran. Despite a swift apology from NATO, the incident caused nationwide protests and less than a fortnight later the anger in Kapisa was still palpable, neither forgiven nor forgotten.

Haji Mohammed Ibrahim, aged 84 and from Tagab, summed up the mood when he said, “If someone has disrespected your religion, your holy book and your women, they are not your friends anymore.”

In contrast, the Taliban have long possessed the ability to tap into the innate piety of life here. One elder recalled watching an insurgent deliver a sermon at a mosque in Alasay. Members of the audience were so moved by his speech, they cried.

This is not to say the Taliban are supported everywhere in Kapisa. The province is split along faultlines that date from the Soviet era. Tensions between two rival mujahideen parties are contributing to the violence. Fighters linked to Hizb-e-Islami are now swelling the Taliban’s ranks, while members of Jamiat-e-Islami hold key official posts, allying themselves to the government and by extension the occupation.

Ethnicity also plays a role in the unrest. Pashtuns and some Pashayi make up the bulk of the resistance. Tajik areas remain predominantly safe. The worry is that these divisions will grow when NATO leaves.

A small American military reconstruction team is based locally but the majority of foreign troops here are French. They are due to depart in 2013. The forces that remain may not be enough to prevent conditions from deteriorating.

Kapisa’s governor, Mehrabuddin Safi, said he has only 900 to 1,000 police and roughly 1,200 Afghan soldiers to protect a population of 700,000. Pro-government militias have been set up to boost the numbers. He was confident that with greater manpower, and improved training and equipment, he would be able to maintain security.

“This is our country, this is our province,” he said. “We have to look after it.”

Only time will tell if such optimism is misplaced, but the omens are not good. A combination of afflictions has left people struggling to survive. The foreign troops are increasingly mistrusted and opinion of the local authorities is little better, giving the insurgents free reign at the gates of Kabul.

Mohammed Farouq, a villager from Tagab, suggested what may be the future for Kapisa when he described a commander in the Afghan army verbally abusing women and deliberately firing mortars at civilians.

“If he is captured by us does he hope for mercy? There is no hope for mercy then,” he said. “But if we can’t do anything, then one day, if he is going somewhere, we will inform the Taliban.”

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