Espionage

Her life as a spy

Vera Atkins was a sphinx to those who knew her, but as a superb new biography reveals, the gallant spymistress of World War II was driven by personal secrets and loyalties.

  • more
    • All Share Services

Her life as a spy

If modern spycraft reached its zenith in the Cold War, it was born during World War II — well, in literary mythology at least. Novels like William Boyd’s recent, gripping “Restless” describe the meticulous training of British undercover agents, in particular a Russian imigri named Eva Delectorskaya, in the proper methods of following a mark, evading a shadow, setting up a letter drop or a safe house and, most important of all, ditching any operation the minute it starts to look a teensy bit off. As a result, Eva survives not only a rigged rendezvous (based on a real incident on the Dutch-German border in 1939) with a pair of Nazi generals pretending to be up for betraying Hitler, but she even manages to evade her own spymaster when he turns out to be a double agent. A contemporary story line about Eva’s daughter, who learns her mother’s true history only as an adult, conveys that the cost of the spy’s life is an eternal, itchy paranoia that turns out to be contagious; pretty soon the daughter is wondering if everyone she knows has a secret identity.

The life of Vera Atkins, a woman who helped run Britain’s Special Operations Executive during the war, is every bit as fascinating and shot through with ambiguity as a spy novel. The version of it told by journalist Sarah Helm in “A Life in Secrets: Vera Atkins and the Missing Agents of WWII” is, on top of that, also a detective yarn in which the author treks to remote Carpathian villages and nibbles beet salad with ancient, decommissioned Romanian princesses in crumbling Soviet apartment blocks as she tries to nail down some of the more elusive facts. But Atkins’ story has less in common with an intricate John Le Carré or Alan Furst novel than it does with the latest newspaper report about CIA screw-ups.

Atkins worked her way up from secretary to deputy and finally to head of Special Operations Executive F, the division of SOE in charge of developing, coordinating and arming the resistance movement in France. She recruited and oversaw the training of agents — some of them women — who were parachuted into Nazi-occupied France to that end. Perhaps the most spectacularly successful of these was Pearl Witherington, a courier who reorganized her circuit (a small, cell-like group of agents) when its leader was captured and led 1,500 Maquis guerrilla fighters against the German army on D-Day. Legend has it that the Nazis put a million-franc bounty on Witherington’s head.

Not all of SOE’s record was glorious, though, and that is the story that Helm prefers to tell. It’s one of the factors that sets her book far above another recent treatment of Atkins’ life, “Spymistress: The Life of Vera Atkins, the Greatest Female Secret Agent of World War II” by William Stevenson. Stevenson has made a profession of peddling old-school stories of espionage derring-do in which comparisons and connections to James Bond fly thick and fast — he also wrote “A Man Called Intrepid” about the British intelligence head who (confusingly) almost shares his name, Sir William Stephenson. “Spymistress” insinuates that Ian Fleming, the creator of Bond, was one of Atkins’ agents (in fact, he worked for naval intelligence) and provides frequent quotations from the author, despite the fact that he appears to have had no significant role in Atkins’ life. Helm, by contrast, never even mentions Fleming.

Stevenson knew Atkins (Helm met her once) and several other figures in the British espionage scene, but this does not work to his advantage. “Spymistress” is mostly just clubby, name-dropping palaver about politics, power brokers and celebrities in mid-20th-century Britain and Europe, with Atkins’ own name parachuted in every now and then to make it seem as if Stevenson is actually writing a book about her instead of showing off his “insider” dish. Stevenson also writes espionage fiction, and wanting to seem up-to-date on all the backstage gossip is a fatal weakness of spy groupies. In this case, a veteran journalist like Helm — who has written for British newspapers for 20 years — tells a much more enthralling story than the thriller writer.

That story involves two familiar, if depressing, recurring themes from real-life espionage history: blunders and turf wars. SOE — set up by Winston Churchill on the eve of the war — was always regarded by Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, but better known as MI6) as a rival. The organization was, as more than one observer and participant characterized it, staffed by amateurs. Some, like Atkins, were remarkably talented individuals who because of their outsider status might not have otherwise found a way to contribute to the “secret war.” Others, like Atkins’ immediate superior, Maurice Buckmaster, a former public-relations head for the Ford Motor Co. in France, were socially acceptable to British elites but disastrously ill-equipped to run agents into the most perilous parts of occupied Europe.

What interests Helm most about Atkins was what she did after the war, in the confusion that prevailed in Europe once the Nazi regime collapsed. Atkins committed herself, with indefatigable determination, to finding out what happened to 118 SOE agents who had not returned to Britain. In a few cases, as with the much-celebrated Odette Sansome, an SOE courier, those agents survived horrendous ordeals, and turned up sans passports and other identification, after escaping from their German captors. Many, however, died in Nazi prisons and concentration camps, and Atkins made it her cause to track down as much hard information as possible about their fates and to make sure that their service was properly honored.

Hers was a surprisingly unpopular mission. Charles de Gaulle didn’t like the idea because he wanted his own people, the Free French Forces, to get sole credit for resisting the Nazi occupation. The head of SOE’s security directorate thought that the investigation was too sensitive to be conducted by someone with a relatively low security clearance and not firmly under his own control. Various British authorities objected to Atkins’ suggestion that the names of missing agents be circulated among the Allies, the Red Cross and other entities operating in the area because to do so would be to publicly admit that they had sent young British women on such dangerous missions. Unlike the male secret agents, few of the women carried military commissions, and were therefore not entitled to the protections guaranteed to prisoners of war.

Perhaps there were other reasons, too, namely the role of SOE bungling in allowing the agents to be caught in the first place. While Atkins was beginning her investigation, her former boss, Buckmaster, was taking a victory lap through liberated France, a bit of self-aggrandizement that would eventually backfire. Already, uncomfortable facts about F Section operations were circulating. One former agent dragged an SOE staff captain to a room in Paris that had been used as a Gestapo interrogation chamber and pointed to blood stains on the wall. He berated her about “how stupid everyone at HQ had been; how they had risked agents’ lives. He said he had done everything to warn London that he was captured, but nobody had noticed.”

At issue were wireless transmissions, the main vehicle by which SOE circuits in occupied territory communicated with the agency’s London office. The messages were supposed to include both a false or “bluff” security check and a “true check” as a way to guarantee that the wireless operator had not been arrested and forced to send them by his or her German captors. London, however, didn’t seem to take its own system seriously, and on more than one occasion, when a captured agent sent what ought to have been a tip-off message including only the bluff check, they got responses along the lines of “My dear fellow, you only left us a week ago. On your first message you go and forget to put your true check.”

Again and again, irregular and suspicious wireless transmissions were dismissed as ordinary mistakes by Buckmaster, who apparently partook of the typical P.R. man’s chronic optimism and belief that if you ignore bad things they might just go away. As a result, SOE continued to drop supplies and personnel directly into the waiting hands of the Germans. “I was amazed,” said one captive agent, “at HQ Gestapo to see the quantities of British food, guns, ammunition, explosives that they had at their disposal.” When SOE parachuted in a pair of new circuit heads, the Germans were able to replace them with impersonators (since none of the operatives in country had met the men yet) and use them to round up even more agents.

Finally, on D-Day, SOE received a transmission from one of the captured agents’ radios reading, “Many thanks large deliveries arms and ammunition have greatly appreciated good tips concerning intentions and plans.” It was signed by the Gestapo. A little later a message from another radio said much the same thing, adding that “certain of the agents had had to be shot” but others were cooperating. (Atkins later learned that Hitler himself had authorized the messages, as a morale breaker.) Buckmaster, bizarrely, took the time to write mocking replies. As Helm tells it, he never fully came to terms with his own role in delivering some of the brave men and women who worked for him into enemy hands, and in later life became almost delusional on the subject, blaming MI6.

Beyond the contaminated wireless operators, however, the SOE was significantly compromised by a double agent named Henri Diricourt, alias Gilbert, who probably betrayed as many of their people as the radio screw-ups did. Suspicions about Diricourt and his dealings with a shady SOE senior staff officer named Nicholas Bodington had been in the air even before the end of the war, but it was only Atkins’ investigations into the fates of her lost agents that definitively established his guilt. She claimed to have always suspected Diricourt but said that the men of SOE were so dazzled by his alpha-male charisma they ignored her reservations. So Diricourt was naturally a topic of interest when Atkins interviewed Hans Josef Kieffer, who ran the German counterintelligence office in Paris where many of the SOE agents were imprisoned before being sent to Germany, just before he was hanged in 1947. “You are asking me if there was a traitor in your ranks?” he said. “But why are you asking me? … Well, I think you know. Of course you know. It was Henri Diricourt.”

Helm details the methodical way Atkins traced often sketchy leads and eyewitness reports to substantiate just how the missing SOE agents died and who killed them. She went to concentration camps, interviewed survivors and sat in on war crimes tribunals, joining the ranks of the first to learn of the extent of Nazi atrocities. She succeeded in unearthing “night and fog” executions (so called by the Nazis because the victims were supposed to vanish from the face of the earth) and learned of the often gruesome deaths of men and women she knew personally and usually saw off as they boarded the planes taking them to France. Four of the women she traced were burned, possibly while drugged but still alive, at the Natzweiler-Struthof camp in Alsace.

Helm gives particular attention to the case of Noor Inayat Khan, a Sufi of royal descent whose fate proved particularly difficult to trace, and with whom, she believes, Atkins had a special bond. (Just before Khan boarded the plane for France, Atkins took off the brooch she was wearing and gave it to her when the girl admired it.) A beautiful, almost otherworldly young woman who studied music and wrote children’s books, Khan struck some SOE officials as too sensitive for the job. She nevertheless showed exceptional courage both before and after she was arrested, and even shamed one captured male agent — who was rather comfortably situated in Kieffer’s headquarters — into attempting an escape. After being moved from prison to prison and kept in shackles, she died at Dachau, shot in the head after a savage beating; her last word was “liberti.” Atkins was instrumental in securing for Khan the George Cross, Britain’s supreme civilian decoration for courage.

No one could fail to be moved by either the horror or the gallantry in the truth Atkins uncovered, yet if one image of her emerges from all the accounts of those who knew her, it was of a woman who rarely expressed deep emotion. Some of the surviving family members of her agents seem to have disliked her for this alone; others have been persuaded by a conspiracy theory arguing that Buckmaster deliberately allowed the agents to be captured because they had been implanted with false information to mislead the Germans. Even the many people who liked and loved Vera Atkins describe her as “cagey” and self-controlled. Yet if she was as “cold” as her critics complained, why was she so dogged, even against her own interests, in investigating her agents’ fates?

Even more nagging is the question of why Atkins, by every account an exceptionally competent, intelligent woman with a phenomenal memory, did so little to bring to account the very people who put her agents in harm’s way? If she felt responsible for Khan and all the rest, as many of Helm’s sources maintain, if she had a keen enough sense of justice to hunt down the Germans responsible for their suffering and to do her part in seeing them punished, why not the SOE leaders and the traitor known as Gilbert? Henri Diricourt, astonishingly enough, walked away from a postwar military tribunal scot-free, largely because no one from SOE showed up with the evidence to convict him. (He is said to have died in the crash of a small plane — filled with gold he intended to trade for opium — over Laos in 1962.)

Helm finds the answers in Atkins’ past, the details of which the spymistress strenuously endeavored to conceal from most of the people she knew and everyone she worked with. Although she presented herself as “more English than the English,” she was in fact a Romanian-born Jew, the privileged daughter of a family, the Rosenbergs, that had made and lost a couple of fortunes in Russia, Eastern Europe and South Africa. Her mother’s side of the family was heavily Anglicized, and her father’s people were assimilated Germans and Catholic converts; her cousin Fritz and his wife only managed to escape Romania when he showed fascist guards that he was uncircumcised.

As a woman, a Jew and an enemy foreign national, Atkins was hardly suitable SOE material on paper. Her origins, despite her efforts to obscure them, were known to many, and anti-Semitism lay behind much of the suspicion she encountered in high places, as Helm amply demonstrates. During her tenure at SOE, Atkins was struggling hard to become a naturalized British citizen, a tall order at that time, and one of her most important sponsors and patrons was Buckmaster. (Conceivably, she might have been thrown out of the country entirely had she aggravated the wrong people, although she probably had too many connections for that.) In later years, she devoted herself more to the celebration of SOE’s true heroes than to the exposure of its incompetence and frauds.

Helm also discovers another likely cause for Atkins’ extreme caution and loyalty toward Buckmaster. One of the chief attractions of “A Life in Secrets” is the book’s dual story line, one describing both Atkins’ investigations and Helm’s prodigious research. In a late chapter that exemplifies biographical diligence, Helm follows a series of hazy leads, including an interview with a very elderly and intermittently senile lady, to dig out persuasive evidence that in 1940, Atkins made a hazardous journey to the Netherlands, at one point hiding for days in a barn. Her goal was to deliver a large sum of money to an official in German military intelligence in order to secure a new “Aryanized” passport for her cousin Fritz, thereby saving his life. Had anyone in Britain discovered that she had bribed a member of the Abwehr, she would never have worked for the government again. This, Helm, believes, is a major source of the chronic secrecy, the caginess, for which Atkins was famous.

The final image of Atkins that emerges from Helm’s superb biography is of a woman compelled by history, prejudice and circumstances into a position in which compromise was the only option. It was surely enough to turn anyone into a sphinx. In the end, the virtue that Atkins chose to stick with was loyalty — to Buckmaster and the SOE, perhaps ignominiously, but also to her unquestionably valiant agents. In a life full of evasions and concessions, it was the one pure star she found to steer by. “They were her ‘bairns,’ if you will,” said a Scottish colleague who had started out resenting Atkins and wound up respecting her. “And after all, she knew she had sent them to their deaths.”

Laura Miller

Laura Miller is a senior writer for Salon. She is the author of "The Magician's Book: A Skeptic's Adventures in Narnia" and has a Web site, magiciansbook.com.

Did the CIA spy on Iraq war critic Juan Cole?

Former agency officer claims the Bush White House asked for personal information on antiwar blogger

  • more
    • All Share Services

Did the CIA spy on Iraq war critic Juan Cole?

The New York Times is reporting a former CIA officer’s claim that the Bush White House and the CIA asked operatives to spy on university professor, blogger (and frequent Salon contributor) Juan Cole in 2005 and 2006.

From James Risen’s Thursday morning Times piece:

Glenn L. Carle, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer who was a top counterterrorism official during the administration of President George W. Bush, said the White House at least twice asked intelligence officials to gather sensitive information on [Professor Cole]. …

In an interview, Mr. Carle said his supervisor at the National Intelligence Council told him in 2005 that White House officials wanted “to get” Professor Cole, and made clear that he wanted Mr. Carle to collect information about him, an effort Mr. Carle rebuffed. Months later, Mr. Carle said, he confronted a C.I.A. official after learning of another attempt to collect information about Professor Cole. Mr. Carle said he contended at the time that such actions would have been unlawful.

If Carle’s claims are true, it would likely mean the CIA acted illegally; as former Agency lawyer Jeffrey H. Smith tells Risen: “The statute makes it very clear: you can’t spy on Americans.”

Cole has already responded to the news on his blog, calling for a full congressional investigation of Carle’s claims, which he says he believes are true:

It seems to me clear that the Bush White House was upset by my blogging of the Iraq War, in which I was using Arabic and other primary sources, and which contradicted the propaganda efforts of the administration attempting to make the enterprise look like a wild shining success.

Carle’s revelations come as a visceral shock. You had thought that with all the shennanigans of the CIA against anti-Vietnam war protesters and then Nixon’s use of the agency against critics like Daniel Ellsberg, that the Company and successive White Houses would have learned that the agency had no business spying on American citizens. …

I hope that the Senate and House Intelligence Committees will immediately launch an investigation of this clear violation of the law by the Bush White House and by the CIA officials concerned.

He concludes by telling readers “what alarms [him] most”: “I know I am a relatively small fish and it seems to me rather likely that I was not the only target of the baleful team at the White House.”

Continue Reading Close

Emma Mustich is a Salon contributor. Follow her on Twitter: @emustich.

“A Covert Affair”: Julia Child, spy girl

A new book tells the cloak-and-dagger story of the famous chef's early years in espionage

  • more
    • All Share Services

Shrewd marketing and its online equivalent, SEO (search engine optimization), dictate that Julia Child’s name gets top billing in both the title of Jennet Conant’s new nonfiction spy saga and in the headline for my review of the same. Yes, the famous French chef of cookbook and public television fame did work for the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), a U.S. intelligence agency, during World War II, as did Paul Child, the man she would eventually marry. However, Julia Child’s war was not so exciting as Jane Foster’s, and if Conant’s “A Covert Affair: Julia Child and Paul Child in the OSS” is somewhat of a bait-and-switch, providing more of Foster’s story than Child fans will expect, it’s hard to complain: Foster is such a remarkable, engaging, ambiguous character.

Foster and Julia McWilliams (Child’s maiden name) were part of a cohort of women (invariably referred to as “girls” by their colleagues) who signed up to work for William “Wild Bill” Donovan’s OSS during the war. They wanted to serve their country, but most of them — Julia especially — were looking for adventure, too. Foster’s ability to speak Malayan (the legacy of a brief marriage to a Dutch diplomat in her early 20s) and Julia’s superior administrative skills made them desirable recruits. So did their backgrounds.

Both women were from wealthy, prominent, conservative California families and had gone to tony women’s colleges, as did Betty MacDonald, one of Conant’s primary sources. The word around the OSS offices was that Donovan’s idea of the ideal female hire was “a cross between a Smith graduate, a Powers model and a Katie Gibbs secretary.” He liked to recruit rich Ivy Leaguers of both genders, reasoning that they were more resistant to bribes. Julia — tall, a bit gawky and unworldly — was intent on livening up her own personality after a youth spent in the narrow-minded upper echelons of Pasadena society. Foster, on the other hand, devoted herself to livening up everyone else’s.

Foster seems to have adopted the “madcap heiress” of 1930s Hollywood comedies as a role model. In her first posting, Ceylon, Foster adopted a baby chipmunk, which she raised, named Christopher and took to carrying around in her pocket. The animal’s many escapes and Foster’s subsequent pursuits led to absurd scandals, such as the time Foster crawled under a table to look for the rodent and ran her hand up a general’s pant leg. Charged with Morale Operations (propaganda), Foster devised a notorious operation in which hundreds of condoms were stuffed with anti-Japanese tracts and malaria medication then released by passing submarines off the coasts of Malaysia and Indonesia. She ran local agents and helped devise bogus news reports that mimicked Japanese broadcasts but were subtly tweaked to offend the native population of enemy-occupied territory.

Foster’s duties resembled those of a CIA case officer, although the CIA did not yet exist; Julia, on the other hand, ran the OSS camp’s “nerve center,” compiling the research that came in from the field and dispatching it to Washington and the field operations that needed it. Arguably, Julia’s was the more important job (she had a higher security clearance), but Foster’s was the more thrilling. And while the levelheaded, famously discreet Julia spent her time in the CBI (China-Burma-India) theater pining over Paul Child, who would not realize how perfectly suited they were to each other until after the war, Foster had tragic affairs, got into countless comical scrapes and saw much more of the conflict firsthand.

Things began to go wrong for Foster after the war, when she was sent to Indonesia and Vietnam to help supervise the liberation of POWs and otherwise keep an eye on things. The U.S. was so focused on rebuilding Europe that it was willing to sacrifice many Asian allies who had expected to be granted independence as a reward for helping to defeat the Japanese. Instead, the old, hated, European colonial powers began to reestablish their hold, unimpeded by the Americans. This outraged Foster, who witnessed atrocities and other injustices committed by Dutch and French troops against Indonesian and Vietnamese civilians and believed the U.S was seriously undermining its own interests. She wrote a blistering white paper condemning American policy in Indonesia (it was ignored) and quit her government job to head back to the States.

Meanwhile, after weathering a rough-and-ready posting in Chungking (“It’s dirty beyond belief, utterly inconvenient, full of disease, misery, corruption and mystery,” Paul Child wrote to his twin brother, “but I love it.”), the Childs finally concluded their long courtship. He went to work for the United States Information Service in Paris and she decided to learn to cook. They would not reconnect with Foster until 1952, when they discovered that she, too, was living in Paris, working as a painter under the name Madame Zlatovski. (She had married — or rather, remarried, since it turned out she’d been secretly married to a Russian immigrant throughout the war.) They found her, in Paul’s words, “just as lazy, hazy, impractical and loveable as she was seven years ago.”

The happiness of that reunion was short-lived. Foster and her husband were soon embroiled in the Red Scare, and Paul Child himself was briefly and scarily caught up in the slipstream of her troubles. “A Covert Affair” is a skillfully told tale of espionage, combining just enough background information with the right amount of boisterous anecdote to make the reader feel simultaneously amused and informed. For the early parts of the book, Conant leans heavily on Foster’s own memoirs, as well as Paul Child’s marvelous letters home. But when she gets to Foster’s indictment by a federal grand jury on charges of espionage for the Soviet Union, she has to pick her way across far more uncertain ground. She does so with aplomb.

Was Foster a Soviet spy or a victim of overzealous anti-Communist crusaders who were far too willing to believe the testimony of a showboating informer who also happened to be a proven plagiarist and con man? Without relinquishing her fundamental sympathy with Foster, Conant faults her subject for “her denial and her self-delusion” as well as her refusal “to confront the truth about herself at the most fundamental level.”

The larkish first half of “A Covert Affair” gives way to a much darker but more intriguing consideration of how personality becomes destiny; the very qualities that make Foster so much fun to read about also led to her downfall. The Childs are relegated to the sidelines in this final act, but it hardly matters; by that point, Foster is the one you really care about. Her considerable talents went to waste after the war, mostly because she insisted on saying things about Southeast Asia that the officials back home just didn’t want to hear. No surprise, they all turned out to be true.

Continue Reading Close
Laura Miller

Laura Miller is a senior writer for Salon. She is the author of "The Magician's Book: A Skeptic's Adventures in Narnia" and has a Web site, magiciansbook.com.

Tiny spy planes mimic birds and insects

Researchers are working on nature-inspired drones to help rescue people during disasters and, yes, also to spy

  • more
    • All Share Services

You’ll never look at hummingbirds the same again.

The Pentagon has poured millions of dollars into the development of tiny drones inspired by biology, each equipped with video and audio equipment that can record sights and sounds.

They could be used to spy, but also to locate people inside earthquake-crumpled buildings and detect hazardous chemical leaks.

The smaller, the better.

Besides the hummingbird, engineers in the growing unmanned aircraft industry are working on drones that look like insects and the helicopter-like maple leaf seed.

Researchers are even exploring ways to implant surveillance and other equipment into an insect as it is undergoing metamorphosis. They want to be able to control the creature.

The devices could end up being used by police officers and firefighters.

Their potential use outside of battle zones, however, is raising questions about privacy and the dangers of the winged creatures buzzing around in the same skies as aircraft.

For now, most of these devices are just inspiring awe.

With a 6.5-inch wing span, the remote-controlled bird weighs less than a AA battery and can fly at speeds of up to 11 mph, propelled only by the flapping of its two wings. A tiny video camera sits in its belly.

The bird can climb and descend vertically, fly sideways, forward and backward. It can rotate clockwise and counterclockwise.

Most of all it can hover and perch on a window ledge while it gathers intelligence, unbeknownst to the enemy.

“We were almost laughing out of being scared because we had signed up to do this,” said Matt Keennon, senior project engineer of California’s AeroVironment, which built the hummingbird.

The Pentagon asked them to develop a pocket-sized aircraft for surveillance and reconnaissance that mimicked biology. It could be anything, they said, from a dragonfly to a hummingbird.

Five years and $4 million later, the company has developed what it calls the world’s first hummingbird spy plane.

“It was very daunting up front and remained that way for quite some time into the project,” he said, after the drone blew by his head and landed on his hand during a media demonstration.

The toughest challenges were building a tiny vehicle that can fly for a prolonged period and be controlled or control itself.

AeroVironment has a history of developing such aircraft.

Over the decades, the Monrovia, Calif.-based company has developed everything from a flying mechanical reptile to a hydrogen-powered plane capable of flying in the stratosphere and surveying an area larger than Afghanistan at one glance.

It has become a leader in the hand-launched drone industry.

Troops fling a four-pound plane, called the Raven, into the air. They have come to rely on the real-time video it sends back, using it to locate roadside bombs or get a glimpse of what is happening over the next hill or around a corner.

The success of the hummingbird drone, however, “paves the way for a new generation of aircraft with the agility and appearance of small birds,” said Todd Hylton of the Pentagon’s research arm, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

These drones are not just birds.

Lockheed Martin has developed a fake maple leaf seed, or so-called whirly bird, loaded with navigation equipment and imaging sensors. The spy plane weighs .07 ounces.

On the far end of the research spectrum, DARPA is also exploring the possibility of implanting live insects during metamorphosis with video cameras or sensors and controlling them by applying electrical stimulation to their wings.

The idea is for the military to be able to send in a swarm of bugs loaded with spy gear.

The military is also eyeing other uses.

The drones could be sent in to search buildings in urban combat zones. Police are interested in using them, among other things, to detect a hazardous chemical leak. Firefighters could fling them out over a disaster to get better data, quickly.

It is hard to tell what, if anything, will make it out of the lab, but their emergence presents challenges and not just with physics.

What are the legal implications, especially with interest among police in using tiny drones for surveillance, and their potential to invade people’s privacy, asks Peter W. Singer, author of the book, “Wired for War” about robotic warfare.

Singer said these questions will be increasingly discussed as robotics become a greater part of everyday life.

“It’s the equivalent to the advent of the printing press, the computer, gun powder,” he said. “It’s that scale of change.”

 

Continue Reading Close

White House denies WikiLeaks’ spying charges

Assertions that Secretary Clinton ordered her diplomats to engage in espionage is "ridiculous," says Robert Gibbs

  • more
    • All Share Services

President Barack Obama’s spokesman is labeling as “ridiculous” an assertion by the founder of WikiLeaks that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton should resign if she was involved in asking U.S. diplomats to gather intelligence at the United Nations.

In an online interview with Time magazine from an undisclosed location, founder Julian Assange on Tuesday called on Clinton to resign “if it can be shown that she was responsible for ordering U.S. diplomatic figures to engage in espionage in the United Nations” in violation of international agreements.

White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said Wednesday that Assange’s statements “are both ridiculous and absurd.” Clinton, he said, has done nothing wrong, and U.S. diplomats do not engage in spying. He spoke in an interview on NBC’s “Today” show.

State Department officials said Tuesday that secret instructions to American diplomats to gather sensitive personal information about foreign leaders originated from the U.S. intelligence community but did not require diplomats to spy. Requests for DNA and biometric data on foreign officials were contained in leaked classified cables published by WikiLeaks.

“Secretary Clinton is doing a great job,” Gibbs said. “The president has great confidence in and admires the work that Secretary Clinton has done.”

Continue Reading Close

How to catch a Taliban impostor

If Afghan officials don't want to be fooled by another huckster, they should take a close look at these movies

  • more
    • All Share Services

How to catch a Taliban impostorHamid Karzai (left) and the ladies of "Sex and the City 2"

Today the New York Times reports that a still-unidentified Afghan man was posing as a Taliban leader in secret peace talks with Afghanistan officials. It’s unclear whether this individual was a con man out to line his pockets, a Taliban agent out to sabotage the talks, or a plant from Pakistani intelligence. The writers, Dexter Filkins and Carlotta Gall, note that the incident “could have been lifted from a spy novel.” Regrettably, they may be right. The days when writers of espionage fiction conceived of impostor spies who called themselves Julian or Raoul seem to have passed in favor of writers who are less interested in the glamour of international intrigue than in impostors who don’t drink and call themselves Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour.

Further reports on the story are sure to observe that the entire episode might have been plucked from the movies. This is incorrect. Plucked from films, yes. The story is half-ready for the art house. Strip the tale of glamour, remove any potential for excitement and you’ve not only got a greenlight, but guaranteed analysis in Cineaste, and a panel accompanying the New York opening consisting of Naomi Klein, a New York University expert on the Middle East, and any film critic dextrous enough to use “hegemony” in a sentence.

But the movies? Forget it. Hollywood is too besotted with sequels, reboots, animation to stick a toe into the real world. And the supposed change from this routine that the holiday season offers consists usually of adaptations of the kind of novels (usually Booker winners) that are purchased instead of read, or a Nancy Myers comedy in which a 50-ish divorcee (Meryl/Goldie/Diane) who has founded her own successful wrapping-paper company has to decide if her heart lies with her younger lesbian business partner (Debra Messing) or with a rakish older European diplomat (Bernard-Henri Levy).

Opportunities for film viewing in Kabul are understandably sparse. Salon’s sources in the city report that there are only two screens in operation at the city’s sixplex and they are currently offering “Speed Racer” and “Lambada: The Forbidden Dance.” Clearly, it’s time for America to intervene. Despite our massive expenditures in the country, our officials can surely afford a selection of DVDs designed to train Afghan officials on not falling for an impostor.

We suggest:

“Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner?” (1967) — We direct Afghan leaders to the suspicion shown by Spencer Tracy and Katharine Hepburn in the early part of the film toward the doctor their daughter brings home as her fiancé. The audience may consider their fears unreasonable because the doctor is, after all, Sidney Poitier and the young woman could as easily have brought home Eldridge Cleaver or Sonny Liston. But had the Afghans treated the impostor’s moderate proposals with even a smidge of the skepticism Spence and Kate show toward even such a paragon as Poitier, surely this embarrassing situation might have been avoided.

“Brokeback Mountain” (2005) — Was this individual really in close contact with the Taliban? If he had, he surely would have shown some inclination to the rugged, and all too often lonely, life that solitary figures like insurgents or closeted gay cowboys lead. Simply the mention of certain items — Ralph Lauren flannel shirts; beef jerky; a pet mule named Faiza — would have elicited a certain gleam in the eye of the real McCoy.

“Footloose” (1984) — Certainly only as dedicated a zealot as an actual Taliban leader could resist the combined lure of Kevin Bacon’s dancing and Kenny Loggins’ music. Slip the movie on during a break in negotations. Does this alleged mullah tap his feet, or nod his head sternly during John Lithgow’s fire-and-brimstone sermons? For the sake of the money you’ve just shelled out, pray it’s the latter.

“The Passion of the Christ” (2004) Four words: It’s the Jews’ fault. Sure to warm the heart of any true jihadist.

“Sex and the City 2″ (2010): Watch your man as he watches Carrie and the girls live it up in Abu Dhabi. Does he chuckle at their antics or make proclamations about profanations of the infidel harlots? (Note: The film can also be useful for other methods of recognition. See: “Brokeback Mountain.”)

Charles Taylor is a writer in New York.

Continue Reading Close

Charles Taylor is a columnist for the Newark Star-Ledger.

Page 1 of 32 in Espionage