Down with the Iraqis

If you could generalize, what are the primary needs of Iraqis, let's say in Maysan Province, right now?

Well, in somewhere like Maysan I think people would talk firstly about security. And they are very disturbed both by the continuing level of criminality and by the militia groups which answer to the elected politicians and which still continue to intimidate and occasionally kill citizens on the streets openly with impunity. They're also obviously very worried about terrorism and by the number of people who are being killed by bombs or dragged from their cars and shot on the major highways. People are barely visiting Baghdad at the moment because they see the highways being too dangerous and Baghdad itself as being too dangerous. So, security first.

Then I think they would worry a great deal about what they see as corruption and injustice in government. A collapse in moral standards, a return to tribalism, immorality in general, lack of economic progress.

So not so much gender equality.

Well, of course for women that's a very serious issue. Particularly for educated women from more middle-class backgrounds. They feel that the departure of Saddam has led to a very serious decline in the state of the women, that they were much freer in terms of their social codes and their dress and their behavior under Saddam than they are now under a more Islamist government.

You mentioned corruption being one of the main concerns. However, right before the Maysan elections it becomes clear that one of the more extremist, Islamist groups is probably going to win. And there's an instance, which you discuss in the book, where you realize that in order for the more moderate group to have a chance they need more funds. So you decided to give them money from the CPA bank, essentially allowing the CPA to intervene in the fate of the election. Can you explain your decision to give this group money, which could be perceived as quite contrary to the democratic values the West is trying to build.

I think it was a very difficult decision that I made there and it's still not a decision that I'm entirely comfortable with. But my sense is that the extremist groups, the Islamist groups who hated the coalition, who wished to impose extremely conservative, oppressive codes, who were supported by violent, armed militias, were dominating the province partly because they were the only parties with access to funds. They were funded by the Iranian state covertly and by Syrians covertly and even by independent businessmen from other parts of the Middle East.

The moderate Islamic groups had a much more tolerant, pluralistic vision of Islam and a much more pragmatic and cooperative attitude toward the international community. They were not supported by violent armed militia groups and therefore resembled more closely the kind of democratic society that we were trying to establish, but received no funding or support at all. So the extreme Islamist groups could hire entire rioting crowds of 3,000 or 4,000 people and pay them, and the moderate groups were unable to rent a tea boy and communicate their message.

So my sense was that providing a small amount of funding to new political parties with moderate, human rights-friendly agendas was necessary in terms of the creation of a pluralistic democracy.

You've said that you don't see the likelihood of civil war in Iraq -- even if, or when, the U.S. troops eventually withdraw. But at many times throughout "Prince of the Marshes" you highlight major divisions among Iraqis -- even from province to province or town to town there will be an "official council" and then an "alternative council." And there's a perception in the U.S. that, if anything, civil war has already broken out.

In 2003-2004 I thought civil war was very likely. Not civil war in the sense of two huge factions fighting each other up and down the country, but a collapse of authority and a disparate group of local and tribal militias and parties squabbling and fighting it out town by town. That changed at the end of 2004 and by the elections of 2005. I know in southern Iraq, basically, the government has authority and keeps control, and the only two groups really squabbling outside the law are the armed militias of the Sadrist party and the Badr Brigades, which are the two big elected parties.

I think those militia groups are kept mostly under control by their political leadership and I think those political groups have proven again and again a real ability to negotiate compromises and find resolutions -- even with their Sunni opponents. Most Iraqis I know -- in fact all Iraqis I know, who are Iraqi Arabs as opposed to Kurds -- have a strong sense of being an Iraqi, which trumps their sectarian divide. Therefore, my intuition is that were we to withdraw, rather than collapsing into a terminal civil war between Sunni and Shia factions, Iraqi society and Iraqi politicians would be able, relatively rapidly, to reestablish control and a unitary nation with an exception of the Kurdish area.

Do you think there will eventually be an independent Kurdish state?

I think the Kurds probably will eventually press for greater and greater autonomy and perhaps eventually independence, yeah.

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