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A L S O+T O D A Y

Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Starr
By Gary Kamiya
When the real Kenneth Starr finally stood up before the House, he turned out to have a split personality
Starr Wars
By Joan Walsh
The Democrats strike back
Nothing has changed
Compiled by Lori Leibovich and Fiona Morgan
The consensus of political experts is that no minds were changed by Starr's day in court
Dear Ken
The full text of ethics advisor Sam Dash's letter of resignation to Kenneth Starr
Starr on the stand
An uncut transcript of Thursday's sometimes rancorous and often bitterly partisan congressional impeachment proceedings
A dozen questions Congress should ask Kenneth Starr
By David Talbot, Murray Waas and Joan Walsh
(11/18/98)

T A B L E+T A L K
Discuss Ken Starr and his testimony in the Politics area of Table Talk

R E C E N T L Y
Same Old Party
By Joshua Micah Marshall
New leadership can't mend the rifts among Republicans in Congress
(11/19/98)
Reply to C.D. Ellison
By David Horowitz
It's time for blacks to have a two-party system, too
(11/19/98)
Toppling Saddam
By Frank Smyth
Clinton wants a new government in Baghdad, but he and the Iraqi opposition are unlikely to be up to the task
(11/18/98)
Brother on brother
By Murray Waas
Whitewater witness David Hale attempted to suborn perjury by his own brother by asking him to falsely corroborate illegal acts by President Clinton
(11/17/98)
The mark of Cain: a tale of two brothers
By Murray Waas
Though they traveled the same path from the family dirt farm through law school, the Hale brothers turned out different as night and day
(11/17/98)
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STARR SPEAKS | PAGE 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
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C. The President's Actions: Dec. 5-Jan. 17
I will next turn to some of the essentials of the referral. That will include the specifics of Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the Jones case and the president's actions in response to that involvement.
The key point about the president's conduct is this. On at least six different occasions – from Dec. 17, 1997, through Aug. 17, 1998 – the president had to make a decision. He could choose truth, or he could choose deception. On all six occasions, the president chose deception – a pattern of calculated behavior over a span of months.
On Dec. 5, 1997, Ms. Jones's attorneys identified Ms. Lewinsky as a potential witness. Within a day, the president learned that Ms. Lewinsky's name was on the witness list.
After learning this, the president faced his first critical decision. Would he and Monica Lewinsky tell the truth about their relationship? Or would they provide false information – not just to a spouse or to loved ones – but under oath in a court of law?
Eleven months ago, the president made his decision. At approximately 2 a.m. on Dec. 17, 1997, he called Ms. Lewinsky at her Watergate apartment and told her that she was on the witness list. This was news to Ms. Lewinsky. And it bears noting that the president – not his lawyer – made this call to the witness.
During this 2 a.m. conversation, which lasted approximately half an hour, the president could have told Ms. Lewinsky that they must tell the truth under oath. The president could have explained that they might face embarrassment but that, as a citizen and as president, he could not lie under oath and he could not sit by while Monica did so. The president did not say anything like that.
On the contrary, according to Ms. Lewinsky, the president suggested that she could sign an affidavit and use – under oath – deceptive cover stories that they had devised long ago to explain why Ms. Lewinsky had visited the Oval Office area. The president did not explicitly instruct Ms. Lewinsky to lie. He did not have to. Ms. Lewinsky testified that the president's suggestion that they use the pre-existing cover stories amounted to a continuation of their pattern of concealing their intimate relationship. Starting with this conversation, the president and Ms. Lewinsky understood, according to Ms. Lewinsky, that they were both going to make false statements under oath.
The conversation between the president and Ms. Lewinsky on Dec. 17 was a critical turning point. The evidence suggests that the president chose to engage in a criminal act – to reach an understanding with Ms. Lewinsky that they would both make false statements under oath. At that moment, the president's intimate relationship with a subordinate employee was transformed into an unlawful effort to thwart the judicial process. This was no longer an issue of private conduct.
Recall that the Supreme Court had concluded that Paula Jones was entitled to an "orderly disposition" of her claims. The president's action on Dec. 17 was his first direct effort to thwart the Supreme Court's mandate.
The story continued: The president faced a second choice. On Dec. 23, 1997, the president submitted under oath a written answer to an interrogatory. The request stated in relevant part: "Please state the name ... of (federal employees) with whom you had sexual relations when you (were) ... president of the United States." In his sworn answer, the president stated "None."
On Dec. 28, the president faced a third critical choice. On that day, the president met with Ms. Lewinsky at the White House. They discussed the fact that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed for gifts she had received from the president. According to Ms. Lewinsky, she raised the question of what she should do with the gifts. Later that day, the president's personal secretary, Betty Currie, drove to Ms. Lewinsky's Watergate home. Ms. Lewinsky gave Ms. Currie a sealed box that contained some of the subpoenaed gifts. Ms. Currie then stored the box under her bed at home.
In her written proffer on Feb. 1, four weeks after the fact, Ms. Lewinsky stated that Ms. Currie had called her to retrieve the gifts. If so, that necessarily meant that the president had asked Ms. Currie to call. It would directly and undeniably implicate him in an obstruction of justice. Ms. Lewinsky later repeated that statement in testimony under oath. Ms. Currie, for her part, recalls Ms. Lewinsky calling her. But even if Ms. Lewinsky called Ms. Currie, common sense and the evidence suggest some presidential knowledge or involvement, as the referral explains.
Let me add another point about the gifts. In his grand jury appearance in August, the president testified that he had no particular concern about the gifts in December 1997 when he had talked to Ms. Lewinsky about them. And he thus suggested that he would have had no reason to take part in December in a plan to conceal the gifts. But there is a serious problem with the president's explanation. If it were true that the president in December was unconcerned about the gifts, he presumably would have told the truth under oath in his January deposition about the large number of gifts that he and Ms. Lewinsky had exchanged. But he did not tell the truth. At that deposition, when asked whether he had ever given gifts to Monica Lewinsky, and he had given her several on Dec. 28, the president stated "I don't recall. Do you know what they were?"
In short, the critical facts to emphasize about the transfer of gifts are these: First, the president and Ms. Lewinsky met and discussed what should be done with the gifts subpoenaed from Ms. Lewinsky. Second, the president's personal secretary Ms. Currie drove later that day to Ms. Lewinsky's home to pick up the gifts. Third, Ms. Currie stored the box under her bed.
Meanwhile, the legal process continued to unfold, and the president took other actions that had the foreseeable effect of keeping Ms. Lewinsky "on the team." The president helped Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job in New York. His efforts began after the Supreme Court's decision in May 1997 – at a time when it had become foreseeable that she could be an adverse witness against the president. These job-related efforts intensified in December 1997 after Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness list.
Vernon Jordan, who had been enlisted in the job search for Ms. Lewinsky, testified that he kept the president informed of the status of Ms. Lewinsky's job search and her affidavit. On Jan. 7, 1998, Mr. Jordan told the president that Ms. Lewinsky had signed the affidavit. Mr. Jordan stated to the president that he was still working on getting her a job. The president replied, "Good." In other words, the president, knowing that a witness had just signed a false affidavit, encouraged his friend to continue trying to find her a job. After Ms. Lewinsky received a job offer from Revlon on Jan. 12, Vernon Jordan called the president and said: "Mission accomplished.
As is often the situation in cases involving this kind of financial assistance, no direct evidence reveals the president's intent in assisting Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Lewinsky testified that no one promised her a job for silence; of course, crimes ordinarily do not take place with such explicit discussion. But federal courts instruct juries that circumstantial evidence is just as probative as direct evidence. And the circumstantial evidence here is strong. At a bare minimum, the evidence suggests that the president's job assistance efforts stemmed from his desire to placate Ms. Lewinsky so that she would not be tempted – under the burden of an oath – to tell the truth about the relationship. Monica Lewinsky herself recognized that at the time, saying to a friend, "Somebody could construe or say, 'Well, they gave her a job to shut her up. They made her happy."'
And given that the president's plan to testify falsely could succeed only if Ms. Lewinsky went along, the president naturally had to be concerned that Ms. Lewinsky at any time might turn around and decide to tell the truth. Indeed, some wanted her to tell the truth. For example, one friend talked to Ms. Lewinsky about the Dec. 28 meeting with the president. The friend stated that she was concerned because she "didn't want to see (Monica) being like Susan McDougal" and did not want Monica to lie to protect the president. Needless to say, any sudden decision by Ms. Lewinsky to tell the truth, whether out of anger at the president or simple desire to be law-abiding, would have been very harmful to the president. That helps to explain his motive in providing job assistance.
In mid-January, Ms. Lewinsky finalized her false affidavit with her attorney, who sent it to Judge Wright's Court. The affidavit falsely denied a sexual relationship with the president and essentially recounted the cover stories they had discussed in their middle-of-the-night conversation on Dec. 17.
Let me turn to the president's Jan. 17 deposition. Some have suggested that the president might have been surprised or ambushed at his deposition. Those suggestions are wrong. The president had clear warning that there would be questions about Monica Lewinsky. She had been named on the Dec. 5 witness list. On Jan. 12, only five days before the deposition, Ms. Jones' attorneys identified Ms. Lewinsky as a trial witness. In response, Judge Wright approved her as a witness. Two days later, on Jan. 14, the president's private attorney asked Ms. Lewinsky's attorney to fax Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. During the deposition itself, the president's attorney stated that the president was "fully familiar" with Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.
At the outset of his Jan. 17 deposition, therefore, the president faced a fourth critical decision. Fully aware that he would likely receive questions about Ms. Lewinsky, would the president continue to make false statements under oath – this time in the presence of a United States District judge?
At the start of the deposition, Judge Susan Webber Wright administered the oath. The president swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. As his testimony began, the president, in response to a question from Ms. Jones' attorneys, stated that he understood he was providing his testimony under the penalty of perjury.
The president was asked a series of questions about Ms. Lewinsky. After a few questions, the president's attorney – Mr. Bennett – objected to the questioning about Ms. Lewinsky, referring to it as "innuendo." Mr. Bennett produced Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit. Mr. Bennett stated to Judge Wright that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit indicated that "there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape, or form." Mr. Bennett stated that the president was "fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit." During Mr. Bennett's statements, the president sat back and let his attorney mislead Judge Wright. The president said not a word – to the judge or, so far as we are aware, to his attorney.
Judge Wright overruled Mr. Bennett's objection. The questioning continued. In response, the president made false statements not only about his intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, but about a whole host of matters. The president testified that he did not know that Vernon Jordan had met with Ms. Lewinsky and talked about the Jones case. That was untrue. He testified that he could not recall being alone with Ms Lewinsky. That was untrue. He testified that he could not recall ever being in the Oval Office hallway with Ms. Lewinsky except perhaps when she was delivering pizza. That was untrue. He testified that he could not recall gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and him. That was untrue. He testified – after a 14-second pause – that he was "not sure" whether he had ever talked to Ms. Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be asked to testify in the lawsuit. That was untrue. The president testified that he did not know whether Ms. Lewinsky had been served a subpoena at the time he last saw her in December 1997. That was untrue. When his attorney read Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a sexual relationship, the president stated that the affidavit was "absolutely true." That was untrue.
The evidence thus suggests that the president – long aware that Ms. Lewinsky was a likely topic of questioning at his deposition – made not one, or two, but a series of false statements under oath. The president further allowed his attorney to use Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, which the president knew to be false, to deceive the court. This evidence suggests that the president directly contravened the oath he had taken – as well as the Supreme Court's mandate, in which the court had stated that Ms. Jones was entitled, like every other citizen, to a lawful disposition of her case.
D. The President's Actions: Jan. 17-21
As our referral outlines, the president's deposition did not mark the end of the scheme to conceal. During his deposition testimony, the president referred to his secretary Betty Currie. The president testified, for example, that Ms. Lewinsky had come to the White House to see Ms. Currie, not him; that Ms. Currie had been involved in assisting Ms. Lewinsky in her job search; and that Ms. Currie had communicated with Vernon Jordan about Mr. Jordan's assistance to Ms. Lewinsky. In response to one question at the deposition, the president said he did not know the answer and "you'd have to ask Betty."
Given the president's repeated references to Ms. Currie and his suggestion to Ms. Jones' attorneys that they contact her, the president had to know that Ms. Jones' attorneys might want to question Ms. Currie. Shortly after 7 p.m. on Saturday, Jan. 17 – just two and a half hours after the deposition – the president attempted to contact Ms. Currie at her home. The president asked Ms. Currie to come to the White House the next day, which she did, although it was unusual for her to come in on a Sunday. According to Ms. Currie, the president appeared concerned and made a number of statements abut Ms. Lewinsky to Ms. Currie. The statements included:
"You were always there when she was there, right? We were never really alone."
"You could see and hear everything."
Ms. Currie concluded that the president wanted her to agree with him when he made these statements. Ms. Currie stated that she did in fact indicate her agreement – although she knew that the president and Ms. Lewinsky had been alone and that she could not hear or see them when they were alone.
Ms. Currie further testified that the president ran through the same basic statements with her again on January 20 or 21.
What is important with respect to these two episodes is that at the time the president made these statements, he knew that they were false. He knew he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He knew Ms. Currie could not see or hear everything. The president thus could not have been trying to refresh his recollection, as he subsequently suggested. That raises the question: Is there a legitimate explanation for the president to have said those things in that manner to Ms. Currie? The circumstances suggest not. The facts suggest that the president was attempting to improperly coach Ms. Currie, at a time when he could foresee that she was not a potential witness in Jones v. Clinton.
N E X T+P A G E+| "The first step was for the president to deny the truth publicly."

A L S O+T O D A Y Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Starr By Gary Kamiya When the real Kenneth Starr finally stood up before the House, he turned out to have a split personality Starr Wars By Joan Walsh The Democrats strike back Nothing has changed Compiled by Lori Leibovich and Fiona Morgan The consensus of political experts is that no minds were changed by Starr's day in court Dear Ken The full text of ethics advisor Sam Dash's letter of resignation to Kenneth Starr Starr on the stand An uncut transcript of Thursday's sometimes rancorous and often bitterly partisan congressional impeachment proceedings A dozen questions Congress should ask Kenneth Starr By David Talbot, Murray Waas and Joan Walsh (11/18/98) T A B L E+T A L K Discuss Ken Starr and his testimony in the Politics area of Table Talk R E C E N T L Y Same Old Party By Joshua Micah Marshall New leadership can't mend the rifts among Republicans in Congress (11/19/98) Reply to C.D. Ellison By David Horowitz It's time for blacks to have a two-party system, too (11/19/98) Toppling Saddam By Frank Smyth Clinton wants a new government in Baghdad, but he and the Iraqi opposition are unlikely to be up to the task (11/18/98) Brother on brother By Murray Waas Whitewater witness David Hale attempted to suborn perjury by his own brother by asking him to falsely corroborate illegal acts by President Clinton (11/17/98) The mark of Cain: a tale of two brothers By Murray Waas Though they traveled the same path from the family dirt farm through law school, the Hale brothers turned out different as night and day (11/17/98) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Browse the Newsreal Archives - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - S A L O N E M P O R I U M FREE! 12-ounce bag of Salon Blend with a purchase of $30 or more. While supplies last.
		STARR SPEAKS \| PAGE 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 - - - - - - - - - - C. The President's Actions: Dec. 5-Jan. 17 I will next turn to some of the essentials of the referral. That will include the specifics of Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the Jones case and the president's actions in response to that involvement. The key point about the president's conduct is this. On at least six different occasions – from Dec. 17, 1997, through Aug. 17, 1998 – the president had to make a decision. He could choose truth, or he could choose deception. On all six occasions, the president chose deception – a pattern of calculated behavior over a span of months. On Dec. 5, 1997, Ms. Jones's attorneys identified Ms. Lewinsky as a potential witness. Within a day, the president learned that Ms. Lewinsky's name was on the witness list. After learning this, the president faced his first critical decision. Would he and Monica Lewinsky tell the truth about their relationship? Or would they provide false information – not just to a spouse or to loved ones – but under oath in a court of law? Eleven months ago, the president made his decision. At approximately 2 a.m. on Dec. 17, 1997, he called Ms. Lewinsky at her Watergate apartment and told her that she was on the witness list. This was news to Ms. Lewinsky. And it bears noting that the president – not his lawyer – made this call to the witness. During this 2 a.m. conversation, which lasted approximately half an hour, the president could have told Ms. Lewinsky that they must tell the truth under oath. The president could have explained that they might face embarrassment but that, as a citizen and as president, he could not lie under oath and he could not sit by while Monica did so. The president did not say anything like that. On the contrary, according to Ms. Lewinsky, the president suggested that she could sign an affidavit and use – under oath – deceptive cover stories that they had devised long ago to explain why Ms. Lewinsky had visited the Oval Office area. The president did not explicitly instruct Ms. Lewinsky to lie. He did not have to. Ms. Lewinsky testified that the president's suggestion that they use the pre-existing cover stories amounted to a continuation of their pattern of concealing their intimate relationship. Starting with this conversation, the president and Ms. Lewinsky understood, according to Ms. Lewinsky, that they were both going to make false statements under oath. The conversation between the president and Ms. Lewinsky on Dec. 17 was a critical turning point. The evidence suggests that the president chose to engage in a criminal act – to reach an understanding with Ms. Lewinsky that they would both make false statements under oath. At that moment, the president's intimate relationship with a subordinate employee was transformed into an unlawful effort to thwart the judicial process. This was no longer an issue of private conduct. Recall that the Supreme Court had concluded that Paula Jones was entitled to an "orderly disposition" of her claims. The president's action on Dec. 17 was his first direct effort to thwart the Supreme Court's mandate. The story continued: The president faced a second choice. On Dec. 23, 1997, the president submitted under oath a written answer to an interrogatory. The request stated in relevant part: "Please state the name ... of (federal employees) with whom you had sexual relations when you (were) ... president of the United States." In his sworn answer, the president stated "None." On Dec. 28, the president faced a third critical choice. On that day, the president met with Ms. Lewinsky at the White House. They discussed the fact that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed for gifts she had received from the president. According to Ms. Lewinsky, she raised the question of what she should do with the gifts. Later that day, the president's personal secretary, Betty Currie, drove to Ms. Lewinsky's Watergate home. Ms. Lewinsky gave Ms. Currie a sealed box that contained some of the subpoenaed gifts. Ms. Currie then stored the box under her bed at home. In her written proffer on Feb. 1, four weeks after the fact, Ms. Lewinsky stated that Ms. Currie had called her to retrieve the gifts. If so, that necessarily meant that the president had asked Ms. Currie to call. It would directly and undeniably implicate him in an obstruction of justice. Ms. Lewinsky later repeated that statement in testimony under oath. Ms. Currie, for her part, recalls Ms. Lewinsky calling her. But even if Ms. Lewinsky called Ms. Currie, common sense and the evidence suggest some presidential knowledge or involvement, as the referral explains. Let me add another point about the gifts. In his grand jury appearance in August, the president testified that he had no particular concern about the gifts in December 1997 when he had talked to Ms. Lewinsky about them. And he thus suggested that he would have had no reason to take part in December in a plan to conceal the gifts. But there is a serious problem with the president's explanation. If it were true that the president in December was unconcerned about the gifts, he presumably would have told the truth under oath in his January deposition about the large number of gifts that he and Ms. Lewinsky had exchanged. But he did not tell the truth. At that deposition, when asked whether he had ever given gifts to Monica Lewinsky, and he had given her several on Dec. 28, the president stated "I don't recall. Do you know what they were?" In short, the critical facts to emphasize about the transfer of gifts are these: First, the president and Ms. Lewinsky met and discussed what should be done with the gifts subpoenaed from Ms. Lewinsky. Second, the president's personal secretary Ms. Currie drove later that day to Ms. Lewinsky's home to pick up the gifts. Third, Ms. Currie stored the box under her bed. Meanwhile, the legal process continued to unfold, and the president took other actions that had the foreseeable effect of keeping Ms. Lewinsky "on the team." The president helped Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job in New York. His efforts began after the Supreme Court's decision in May 1997 – at a time when it had become foreseeable that she could be an adverse witness against the president. These job-related efforts intensified in December 1997 after Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness list. Vernon Jordan, who had been enlisted in the job search for Ms. Lewinsky, testified that he kept the president informed of the status of Ms. Lewinsky's job search and her affidavit. On Jan. 7, 1998, Mr. Jordan told the president that Ms. Lewinsky had signed the affidavit. Mr. Jordan stated to the president that he was still working on getting her a job. The president replied, "Good." In other words, the president, knowing that a witness had just signed a false affidavit, encouraged his friend to continue trying to find her a job. After Ms. Lewinsky received a job offer from Revlon on Jan. 12, Vernon Jordan called the president and said: "Mission accomplished. As is often the situation in cases involving this kind of financial assistance, no direct evidence reveals the president's intent in assisting Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Lewinsky testified that no one promised her a job for silence; of course, crimes ordinarily do not take place with such explicit discussion. But federal courts instruct juries that circumstantial evidence is just as probative as direct evidence. And the circumstantial evidence here is strong. At a bare minimum, the evidence suggests that the president's job assistance efforts stemmed from his desire to placate Ms. Lewinsky so that she would not be tempted – under the burden of an oath – to tell the truth about the relationship. Monica Lewinsky herself recognized that at the time, saying to a friend, "Somebody could construe or say, 'Well, they gave her a job to shut her up. They made her happy."' And given that the president's plan to testify falsely could succeed only if Ms. Lewinsky went along, the president naturally had to be concerned that Ms. Lewinsky at any time might turn around and decide to tell the truth. Indeed, some wanted her to tell the truth. For example, one friend talked to Ms. Lewinsky about the Dec. 28 meeting with the president. The friend stated that she was concerned because she "didn't want to see (Monica) being like Susan McDougal" and did not want Monica to lie to protect the president. Needless to say, any sudden decision by Ms. Lewinsky to tell the truth, whether out of anger at the president or simple desire to be law-abiding, would have been very harmful to the president. That helps to explain his motive in providing job assistance. In mid-January, Ms. Lewinsky finalized her false affidavit with her attorney, who sent it to Judge Wright's Court. The affidavit falsely denied a sexual relationship with the president and essentially recounted the cover stories they had discussed in their middle-of-the-night conversation on Dec. 17. Let me turn to the president's Jan. 17 deposition. Some have suggested that the president might have been surprised or ambushed at his deposition. Those suggestions are wrong. The president had clear warning that there would be questions about Monica Lewinsky. She had been named on the Dec. 5 witness list. On Jan. 12, only five days before the deposition, Ms. Jones' attorneys identified Ms. Lewinsky as a trial witness. In response, Judge Wright approved her as a witness. Two days later, on Jan. 14, the president's private attorney asked Ms. Lewinsky's attorney to fax Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. During the deposition itself, the president's attorney stated that the president was "fully familiar" with Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. At the outset of his Jan. 17 deposition, therefore, the president faced a fourth critical decision. Fully aware that he would likely receive questions about Ms. Lewinsky, would the president continue to make false statements under oath – this time in the presence of a United States District judge? At the start of the deposition, Judge Susan Webber Wright administered the oath. The president swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. As his testimony began, the president, in response to a question from Ms. Jones' attorneys, stated that he understood he was providing his testimony under the penalty of perjury. The president was asked a series of questions about Ms. Lewinsky. After a few questions, the president's attorney – Mr. Bennett – objected to the questioning about Ms. Lewinsky, referring to it as "innuendo." Mr. Bennett produced Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit. Mr. Bennett stated to Judge Wright that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit indicated that "there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape, or form." Mr. Bennett stated that the president was "fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit." During Mr. Bennett's statements, the president sat back and let his attorney mislead Judge Wright. The president said not a word – to the judge or, so far as we are aware, to his attorney. Judge Wright overruled Mr. Bennett's objection. The questioning continued. In response, the president made false statements not only about his intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, but about a whole host of matters. The president testified that he did not know that Vernon Jordan had met with Ms. Lewinsky and talked about the Jones case. That was untrue. He testified that he could not recall being alone with Ms Lewinsky. That was untrue. He testified that he could not recall ever being in the Oval Office hallway with Ms. Lewinsky except perhaps when she was delivering pizza. That was untrue. He testified that he could not recall gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and him. That was untrue. He testified – after a 14-second pause – that he was "not sure" whether he had ever talked to Ms. Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be asked to testify in the lawsuit. That was untrue. The president testified that he did not know whether Ms. Lewinsky had been served a subpoena at the time he last saw her in December 1997. That was untrue. When his attorney read Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a sexual relationship, the president stated that the affidavit was "absolutely true." That was untrue. The evidence thus suggests that the president – long aware that Ms. Lewinsky was a likely topic of questioning at his deposition – made not one, or two, but a series of false statements under oath. The president further allowed his attorney to use Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, which the president knew to be false, to deceive the court. This evidence suggests that the president directly contravened the oath he had taken – as well as the Supreme Court's mandate, in which the court had stated that Ms. Jones was entitled, like every other citizen, to a lawful disposition of her case. D. The President's Actions: Jan. 17-21 As our referral outlines, the president's deposition did not mark the end of the scheme to conceal. During his deposition testimony, the president referred to his secretary Betty Currie. The president testified, for example, that Ms. Lewinsky had come to the White House to see Ms. Currie, not him; that Ms. Currie had been involved in assisting Ms. Lewinsky in her job search; and that Ms. Currie had communicated with Vernon Jordan about Mr. Jordan's assistance to Ms. Lewinsky. In response to one question at the deposition, the president said he did not know the answer and "you'd have to ask Betty." Given the president's repeated references to Ms. Currie and his suggestion to Ms. Jones' attorneys that they contact her, the president had to know that Ms. Jones' attorneys might want to question Ms. Currie. Shortly after 7 p.m. on Saturday, Jan. 17 – just two and a half hours after the deposition – the president attempted to contact Ms. Currie at her home. The president asked Ms. Currie to come to the White House the next day, which she did, although it was unusual for her to come in on a Sunday. According to Ms. Currie, the president appeared concerned and made a number of statements abut Ms. Lewinsky to Ms. Currie. The statements included: "You were always there when she was there, right? We were never really alone." "You could see and hear everything." Ms. Currie concluded that the president wanted her to agree with him when he made these statements. Ms. Currie stated that she did in fact indicate her agreement – although she knew that the president and Ms. Lewinsky had been alone and that she could not hear or see them when they were alone. Ms. Currie further testified that the president ran through the same basic statements with her again on January 20 or 21. What is important with respect to these two episodes is that at the time the president made these statements, he knew that they were false. He knew he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He knew Ms. Currie could not see or hear everything. The president thus could not have been trying to refresh his recollection, as he subsequently suggested. That raises the question: Is there a legitimate explanation for the president to have said those things in that manner to Ms. Currie? The circumstances suggest not. The facts suggest that the president was attempting to improperly coach Ms. Currie, at a time when he could foresee that she was not a potential witness in Jones v. Clinton. N E X T+P A G E+\| "The first step was for the president to deny the truth publicly."