The post-Cold War relationship between the United States and Russia has always been uneasy, but the past week saw a level of tension unrivaled in recent years. President Boris Yeltsin escalated his rhetoric denouncing the bombing in Yugoslavia, and warned that the cordial state of East-West relations could deteriorate into a European and possibly world war if NATO persists with airstrikes against Yugoslavia. While reports last week that Russia would re-target its nuclear missiles toward NATO nations and forge a union with Serbia were denied soon after they became public, they served to underscore the sudden frostiness between the two Cold War antagonists.
Does the tension foreshadow a permanent frost? Certainly Yeltsin's complaints are reminding U.S. leaders of Russia's ability to act as a destabilizing force in the Balkans region. Although Russia is in economic and political turmoil and appears unwilling -- and probably unable -- to take military action on the ground, the Yeltsin-Primakov government still has at its disposal a large nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Operation Allied Force has intensified anti-American sentiments in Russia, tarnishing the image of the United States as a helpful partner in reform and a model of democratic humanism.
Russian specialists disagree about what Moscow's latest moves mean. But most are united in dismay at the Clinton administration's current policies toward the former Soviet Union. Salon asked two Russia experts to talk about the current state of American-Russian relations and the war in Yugoslavia. Stephen F. Cohen is a professor of Russian studies and history at New York University and a contributing editor to the Nation. Dimitri K. Simes is director of the Nixon Center and served as a policy advisor for the Nixon, Reagan and Bush administrations. He emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1973.
Could the war in Yugoslavia mean a return to the Cold War?
Cohen: The short answer is yes, absolutely. The reason is that the bombing has aroused latent Cold War feelings on both sides, in Moscow and in Washington, but more so at the moment in Moscow. The anti-American feeling there is authentic and widespread and is being expressed by both the political elite and ordinary citizens. Now you can't replicate the Cold War. The circumstances were different. But certainly driving Russia out of the West, out of Europe, and erecting some latter-day variant of the Iron Curtain between the countries is possible. It is not inevitable, but the bombings have been a substantial stride in that direction, a stimulus to that kind of development.
You want to remember there is no one Yeltsin administration, no one Russia, no one set of Russians, and that there are different groupings and points of view that are struggling over this very issue. Based on what I know, on firsthand discussions in Moscow on a fairly regular basis and on reading the Russian press, there is no one point of view. Even within the Yeltsin administration there are several. There is the viewpoint that there should be a very hard, even military, reaction to the American bombing, which would be strengthened if ground forces were introduced. There is the viewpoint that under no circumstances should the Russians resort to any kind of military reaction; i.e, that Russia should remain rhetorically engaged but practically laid back in order to A) avoid spoiling the relationship with the West, and B) hold Russia in reserve for an important diplomatic role when it becomes clear that a military solution is in the making.
Simes: Russia is a country which throughout history has been slow to adjust to new foreign policy situations. But once it begins to change it unfortunately also begins to change with great speed and goes beyond reason. And what you see in the making is a serious anti-Western, and particularly anti-American, political wave in Moscow. Up until now, the Russian government and Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov were trying to control this wave by offering a lot of pseudo-patriotic rhetoric, but substantively doing very little that would harm the United States. I do not know where the red line is beyond which Primakov would make a choice between losing domestic legitimacy and starting to create problems in the U.S.-Russian relationship. But I think we are moving in the direction of this invisible line and perhaps are very close to it.
I think our relations with Russia depend very much on how this war ends. If this war ends with a negotiated solution, in which Russia is invited to play a role and has helped to bring about a settlement, I think we can limit the damage and create perhaps not a new foundation but at least a new impulse for the U.S.-Russian relationship. If NATO prevails on the battlefield through air strikes and Milosevic is forced to surrender, it would do a lot of damage to the U.S.-Russian relationship. It would move Russian public opinion and the Russian political process in a more nationalistic and xenophobic direction. But hopefully it still would be controllable, at least in the short run. If contrary to our hopes, Milosevic resists and the war continues on the ground for a couple more weeks, then all kinds of political scenarios may become possible. You have to understand there is a potential for a very dangerous escalation of global tensions. We do not want to start the 21st century by prevailing in Kosovo but losing Russia and China.
But is this conflict about more than Yugoslavia?
Cohen: What you've got is a bombing arousing conflicts within the Kremlin and the Russian political class coming at a moment when a political succession struggle is under way. Yeltsin won't be around too much longer. Therefore a struggle for power and policy is underway, which affects Russian reactions.
Simes: The anti-Americanism that we see in Russia today did not begin with the bombing. It originated in the disastrous impact of Yeltsin's economic policies -- of so-called shock therapy -- which fairly or unfairly millions of Russians believe were made in America. That was the origin of the current anti-American sentiment. It was exacerbated by the expansion of NATO. It was further exacerbated by the bombing of Iraq. And now it is greatly exacerbated by the bombing in Yugoslavia.
So it is a process, a process of the Russian backlash against American policies. Part of that is an enormous disillusionment by the generally pro-Western middle-class intellectual professionals, who believed that, if nothing else, America was a humanitarian nation that would not do the kinds of unhumanitarian things the Soviet regime had done over the years.
How could Russia escalate the current conflict?
Cohen: There is a powerful view in Washington that Russia has no options, that Russia is on her knees, and even though Russia is hollering and bitching and complaining, there is nothing Russia is going to do about it. This is a mistaken view. Russia has options. The problem is we won't like any of the options.
In the short run, for example, if provoked, or if the more militant factions in Russian politics win, the short-term option for Russia would be to break the weapons sanctions against Yugoslavia and possibly against Iraq. In the long run, if America decides to punish Russia by refusing to let Russia into the West, by cutting off financing, Russia could become an arsenal on a long-term basis to all those nations that the United States does not want to see undergo a military build-up. That would mean Iran, Iraq, China, perhaps India, Pakistan and maybe even Libya. And Russia could earn billions of dollars doing this, a lot more than the pittance that the IMF is offering. So Russia has options, but none of them good from the American point of view.
If you want stability in the Balkans you must have: A) a stable Russia, and B) Russian cooperation. And if you're bombing Iraq because you're worried about weapons of mass destruction, the great number of weapons of mass destruction that you should be worried about are in Russia. So this priority makes no sense from America's own interests.
Simes: If Russia wanted to, I think it would be very easy for them to stop the NATO alliance. The question is: What price would they be willing to pay? If President Milosevic appears in Moscow to sign a defense treaty and President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Primakov announce that Yugoslavia is now a part of Russia's vital national security interests, if Russia puts its strategic nuclear forces on increased alert, it is very difficult for me to imagine that NATO would be willing to risk World War III over Yugoslavia. Needless to say, if Russia were to accomplish that, it would pay an enormous price: isolation from the West, no new Western loans. Essentially Russia would be put outside the global mainstream. One very much hopes that they will be smart enough and pragmatic enough not to allow something like this to happen. But history is not just about pragmatic relations. History is also about political processes, about emotions, about leaders trying to enhance their domestic standing. And if this situation in and around Yugoslavia continues much longer, there is a risk of escalation and miscalculation on all sides.
There is no way Russia can make a difference on the ground in Kosovo, if for no other reason than that there is no way for them to have either an airlift or to deliver forces by train or by ship. Even if they wanted to move their air defense missiles into Yugoslavia, and NATO for some strange reason decided to allow these missiles to arrive without bombing Serbian airfields, I don't know how they could be delivered.
What role could Russia play in securing peace in the Balkans?
Simes: I think Primakov is not going to do the bidding of the Clinton administration. If Vice President Gore asks him to go to Milosevic and persuade him to accept NATO positions, I don't think that Primakov would want to do it. And even if he wanted to do it, he couldn't do it. If Milosevic wants to surrender, on the other hand, it might be easier for Milosevic, psychologically and politically, to surrender to Primakov than to the United States. But as along as Milosevic does not want to surrender, I don't think Primakov will be pressuring him to do so.
What worries me is not how Russia may meaningfully help Milosevic, but the escalation of tensions around Yugoslavia. Remember, Russia is a weak and sleeping giant, but it is still a giant. And if you provoke the Russians, as they were provoked many times in their history, you may find their responses very surprising. Russia started World War II with humiliating defeats. Russian campaigns against Napolean initially resulted in defeat and surrender after defeat and surrender. Most Americans don't talk about history when it comes to situations like this. History is important.
The Russians are already desperate and angry and there is a great accumulation of anger against the West. Until now, in the competition between pragmatic national interests and public indignation in Russia, national interests were prevailing. But we cannot take for granted that if this conflict continues, this situation could prevail indefinitely. A victory of common sense in Russia is not something one can ever take for granted.
What about Russia's historic and religious ties with the Serbs?
Simes: Religious and ethnic ties are important. However, I would not overstate the importance of these ties. Historically, the Russians have had difficult relations with Yugoslavia. Under Tito, Yugoslavia if anything had a pro-American rather than a pro-Soviet orientation. But Russia did traditionally protect the Serbs -- against the Ottoman Empire, against the Germans, against the British Empire.
I think to appreciate the Russian response to Yugoslavia, you have to consider two other factors. The first thing is that the Russians have had their own experience with the United States and with American policy. They do believe that the United States backed radical reformers in Russia, using the IMF as a proxy, and in this way contributed to Russia's financial and economic disaster. They do feel that the Clinton administration, while talking about strategic partnerships with Russia, was careful to reduce Russia down to size and limit Russian international effectiveness. In the case of Yugoslavia, they do feel that the Clinton administration did whatever it wanted in Yugoslavia, and that helping Albanians was much more important than taking Russian views into account. It is this sense of humiliation mixed with impotence that emerged in Russia vis-`-vis the U.S. before the current crisis, which explains the extreme radicalism of some Russians in response to the war.
Cohen: So long as images of Slav cities burning are being broadcast back into Russia, it generates a profound revulsion against America on two levels. One, it's sentimental: "My God, they're bombing Slavs." Second, it's fear-inducing: "They're bombing closer and closer to Russia. We could be next." Some people think that the anti-American sentiment to the bombing in Yugoslavia is not authentic. They think it is all for show. And admittedly, some people are showboating, namely Zhirinovsky and that crowd. But for the people I know in the political establishment as well as ordinary rank-and-file citizens, it's a horrifyingly authentic reaction.
Does the war affect the internal power dynamics for Yeltsin and Primakov?
Cohen: First, physically and probably mentally, Yeltsin is not capable of sustaining the energy necessary to be a day-to-day leader. We've known that for the last two to three years. What he does seem to be capable of is periodic interventions. But bear in mind something else: It is widely understood in Russia that Yeltsin was part of the pro-American faction in Russian politics. It was Yeltsin who conceived of the idea of My Dear Great Friend Bill and My Dear Great Friend Kohl. It is now American and German warplanes that are bombing Serbia. Therefore, Yeltsin's political position, not to mention his health position, are in shambles. A poll last week, for example, shows that 6 percent of Russians support Yeltsin.
Simes: Prime Minister Primakov is no friend of the United States. But he is no friend of Slobodan Milosevic either. I am sure he resents Milosevic almost as much as he resents Clinton because, after all, it is Milosevic who put him in this terrible predicament, where he has to make a choice between surrendering to NATO demands and alienating Russian public opinion or moving against NATO and the United States and risking his vital American connections. I think Primakov is a man in a very difficult position. He did not have any plan when he went to Belgrade. He was sent there by President Yeltsin, which is an important reminder that Yeltsin cannot govern but still can give orders and fire prime ministers. Primakov left Belgrade empty-handed and since then he has been trying to cool the situation, while proceeding with vicious and often totally unfair criticisms of NATO actions. To some extent, his rhetoric was designed for domestic consumption, to allow him to do little that would damage the U.S.-Russia relationship beyond repair.
Primakov is a Russian patriot and he does not like the idea of the United States being the only superpower and NATO acting unilaterally without a U.N. mandate, meaning without consultation with Russia. It is also clear that Primakov's domestic power is limited. He has high public opinion polls, but Yeltsin now resents him, precisely because of that popularity. His domestic economic results are modest at best, and he can survive and have whatever effect on the system he has because the Russian parliament supports him. So if it appears that he goes against the Russian political mainstream, he may survive but he would not be able to do anything. He would not be able to continue with reforms. That is why he is maneuvering. That is why his conduct appears inconsistent. I think he will avoid radical steps as long as he can. His instinct essentially is: "Do as little harm as possible but don't take chances, don't stand tall in the name of some higher objective." Primakov is not sufficiently strong politically -- and I think it is not in his very flexible and pragmatic nature -- to take tough positions and risk his political neck.
