Then just three weeks ago, in a monarchy shakeup that went virtually unnoticed by the Western press, Prince Turki al-Feisal was replaced as chief of the Saudi Intelligence Service "at the request" of the king, becoming the first "first-rank" Saudi prince in two decades to lose his job. Speculation ran high that Turki was demoted because of his inability in recent years to persuade the Taliban to turn over bin Laden. (Saudi Arabia stripped bin Laden of citizenship in 1994.) The irony is, it was Turki who first recruited bin Laden, then a young Saudi millionaire, to the Afghan cause nearly two decades ago as a way to demonstrate the Saudis' resolve in driving out the Soviets.
But much has changed in Saudi Arabia during the last 20 years. Once run as an opulent welfare state, where college graduates were virtually guaranteed cushy, 30-hour-a-week white-collar jobs, Saudi Arabia today is battling rising unemployment, particularly among young men. And the Saudis have too many young men (and young women). Nearly half the country's 20 million citizens are under the age of 20, products of a baby boom during the country's heady 1980s oil glory days. Saudi mothers bear an average of six children apiece, and the country's annual population growth in recent years has hovered at about 4 percent, among the highest in the world.
The result is a growing number of discontented, educated natives who may present more of a danger than indigent populations do in neighboring countries. "Poor laborers are not the biggest problem. The problem are those with some education, the potential professionals," says Voll. "Look at the description of the hijackers. They were Saudi middle-class wannabes who expected to be professionals and didn't see opportunities they thought should be there. People like that are much more dangerous, and can do things peasants can't do. Like blend into a Florida suburb." (Several of the hijackers lived and trained as pilots in Florida.)
The London Guardian newspaper this week quoted a Muslim source as suggesting that 80 percent of bin Laden's recruits are from Saudi Arabia. Even if that number is too high, it's now clear that bin Laden's following in his homeland is more intense than most Westerners believed. That's particularly true in the desolate regions of Asir and Baha near Yeman, where bin Laden's family is from and where several of the hijackers lived.
Even the Saudi government seemed to concede that point when it broke off relations with the Taliban, insisting that the Afghan government "had made their land a reception, training and recruitment center for a number of lost people of every nationality, particularly Saudis, so that they carry out criminal acts." (Emphasis added.)
That suggests the Saudis have been duped by the Taliban, which has been busy luring unsuspecting Saudis to the dark side of radical dissent.
Yet during the 1980s the Saudi government encouraged, even glorified, Saudis who took up arms against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Over the years, between 10,000 and 25,000 young Saudis have left the country to join Islamic guerrilla groups, according to Cordesman.
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, author and expert on Islamic extremism in Pakistan, writes that the problem is even more widespread: "If the U.S. wants to do something about radical Islam, it has to deal with Saudi Arabia. The 'rogue states' [Iraq, Libya, etc.] are less important in the radicalization of Islam than Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the single most important cause and supporter of the general fanaticization of Islam."
Why hasn't America raised that red flag? Consider that last May Saudi Arabia announced its most lucrative Western investment deal in nearly three decades, a natural gas project by America's ExxonMobil oil company valued at $100 billion.
Meanwhile, since 1989, Saudis have purchased $40 billion worth of military products from America.
That's not to suggest there haven't been tensions between Washington and Riyadh recently. In 1995, terrorists killed four Americans working in the Saudi capital. FBI officials wanted to interview the arrested suspects, who were clearly bin Laden sympathizers. Saudi courts refused to cooperate, and beheaded the men instead.
The next year, terrorists, trying to drive U.S. forces out of Saudi Arabia, parked a truck outside the U.S. military Khobar Towers apartment in Dhahran, killing 19 Americans and maiming 372. Once again, FBI investigators were denied access to evidence and the chance to question the suspects. American law enforcement blamed the crime on a dissident Saudi group that Saudi officials say does not exist.
Earlier this year, an American grand jury handed down indictments against the Dhahran terrorists, some of whom sit in Saudi jails. Saudi officials dismissed the move though, and have refused to extradite any of the men to stand trial in America. (The case has proven to be particularly embarrassing for the Saudis since three months before the Dharan attack, officials uncovered the plot, yet were still unable to stop it.)
Experts explain the snubs by suggesting that the Saudi royal family simply cannot afford to be seen as currying favor with America, which would ignite more anti-Western resentment among an already suspicious minority at home. It's against that backdrop that the Saudis must now carefully tread during the pending U.S.-sponsored war on terrorism.
"The best-case scenario for them is a short, precise military operation that succeeds in destroying bin Laden's bases and key infrastructure components," says Neil Patrick, the head of the Middle East program at the Royal United Services Institute in London.
But administration officials themselves say that's not likely any time soon. And pressure seems to be mounting from hawks to plan strikes beyond Afghanistan and to include other Muslim states with alleged terrorist ties, such as Iraq or Yemen. That could be viewed as a war on Islam, which would exacerbate Saudi Arabia's internal pressures.
"If the United States bombs Afghanistan and somehow only hits bin Laden and his lieutenants, nobody in the Middle East will be upset," says Abunimah. "The danger is U.S. will kill lots of innocent people and those pictures will be splashed over satellite throughout the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia will be held responsible. Or the war goes on and America needs to bomb more targets and rolls out an attack on Iraq. That's not a situation Saudi Arabia wants to be in."
About the writer
Eric Boehlert is a senior writer at Salon.
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