Israel, meet the Arab street

Feb. 6, 2006 | TEL AVIV, Israel -- A decade ago, as Israelis were debating the wisdom of signing peace agreements with Yasser Arafat, Shimon Peres -- who had negotiated the Oslo deal and won the Nobel Peace Prize -- pulled out a winning argument. "What's the alternative? Hamas?" the angry Peres shouted from the Knesset podium at the opposition seats. He warned that failure to reach a reasonable compromise with Arafat's Fatah, the secular wing of the Palestinian national movement, would eventually elevate its Islamic rival, Hamas, to power.

Peres' gloomy prophecy came true on Jan. 25, when Hamas won a landslide victory in the Palestinian legislative election, ending four decades of exclusive rule by Fatah. Despite the fact that it is only a quasi state, with most of its putative territory under Israeli control, the Palestinian Authority put on a show of democracy unprecedented in the Arab world. For the first time ever in the region, the masses voted down the ruling party.

Several factors led to the electoral victory, which surprised Jerusalem, Washington and capitals in Europe, as well as the Hamas leadership itself. Mahmoud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen), who succeeded Arafat after his death in November 2004, proved ineffective for a number of reasons. Lacking his predecessor's charisma and status, the soft-spoken Abbas failed to win the hearts of his fellow Palestinians. A determined opponent of terror, Abbas won the admiration of President George W. Bush, but little tangible support from either the Americans or the Israelis. The Israeli government, which had previously hoped for Arafat's demise, treated Abbas with indifference that verged on contempt. And last, but not least, Hamas ran a more successful campaign, built upon its proven record of delivering social services more effectively than the corrupt P.A. and taking credit for Israel's decision to evacuate the Gaza Strip last summer.

Ignoring warnings from Israel, the Bush administration decided to push its Arab democratization doctrine, and pressured both Abbas and the Israelis to hold the Jan. 25 election regardless of its outcome.

The declared goal of Hamas is the destruction of Israel, whose existence it sees as a desecration of holy Muslim land. The group has murdered hundreds of Israelis in suicide bombings since 1994. It led the militant Palestinian opposition to the Oslo accords in the 1990s and the terror offensive during the recent intifada. The United States and the European Union consider it a terrorist group, boycotting its operatives and banning fundraising for its projects. When the Islamic party won the Palestinian municipal elections several months ago, in a forerunner to its current victory, its elected mayors faced an incommunicado policy from Israeli and foreign officials.

Given this record, the initial reaction to the Hamas legislative victory was hardly surprising. The election raised a wave of fear, in Israel and abroad, that whatever remained of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process was all but doomed. What is undeniable is that it created severe political uncertainty in the Palestinian Authority. Abbas, elected directly by a popular vote last year, is still the president and chief executive. He remains committed to peace and reconciliation with Israel, and is demanding full control over the P.A. security organs in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas will control the Parliament and therefore the vote of confidence for the next Palestinian cabinet, but it remains unclear whether the group will hold ministerial portfolios. Either way, the cabinet-forming process will take several weeks.

Clearly, Hamas' decision to enter the political process -- which it had rejected before -- has been the most important development of the post-Arafat era. It broadens the basis of Palestinian political participation, which gives a better representation of the public will. And it raises a big question: Will Hamas' new responsibility make it tamer and more moderate, or will the P.A. become more extreme -- or will it be a combination of both? It is too early to tell, as all the relevant players are adjusting themselves to the new reality, and Hamas leaders are hinting at a de facto acceptance of Israel. Domestically, they must decide whether to pursue their religious agenda, aiming to create an Iran-style theocracy, or let go, allowing boys and girls to study in the same classrooms and young Ramallah women to wear their jeans.

Following the initial shock, the main effort of Israel, Western governments and Egypt has been to contain the problem. Israel's acting prime minister, Ehud Olmert, and his foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, successfully lobbied the international community for presenting benchmarks to Hamas as preconditions for its acceptance. The three demands are disarming and renouncing violence, recognizing Israel's right to exist, and accepting all past Palestinian agreements with Israel, including the American-sponsored "road map" plan for Palestinian statehood. It remains unclear if Hamas would agree to change itself so dramatically, trading its ideology for international legitimacy and a de facto pardon for its past atrocities.

The P.A. election caught Israelis in the midst of their own campaign for the March 28 election. It has already become the most dramatic electoral campaign in the country's history, following the hospitalization of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who has remained unconscious since his Jan. 4 stroke. During his last months in office, Sharon revolutionized Israeli politics, first by pushing through the Gaza withdrawal, and later by leaving the ruling Likud Party and forming his new centrist party, Kadima. Sharon turned his back on his lifetime creations -- he had been the architect of both the settlements and Likud back in the 1970s -- and his sudden departure has left Israel with new borders and a new, untested political map. Kadima was initially seen as a fad, built around Sharon's immense popularity and lacking a coherent vision. Nevertheless, his successor Olmert has succeeded in maintaining the new party's considerable edge in the polls.

Olmert wanted to run a low-profile campaign, adhering to Sharon's legacy and taking few risks. The Hamas victory, however, presented him with a first leadership test. To avoid domestic criticism, he had to respond without appearing weak, while being careful not to overreact and offend the international community, which has been supportive of Israel since Sharon's Gaza pullout.

Predictably, Olmert's personal and political rival, Likud chairman Benjamin "Bibi" Netanyahu, was quick to exploit the upheaval on the other side. Warning that a "Hamastan," a terrorist satellite of Iran, had been created near Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Netanyahu revised his campaign strategy to paint Olmert and Kadima as foolishly exposing the country to terrorists. The new Likud posters scream "Strong Against Hamas" with Netanyahu's picture. The right-wing opposition blamed Olmert for the Hamas victory, because of his decision -- under American pressure -- to allow Palestinian voting in East Jerusalem, which Israel conquered in the 1967 war and considers its sovereign territory. Refusing the Jerusalem vote, argued the Likud, could have given Abbas an excuse to hold off the election.

Next page: For the first time, Israel will have to deal with the Arab public