Glenn Greenwald: I'm joined today by Dr. Gigi Gronvall, who's an immunologist with the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. She's also an assistant professor of medicine at the University of Pittsburgh, and the associate editor of the quarterly journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism. Thanks very much for joining me today.

Dr. Gigi Gronvall: Thank you very much.

Greenwald: Now, I want to begin by asking you about a Washington Post article this morning, which actually quotes the director of your Center, Tara O'Toole, as follows, and I'm first reading from the article:

Bioweapons experts said they were unimpressed by the government's description of the DNA link between the anthrax in the letters and spores in a flask in Ivins' lab.

"There is not enough scientific evidence to make an evaluation of the science the FBI used in this investigation," said Tara O'Toole, who heads the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh.

Do you agree with that assessment, and if you do can you talk about why?

Gronvall: In the documents that the FBI released, they basically made assertions about the conclusions of the science that they had done. But they didn't actually present it for analysis. So, it's hard to say whether or not the science, to evaluation the science when really none was put out there to evaluate. It was an assertion that they had made this link. But there was no data. I think that is what she was getting at.

There are a couple of issues. Even the way the science was done - I'm sure the science was done very well - but then it's the conclusions from what the data tells you and how that leads to assertions in the investigation. I think scientists would like to see the data, then they would know the uncertainties in the data, what other issues there are, and can the assertions that the FBI, do they rest on some solid data? Can they make those assertions based on the data they have?

Greenwald: So, given the current state of what it is that they released, is it fair to say that a scientist would be essentially incapable of assessing one way or the other whether the conclusions asserted by the FBI are in fact valid or subject to questions or criticisms or flaws in the reasoning?

Gronvall: Yeah, I think on a broad level - they didn't present anything so it's really hard to comment on it. You can develop a list of questions about it, but broadly, it's hard to poke holes at something that hasn't been offered.

Greenwald: Right. Now, one of their principal claims that's presented in conclusory fashion, is that there's a strain of anthrax that was sent in all of the letters, which is RMR-1029, that they say is identical to the strain of anthrax that was used in a particular flask under Dr. Ivins' control at Fort Detrick. Can you talk to whether it's possible, given the current state of science and molecular analysis, to pinpoint an anthrax strain, not just to a particular flask, but in a way that eliminates the possibility that that same strain exists in other places?

Gronvall: Right. This is a good example of what I'm trying to say. The way the science is done - I'm sure - it's amazing, right? This is something that couldn't have been done 10 years ago, where you could find out that exactly that strain is duplicated in different places. You just wouldn't have the complete knowledge that you could today. But what that doesn't tell you is, does that exact strain exist in other places they didn't check? What is the level of uncertainty? What are the other - without knowing what the mutations were in this RMR-1029 and without knowing what sort of expansive testing they did, of other strains, it's hard to say that this is it, this is the only one.

The science may have been done well, but how it was used - because science is basically a tool to help you answer these questions in this case. Is the assertion valid? Even if that flask, the anthrax in that flask matches what was in the letters, does that mean it doesn't also match a field somewhere in Texas? You have to show that data to both include other possible leads, and also exclude a whole bunch.

Greenwald: Right. Do you agree, at least based on what the FBI has thus far unveiled, that there's nothing in what they've disclosed that suggests how they've done that or even whether they've done that?

Gronvall: Right. Right. That is true.

Greenwald: I want to ask you a question specifically about anthrax, and perhaps it's beyond the ken of your expertise and maybe it isn't. But one of the things has been so striking from the beginning of the entire anthrax episode is that, although there's been some conflicting reports about what exactly the grade of anthrax that was sent, there's been a consensus, I think, that the anthrax that was sent, especially to Senators Daschle and Leahy, were dangerous and alarming, because they were prepared in such a way as to enable them to be airborne.

In fact, some of the scientists from the FBI and elsewhere have said that what was so alarming about it was that it was actually difficult to even examine it under the microscope, because it would essentially disperse so quickly. Now, regardless of whether it was weaponized, or aerosolized, or whatever the strain was, given the properties that have been described by virtually everybody who has examined this, is it possible that you could work with anthrax of the that type without having spores on your clothes, or in the immediate environment of wherever it is that you're working with the anthrax?

Gronvall: You know, there's so many what-if's here. Just to get to your first point, basically how was it prepared and was it weaponized, and if it was or wasn't, what was done to it, how dangerous, how floaty really was it. It's really hard to say without directly being in the investigation, and they didn't report any of that. Whether it would be possible to work with it if it was extremely volatile, extremely airborne and floaty as it's been described without getting it on you and on other things. They didn't present what they tested and if they found anything, although one would presume if they found something they would say so.

I think the bigger question at least from my perspective in the science policy realm, is how difficult was it to do. Did they reverse engineer this process? And learn what exactly did it take to make this anthrax, and was it difficult? Did it require special equipment? I don't really consider a lyophilizer to be special equipment. And this has really big implications for the threat of bioterrorism. Bruce Ivins did not have training in weapons labs back when the US was making biological weapons. He worked in research and if he was able to make a very very good weapon, then that has implications for how another person could pull off this kind of attack.

Greenwald: I just want to follow up on what you just alluded to with regards to research programs that used to exist in the United States for the production of actual biological weapons. One of the areas that I think has been new to a lot of people who have been looking into this anthrax matter, and I know it's been new to me, is actually how sprawling anthrax research is beyond just what takes place at Fort Detrick. There's the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah that's a US Army facility, and then there's a whole kind of private network of anthrax research that takes place at corporations that are fairly secretive like Battelle Laboratories and other places.

Gronvall: And then there's all the universities as well.

Greenwald: Right. So, can you talk about whether the type of anthrax that has been variously described - and I know there's some conflicts - what kind of the range of strain that has been described, that was, say, sent to Daschle and Leahy, which were considered the most dangerous. Whether there are other institutions both private and public, beyond Fort Detrick, capable of producing that kind of anthrax and whether there's research and other work undertaken there that would enable someone to have access to strains of that type?

Gronvall: That's kind of what I was trying, what the FBI, if they don't make public the details of how they think this anthrax was created, to make what into the envelopes, if they don't make that public - and you can imagine why they would not want to - I hope that they do brief people who should know about it, it really does have an implication for the threat. It's not just that anthrax is worked in all these companies here and laboratories here. Anthrax is found in laboratories all over the world. And it's more, even outside of the laboratories. This strain found its way into a laboratory because it killed a cow in Texas. You can find anthrax in the soil in the US and many, many other places. So, it's out there. It's a question now of how difficult was it and there's been a lot of conjecture about how difficult it was to create whatever the anthrax, whatever weaponization techniques, or none, went into those letters. It's an important question because if it turns out that it was easy, then that adds a lot more urgency on the other side - how you respond to an anthrax attack. This is pretty limited in scope, and it was still extremely dangerous. It's a vulnerability that we're not prepared to address.

Greenwald: Right.

Gronvall: I know a lot of people, at least a lot of people I've talked to, feel, why are we working on this at all if it was this easy to make or if it could be used as a weapon, why is it in all these places? The fact is it's everywhere, so if we don't do research on this, if we don't take measures to make ourselves prepared for an attack, it's not going to go away, the threat is not going to go away if we're not looking at it.

Greenwald: Well, just to follow up on that, to be a little more specific about what I have in mind. There's a now overlooked story by Judy Miller among other New York Times reporters which was published on September 4th, 2001, a week before the 9/11 attacks, which is why it ultimately ended up getting lost, that you're probably familiar with. But it grew out of her book on biological warfare. And what it reported was, and this is the first sentence, quote: "Over the past several years, the United States has embarked on a program of secret research on biological weapons that some of officials say test the limits of the global treaty banning such weapons."

And it goes on to describe that the Pentagon drew up plans to engineer genetically a more potent variant of the bacterium that causes anthrax and specifically lists Battelle and other places as a military contractor that has been selected to create the genetically altered anthrax. It just seems that we know so little about what this whole industry does, for reasons that you suggested earlier might be legitimate in terms of secrecy, but how far were we or are we skirting the limits of, or that line between research into vaccines and the manufacture of biological weapons, and how widespread is that research that kind of skirts that line?

Gronvall: Doing research on a vaccine does not have to cross any of those lines. But I think where it gets much more tricky and how it gets close to at least what I think Judy Miller was talking about, in the passage you mentioned, is the threat assessment piece. I think there's Project Bacchus that you're referring to, which was a project to see if there were any signatures involved in making the biological weapons. And a group of people made a simulate - so they weren't actually working with the anthrax, they were working with a sotillus, I think - and the conclusion was there wasn't any unconventional signature for a biological weapons facility, nothing they could pinpoint the way that you can pinpoint a nuclear weapons program. So, threat assessment is a very complicated problem that requires a lot of oversight and requires a lot of checks and balances. That is the mission, one of the missions of NBACC, National Biodefense Analysis & Countermeasures and then there's another 'C' in there somewhere (Transcriptionist's note: 'National Biodefense Analysis & Countermeasures Center') but this piece of making a vaccine does not have to be secret. And a lot of work is published openly now in making vaccines or diagnostics and so - I don't know how to answer your question but to say that it doesn't have to be thus.

Greenwald: Right. Well, I think, the bottom line is that a lot of people seem to be rushing to try and conclude that the FBI's case here is persuasive, and people can make their own assessments as to the circumstantial evidence, even though it's still a very one-sided presentation, since nobody has been able to see that either. But I think it's important to underscore that the scientific claims are nothing more than conclusions, and hopefully they'll be pressured to disclose the underlying data so that people like you can dig in to it and tell us how valid or persuasive those conclusions really are since it lies at the heart of the what FBI here is claiming.

So I want to really thank you for taking the time, it was really illuminating, and I appreciate your talking to me today.

Gronvall: Okay, thanks.

[Transcript courtesy of Thames Valley Transcribe]