Egyptian Protests

Newsreal: Finish the job? Not in our lifetime

The U.S. can't "go all the way" in Iraq because Saddam Hussein's neighbors need to keep him around.

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WASHINGTON – The deal that United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan struck with Saddam Hussein over the weekend may have diffused the Iraqi crisis, at least temporarily. but diplomats acknowledge it is probably only a matter of time before the world community is nose-to-nose again with the Iraqi strongman over yet another of his violations of international law.

What is not so readily acknowledged is that absent a cohesive American strategy, Middle Eastern leaders wouldn’t have it any other way.

The dirty little secret of the Iraqi crisis, whether it simmers at the United Nations or threatens to boil over into armed conflict, is that the Middle East, the region that would seemingly have the most to gain from Saddam’s quick dispatch, needs the petty tyrant.

Why? As long as Saddam remains in power, other leaders in the Middle East look good by comparison. For Syria’s President Hafez-al Assad, for example, the focus on Saddam means less attention paid to his own repressive policies. Neighboring Iran, these days regarded as the lesser of two evils, can rebuild its economy and its military undisturbed, secure in the knowledge that either the U.N. or the U.S. will periodically slap down the Islamic republic’s most fervent enemy so long as Saddam is around.

Even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu earns dividends. Most Israeli intelligence experts have concluded that Saddam no longer has the capability to rain scud missiles on the Jewish state, as he did during the Gulf War. but the memory of those attacks is very much alive in the Israeli mind. Netanyahu, ordering the distribution of gas masks to the general population during the recent crisis, artfully manipulated those memories to deflect attention away from the stalled Middle East peace talks, and he can be expected to utilize the Iraqi threat again if the pressure for concessions becomes too uncomfortable.

Then there are the Kissingerian “balance of power” considerations. Ever since World War I, the stability of the Persian Gulf has depended upon a balance between its two largest nations, Iraq and Iran. But unlike Iran, an ancient and homogeneous culture, modern Iraq is largely a creation of colonial British cartographers and encompasses three distinct regions: the Kurdish north, the Sunni Muslim center and the Shiite Muslim south. If the U.S. toppled Saddam, Iraq could fracture along those ethnic and religious lines, throwing the entire Middle East into turmoil.

Under this scenario, diplomats fear Iran, coming to the aid of its Shiite co-religionists, might grab the south, extending its influence up to the borders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia — a prospect that neither desert kingdom, not to mention the United States, relishes. In the north, the breakaway Iraqi Kurds would likely set their sights on a long-sought independent Kurdistan, which would include Kurdish areas of Syria, Iran and Turkey. To preempt such a development, all three countries might tear off chunks of northern Iraq to serve as buffers.

Even if Iraq were to hold together after Saddam’s fall, certain Middle eastern
countries
would not be happy at the prospect of new pro-Western regime in Baghdad.
Aligned with Jordan, which has a peace treaty with Israel, Iraq would
become part of a powerful new pro-Western bloc extending from the
Mediterranean to the frontiers of Persia. Not only would this new alliance
greatly upset Iran and Syria, it would also outweigh Iraq’s other
traditional rival, Egypt. For all these countries, Saddam’s survival is
an insurance policy against their own marginalization.

The third factor is oil. Ever since the United Nations embargo after the
Gulf War halted most Iraqi oil exports, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil
emirates have been pumping more — and earning more — to make up for the
shortfall. With a change of regime in Baghdad and the reintroduction of
Iraqi oil into the world market, supplies would increase and prices would
fall. For Saudi Arabia, which is $65 billion in debt, thanks to
overspending on arms and vast public works projects, this would be
especially disastrous. It could even lead to domestic unrest in this
feudally run kingdom. So Saddam serves another crucial purpose: He keeps
oil prices, and therefore various governments, stable.

All of these political realities can perhaps be summed up in one phrase:
The devil you know is preferable to the one you don’t. As bad as Saddam is
– and many Arab leaders say that he’s monstrous — the status quo in the
Middle East serves them well. Apart from Lebanon and Qatar, the last time
leadership changed hands in the Arab world was in 1981, when Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat was assassinated. That is why the region’s kings,
princes and presidents are so eager to end the crisis through diplomacy. A
familiar today with Saddam seems far better than an uncertain tomorrow
without him.

The question, of course, is whether that status quo is good enough for the
United States. The U.S. still must sign off on Annan’s deal, which
reportedly permits unrestricted U.N. arms inspections of previously closed
presidential sites. But what happens if diplomacy ultimately fails and
subsequent American air strikes fail to open Iraq to unfettered U.N. arms
inspections?
More air strikes? If ground troops are deployed, do they march all the way
to Baghdad this time, unaccompanied by any Arab allies? In which case, is
Washington ready for the regional fall-out?

Edward Djerijian, assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern affairs
during the Bush administration and one of the architects of U.S. policy
toward Iraq after the Gulf War, says The Clinton administration’s Iraq policy
suffers from major flaws.

The first is Clinton’s insistence on maintaining U.N. sanctions so long as
Saddam stays around. “Our strategic objective became unclear when the
Clinton administration indicated that even if Saddam complied with all U.N.
Security Council resolutions, the sanctions against Iraq would remain as
long as Saddam stayed in power,” says Djerijian, now director of the Baker
Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston. “That was
not the basis upon which the coalition was built. It allowed Saddam
to go to the Russians, the Chinese and others and say, ‘The Iraq people are
damned if I do and damned if I don’t.’”

The second is American failure to follow through on its commitments to
fellow anti-Iraq coalition members to push through the Middle East peace
process once the Gulf War was over. Specifically, Djerijian points to the
Clinton administration’s reluctance to take on Netanyahu, who is
perceived as bringing the peace process to a halt

“Right or wrong, the feeling in the Arab street is that the United States
is ready to bash the poor, suffering Iraq people again, but it’s not
willing to pull its weight in confronting Netanyahu. This has made Arab
leaders wary of supporting us,” Djerijian says. “We have to handle both
issues. We have to be ambidextrous.”

Finally, before any concerted action against Saddam can be contemplated,
the U.S. has to get firmly behind a political alternative to Saddam.
Djerijian says the Clinton administration essentially abandoned the Iraqi
opposition when it failed to resolve a power struggle between two Kurdish
leaders in U.S.-protected northern Iraq in 1996, prompting one to cut a
deal with Saddam and the other to turn to Iran. Sensing his chance,
Saddam reoccupied northern Iraq that summer, wiping out the Iraqi
opposition. “That shows we have not been serious about supporting the Iraqi
opposition, and we have to be,” Djerijian says.

But reestablishing a political alternative to Saddam will take a long
time, possibly years. In the meantime, the question that a veteran from Maine
posed to Defense Secretary William Cohen during the administration’s recent
town meeting in Ohio bears remembering. If the U.S. doesn’t go in and finish
the job this time, was it going to “come back and ask my grandson and some of
these other grandsons to put their lives on the line” again? The simple answer is yes. Until the United States can come up with a
better plan, containment offers the least disruptive of all possible worlds.

Jonathan Broder is Salon's Washington correspondent.

Paradise found

Tracy Johnston discovers the still unspoiled oasis of Siwa in the Egyptian desert.

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Now that I’m an adventure traveler who likes being pampered, I’ve come to appreciate the comfortable but eccentric remote-outpost hotel — a quiet place in some odd, forgotten backwater that’s classy enough to provide fresh fruit juice and clean sheets. The best hotels are small and built using native materials, and they have a common place for eavesdropping, a place for getting local news and gossip. The owners, often expats, should live on the premises, because who they are and how they run the place are part of the experience. I’m not interested in their cockamamie political ideas or their mysterious pasts, but getting to know them and their hotel is often the best way to learn about the exotic world in which they run a business.

I always try to find out how the hotel works: How does it fit into the community? What do the local people think of it? What are its biggest problems? The culture of the hotel may be a
hybrid, but it often has its own integrity and charm.

I found just such a hotel recently, and am moved to write about it because it also has a truly amazing setting: an ancient Egyptian city in an isolated desert oasis just a few miles from the border of Libya. The name of the hotel goes right over the top: the Siwa Safari Paradise Resort.

The owners are an upper-middle-class Egyptian couple who started coming to Siwa because they love the desert. Mustapha Abdal Azid is an elegant, passionate man — a retired diplomat and banana farmer who was part of the junta of young army officers who overthrew King Farouk. His wife, Zakia, is a creamy-skinned Scandinavian woman he met 35 years ago in Italy. They say they don’t quite know how the resort got started: It just grew from a plan to build a compound for their extended family. Mustapha says he got caught up in what Egyptians call “Umbrella Architecture” — drawing lines with the point of an umbrella in the sand. He demonstrates this by following, with a pointed finger, the sinuous path that winds through a group of bungalows. “You know why I kept going?” he says. “I figured out how to build this many cottages without cutting down a single tree.”

I’m tempted to say that the very best thing about the hotel is its delicious food and especially its desserts, but in truth it’s the setting — the oasis of Siwa’s extraordinary place in time. Siwa was an important center for both the ancient Greek and Egyptian worlds around 500 B.C. Later it was populated by a tribe of Berbers who migrated from the western Sahara and stayed isolated from the rest of the world for 13 centuries. And now its growing population of 23,000 people is about to make perhaps the most dramatic change: the transition to the modern world.

It won’t be long until Siwa’s history will have to be roped off and managed for tourists, but right now you can go to the Oracle of Amoun — where Alexander the Great came with an army of men and horses to find out if he was the son of Zeus — and stand amid a pile of stones and carvings just lying around in the sand. And unlike other tourist spots in Egypt, you can walk around town without being hassled for money. Siwans, who speak their own unique language, exist with foreigners peacefully. At the same time, traditions persist: Women in Siwa get married at age 14 and afterwards practice a form of Purdah so extreme that no man other than a relative may ever see them. Olive oil in Siwa is still made for export by crushing olives with a grinding stone turned by a donkey.

Last winter, my husband, step-daughter and I left Cairo for Siwa early in the morning (before rush hour) and drove north to the Mediterranean and then west along the coast, passing some of the world’s most beautiful beaches. We didn’t stop much because what had happened to those beaches was pretty depressing: Thousands and thousands of half-built, architecturally undistinguished vacation apartments and condos were lined up like Lego structures on the sand. We were happy to reach the turn-off to Siwa and even happier when all signs of human habitation stopped. We drove the last 200 miles across a desert that seemed to have no geographical features. Although we were within shouting distance of one of America’s prime bogeyman — Moammar Gadhafi — we cruised through a land of stillness and light in a peaceful, happy trance.

We saw the first signs of civilization in the glow of a sunset and, in the far distance, a mirage: a huge lake, or even an ocean, shimmering on the horizon. By the side of the road were a few treeless mud and concrete buildings. If this was Siwa, we said, where were the springs? The palm trees? Almost without warning, we came to a bustling town square, with men and children riding around in donkey carts. Overlooking the square was the ruin of a 12th century mud fortress; we had indeed traveled back in time.

Despite the exoticness of the setting, I had a feeling of dij` vu. The few
tourists in town were young backpackers looking as they did when I was among them
in the l960s: impossibly gorgeous and unkempt. There were some small, funky hotels
and a couple of outdoor restaurants with menus (beefburger, french fries, etc.)
written on fading signs. For backpackers, I learned, Siwa is an exotic place to
relax and stay warm in the winter, live cheaply in an ancient and fascinating
culture and — because Siwa’s spring water is absolutely pure — recover from
various illnesses.

In my 20s I would have preferred to stay in those $7-a-night hotels,
but now I was thrilled to find the Siwa Safari Paradise Resort just off the main
town square, down a dirt road lined with date palms. The resort was brand new and
deliciously empty, and featured a free-form, spring-fed swimming pool. A charming cottage
for two with a truly wonderful breakfast cost only $60 a night.

That night we gobbled down the fresh cucumbers, tomatoes, olives and cheese
we had been afraid to eat in the rest of Egypt, and then went into the garden to
play cards. There we found a group of Egyptian bureaucrats and businessmen in
suits and ties talking intently around a table. It didn’t take long to hear the
news: Within a year, the Egyptian government was going to open up a nearby
military airport to civilians. We were dismayed by the news, but at the same
time thankful that we had arrived in Siwa at the perfect moment in time.

For the next few days we rented bicycles from one of the cheap hotels in town
and headed off on journeys even further back in time. I am not a history buff,
but history in Siwa, as in all of Egypt, has a way of staring you in the face.
Greek, Egyptian, Bedouin and Berber artifacts and tales swirled around us in an exciting
stew. At the Oracle of Amoun, which was on a hill, we saw just how vast the place
was — over 23,000 people and 400,000 date and olive trees. The lake we’d seen
coming in turned out to be no mirage: It was a huge salt lake. Too huge. The
Egyptian government has a project in the works to get rid of Siwa’s rising
ground water by pumping it hundreds of miles away into something called the Quattar
Depression.

We stayed at the Oracle for a while, entranced by the mysteries that seem to
live in the very air of Egypt: Who is God? What
is our fate? And how perfect can the experience of eating a ripe tomato be? We
also found Siwa’s Mountain of the Dead, which had some tombs dating from the
Ptolemaic period (525-332 B.C.) and earlier. A guardian at the site showed us the
head (complete with hair) of a mummy.

Back at the hotel we learned that one of Mustapha and Zakia’s grown sons had come
home from a hospital in Alexandria, where he had gone after he had broken his arm in a
dune-buggy accident. Although we had figured out that non-Siwan Egyptians were outsiders in
Siwa much like ourselves, dozens of local people came by to offer Mustapha and
Zakia sympathy and help — some bringing not only food but money. We missed some
Siwa stories because of all the uproar, but Mustapha did find time to tell us a
few.

My favorite was about the Greek woman archaeologist named Liana Souvaltsis,
who spent many years excavating in Siwa, looking for Alexander’s burial site. It
seems to be an accepted fact that Alexander the Great wanted to be buried in Siwa,
but he was in Jerusalem when he died, and on the way back to Egypt his body was
kidnapped from its 2,000-member funeral procession. Some years ago, the
woman held a press conference in Siwa to announce that she had finally found
Alexander’s tomb. It was a huge discovery and there was much excitement in the
archaeological world, but then came the time for the second press conference in Cairo, where she
was going to reveal her proof. Souvaltsis never showed up.

We learned, too, that for the past
several years another unsuccessful archaeologist has been showing up, donating his
camels to the local people for a tasty barbecue. He is a German man who makes the
long trek from Luxor to Siwa each summer, crossing hundreds of miles of desert in
search of the remains of an army of 50,000 men. The men were sent to destroy
Siwa’s oracle by the king of Persia but were never heard from or seen again.

And we found out about one very intriguing local custom: Each October there is a three-day festival
during which Siwans must settle all of their past year’s disputes.

Mustapha also found time to talk to me about the problem of what was going to
happen to Siwa after the onslaught of tourism. “You tell me,” he said, “what
better way is there for the local people here to become economically independent?
Selfishly speaking, I’d like to see Siwans keep their culture intact — it’s good
for business. But how can you say that you hope people will remain poor and
uneducated? I think we just have to try to manage development. Keep it small
scale and in good taste.”

“But look at what’s happened to the north coast,” I said.

“I hate what’s happened to the whole north coast,” he agreed. “I just hate
it. I used to come to Marsa Matrouh (the closest town to Siwa, 190 miles
away) when it was the most beautiful place on earth — just some Bedouin tents and
a few fishermen on the white sand and that beautiful turquoise water. Now I don’t
even like to see what’s happened — I try to avoid looking at it whenever I drive
through.”

“So how can you want development?”

“Maybe one of the good international hotels will come. Maybe they can do it
right.”

“A Sheraton?”

“If Sheraton would build the right kind of hotel, why not? For years Siwa
has been dependent on aid. People cheered when Nassar came here in the l950s and
promised the people he’d build a road. Now we have electricity and even
television — the modern world has come in. We’re working with the local elders
here who want development; the young people want it too. There are only a very
few people in the middle who are resisting.”

On our last night in Siwa we heard some singing and drumming and I found out
that it was a “show” being put on at one of the backpacker hotels. I
tried to imagine a group of young Siwan men drumming and singing happily with the
laid-back young backpackers, but all I could think about was a refueling stopover
I once made on the island of Biak off the coast of Irian Jaya. It was 4 in the
morning and three men came into the airport waiting room dressed in grass skirts
and necklaces of bone. They walked over to a corner and started stomping their
feet and playing ukuleles. Out of embarrassment everyone eventually went over to
a duty-free shop and stared at the perfumes desultorily.

I’m rooting for Siwa, but still — go there as soon as you can.

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Tracy Johnston is the author of "Shooting the Boh."

Newsreal: Purveyor of catastrophe

Khomeini, Saddam, the killing of the Kurds, war after war in the Middle East -- all brought to you by the U.S. arms trade. Maybe it's time for Washington to rethink its policy.

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Even without America’s signature, the treaty to ban the use of land mines, signed in Ottawa on Wednesday, is a crowning achievement for a worldwide grass-roots group, the Nobel Peace prize-winning International Campaign to Ban land mines. However, the U.S. has said it will stop using land mines everywhere except in Korea, and will come up with a plan to replace land mines there by 2006. Many analysts expect that continuing moral pressure will ultimately force the U.S. to sign the treaty.

Could the same pressure from ordinary people be applied to a much larger threat to lives and peace — the continuing deployment of large weapons systems, mostly by the United States, and particularly in the Middle East? This is a question posed by John Tirman in his new book, “Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America’s Arms Trade” (Free Press).

Tirman is executive director of the Winston Foundation, a Washington organization that funds peace projects around the globe. He writes that the Middle East conflict is the direct result of U.S. arms sales to the region. He notes that such sales to Iran in the 1970s encouraged the Shah to view all internal problems “as nails that required a hammer” — an attitude that led to the Iranian revolution in 1979. Tirman argues that U.S. weapons sales to Israel, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have fostered similar mind-sets among their leaders, resulting in human rights abuses, corruption and policies that have undermined the very security that the weapons were meant to protect.

Salon spoke with Tirman about the continuing effect of U.S. arms sales in the post-Cold War world and what can be done to get Washington to change course.

You suggest that the chief reason Saddam Hussein is such an international menace is U.S. arms policies.

Our problems with Iraq today are the direct result of them. After the Shah of Iran’s fall in 1979, the United States, in a panic, began to sell weaponry to Iraq. It wasn’t much, although we gave Iraq military assistance in less direct ways. One was real-time military intelligence during its war with Iran; when warplanes were taking off from bases in Iran, Iraq would learn it immediately from U.S. satellites. Another was $5 billion in U.S. agricultural credits, which Iraq used to buy weapons. The third was political credibility, which the U.S. gave Iraq by taking it off the list of countries that support terrorism and then recognizing it diplomatically. All this made it easier for Iraq to buy weapons from various vendors. There were also covert shipments from the U.S. of dual-use items, like trucks, some helicopters and computers through Jordan. A company in Rockville, Md., sold Iraq biological weapons agents.

We repeated the same mistakes we had made earlier with Iran.

The Iranian revolution was, in my view, the result of the militarization of the Shah’s regime, the corruption, the diversion of resources, the pro-Western vassalage. All the things that can be described as part of the U.S. arms trade. Now we’re making the same mistake in countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. And that is something that you don’t read in the media coverage of the current crisis with Iraq. No one has gone back to look at the roots of this crisis. It’s as if history began on Aug. 2, 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. It didn’t.

Some would say the destabilization has been caused by America’s total support of Israel.

We should reexamine our arms sales to Israel. They have encouraged Israel to see all of its problems as security problems and not political problems that can have political solutions. I think we’ve done Israel a disservice by selling them so many weapons.

But why shouldn’t America arm its allies in the Middle East?

It’s wrong because there have been so many debacles associated with the policy. Iran and Iraq are the two biggest foreign policy disasters since Vietnam. Then there’s Turkey, which has become a human rights catastrophe in its treatment of the Kurds, and there’s Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are teetering on the brink of their own catastrophes. Then there’s Pakistan, where human rights abuses are uncontrolled, and Afghanistan, where the forces we supported against the Russians have returned the country to the 15th century. That, to me, is a failed policy.

Washington policy makers would say it was an attempt to achieve various balances of power in the region.

The policy was to find moderate pro-Western regimes and basically bribe them with weapons to do our bidding and protect our oil interests in the region. You can say that the policy aimed at a balance of power in the Persian Gulf, or that it aimed at “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran. But it’s essentially the same policy: We arm our friends in the region to help us protect our economic interests. And it just keeps backfiring.

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – -

How is the U.S. responsible for the Turkish oppression of the Kurds?

U.S. weapons sales encourage the Turkish leadership to see a solution only in
military terms. In southeast Turkey, entire villages are being destroyed and
huge numbers of people are being displaced. Refugees have
flooded the larger cities, where they can’t find work. As a consequence,
they’ve been marginalized. And who helps them? Nobody helps them except for
Rafah, the Islamic Party. They help them in the same way that the old
Democratic Party machine helped immigrants in the United States during the
19th century, building their loyalty for generations. In Turkey, it’s exactly
the same. Rafah’s well-organized social welfare policy has been able to
win the loyalty of the Kurds, who are now a major element in Turkey’s Islamic
revival.

Even as we patrol “no-fly zones” to protect the Kurds in Iraq against Saddam Hussein.

The relationship between Ankara and Washington is
first and foremost a military one. The U.S. saw Turkey as
part of the bulwark against the Soviet Union and now sees
it as a foothold in the Middle East. Everything the Turkish military has done
against the Kurds has been endorsed, either explicitly or implicitly, by the
U.S. government. As one defense official put it to me, “We need the
bases in Turkey more than we need the Kurds.” Basically that sums up the
situation there.

In the same way that we needed the Shah more than the Iranian people.

Right. The
weapons that we sold to the Shah weren’t used against the Soviet Union;
they were used for other purposes, including against his own people. It’s
the same general pattern that’s unraveling in Turkey. And the costs for Turkey
have been enormous. We’re talking about 28,000 dead, some 200,000 wounded and
2 million homeless in the southeast; millions of dollars wasted; an economy
in ruins; a staggering national debt and falling foreign investment. I’d call
that a catastrophe. And it could get worse. The Islamicists could rise
again, and there could be an ugly confrontation with the military and no way
of knowing what the outcome would be.

How about Saudi Arabia?

Saudi Arabia follows the same policy pattern: Find the moderate
Islamic regime to do our bidding, supply it with weapons and hold our
breath and hope for the best. We are now in the process of holding our
breath. In Saudi Arabia, there are human rights abuses, Islamic terrorism, a
lot of concern about the stability of the regime and who would come in if it
falls. It’s a real house of cards.

You think the regime is that shaky?

It’s very fragile. They’re deeply in debt. They’ve overspent on weapons. I don’t see how the House of Saud can
maintain itself like this indefinitely. If and when it goes down, it will go
down in a way that Washington will consider catastrophic. Either someone
will come to power that we don’t like, or there will be enormous disruption to
our oil supplies. Almost certainly, something bad will happen. The only thing
we don’t know is when.

Couldn’t the U.S. use its arms sales to bring about more enlightened policies in these countries?

This is one of the great fallacies — that we have to keep selling them
weapons to maintain our influence. Turkey, which was supposed to be one of the pillars of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq, has basically thumbed its nose at the policy.
They’re trading with Iran, and they want very much to resume trade with Iraq.
Turkey is one of the most outspoken proponents of lifting the oil embargo on
Iraq. It supported Saddam when he made his military incursion into
northern Iraq last year. In the current crisis with Iraq over the U.N.
weapons inspections, Turkey publicly stated that it does not support U.S.
military action. They want Saddam in power, and they want Saddam to have
control over the north. So what good has all our weapons largess done for
us so far? The answer is not very much. The same fallacy applies to Saudi
Arabia and our other allies in the Gulf. Remarkably, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
wanted no part of U.S. military action against Iraq. When you think about it,
when you think that Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia, that’s
astounding.

How would you change U.S. policy?

You start with establishing a moral international standard, a code of
conduct, for countries to whom you are going to sell weapons. There’s a proposed standard now in the United States and Europe which is a pretty good place to start.
It says you don’t sell weapons to non-democratic regimes or to
regimes that have exhibited a gross pattern of human rights abuses. Through
diplomacy and economic power, the U.S. would get other major weapons-selling
countries, especially Europe, to sign on to the standard.

That sounds wonderfully utopian. Is it realistic?

People always say it sounds utopian until you come up with counter-examples,
like the treaty to ban land mines. Only five years ago, such a treaty wasn’t
even on the map. Now we have a treaty, which has been signed by most of the countries of the world, including Europe.
How did that happen? Well, it happened because there was a moral
outcry. And even though the United States is not signing the treaty, we don’t
sell mines anymore, and we only use them in one arena — Korea. That’s a long way from where the United States was 10 years ago.

There’s no reason you can’t do this with other weapons. If, for example,
you implement a policy that says we won’t sell weapons to
Saudi Arabia, the Saudis will have to find other solutions for their security.
Maybe they will sign a defense pact with the United States. Or maybe they
will build a regional security arrangement with other neighboring countries.
Or maybe they will open up and become more democratic.

Our policy until now has been catastrophic. We have to change the fundamentals.
And one of those fundamentals is the arms trade. If you can change one piece
of this relationship, then all the other pieces — the question of oil
supplies, the Arab-Israeli conflict — all look a little easier to resolve.
It’s time to start somewhere.

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Jonathan Broder is Salon's Washington correspondent.

Newsreal: Shape of things to come

Neither the massacre at Luxor nor the confrontation between the U.S. and Iraq are the real stories in the Middle East. Overshadowing everything is the failing Arab-Israeli peace process and the failure of the Clinton administration to do anything about it.

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TANGIER, MOROCCO — | The massacre of 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians by Islamic fundamentalists in the ancient Egyptian city of Luxor was a sideshow. Tragic and gruesome — and perhaps a taste of bloodier things to come in Egypt — but in the increasingly unstable Middle East, a sideshow nonetheless.

The real action is taking place in the crowded slums and coffeehouses all over the Arab world and in the palaces and presidential offices of its disgruntled leaders. Amid a rising tide of anger and frustration, the region’s decision-makers are desperately trying to prevent the current confrontation between Iraq and the United States from destroying what little is left of the Middle East peace process.

And from here, the Clinton administration is being seen — even by its closest friends — as a muscle-bound naif, lacking the courage of its own often-stated political convictions to secure a true and lasting peace.

Arabs have not forgotten America’s pledge in 1991, after being helped by Arab allies to subdue a belligerent Iraq, to make an evenhanded effort toward an Arab-Israeli settlement. Here in Morocco, one of America’s oldest and closest allies in the region, that promise was symbolized by the 1994 Middle East Economic Summit in Casablanca, a gathering of Israeli and Arab leaders and business people that translated the hopeful rhetoric of regional peace and economic cooperation into something tangible.

Three years after the Casablanca summit, Arab expectations lie dashed. The only tangible result of the Gulf War victory seems to be the unrelieved suffering of the Iraqi people. No Arab leader trusts or supports Saddam Hussein, but a strong sense of Arab and Muslim solidarity compels them to side with their powerless Iraqi brethren. As a result, President Clinton’s bid for support for the use of military force to punish Saddam for his noncompliance with United Nations weapons inspectors is getting a very cool reception here. Even Kuwait, the victim of Saddam’s 1990 aggression, will not support the use of more U.S. force against Iraq.

Instead, Arabs are asking, where is the American president’s outrage over Israel’s dismal record of noncompliance in the Middle East peace accords? Ever since Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu assumed power in 1996, the U.S.-sponsored process has faltered and stalled, largely as a result of Israel’s continued construction of Jewish settlements, the wholesale demolition of Arab houses and other provocative acts. Netanyahu’s botched attempt to assassinate a Hamas political leader in Amman last month outraged Jordan’s moderate King Hussein, once Israel’s staunchest defender in the Arab world.

What has the Clinton administration done to protect its investment in Middle East peace, Arabs ask, other than to slap Israel with the mildest of rebukes? It should have come as no surprise to the White House that despite its best efforts only a smattering of low-level Arab officials attended this month’s Middle East Economic Summit in Qatar. Such regional gatherings, with all their attendant political symbolism, cannot be divorced from the glaring absence of any meaningful peace process, Arab officials say. To attend, they add, would have just given Netanyahu another concession he could pocket without offering anything in return.

Here in Morocco, the prevalence of such anger and frustration toward the United States is noteworthy. In 1777, before the outcome of the American Revolution was clear, Morocco became the first country in the world to recognize American independence, the foundation for the longest alliance with the United States in the entire Arab world. Before Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made his historic journey to Jerusalem in 1977, it was Morocco’s King Hassan who hosted the secret Israeli-Egyptian talks that made the visit possible. In addition to hosting the first Middle East economic summit, Hassan established low-level diplomatic relations with Israel and welcomed a permanent Israeli representative in Rabat. Other than the U.S. ambassador, no other foreign envoy enjoys such access to the Moroccan monarch.

The man who put together the Casablanca summit is Andre Azulay, Hassan’s top economic counselor, an elegantly tailored, French-speaking Morrocan Jew with close friends and family in Israel. “Today, I feel like all my work has been in vain,” he told Salon. “You can see the distance from where we were before, how everything has been broken and hurt. Today, because of Israel’s policies, there is no more momentum.” Azulay pauses, then adds: “We have special credentials in this matter. When we say that the peace process is in trouble, people have to listen to us.”

King Hassan places the blame for that lack of momentum squarely at Clinton’s feet. During a meeting last month in which U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross urged the king to send a delegation to the Qatar economic summit, Hassan angrily accused the Clinton administration of blithely standing by while Netanyahu was allowed to backslide on one commitment after another, and of violating Washington’s solemn promise to remain evenhanded.

“This is a guy who went out on a limb for peace long before any other Arab leader,” departing U.S. Ambassador Marc Ginsberg told Salon. “He can’t understand why the United States won’t protect its own investment in the region, why it’s letting Netanyahu change the rules of the game. This is a guy who doesn’t like the look of the limb anymore. It’s a limb where he can get shot.”

The same goes for other moderate Arab leaders who realize that the future depends on their ability to lift their people out of the crushing poverty that fuels Islamic extremism. How do they explain the lack of dividends from what is being seen in the coffeehouses and bazaars as a blatantly unfair peace process — a point the extremists are quick to exploit?

They are also looking with increasing scorn at Clinton’s apparent reluctance to get tougher with Netanyahu. According to a recent poll, more than 80 percent of American Jews support further Israeli withdrawals from the occupied West Bank land to further the peace process. Moreover, American Jews, 90 percent of whom belong to the Reform or Conservative denominations, are outraged over Netanyahu’s plans to support a proposed religious law that will effectively disenfranchise them in Israel. And when the chairman of the congressional appropriations committee warned Netanyahu’s government that the $3 billion of U.S. aid would be cut unless it handed over an American Jew suspected of a murder outside Washington, D.C., there was barely a peep of protest either in Congress or among American Jewish groups. So, goes the thinking here, isn’t it time for Clinton to take on an Israeli government that not only inspires contempt almost everywhere, but even speaks for less and less Jews?

A tougher U.S. posture toward Netanyahu would be greatly welcomed in the dispirited Arab world. There are risks: American Jews and Congress could circle the wagons (and hurt Al Gore’s chances in 2000). But after President Clinton’s constant reminders about the need for the Arabs to take risks for peace, he would be well-advised to take a few of his own. Lest the kind of sideshow seen this week in Luxor become the main event.

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Jonathan Broder is Salon's Washington correspondent.

Newsreal: Massacre in the desert

A former New York Times Cairo bureau chief describes the group behind the attack that killed over 60 people near Luxor, Egypt, and explains why they go after foreign tourists as a way of getting a radical Islamic state.

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Such a thing wasn’t supposed to happen in Egypt, not since the government insisted it had the country’s home-grown Islamic terrorist group under firm control. So how was it that gunmen had three hours to shoot down and kill at least 60 people (the numbers vary), most of them Japanese, French, German and Swiss tourists, in a temple courtyard in the desert near Luxor?

According to reports, the militant group known as Gama’a al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) claimed responsibility. The radical Muslim organization has killed more than 1,000 people since 1992 and has specifically targeted foreign tourists. According to government figures, released coincidentally on Monday, the country is expected to earn $3.7 billion this year from the more than 3.5 million people visiting the country.

Are we about to see more and even more violent terrorist attacks in Egypt, which has been a relative model of political stability in the Arab world? Salon spoke with Judith Miller, former Cairo bureau chief for the New York Times, and author of “God Has Ninety-Nine Names: Reporting From a Militant Middle East” (Touchstone, 1997).

Who is this group, the Gama’a al-Islamiya, which reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack, and what does it want?

They very much want what most of the militant Islamic groups want: They want power; they want Sharia (Islamic holy law) as the law of the land. They want an end to the peace treaty with Israel, they want an end to American aid, and to any American presence in the country. They want a “radical Islamic state,” like Sudan or Iran. It’s your standard Islamic militant movement.

Why attack foreign tourists? That alone won’t bring down the government, will it?

Tourism is one of Egypt’s biggest industries. Their thinking is, if they can bring tourism to its knees, that will make the poverty in the country more unbearable than it is, so the people will rise up against the state. This attack strikes at the heart of the system, no doubt about that.

The Egyptian government is reported to be “in shock” about the attack. Why?

Because the group had been pushed out of Cairo to the “periphery” of the country. But as you can see from this astonishing operation, they have deep roots, in the south, in Upper Egypt, or they wouldn’t have been able to pull anything like this off.

What does the group have “deep roots” in?

They are rooted in the kind of misery and poverty of the villages surrounding these great monuments, like at Luxor. The militants have always been strong in Upper Egypt, which is more tribal and just about every family has one member who has some kind of Islamist connection. It’s much harder for the police to root them out than in Cairo.

President Mubarak’s cabinet went into emergency session Monday night. How are they going to explain what happened?

Obviously, Gama’a al-Islamiya is not under control, like the government has claimed. But let’s be clear here. As terrible as this attack is, I don’t think we’re anywhere close to the situation in ’93 and ’94, when they were operating at will, blowing up cafe drinkers in Cairo. As terrible as this attack was, and I don’t mean to diminish it, it’s not a systemic problem, like the wave of terrorism that gripped the country in 1994. As far as we know, at this point, it’s a tragic, but isolated incident.

So we’re not looking at an Algerian situation here?

No. In Algeria, you have a kind of civil war. This is not a civil war in Egypt. Most Egyptians do not support this kind of terror. They are appalled by it. And much of their livelihood depends on tourism. In that sense, this was a counterproductive attack.

Don’t they have any support outside the south — in the military, or in schools?

We haven’t heard that they have support in the military. They did have tremendous support among teachers, but one of the things that Mubarak has been doing — quietly — is to go after Islamists within the school system. The government realized that they could be winning the battle against the armed group but losing the war if you have Islamic militants teaching your young people. About a third of Egypt’s children still go to school in a kind of religious separate school system where they get a much stronger dose of Islamic orthodoxy. That tends to be a problem.

The other, bigger Islamist group is the Muslim Brotherhood. How does it relate to Gama’a al-Islamiya?

Gama’a al-Islamiya is a spinoff group from the Muslim Brotherhood — which is the largest Islamist movement in the world. I am certain that the Brotherhood will condemn this action. They are not the same people who did it.

How influential is the Muslim Brotherhood?

They have to be very careful how they operate. They are not really permitted to function politically on their own; they have to ally themselves with other parties in order to gain a voice. But if there were a real, free election, the Muslim Brotherhood would do very, very well. Some people say they would even win.

Apart from stoking the fears of tourists, what effect could this attack have on foreign investment. Do the Japanese, for example, have significant holdings in Egypt?

Yes, especially in oil and gas. Amoco is bigger. But I don’t think foreign businesses will be especially shaken by this attack. I mean, Amoco has even gone into Algeria.

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Andrew Ross is Salon's executive vice president.

Carolyn Chute's Wicked Good Militia

The author of "The Beans of Egypt, Maine" is leading an army of grave, silent woodsmen in a backwoods campaign against corporate greed

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Well, at least one debate is finally settled: Carolyn Chute –
novelist, wry Earth Mother, accidental militia leader — has this election
year’s fiercest and funniest stump speech.

Pat Buchanan may want a “lock and load” foreign policy; Chute invites
her admirers to bring their guns back to her place to “plunk away at dog
food cans” and “smell the stink of sulfur.” Lamar Alexander may tinkle away
half-heartedly on upright pianos; Chute leads her gathered through a
vigorously subversive rendition of Woody Guthrie’s “This Land Is Your Land”
that includes stanzas such as “This land is Wal-Mart’s! … This land is
Exxon’s!” and that ruefully concludes: “This land weren’t made for you and
me.” Steve Forbes may peddle his flat tax; Chute is for flattening greedy
corporations, and she draws whoops and cheers with homely, old-fashioned
similes. “A corporation is like a bad chair,” she proclaims to the 100 or
so people who have packed a remote former schoolhouse in this rural Maine
town to hear her. “You sit on it, and if it pokes you in the ass, you throw
it away.”

Welcome to the spirited second meeting of Chute’s 2nd Maine Militia, a
loosely-organized and decidedly non-partisan group of pro-gun, anti-big
business citizens that just may give American politics a much-needed poke
in the ass.



Carolyn Chute, at age 49, isn’t running for anything, nor is her
“Wicked Good Militia,” as she likes to call it, backing any candidates. But
this shy, genial woman, dressed as usual in a frumpy skirt, mud boots and
bandana, seems committed to reminding voters that the real divide in
American politics isn’t Left vs. Right — it’s Up vs. Down. Chute likens
the grim American economic climate to a “burning house,” and worries that
too many people have quit trying to run rescue missions, instead standing
off to the side talking about tangential issues: “gay rights, guns, welfare
mums, and drugs.” Her brand of optimistic, let’s-band-together economic
populism neatly skirts Buchanan’s bigotry and exploitative fear, and takes
direct aim at the kind of class issues that make most politicians flee in
blind panic.

Chute’s ideas are clearly resonating in ingrown, isolated rural Maine,
where unemployment is high, where most have been left behind by the tech
revolution, and where logging companies, Chute says, “are threatening to
turn the land into a moonscape.” When you mix in Chute’s innate sense of
theater — meetings begin with a bang on a tin trash can lid, the hall is
strewn with placards and signs listing the sins of various CEOs, and her
stern, bearded, rifle-bearing husband Michael greets visitors at the door
wearing a tricornered patriot’s hat — the militia’s hardscrabble appeal is
just about undeniable.

Those who’ve come to hear her, on this recent Sunday, run the
ideological gamut from bespectacled former union organizers to stooped,
demure local janitors. But as she speaks, Chute pointedly keeps one eye on
a gaggle of big, beefy, unkempt men loitering by the door — men who seem
to have sprung up directly from her now-classic first novel, a vivid
chronicle of rural poverty titled “The Beans of Egypt, Maine.” (“If it
runs, a Bean will shoot it,” Chute wrote of these brawling backwoods men.
“If it falls, a Bean will eat it.”)

“I know some of you people here are shy,” she says, glancing over at
the would-be Beans. They’re what Chute likes to think of as her core
constituency — round, spikily-bearded men who’ve emerged from the
surrounding woods and trailer parks, dressed in so many grimy layers of
clothing that they seem almost like black denim artichokes. “We want shy
people in this militia. We want you to show up when we confront
politicians, and to bring your grave silence along with you. Grave silence
is far more powerful than the same old voices yapping away.”

The men nod and stare back at her, suddenly graver and silenter than
ever.

Scaring Off Yuppies

Carolyn Chute clearly doesn’t mind, as militia member and Maine
journalist Catherine Sengel puts it, “scaring off yuppies.” In fact, Sengel
feels that Chute’s focus on guns serves a pair of distinct purposes –
beyond the fact that Chute’s husband loves backyard target practice. “It
keeps away the same old tired bohemian intelligentsia types,” she says.
“And it attracts the Mainers she really wants. Up here, the disenfranchised
are generally the people with guns.”

Chute puts it another way. “It’s a constitutional and a cultural
issue,” she says, in an interview shortly before the meeting. “People
around here have guns, both for hunting and to protect themselves. And
frankly, we don’t want the government to have guns and not us. We don’t
want the government to have anything we don’t have, because government
isn’t We The People anymore. And guns won’t go away, anymore than abortion
ever has, or marijuana.”

Coming from anyone else — Pat Buchanan, let’s say — such a
pro-buckshot posture would seem coolly cynical. But little about Chute or
her life seems in any way calculated; she has lived the kind of grinding
poverty she writes about in her three earthy and plainspoken novels, “The
Beans of Egypt, Maine” (1985), “Letourneau’s Used Auto Parts” (1988) and
“Merry Men” (1994).

A high school dropout at age 16, Chute married
almost immediately and
gave birth to her first child, a daughter. The marriage ended in divorce;
Chute survived with her daughter by working a long series of dead-end jobs
– including plucking chickens, driving a school bus, and working on a
potato farm, rarely making more than $2,000 a year. It was only after marrying her current husband, an illiterate jack-of-all-trades named
Michael Chute, in 1978, that she completed high school at night and began
taking classes at the University of Maine. She began writing stories while
attending a writing workshop there, and eventually had fiction published in
magazines like “Grand Street” and “Ploughshares” before beginning work on
“The Beans of Egypt, Maine.” “This book was involuntarily researched,” she
said in an interview at the time. “I have lived poverty. I didn’t choose
it. No one would choose humiliation, pain, and rage.”

Over the years, Chute has poured that humiliation, pain and rage into
her fiction. But she has retained a peppery political streak, dashing off
heated Op-Ed pieces to New England newspapers, and (famously) teaching one
of her dogs to growl at the mention of the name Reagan.

These days, she says, she’s rather be working on her fourth novel,
which she has partially completed, than talking politics. But for now, the
militia is taking nearly all of her time. “I’ve spent $1,000 on all this
photocopying and whatnot, and I’m broke,” she says. “But it’s worth it.
There is no candidate out there who is addressing these issues, and who
isn’t taking corporate gifts, who isn’t owned,” she says. “Voting isn’t
enough anymore. We can only vote for the clowns that are put up there. I
don’t expect anything to change soon — we’re talking about the kind of
revolution that will take place over decades, not in the next election.”

It doesn’t help the militia speed things up, some members grumble,
that Chute doesn’t own a telephone, and that people are forced to write or
drive out to her house to contact her. “Not having a phone is her defense
mechanism,” Sengel says. “She’s too kind. If she has a phone, she’ll talk
for an hour to whomever calls.”

The Big Green Paper Nipple

Thus far, the 2nd Maine Militia’s official membership totals only a
few dozen, and it isn’t clear, beyond a few scheduled rallies and meetings,
where exactly its energies will be directed.

Watching Chute in action, however, you quickly come to understand why
she has touched a chord in so many Mainers, including a 61-year-old local
boiler operator named Carl Adams from nearby Buxton. “It’s good to see
people finally getting together and standing up for something,” Adams says.
“It’s time to talk about some new, different ideas. This woman has the kind
of spirit we really need.”

Watching from the back row with Adams, Chute’s message comes off as a
funky mixture of homespun humor and more serious economic analysis. One
minute she plays to the crowd, suggesting that everyone pry themselves off
the “big green paper nipple” and drawing laughs with riffs on how products
are getting progressively worse. “Everything’s getting cheesier,” she says,
laughing. “I just bought a new snow shovel, and it broke! I admit it was a
heavy snow day, but what’s going on? It was probably made in Hawaii.” In
the next, however, she’s quoting economist Milton Friedman (“A corporation
cannot be ethical; its only responsibility is to turn a profit”) and
bashing Labor Secretary Robert Reich.

Chute passes around a copy of a New York Times Op-Ed piece by Reich,
in which he advocates giving corporations incentives to be socially
responsible. Chute has penciled the word “Yikes” in the margins. “These
corporations don’t need incentives,” she says. “What we need to do is throw
their corporate charters in the trash. People will get the idea, and you
know the shareholders will.”

Chute’s politics have attracted the attention of — and have been
influenced by — the ideas of the well-known Maine union organizer Peter
Kellman, who heads the Maine Chapter of the Program on Corporations, Law
and Democracy, as well as the group’s national leader, Rich Grossman. All
three carry a fervent populist vision, and are fond of quoting Thomas Paine
citizen’s lament: “Beneath the shade of our own vines we are attacked; in
our own house, and on our own lands, is the violence committed against us.”

In the end, however, it’s clear that Chute idiosyncratic views are no
one’s but her own. The 2nd Maine Militia’s “first document” lists some of
her bedrock objectives, including: extending the right of free speech and
assembly to work sites and shopping malls; banning lobbyists from the
political process; banning paid political ads in favor of requiring the
electronic media to devote air time to candidates; limiting campaign
contributions to $100 per citizen; and limiting the number of newspapers or
magazines that can be owned by any single person or corporation to one.

The militia document also criticizes at length the Supreme Court’s
ruling, in the 1886 Santa Clara case, that corporations could be granted
various rights that citizens have, including free speech protections.
Corporations “now dominate the public and private life of our society,” the
fiery document reads, “defining the economic, cultural and political agenda
for humans and all other living things.”

Chute’s distinct brand of non-partisan populism fits in well with New
England’s persistent independent streak. Maine has the country’s only
independent governor in Angus King, and nearby Vermont has the country’s
only independent/socialist congressman in maverick Bernie Sanders. Like
Sanders, Chute has an earthy appeal — it’s populism with a very human
face.

A Lonely, Scary Road

The militia meeting is winding down, and outside the day has turned
blustery, and smoky clouds alternate with moments of what Chute has
described, in “The Beans of Egypt, Maine,” as “birdless airplaneless
sunless cloudless leafless sky … warm steaming blue.”

Inside, Chute is steaming as well. “Do you ever feel amazed when
people tell you it’s not as bad here as in other countries?” she asks,
pulling back a strand of her wispy brown hair from her eyes. “You want to
ask: Where have they been? Certainly not in Maine.”

But her message is, as always, ultimately consoling. “We need to stay
together, to spread the truth like religion,” she says. “It’s a lonely,
scary road, and we’ve got to walk it together.”

Over by the door, the largest of the grave, silent woodsmen looks up
and says, quietly, “Amen.”

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Dwight Garner is Salon's book review editor.

Page 46 of 46 in Egyptian Protests