Egyptian Protests
Newsreal: Finish the job? Not in our lifetime
The U.S. can't "go all the way" in Iraq because Saddam Hussein's neighbors need to keep him around.
WASHINGTON – The deal that United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan struck with Saddam Hussein over the weekend may have diffused the Iraqi crisis, at least temporarily. but diplomats acknowledge it is probably only a matter of time before the world community is nose-to-nose again with the Iraqi strongman over yet another of his violations of international law.
What is not so readily acknowledged is that absent a cohesive American strategy, Middle Eastern leaders wouldn’t have it any other way.
The dirty little secret of the Iraqi crisis, whether it simmers at the United Nations or threatens to boil over into armed conflict, is that the Middle East, the region that would seemingly have the most to gain from Saddam’s quick dispatch, needs the petty tyrant.
Why? As long as Saddam remains in power, other leaders in the Middle East look good by comparison. For Syria’s President Hafez-al Assad, for example, the focus on Saddam means less attention paid to his own repressive policies. Neighboring Iran, these days regarded as the lesser of two evils, can rebuild its economy and its military undisturbed, secure in the knowledge that either the U.N. or the U.S. will periodically slap down the Islamic republic’s most fervent enemy so long as Saddam is around.
Even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu earns dividends. Most Israeli intelligence experts have concluded that Saddam no longer has the capability to rain scud missiles on the Jewish state, as he did during the Gulf War. but the memory of those attacks is very much alive in the Israeli mind. Netanyahu, ordering the distribution of gas masks to the general population during the recent crisis, artfully manipulated those memories to deflect attention away from the stalled Middle East peace talks, and he can be expected to utilize the Iraqi threat again if the pressure for concessions becomes too uncomfortable.
Then there are the Kissingerian “balance of power” considerations. Ever since World War I, the stability of the Persian Gulf has depended upon a balance between its two largest nations, Iraq and Iran. But unlike Iran, an ancient and homogeneous culture, modern Iraq is largely a creation of colonial British cartographers and encompasses three distinct regions: the Kurdish north, the Sunni Muslim center and the Shiite Muslim south. If the U.S. toppled Saddam, Iraq could fracture along those ethnic and religious lines, throwing the entire Middle East into turmoil.
Under this scenario, diplomats fear Iran, coming to the aid of its Shiite co-religionists, might grab the south, extending its influence up to the borders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia — a prospect that neither desert kingdom, not to mention the United States, relishes. In the north, the breakaway Iraqi Kurds would likely set their sights on a long-sought independent Kurdistan, which would include Kurdish areas of Syria, Iran and Turkey. To preempt such a development, all three countries might tear off chunks of northern Iraq to serve as buffers.
Even if Iraq were to hold together after Saddam’s fall, certain Middle eastern
countries
would not be happy at the prospect of new pro-Western regime in Baghdad.
Aligned with Jordan, which has a peace treaty with Israel, Iraq would
become part of a powerful new pro-Western bloc extending from the
Mediterranean to the frontiers of Persia. Not only would this new alliance
greatly upset Iran and Syria, it would also outweigh Iraq’s other
traditional rival, Egypt. For all these countries, Saddam’s survival is
an insurance policy against their own marginalization.
The third factor is oil. Ever since the United Nations embargo after the
Gulf War halted most Iraqi oil exports, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil
emirates have been pumping more — and earning more — to make up for the
shortfall. With a change of regime in Baghdad and the reintroduction of
Iraqi oil into the world market, supplies would increase and prices would
fall. For Saudi Arabia, which is $65 billion in debt, thanks to
overspending on arms and vast public works projects, this would be
especially disastrous. It could even lead to domestic unrest in this
feudally run kingdom. So Saddam serves another crucial purpose: He keeps
oil prices, and therefore various governments, stable.
All of these political realities can perhaps be summed up in one phrase:
The devil you know is preferable to the one you don’t. As bad as Saddam is
– and many Arab leaders say that he’s monstrous — the status quo in the
Middle East serves them well. Apart from Lebanon and Qatar, the last time
leadership changed hands in the Arab world was in 1981, when Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat was assassinated. That is why the region’s kings,
princes and presidents are so eager to end the crisis through diplomacy. A
familiar today with Saddam seems far better than an uncertain tomorrow
without him.
The question, of course, is whether that status quo is good enough for the
United States. The U.S. still must sign off on Annan’s deal, which
reportedly permits unrestricted U.N. arms inspections of previously closed
presidential sites. But what happens if diplomacy ultimately fails and
subsequent American air strikes fail to open Iraq to unfettered U.N. arms
inspections?
More air strikes? If ground troops are deployed, do they march all the way
to Baghdad this time, unaccompanied by any Arab allies? In which case, is
Washington ready for the regional fall-out?
Edward Djerijian, assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern affairs
during the Bush administration and one of the architects of U.S. policy
toward Iraq after the Gulf War, says The Clinton administration’s Iraq policy
suffers from major flaws.
The first is Clinton’s insistence on maintaining U.N. sanctions so long as
Saddam stays around. “Our strategic objective became unclear when the
Clinton administration indicated that even if Saddam complied with all U.N.
Security Council resolutions, the sanctions against Iraq would remain as
long as Saddam stayed in power,” says Djerijian, now director of the Baker
Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston. “That was
not the basis upon which the coalition was built. It allowed Saddam
to go to the Russians, the Chinese and others and say, ‘The Iraq people are
damned if I do and damned if I don’t.’”
The second is American failure to follow through on its commitments to
fellow anti-Iraq coalition members to push through the Middle East peace
process once the Gulf War was over. Specifically, Djerijian points to the
Clinton administration’s reluctance to take on Netanyahu, who is
perceived as bringing the peace process to a halt
“Right or wrong, the feeling in the Arab street is that the United States
is ready to bash the poor, suffering Iraq people again, but it’s not
willing to pull its weight in confronting Netanyahu. This has made Arab
leaders wary of supporting us,” Djerijian says. “We have to handle both
issues. We have to be ambidextrous.”
Finally, before any concerted action against Saddam can be contemplated,
the U.S. has to get firmly behind a political alternative to Saddam.
Djerijian says the Clinton administration essentially abandoned the Iraqi
opposition when it failed to resolve a power struggle between two Kurdish
leaders in U.S.-protected northern Iraq in 1996, prompting one to cut a
deal with Saddam and the other to turn to Iran. Sensing his chance,
Saddam reoccupied northern Iraq that summer, wiping out the Iraqi
opposition. “That shows we have not been serious about supporting the Iraqi
opposition, and we have to be,” Djerijian says.
But reestablishing a political alternative to Saddam will take a long
time, possibly years. In the meantime, the question that a veteran from Maine
posed to Defense Secretary William Cohen during the administration’s recent
town meeting in Ohio bears remembering. If the U.S. doesn’t go in and finish
the job this time, was it going to “come back and ask my grandson and some of
these other grandsons to put their lives on the line” again? The simple answer is yes. Until the United States can come up with a
better plan, containment offers the least disruptive of all possible worlds.
Jonathan Broder is Salon's Washington correspondent. More Jonathan Broder.
Paradise found
Tracy Johnston discovers the still unspoiled oasis of Siwa in the Egyptian desert.
Now that I’m an adventure traveler who likes being pampered, I’ve come to appreciate the comfortable but eccentric remote-outpost hotel — a quiet place in some odd, forgotten backwater that’s classy enough to provide fresh fruit juice and clean sheets. The best hotels are small and built using native materials, and they have a common place for eavesdropping, a place for getting local news and gossip. The owners, often expats, should live on the premises, because who they are and how they run the place are part of the experience. I’m not interested in their cockamamie political ideas or their mysterious pasts, but getting to know them and their hotel is often the best way to learn about the exotic world in which they run a business.
Continue Reading CloseTracy Johnston is the author of "Shooting the Boh." More Tracy Johnston.
Newsreal: Purveyor of catastrophe
Khomeini, Saddam, the killing of the Kurds, war after war in the Middle East -- all brought to you by the U.S. arms trade. Maybe it's time for Washington to rethink its policy.
Even without America’s signature, the treaty to ban the use of land mines, signed in Ottawa on Wednesday, is a crowning achievement for a worldwide grass-roots group, the Nobel Peace prize-winning International Campaign to Ban land mines. However, the U.S. has said it will stop using land mines everywhere except in Korea, and will come up with a plan to replace land mines there by 2006. Many analysts expect that continuing moral pressure will ultimately force the U.S. to sign the treaty.
Continue Reading CloseJonathan Broder is Salon's Washington correspondent. More Jonathan Broder.
Newsreal: Shape of things to come
Neither the massacre at Luxor nor the confrontation between the U.S. and Iraq are the real stories in the Middle East. Overshadowing everything is the failing Arab-Israeli peace process and the failure of the Clinton administration to do anything about it.
TANGIER, MOROCCO — | The massacre of 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians by Islamic fundamentalists in the ancient Egyptian city of Luxor was a sideshow. Tragic and gruesome — and perhaps a taste of bloodier things to come in Egypt — but in the increasingly unstable Middle East, a sideshow nonetheless.
The real action is taking place in the crowded slums and coffeehouses all over the Arab world and in the palaces and presidential offices of its disgruntled leaders. Amid a rising tide of anger and frustration, the region’s decision-makers are desperately trying to prevent the current confrontation between Iraq and the United States from destroying what little is left of the Middle East peace process.
Continue Reading CloseJonathan Broder is Salon's Washington correspondent. More Jonathan Broder.
Newsreal: Massacre in the desert
A former New York Times Cairo bureau chief describes the group behind the attack that killed over 60 people near Luxor, Egypt, and explains why they go after foreign tourists as a way of getting a radical Islamic state.
Such a thing wasn’t supposed to happen in Egypt, not since the government insisted it had the country’s home-grown Islamic terrorist group under firm control. So how was it that gunmen had three hours to shoot down and kill at least 60 people (the numbers vary), most of them Japanese, French, German and Swiss tourists, in a temple courtyard in the desert near Luxor?
According to reports, the militant group known as Gama’a al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) claimed responsibility. The radical Muslim organization has killed more than 1,000 people since 1992 and has specifically targeted foreign tourists. According to government figures, released coincidentally on Monday, the country is expected to earn $3.7 billion this year from the more than 3.5 million people visiting the country.
Continue Reading CloseAndrew Ross is Salon's executive vice president. More Andrew Ross.
Carolyn Chute's Wicked Good Militia
The author of "The Beans of Egypt, Maine" is leading an army of grave, silent woodsmen in a backwoods campaign against corporate greed
Well, at least one debate is finally settled: Carolyn Chute –
novelist, wry Earth Mother, accidental militia leader — has this election
year’s fiercest and funniest stump speech.
Pat Buchanan may want a “lock and load” foreign policy; Chute invites
her admirers to bring their guns back to her place to “plunk away at dog
food cans” and “smell the stink of sulfur.” Lamar Alexander may tinkle away
half-heartedly on upright pianos; Chute leads her gathered through a
vigorously subversive rendition of Woody Guthrie’s “This Land Is Your Land”
that includes stanzas such as “This land is Wal-Mart’s! … This land is
Exxon’s!” and that ruefully concludes: “This land weren’t made for you and
me.” Steve Forbes may peddle his flat tax; Chute is for flattening greedy
corporations, and she draws whoops and cheers with homely, old-fashioned
similes. “A corporation is like a bad chair,” she proclaims to the 100 or
so people who have packed a remote former schoolhouse in this rural Maine
town to hear her. “You sit on it, and if it pokes you in the ass, you throw
it away.”
Dwight Garner is Salon's book review editor. More Dwight Garner.
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