FISA

Bush: Trust me on spying

Revealing the program was "shameful," Bush says, and talking about it only helps the enemy.

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In a press conference from the White House this morning — his third live televised event in three days — George W. Bush tried to defend his decision to engage in warrantless spying on Americans citizens, all the while condemning those government officials who exposed the controversial program to public view in the first place.

Bush said it was a “shameful act” for anyone to reveal that he had authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on telephone calls without warrants, and he said he assumed that the Justice Department was taking the steps necessary to begin an investigation into leaks of classified information. At the same time, he suggested that he would oppose any congressional investigation into the spying program itself. “The fact that we’re discussing this program is helping the enemy,” Bush said.

The president didn’t explain — the president can’t explain — why. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allows the executive branch to monitor telephone calls and other electronic communications so long as it obtains a warrant for doing so. If al-Qaida is paying as much attention as Bush suggests, it already knew that much, and it has “adjusted” — Bush’s term — to that knowledge accordingly. What Bush’s program for spying did was remove the warrant requirement FISA imposes. How does that change anything for al-Qaida? How would terrorists communicate differently if they knew that the National Security Agency might be monitoring them without a warrant instead of with one? There’s no good answer to that question, and Bush didn’t give one.

Bush also failed to explain, at least in any way that made sense, why he needed to evade FISA’s requirements. Bush said repeatedly that the war on terror is a new kind of war that requires fast action by the United States. “This is a different era, a different war, it’s a war where people are changing phone numbers and phone calls, and they’re moving quick,” he said. “We’ve got to be able to prevent and detect. It requires quick action.”

But the FISA process was designed for quick action. And indeed, FISA allows the executive branch to begin monitoring communications immediately and then seek a warrant after the fact. How isn’t that “fast” or “quick” or “agile” enough? Bush couldn’t say. Instead, he suggested again and again that the FISA process is for “long-term monitoring” and that, after the attacks of 9/11, he saw the need to “detect.” He never explained what he meant by that or how the FISA process couldn’t be used both to “monitor” and to “detect.”

It wasn’t at all clear that he knew. And if he knew, he certainly wasn’t saying. Bush said he wouldn’t get into details about the secret spying program because doing so would help al-Qaida. Americans would simply have to trust him, he said, trust that he’s doing everything he can to protect them from attack while respecting their civil liberties.

Tim Grieve is a senior writer and the author of Salon's War Room blog.

Spying on Americans: Did Bush break the law?

"Even in a time of war, you have to follow the process."

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The New York Times reported Friday that, in 2002, George W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency to begin monitoring — without warrants — telephone calls and e-mail messages originating in the United States. After an initial dodge, the president has now admitted as much.

Two questions follow. Did the president break the law? And why did he do what he did? The answer to the first question seems self-evident. The answer to the second does not.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 sets out the rules for monitoring electronic communications. Those rules are clear. Except during the first 15 days after a declaration of war by Congress, the executive branch cannot monitor electronic communications that originate in the United States without obtaining a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

Members of the Bush administration may have thought FISA’s warrant requirement foolish or even “quaint” in the days after 9/11. They may have thought — as they apparently did — that the warrant requirement represented a constitutionally impermissible limit on the president’s power as commander in chief. There were ways to address such concerns. The administration could have gone to Congress to ask that FISA’s warrant requirement be amended. Or the administration could have gone to the courts to ask that the warrant requirement be overturned.

It did neither. The administration simply ignored the other branches of government and took it upon itself to do what it wanted to do. It violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. And in the process, it obliterated the notion of separated powers built into the U.S. Constitution. As Sen. Lindsey Graham, a Republican, said over the weekend: “Even in a time of war, you have to follow the process, because that is what a democracy is all about: a process.” Graham said he couldn’t think of any legal justification for making an end run on FISA. Another Republican, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter, proclaimed Bush’s actions “wrong, clearly and categorically wrong.”

Specter said his committee will hold hearings on the spying program early next year, and that the legality of the president’s actions is a matter that will need to be “examined.” As we said at the outset, there’s another question to examine: Why did Bush do it?

In his weekly radio address Saturday, the president said that monitoring electronic communications is “a vital tool in our war against the terrorists” and “critical to saving American lives.” We don’t doubt that, and neither did Congress in 1978: In adopting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, it gave the executive branch the power to engage in electronic surveillance. What the president hasn’t explained so far is why the FISA process isn’t good enough. And indeed, it is hard to see how it isn’t.

Maybe the president thought it was too hard to get warrants from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. But as Josh Marshall notes, it wasn’t hard: In more than 25 years, the court has rejected a tiny handful of the thousands upon thousands of warrants the executive branch has requested. So maybe the president thought it took too long to get warrants from the court. But as Knight Ridder notes, the FISA allows the executive branch to begin eavesdropping immediately so long as it seeks a warrant from the court within 72 hours afterward.

So what did the president think? Why did he think he needed to go around the rules set forth by Congress in order to achieve the objective of keeping Americans safe? It’s hard to come up with an answer to that question. And in fact, it doesn’t matter. If the procedures set forth in FISA weren’t good enough for this administration, there were ways to change them. Ignoring them — and in the process, the courts, Congress and the Constitution — wasn’t one of them.

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Tim Grieve is a senior writer and the author of Salon's War Room blog.

Senate report: FBI still unprepared

A bipartisan report says the agency is still too cautious in dealing with terror suspects -- and has promoted the agents who bungled the Moussaoui case.

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Whether we’re talking about a nightclub sound manager warning that pyrotechnic displays might cause a concert to turn into a disaster, a NASA safety engineer expressing concern that the Space Shuttle Columbia might break apart two days before it blew up, or two former senators trying to get the president to pay attention to their January 2001 report on a pending terrorist attack, you might think by now we would pay a little more heed to alarms sounded by expert sources.

But a recent warning alarm about the continued ineptitude of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, sounded by a bipartisan group of senators last week, went almost entirely unheard. The questions raised were grave, focusing not only on what the FBI did wrong before 9/11, but also on the fact that those same mistakes, systemic problems and incompetent FBI executives continue to plague the bureau, leaving the country vulnerable to another terrorist attack.

“There is a real question as to whether the FBI is capable of carrying out counterintelligence to protect the citizens of the United States,” Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Penn., said, acknowledging “anger and frustration” in his tone. “Sept. 11 might well have been prevented” had the FBI done its job properly, he said. “What are they doing now to prevent another 9/11?”

Specter was one of three senators on the Judiciary Committee who, on Tuesday, Feb. 25, at the Senate Radio/TV Gallery, said that the FBI still didn’t have its house in order, almost a year and a half after Sept. 11. Sen. Charles Grassley of Iowa and Specter — the No. 2 and No. 3 ranking Republicans on the Judiciary Committee — and Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, the ranking Democrat, issued an interim report.

Its chief criticism: that FBI officials as high-ranking as the director were ignorant of the surveillance law, and were still applying a too-stringent standard for those FBI agents seeking warrants to watch individuals under suspicion.

They also proposed legislation to ensure greater congressional oversight of the FBI’s surveillance powers.

Disconcertingly, FBI sources contacted by Salon backed the report. “It’s an important report,” the FBI’s Minneapolis bureau chief, whistleblower Coleen Rowley, told Salon. “Unfortunately, it’s not getting as much attention as it deserves.” The FBI still needs “to address its inherent endemic problems,” says Time Magazine’s 2002 Person of the Year. And as the Senate report indicates, much of that improvement has yet to take place.

“They’re right on point,” seconds former FBI special agent John Vincent, who retired last December after 27 years in the bureau and who reviewed the interim report for Salon. “Everything they said was correct.”

A very early draft of the report was leaked to the New York Times last August, at a time when only Specter was involved. A less comprehensive version, the report didn’t directly criticize FBI director Robert Mueller III, name specific FBI brass allegedly at fault, or specifically address how the FBI was misunderstanding the applicable surveillance law. This report does. Though all members of the Judiciary Committee were invited to participate in the drafting the report, only Grassley and Leahy did so. The committee chairman, Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, issued a letter protesting the report’s findings.

Referring to an FBI field report from Phoenix about suspicious individuals taking flight training courses, and the stymied Minneapolis investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui, Specter said that “it was evident that had this trail been followed, along with other evidence, that the tragedy of Sept. 11 might well have been avoided.” After all, Specter said, the warrant that Rowley sought to search Moussaoui’s computer — which was not granted until after the terrorist attacks — would have revealed “a veritable blueprint” for the events of that horrible Tuesday morning.

The three senators charged key members of the law enforcement organization with negligence, incompetence and ignorance. “I hate to say this,” Leahy said, “but we found that the FBI is ill-equipped” to conduct surveillance on those in the United States possibly plotting terrorist acts on behalf of foreign powers. The senators’ complaints focused around implementation of warrants under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Passed in 1978 to prevent Communist espionage, and expanded in the USA PATRIOT Act to prevent further terrorist attacks, FISA allows the government to conduct surveillance on foreign nationals and U.S. citizens acting as foreign agents.

The senators said FBI brass in Washington, D.C., imposed too harsh an evidence standard before applying for FISA warrants.

In the past, the senators said, a FISA application usually needed to show a reasonable basis to believe that an individual is engaged in criminal conduct. But the FBI for years has been acting as if the standard is a higher one, requiring “probable cause,” meaning that it is more likely than not that the person will engage in some malfeasance. Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., chairman of the Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence, clearly agrees with the three senators on this matter. A few months ago, Shelby said that Justice Department attorneys used “a hyperrestrictive and legally unnecessary approach to FISA applications.”

The Justice Department immediately dismissed the report as being “old news,” inaccurate, unfair, unofficial and the views of a minority on the committee.

“The Justice Department has fully addressed the FISA problems that occurred almost entirely prior to this administration,” Justice Department spokeswoman Barbara Comstock said, referring to 75 error-filled FISA warrants filed in 2000 and 2001 — a matter that was only a small part of the report’s focus. (For this story, the FBI referred questions to the Department of Justice, which referred a reporter to Comstock’s written statement.)

In rejecting the senators’ report, Comstock also quoted Judge Royce Lamberth, the former presiding judge of the FISA court, in support of her claim that all was well at the Justice Department. Lamberth said, “We consistently find the [FISA] applications ‘well-scrubbed’ by the attorney general and his staff before they are presented to us,” and that “the process is working. It is working in part because the attorney general is conscientiously doing his job, as is his staff.”

But many in law enforcement view Lamberth as being too cautious in his views of what surveillance is permitted under FISA — precisely the mind-set that has made FBI brass in Washington, D.C., so uncooperative and unwilling to help agents in the field, intelligence sources say. Citing Lamberth as supportive of the FBI’s current view of FISA would be like citing Mark McGwire in support of Major League Baseball’s policy on performance-enhancing dietary supplements.

Because of all these problems, the three senators proposed the Domestic Surveillance Oversight Act of 2003, requiring that every act of surveillance be reported to the House and Senate Judiciary committees. All three senators expressed concern that the Justice Department and FBI had not been responsive or cooperative with their oversight inquiries. “The FBI and the Justice Department seem to make it an adversarial process,” Grassley said.

Since the bill would mandate public accounting of the broad details — though not specifics — of the number of individuals subjected to surveillance under FISA and the number of times FISA information is used for law enforcement purposes, civil libertarians applauded it.

“There’s a lot of concern in this country that, especially with the USA PATRIOT Act, FISA has become a massive tool for secret surveillance,” Timothy H. Edgar, legislative counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, told Salon. “One way to assuage those concerns — or show that they’re true — is to have more reporting.” While the secret nature of foreign surveillance may be understandable, Edgar says that “certainly some basic information about how many people are under surveillance or what rules are used to issue a FISA warrant wouldn’t be national security issues.”

The ACLU’s support of the bill is curious, however, in that Specter, Grassley and Leahy spent so much time talking about the FBI enforcing too high a standard for granting warrants. Is that something the ACLU would support? “It depends,” Edgar says. “If it’s bureaucratic intransigence, we’re not for that.” Edgar also sees such problems as ultimately eroding civil liberties since “if the government is not using the powers it has effectively against persons suspected of terrorism, that encourages the Congress to grant it more authority.”

Rowley agrees that “greater oversight is needed.”

“And obviously, right now, we’re not only in a climate of terrorism but we’re adding onto it a war,” she told Salon. “So all of these issues, if anything, have grown, so the need for oversight has grown as well.”

On Tuesday, senators said that during their “what went wrong?” hearings last summer, it was clear that key FBI attorneys and Mueller still didn’t know the correct standard — that they were still thinking the burden of evidence is higher than the law provides, still maintaining a too-harsh standard before they would attempt to obtain a FISA warrant.

This is even more troubling since the Justice Department and FBI headquarters developed an attitude of priding themselves on never having a FISA warrant application rejected by the FISA court, as if overcautiousness was a badge of honor. This has been apparent at least since Attorney General Janet Reno appointed a review team to look at FBI bungling of the Wen Ho Lee case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Randy Bellows concluded that the Justice Department and FBI had been too conservative when applying for FISA warrants in the Lee case. Bellows called their record of only having had one FISA application rejected “unseemly” and “proof of error rather than proof of excellence.”

Numerous expert sources told Salon that the problem began during the administration of President Clinton under Attorney General Janet Reno, but that it still exists. “The FBI doesn’t need the broad powers given to us in the PATRIOT Act,” former agent Vincent says. All they need is for the FBI executives back in Washington to apply the actual law. “They always applied too high a standard.”

Specter seemed perhaps most chagrined at the fact that even though “director Mueller did not appear to know the [FISA] standard” in a June 6, 2002, hearing, when FBI attorneys were questioned in a closed hearing more than a month later, on July 10, they too remained misinformed. Not one of these had even heard of Illinois vs. Gates, the relevant 1983 Supreme Court decision about that matter.

The interim report also indicates that last June, Mueller indicated that from then on he wanted to be informed every time a request for a FISA warrant was denied. The weekend after that declaration, however, “the FBI lawyer whom it most directly affected claimed to know nothing about the new ‘policy’ beyond what he had read in the newspaper.”

When Mueller is next called before the Senate, “He’s going to have a lot of questions to answer,” Specter promised.

The senators didn’t express much confidence that anything had changed since last summer. A Sept. 13 memo FBI brass wrote to clarify the FISA standard for all agents was, Specter said, “virtually unintelligible.” The curmudgeonly former district attorney of Philadelphia said that he feared that this misunderstanding of FISA law had meant a delay in the arrest of Sami al-Arian. Al-Arian is the former University of Southern Florida computer sciences professor accused two weeks ago of conspiracy to murder more than 100 Israelis and Americans in suicide attacks as leader of the terrorist organization Palestinian Islamic Jihad. “I wonder how many files there are like al-Arian’s?” he asked.

In her famous May 21, 2002, memo to Mueller, Rowley faulted a number of higher-ups at the FBI headquarters in Washington with obstructing her ability to get a FISA warrant to search Moussaoui’s computer. Their job “was to assist and coordinate with field division agents on terrorism investigations and the obtaining and use of FISA searches,” Rowley wrote, but instead they decided to “throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis’ by-now desperate efforts to obtain a FISA search warrant.”

“This is not theoretical criticism,” Specter said, citing Rowley’s experience. Rowley felt that the threshold for a FISA warrant had been more than met as soon as the “French Intelligence Service confirmed his affiliations with radical fundamentalist Islamic groups and activities connected to Osama Bin Laden,” she wrote in her memo. Moreover, unbeknownst to Rowley, three weeks earlier FBI headquarters had received the so-called July 10, 2001, Phoenix memo from FBI agent Kenneth Williams, which noted that bin Laden supporters had been “attending civil aviation universities/colleges in Arizona.”

Some have argued that the FBI was merely complying with FISA law. “Under FISA, you’re supposed to show that a person is either working for a foreign government or a terrorist group. The French just said he was a radical fundamentalist,” Ronald Kessler, author of “The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI,” told Salon last May. The National Security Law Unit of the FBI told Rowley that Moussaoui had to be a member of a “recognized” international terrorist organization in order to meet FISA requirements.

But the senators argue that the statute in no way requires that the terrorist group be an identified and State Department-recognized organization. All that is needed to qualify as “a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore,” the senators argue in their report, is that there is a substantial chance that Moussaoui was planning a terrorist attack with a “group,” meaning at least two people total.

But using the latter, faulty, standard, the FBI brass, led by Marion “Spike” Bowman, chief of the National Security Law Unit, ruled that there wasn’t enough “probable cause” to justify a FISA warrant. That changed, of course, on the morning of Sept. 11, illustrating that — as Rowley wrote in her memo — “the missing piece of probable cause was only the FBI’s (FBIHQ’s) failure to appreciate that such an event could occur. The probable cause did not otherwise improve or change.”

Incredibly, in Des Moines, Iowa, on Jan. 10, Mueller awarded Bowman with a presidential citation and cash bonus of approximately 25 percent of his salary.

“The lesson at the FBI still is if you mess up, do something wrong, you get promoted, you get an award,” Grassley said Tuesday.

Former agent Vincent agrees. “I think that says it all,” Vincent tells Salon about the Bowman citation. He goes on to tell about a recent inspection at the FBI’s Chicago field office, where Vincent served until his December retirement, where an assistant special agent in charge received a poor rating. Not long afterward, that ASAC was promoted and became a special charge in a different city. “That’s how the FBI works now,” Vincent says.

Grassley agrees. “I can’t think of a single person being held accountable anywhere in government for what went on and what went wrong prior to Sept. 11,” he said. “It seems that nobody in government makes any mistakes anymore.” At the press conference he cited as examples not only Bowman, “who got a big award and a cash bonus,” but five others:

1. Supervisory special agent Michael Maltbie, who not only concluded there wasn’t enough information to go forward with Rowley’s FISA application, but removed certain information from her request before presenting it to the National Security Law Unit. Maltbie “got a transfer to Cleveland” where he’ll be a field supervisor, Grassley said.

2. David Frasca, head of the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit, to whom the Phoenix memo was addressed, though he didn’t see it until after Sept. 11. Frasca is “still at headquarters,” Grassley said.

3. Van Harp and Charles Matthews, whom Grassley described as two of the “senior FBI officers who committed misconduct then lied about it and covered up” matters related to the Ruby Ridge fiasco.

4. And Robert Jordan, the assistant director of the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility, whom Grassley called “petty” and whom the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General accused of having given “a clear impression of retaliation” against unit chief John Roberts, who was critical of the FBI on CBS’s “60 Minutes.”

In broad terms, many of these same complaints were raised in a report issued last December by Shelby. “The pattern of dysfunction compels us to consider radical reform at the FBI,” Shelby wrote.

But little seems to have changed since then. Former agent Vincent is pessimistic about the possibilities of solving the bureau’s problems. “Is it possible for the FBI to change its culture? No,” he said. “Somewhere along the line everything got flipped around.”

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Jake Tapper is national correspondent for Salon.

Big Brother’s big win

This week's closed-door ruling by a secretive court will give the feds unprecedented domestic spying powers, a constitutional expert says.

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Big Brother's big win

Attorney General John Ashcroft scored a major legal victory on Monday when a secret appeals court ruled that his Justice Department can spy on Americans — by wiretapping, searching their homes and reading their e-mail, among other measures — without first obtaining a warrant showing probable cause for criminal activity. The decision emboldens the government’s war on terror at home but also raises fresh concerns about privacy and due process.

Ashcroft immediately praised the decision, saying it “revolutionizes our ability to investigate terrorists and prosecute terrorist acts.” He also quickly designated a new FBI unit that will pursue intelligence warrants allowed under the new law. But civil libertarians and defense attorneys warned the ruling will allow the government to freely spy on its citizens, with little or no oversight. “The problem is it applies an across-the-board, presumptive secrecy,” says David Cole, a professor of constitutional law at the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington. In an interview Monday, Cole examined the ruling; described the unique, little-known court at its center; and warned that by lowering the standards needed to spy on citizens, it may prove to be a historic erosion of Fourth Amendment protections.

Since 1978, the government has been able to go to a special closed court for permission to spy on a target even without demonstrating probable cause that the person is breaking a law. Permission has been granted only if the primary goal of the investigation is to gather foreign intelligence, not to prosecute people. Under a new provision included in the USA PATRIOT Act and upheld Monday, American citizens targeted in criminal terrorism investigations can now be wiretapped without the government’s having to show probable cause.

The ruling brings to light, at least temporarily, the secretive workings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, court. Created in 1978, the court comprises a rotating panel of 10 judges appointed by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. Judges meet every two weeks in a soundproofed room in an undisclosed location to rule on the government’s applications. The court’s rulings are always secret and the people targeted never know that the court has approved the investigations. FISA warrants do not have to meet the higher standards of probable cause needed for federal warrants in criminal cases. Only once, out of nearly 10,000 requests, has the FISA court rejected an application.

That seemingly cozy relationship was strained two years ago, though, when the government admitted to 75 instances in which errors were made when it sought FISA applications in connection with terrorist investigations. In May of this year, citing that “alarming number of instances” of having been misled, the FISA judges unanimously rejected the Justice Department’s attempt to broaden FISA’s reach under the PATRIOT Act to allow law enforcement to obtain FISA surveillance warrants for criminal — not intelligence-gathering — investigations.

Ashcroft’s Justice Department then petitioned the FISA appeals court, which, because the FISA court usually grants the government whatever it wants, had never before been activated. On Monday that three-judge panel ruled in Ashcroft’s favor, clearing the way for criminal prosecutors to use broad new authority in battling the war on terrorism.

Cole, who also serves as an attorney with the progressive Center for Constitutional Rights, detailed on Tuesday how the ruling might permanently erode the constitutional provisions that protect Americans against unreasonable searches and seizures.

How significant was this ruling?

It’s significant because it holds that the government can conduct secret searches and electronic wiretapping of U.S. persons without probable cause of criminal activity. The bottom line of the Fourth Amendment protection is that before the government can intrude upon your privacy by searching your home or your backpack, or wiretap your phone, it must have probable cause to believe you’re engaged in criminal activity.

When FISA was created, probable cause was no longer needed in those cases, correct?

Right. The kind of quid pro quo was, we recognize that in creating areas like foreign intelligence gathering, the government has a legitimate interest in tapping people’s phones and searching people’s homes; that’s counterintelligence. Therefore we will authorize the government to engage in those types of searches without probable cause. But only where the principal purpose of the investigation is foreign intelligence gathering and not criminal prosecution. Once it became a criminal investigation, [prosecutors] could still get wiretaps, but they had to go through the constitutionally mandated system.

If the government wants to wiretap somebody for foreign intelligence purposes, and as they monitor the information they realize it could lead to criminal prosecutions, the continued wiretap would have to be sanctioned by a criminal warrant?

Yes, and that point it could be sanctioned, because prosecutors would have developed probable cause that criminal activity is going on.

But now, if the government wants to gather foreign intelligence and they see they have a lot of information that could lead to criminal protection, they can just maintain it under FISA?

Yes.

Or they could launch the investigation under FISA?

Right. And that’s more likely. I think what the lower FISA court was concerned about was that Congress [through the PATRIOT Act] was creating a route that law enforcement could tap people’s phones and conduct searches without showing probable cause of a crime. So the court wanted to make sure that route does not become an end run around the Fourth Amendment. And so initially the way you did that was to say the primary purpose of the investigation has to be foreign intelligence. And once the primary purpose becomes criminal, you have to go the criminal route.

But Congress changed that?

Right. What they did in the PATRIOT Act was say, no, that’s no longer required. What the lower court said in May was there’s still a legitimate concern of criminal investigations using FISA as an end run around the constitutional requirement. Therefore we don’t want U.S. attorneys engaged in criminal investigations to be running and directing FISA wiretaps.

But the ruling on Monday, didn’t it essentially say to the lower FISA court, you may not like the PATRIOT Act, but it is what it is?

Right, and that it’s not appropriate for the lower court to be directing how law enforcement agencies structure themselves.

So it said that the FISA court overstepped its bounds?

Right.

Even though that lower court decision was signed off by all 10 FISA judges?

Correct. What’s interesting is that it was signed off on by all the judges who have been involved in the nitty-gritty work of authorizing and overseeing FISA.

And they’re the ones who’ve had the 75 misleading applications brought before them?

The irony is that the lower FISA court had never, or only once, turned down a FISA application in its 20-some-odd years. In other words, the government never had any reason to appeal because it won approval every time it went to the FISA court. What the lower court decision in May suggested was they were concerned about some of the abuses that had crept into the system, and that led them to try to rein in the use of this authority. They in turn get overturned by three judges who have never before dealt with FISAs and who have never overseen a single FISA wiretap and who were constituted this one time for this one appeal and will probably never come together again.

Was this ruling a surprise?

I think the May ruling was a surprise. The fact that judges would in any way question or reject the government’s assertion of authority, particularly after Sept. 11, was the surprise. But it’s hardly surprising now that three Reagan-appointed conservative federal appellate judges have given the government what it wanted in the first place.

Can this decision be appealed?

That’s a good question. There’s no party on the other side. The government is the only party in this case because the statute only provides for the government to have the right to an appeal [with FISA]. Ordinarily you have a party on the other side and the losing party gets to appeal. Here, the losing party is the American public at large, and they have no have particular standing before the court.

You think this is the final word?

It’s very likely to be the final word.

Won’t other courts have a chance to rule on it?

If the government uses FISA warrants in criminal investigations, defendants will be able to argue that it’s impermissible.

What would be their argument?

In all criminal cases, warrant applications at least initially are one-sided. The government goes in and presents an affidavit to a judge. But what’s different is, once the search is conducted under an ordinary search warrant or wiretap, the person is told: “Your house has been searched.” That person can then challenge the constitutionality of the search. He can get access to the affidavits that supported the search. Then the court looks at the affidavit and asks if there was sufficient information to justify the warrant and it’s litigated.

In the FISA context, by contrast, most people who are subjects of FISA searches never learn that they were subjected to a FISA search.

But they will if their case becomes a criminal prosecution now?

They will, but they still get no access to the warrant application. So when the FBI goes in on a criminal investigation for a warrant, they know at some point down the road their statements are going to be tested by a lawyer for the defendant who’s going to be questioning the legitimacy. But now with FISA they never have to be questioned.

Theoretically, in a criminal case based on a FISA warrant, would the judge ever see the FISA warrant?

The judge would see it, but not the defense attorney and not the defendant, which is completely new to the criminal court.

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Eric Boehlert, a former senior writer for Salon, is the author of "Lapdogs: How the Press Rolled Over for Bush."

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