Qaeda officials who are killed by drones will be replaced. The group’s structure will survive and it will still be able to inspire, finance and train individuals and teams to kill Americans. Drone strikes hinder Qaeda fighters while they move and hide, but they can endure the attacks and continue to function.

Moreover, as the drone campaign wears on, hatred of America is increasing in Pakistan. American officials may praise the precision of the drone attacks. But in Pakistan, news media accounts of heavy civilian casualties are widely believed. Our reliance on high-tech strikes that pose no risk to our soldiers is bitterly resented in a country that cannot duplicate such feats of warfare without cost to its own troops.

Though he obviously knows the answer, Blair does not say whether this widespread Pakistani perception about civilian casualties is based in fact; if anything, he insinuates that this “belief” is grounded in the much-discussed affection which Pakistanis allegedly harbor for fabricated anti-American conspiracy theories.  While the Pakistani perception is significant unto itself regardless of whether it’s accurate — the belief about drones is what fuels anti-American hatred — it’s nonetheless bizarre to mount an anti-drone argument while relegating the impact of civilian deaths to mere “belief,” all while avoiding informing readers what the actual reality is.  Discussions of the innocent victims of American military violence is one of the great taboos in establishment circles; that Blair goes so far out of his way to avoid discussing it highlights how potent that taboo is.

Last month, I interviewed Chris Woods of the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which had just published a report conclusively documenting the falsity of John Brennan’s public claim that “in the last year, ‘there hasn’t been a single collateral death‘” from U.S. drone attacks.  Last week, the Bureau published an even more detailed report focusing on the number of Pakistani children killed by American drone attacks:

The Bureau has identified credible reports of 168 children killed in seven years of CIA drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas. These children would account for 44% of the minimum figure of 385 civilians reported killed by the attacks. . . .

The highest number of child deaths occurred during the Bush presidency, with 112 children reportedly killed. More than a third of all Bush drone strikes appear to have resulted in the deaths of children. . . . President Obama, too, has been as Commander-in-Chief responsible for many child deaths in Pakistan. The Bureau has identified 56 children reported killed in drone strikes during his presidency . . . .

The report indicates that the number of Pakistani children dying from drone attacks has decreased substantially over the past several months — since September, 2010, when one man’s son, two daughters and nephew were all killed by a single U.S. strike — but such deaths nonetheless continue (including one in April of this year, in which a 12-year-old boy, Atif, was killed).  These facts make John Brennan’s blatant lie particularly disgusting: it’s one thing to kill children using remote-controlled weaponized air robots in a country in which we’re not formally at war, but it’s another thing entirely to stand up in public and deny that it is happening.

In several ways, the Bureau’s study significantly understates the extent of U.S.-caused civilian deaths in the region.  As Woods told me, the Bureau uses such a rigorous methodology — counting civilian deaths only when they can be definitively confirmed up to and including the victims’ names — that some deaths almost certainly go uncounted in the notoriously inaccessible Waziristan region.  Other credible reports provide an even starker assessment of the number of innocents killed.  Moreover, this latest report from the Bureau counts only child deaths, not those of innocent adult men and women in Pakistan, nor does it discuss the large number of civilian deaths from drones outside of Pakistan (Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), nor the U.S.-caused deaths of civilians from means other than drones (such as the “amazing number” of innocents killed at checkpoints in Afghanistan).

Adm. Blair’s Op-Ed may have had a much greater impact had it included a discussion of these facts, rather than implying that the problem with American drone attacks is Pakistani paranoia.  That’s precisely why the Op-Ed — like most discussions in establishment venues of this topic — didn’t include those facts.  

* * * * * 

Thanks so much to Yves Smith, Maz Hussain, and Mark Adomanis for providing such stimulating and enlightening discussions during my absence last week.  Filling in for a writer is not easy, as I learned when I did it for Digby way back in early 2006, very soon after I began writing about politics.  You try to maintain your own voice and focus while realizing that you’re writing for someone else’s readership with its own pre-existing set of interests and expectations.  All three did a superb job of balancing those considerations and it made my week off more enjoyable knowing that excellent content was being provided.  You can continue reading Yves at her Naked Capitalism blog, Maz on his blog and on Twitter, and Mark on his Forbes blog and on Twitter.

Pakistani father Din Mohammad had the misfortune to live next door to militants in Danda Darpakhel, North Waziristan. His neighbours were reportedly part of the Haqqani Network, a group fighting US forces in nearby Afghanistan.

On September 8 2010, the CIA’s Reaper drones paid a visit. Hellfire missiles tore into the compound killing six alleged militants.

One of the Hellfires missed its target, and Din Mohammad’s house was hit. He survived. But his son, his two daughters and his nephew all died. His eldest boy had been a student at a Waziristan military cadet college. The other three children were all below school age.

An Obama administration official told ABC that these numbers are “way off the mark” — but, tellingly, did so on the condition of anonymity, meaning he or she will be protected from any accountability.

Meanwhile, the New York Times’ Scott Shane has an important article reviewing the same issue and in particular Obama counterterrorism adviser John Brennan’s claim in June that for the previous year CIA drone strikes hadn’t caused “a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities we’ve been able to develop.” Shane finds that basically every outside observer — including those of all ideological stripes — finds this claim to be preposterous:

Others who question the C.I.A. claim include strong supporters of the drone program like Bill Roggio, editor of The Long War Journal, who closely tracks the strikes.

“The Taliban don’t go to a military base to build bombs or do training,” Mr. Roggio said. “There are families and neighbors around. I believe the people conducting the strikes work hard to reduce civilian casualties. They could be 20 percent. They could be 5 percent. But I think the C.I.A.’s claim of zero civilian casualties in a year is absurd.”

Brennan issued a new statement to the Times suggesting that the CIA has merely “not found credible evidence of collateral deaths” from the drone strikes:

“Fortunately, for more than a year, due to our discretion and precision, the U.S. government has not found credible evidence of collateral deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan or Iraq, and we will continue to do our best to keep it that way,” Mr. Brennan said.

Given that the drones are operated remotely, it’s far from clear how the CIA even knows who is being killed in many of these strikes.

A resurgent Taliban and the return of a radical Islamic regime in Kabul could create a new safe haven for anti-Indian terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba — the Pakistan-based terrorist organization responsible for the November 2008 attacks on Mumbai.

Some analysts fear that even as Islamabad works to bring the Taliban on board for a peace deal in Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership may help broker a settlement between Pakistan and various domestic terrorist groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban, uniting the various jihadi organizations to focus on India, according to Indiana University professor Sumit Ganguly.

Realistically, the United States won’t cut and run in 2014, but it will reduce its presence and convert its counterinsurgency operations into “counterterrorism plus,” says Christine Fair, a professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies.

The recent move to freeze $800 billion in military aid to Pakistan is probably as much a signal to Congress that the State Department knows what it’s doing than an indicator of any real plans to change horses midstream.

But let’s play what if.

Despite concerns about China’s rising influence in the region, losing Pakistan — an unlikely, if not impossibly bold maneuver — could be the most profitable move Washington has made in the War on Terror since Sept. 11. And India could benefit even more than the United States.

The conventional wisdom in New Delhi is that China uses Pakistan as a tool to thwart India’s rise as a regional power, while Beijing sees the growing strategic partnership between India and the United States as part of a broader effort to prevent China from developing interests any further afield.

But even though there is more than a little truth in those perceptions, the United States may have an opportunity to create a paradigm shift in the politics of the region with a change in the way it views Pakistan — paradoxically gaining influence by ceding power.

For 50 years, America has endeavored to create a strong, democratic ally in Pakistan by doling out billions of dollars in economic and military aid, only to watch with horror as it emerged as one of the most virulently anti-American countries in the world and a covert sponsor of terror, Lawrence Wright argued convincingly in a recent issue of the New Yorker.

Because aid flows through the military establishment and the Inter-services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), it seems, American cash has empowered a shadowy regime of spooks and soldiers at the expense of the legitimate civilian government. But that’s not the only compelling case for turning off the tap now, as Islamabad attempts to extort a dominant role for Pakistan in post-war Afghanistan.

Washington could save billions of dollars a year and stick Beijing with the bill at a single stroke, even as it alleviates Chinese fears of containment or encirclement by granting it equal responsibility for guaranteeing security in its own backyard.

More importantly, granting China that responsibility would likely compel Beijing to take a leadership role in managing and reforming Pakistan, rather than stirring up trouble with the confidence that the U.S. is riding herd. It would also address a simple reality: China already exerts more influence over Pakistan than the United States.

“I don’t think the Americans have done enough to reach out to China,” said Fair. “I don’t think they’ve done enough to reach out to Saudi Arabia. They have a lot more influence than we do.”

Moreover, paranoid fears aside, Beijing has repeatedly shown it has no interest in pushing Pakistan over the brink. In 1999, the Chinese thwarted Gen. Pervez Musharraf by refusing to support him in the Kargil War against India, for instance. Likewise, it was Beijing (not Washington) that induced the Pakistani government to send troops in to root out Islamic militants barricaded in the Lal Masjid in 2007.

And, most recently, when Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani sought a Chinese pledge of support following Washington’s decision to freeze $800 billion in military aid, Beijing maintained a studied silence.

“It is Pakistan that wants China more than China wants Pakistan,” said Suba Chandran, director of the New Delhi-based Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies.

Neither the United States nor India can match China when it comes to playing hardball with Pakistan’s military establishment. But both strategic partners could do a great deal more to promote Pakistan’s civilian institutions if they focused on trade, according to Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council.

For instance, by expanding so-called “reconstruction opportunity zones” — where manufacturers enjoy preferential tariffs for exports to the United States — America could reduce the need for humanitarian aid at the same time it strengthens its economic ties with civilian Pakistanis. Similarly, removing various roadblocks could boost trade between India and Pakistan from today’s $2 billion to $42 billion a year — creating a strong, new economic impetus for peace that might well spill over into Afghanistan.

“The pressure will grow on the military establishments to tone down their rhetoric and stop talking to each other as adversaries as the two countries economies are increasingly going to be linked,” Nawaz said.

Meanwhile, said Chandran, a comparable increase in Sino-Indian trade promises to make China and India economic partners in the upcoming “Asian Century.”

If, that is, China and India can resolve a niggling border dispute and Washington can convince Beijing that the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership is not part of a secret plan to keep China down.

Here’s Matt Drudge’s headline (which was, for hours, just below the huge Murdoch story on top of the page): “Obama donor arrested as ‘Pakistani agent’…”

Free Republic used the same headline, along with “Pakistani accused of masking contributions to US politicians.”

Leaving aside the fact that “Pakistani agent” sounds more like “spy” than “unregistered foreign lobbyist,” it’s true that Syed Ghulam Fai gave $250 to Barack Obama, making him an “Obama donor.” He’s also given $6,000 to the National Republican Senatorial Committee and at least $10,000 to Representative Dan Burton, a Republican from Indiana.

And it looks like the ISI bought itself a very good friend!

Burton has been very active on the Kashmir issue. Shortly before receiving a donation from both Fai and Ahmad, Burton announced the formation of a Kashmir caucus in the U.S. Congress. He has traveled to Kashmir for events sponsored by Fai’s Kashmir Center and has spoken in favor of resolve the standoff between Pakistan and India over the territory in Pakistan’s favor.

It’s obviously a complex story, and we won’t know all the details for some time, but Matt Drudge does have the important keywords: PAKISTAN AGENT OBAMA ARREST. (And here’s the Fox Nation story! OBAMA PAKISTAN ARREST AGENT. Just get those keywords out there, no one will read beyond the headline.)

Despite billions of dollars in American aid since the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, the relationship has long been tense because of Pakistan’s reluctance to target Taliban militants on its territory who stage cross-border attacks against NATO troops in Afghanistan.

The relationship took a nose dive on May 2 when U.S. commandos staged a covert raid to kill al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani garrison town not far from Islamabad. The raid humiliated the Pakistani military, which ordered U.S. trainers out of the country and reduced bilateral cooperation.

The lack of trainers means that planned U.S. equipment cannot be put into service, which reduces some of the needed aid. Also, about $300 million from the trimmed aid was intended to reimburse Pakistan for the cost of deploying troops along the Afghan border.

But U.S. officials claim that Pakistan has not lived up to pledges to uproot and disrupt Taliban militants and suspected al-Qaida factions in the border region.

President Barack Obama’s chief of staff, William Daley, said Sunday that the U.S. was suspending $800 million in aid to the Pakistani military until the two countries can patch up their relationship.

But Tariq Fatemi, another former Pakistani ambassador to the U.S., said he thought the American strategy to pressure Pakistan was destined for failure.

“I think it is unwise to expect the Pakistanis to buckle under what is a publicly delivered snub,” said Fatemi. “It will strengthen those elements in the armed forces that have always had grave misgivings of the relationship with the United States.”

Many Pakistanis have never forgiven the U.S. for slapping sanctions on the country in 1990 because of its work to develop a nuclear weapon. The decision came only a year after Pakistan and the U.S. were successful in a decade-long quest to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

The sanctions left many Pakistanis with a sense that the U.S. was only interested in a “transactional” relationship that it could abandon once its interests were served.

Fatemi, the former ambassador, said the U.S. decision appeared to undercut claims by Obama administration officials that the U.S. was interested in a long-term relationship that encompassed much more than counterterrorism cooperation.

Pakistan army spokesman Maj. Gen. Abbas said Sunday that the military had received no official notice from the U.S. that aid was being suspended. He also said that the loss of aid would have no effect on military operations against Islamist militants in the country because they were being conducted with Pakistan’s own resources.

“I think it hurts Washington more than it hurts Islamabad,” said Lodhi, the former ambassador. “Assistance is influence, and when you withhold it or suspend it, you deprive yourself of influence.”

Pakistan army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani seemed to pre-empt the effect of the aid cut in a speech after the bin Laden raid — saying all U.S. military assistance now should be diverted to improve the country’s economy and help common Pakistanis.

“They want to end any impression that they are some kind of hired help,” said Lodhi.

Some analysts have predicted that the suspension of military aid could hurt the military’s war against the Pakistani Taliban over the long run, especially since the country is suffering an economic slump.

But Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani defense analyst, said that Pakistan’s close relationship with China could offset the impact. Pakistan has long purchased military equipment and missiles from China at lower-cost rates and bought fighter aircraft from the country last year, she said.

The Pakistani military is “trying to go the Chinese way,” said Siddiqa.

It is unclear what other actions Pakistan will take in response to the suspension of U.S. military aid. It could be less helpful in targeting al-Qaida fighters within the country and in pushing Afghan Taliban militants with whom it has historical ties to negotiate an end to the Afghan war.

Pakistan is also believed to secretly support U.S. drone strikes against militants in the country’s mountainous tribal region. That support has been shaken in the wake of the bin Laden raid and could be further imperiled by the suspension of aid.

One of the most high-profile points of leverage that the Pakistanis have with the U.S. is the shipment of a large percentage of non-lethal supplies through the country to NATO troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan temporarily closed the border to NATO supplies last year after an accidental U.S. helicopter strike killed two Pakistani troops. It is unclear if the suspension of aid could provoke a similar response.

“When you take this kind of action, you reinforce the transactional nature of the relationship,” said Lodhi. “The moment you do that all bets are off because the response will not be a very positive one.”

But Lodhi also noted that Pakistan and the U.S. do share common interests in combatting terrorism and fostering a stable Afghanistan — even if the details don’t always match up.

“The common interest is there, but the question is can we walk back from the brink and find common ground to rebuild trust step by step?”

Associated Press writer Kathy Gannon contributed to this report.