Suicide

Newsreal: The worst show on earth

Theodore Kaczynski should be in a mental hospital. Instead, he's about to become the star in a grotesque courtroom circus.

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Accused Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski, who’s been described by his defense lawyers as a paranoid schizophrenic, is this week being tested by a court-appointed psychiatrist to determine whether he is competent to stand trial and to act as his own attorney, as Kaczynski has requested. Unless the Justice Department — which has reopened negotiations on the subject — agrees to a plea bargain, most observers believe that the trial will eventually proceed, with an evidently mentally ill defendant in the spotlight.

What is the standard for “competency”? How could Kaczynski, who has already tried to commit suicide in prison, be judged able to act as his own attorney? And if the trial proceeds, what is likely to happen? Salon spoke with Mark Levy, M.D., assistant clinical professor of psychiatry at the University of California at San Francisco, who often acts as a forensic consultant in competency cases.

What is “competence” in the legal sense?

It’s basically the ability to understand the court proceedings, to work within the context of the proceedings and function reasonably — these are loose terms — and to work with one’s attorney in mounting a reasonable defense. You can’t say, well, I’ll work with my attorney as long as he argues that the Martians are invading. That’s not a reasonable defense. That’s part of the issue to be evaluated with Kaczynski …

It’s not enough to be diagnosed as mentally ill?

No. There’s three concepts that need to be differentiated in a legal context. One is “psychosis” which is a medical term; one is “insanity” which is a medical/legal term, and comes into play when determining a person’s guilt or innocence; and the third is “competence” which is an entirely legal term. In the legal context, for example, you can be a psychotic but sane; you can also be psychotic but competent to stand trial.

How does a court-appointed psychiatrist go about determining a person’s competence?

The first thing you do is to try and make an accurate diagnosis, which in Kaczynski’s case would mean determining whether the preliminary evaluation that was done of Kaczynski by the defense psychiatrist and psychologist — that this man is a paranoid schizophrenic — is correct.

How do you do that?

Through interviews, a look at his written material and, ideally — and if he’s forced to cooperate — a battery of psychological tests. With paranoid schizophrenia, the tests look for characteristic mental deficits, like difficulty with abstraction. Schizophrenics are concrete in their thinking. You’d find that when you say to him, “Mr. Kaczynski, when you hear the proverb, ‘a rolling stone gathers no moss’” — despite his high IQ, he may say, “Well, it’s like if you roll a stone on the ground you won’t get moss.” A failure to abstract. Now he may be smart enough to get that one, but someplace along the line, relative to his intellect, you’d find a surprising amount of concreteness to his thinking.

Another indicator may be delusions, which in Kaczynski’s case I think they’ll find.

How do you test for delusions?

The Rorschach Test, the ink-blot test. As long as a paranoid schizophrenic can systematize, he can keep his thinking relatively organized. If you say, “When were you born, where were you born, what was your mother’s maiden name” and ask very specific questions, someone like Kaczynski will perform well. However, if you give them an unstructured environment, like the Rorschach, they fall apart. If you say, “What do you see in this ink-blot?” a healthy person will say, “It’s a butterfly,” or this or that response that’s within a wide array of things that are correlated to healthy people. A schizophrenic will give you more and more bizarre responses: “Well there’s a gun, and in the gun there’s an amoeba and the gun is in the mouth of a woman …” You also see that their anxiety rises. If you ask them open-ended questions, they’ll get very anxious.

Like, “Tell me about yourself …”?

“Tell me about yourself,” “tell me about your feelings in a winter’s night in your cabin …” Because then they’ll be flooded by unconscious or partially conscious impulses that they’re terrified of and they don’t have the defense mechanisms with which to bind.

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -

Anything else to look for in Kaczynski?

Major depression, which is acute now because his worldview is crumbling. He’s faced with having to give up the house of cards that has kept him partially sane. If his worldview of the threat of technology justifying murder is seen as simply insane, and therefore invalid, then his whole life has been worthless. That’s a very depressing conclusion that I don’t think he’s capable of bearing.

What makes you think that?

He seems to have gotten much worse since the issue of his insanity defense has come up. That was what presumably led to his suicide attempt. You’re seeing an acute suicidal depression that’s emerging underneath as his paranoid defenses are challenged and begin to crumble.

What would happen if he is found not competent to stand trial?

He would be treated against his will in a mental hospital. Usually, defendants who are found not competent initially come back and are tried once they’ve been given medication and whatever other treatment is deemed appropriate. They are tried when they are cured, or more usually when their symptoms are under control.

You believe Kaczynski is incompetent to stand trial?

I believe he is, though I haven’t examined him. But everyone knows. The cop on the corner knows he’s a loon.

Even before he tried to commit suicide.

Normally, someone who puts his head through a noose and says, “I hate this life, get me out of here,” should not be considered competent to stand trial. If he walked into a community mental health clinic at that point, and was deemed to be a danger to himself, he could be held against his will for treatment. If he were in a hotel room trying to hang himself with his underwear and brought in to a clinic by the police, he would be deemed incompetent and would lose his civil rights despite the Bill of Rights.

So how might the court-appointed psychiatrist find him competent?

Well she could find that he’s not psychotic, though I think that’s unlikely. She could find him psychotic but “compensated.” That is, even though he’s got some ideas that people would regard as delusional, he is quite capable of understanding the proceedings. He doesn’t have to be working well with an attorney. He doesn’t have to be a good attorney to be allowed to represent himself. It’s a very low test. It’s dumbed down and made easy to say he’s competent. It’s much more difficult — but correct — to say that he is a paranoid schizophrenic who is decompensating as the psychotic nature of his beliefs come into question, that he’s also acutely suicidal. On that basis alone, he’s incompetent in my book.

But, in defense attorney Ronald Kuby’s words, if he can tell the difference between the judge and a grapefruit …

That’s the thing. Dumbing it down. The easy way out on this one is to say he’s competent because he’s got a 160 IQ and he can answer some simple questions about what the proceedings are, that he said, “Yes of course I’ll work with the attorney.” And the judge will have no choice — I think he isn’t particularly imaginative anyway — but to let the trial go on. And it’ll be a circus like Colin Ferguson, who represented himself (with Kuby as his legal advisor).

You don’t think Kaczynski should be allowed to be his own attorney?

What will happen if he’s deemed competent — which means nobody will be treating him — and argues his own case in court? His fantasy probably is that he’ll get a platform from which to argue the validity of his beliefs, and in some way to try to justify his actions. To Kaczynski, it almost doesn’t matter if he’s executed because he’d be a martyr in his own mind. “The world wasn’t ready to hear the truth I had to offer.” But the reality will be that as his anxiety rises, under the circumstances of the trial, as the prosecutor cross-examines him and rattles him, he’ll become more and more out of control. His actions and perhaps his behavior will become idiosyncratic and bizarre, as you saw with Colin Ferguson.

Some observers think that Kaczynski may be crazy like a fox, that he has known exactly when and how to disrupt the proceedings, in order to save his life.

Oh sure. The less you know about him, it might seem that way. But I also think
it might save his life because the jurors may have second thoughts about imposing the death penalty after seeing him come apart in the courtroom. Depending upon how disorganized he becomes, it might become a mistrial. He can’t try his own case if he has to be kept in another room watching it on television.

Ros Davidson is a frequent contributor to Salon.

Satan goes to Harvard

In 'Halfway Heaven,' her otherwise acute chronicle of a Harvard student's savage murder of her roommate, author Melanie Thernstrom abandons her painstaking effort to make sense of the killing by resorting to an increasingly popular explanation of heinous crimes -- Good vs. Evil

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on May 28, 1995, a murder was committed at Harvard University: Sinedu Tadesse, a 20-year-old Ethiopian scholarship student, stabbed her roommate Trang Ho, a gifted 20-year-old Vietnamese immigrant also on a scholarship. More precisely, Tadesse stabbed Ho 45 times with a hunting knife she had bought expressly for that purpose while Ho lay sleeping in bed. Tadesse then hung herself with a noose she had prepared in advance. The crime was stunning not only because it was savage, but because, as a Harvard official commented at the time, “there (was) no apparent reason.” All the ensuing media coverage, and all the speeches and meetings seemed to make the event more mysterious, not less.

In “Halfway Heaven,” Melanie Thernstrom, a Harvard graduate who also taught there, addresses this mystery with intelligence, tenacity and courage. She appears to have felt the tragedy deeply and to have striven mightily to understand it. Unfortunately, she also strove to resolve it — unfortunately because by the last third of the book her desire for resolution has apparently shriveled her capacity to understand. “Halfway Heaven” starts as a thorough, meaty and humane illumination; it ends as a Hollywood movie about Good and Evil. This ending not only disappointed me, it made me angry. A story like this urgently needs our deepest compassion, for both the perpetrator and the victim, not only for the sake of the dead, but for the rest of us as well. And dramas of Good and Evil simply don’t allow room for much more than a sentimental counterfeit.

Thernstrom would doubtless say that she did have compassion, and truthfully it is clear that she tried very hard. Of course, she didn’t have to try to feel for Trang Ho; anyone would. She escaped Vietnam with her father and older sister in an illegal boat, arriving in America after staying almost a year in an Indonesian refugee camp which Thernstrom describes as “violent and dangerous.” Trang showed great courage and ingenuity in adapting to her new country, excelling in school and supporting her struggling father; the high school teachers interviewed by Thernstrom clearly loved her and were moved by her. She was a natural leader with a nearly overdeveloped sense of responsibility who worked hard at everything, was endlessly cheerful and, it would seem, almost single-handedly held her family together during an ugly divorce. “When someone dies you always portray the victim as so perfect and good,” said a friend, “but with Trang it’s really true — she really was that perfect.”

Although she came from an upper-class family, Sinedu faced difficult circumstances too. She grew up during Ethiopia’s Red Terror, a time of mass murder and atrocities, when corpses were dragged to families’ doorsteps by soldiers who then forced the bereaved to pay for the bullet before giving up the body. As Thernstrom puts it, it was a regime in which “the murderers had the power.” Sinedu’s father was imprisoned by this regime for two years when Sinedu was 7, throwing the family into turmoil. In this deadly atmosphere, Sinedu worked single-mindedly to gain admission to the prestigious International Community School where she graduated a valedictorian and gained a scholarship to Harvard.

But the dream opportunity soon devolved into a nightmare as Sinedu proved completely at a loss to cope with the demands of the new environment. She was unable to keep up academically and she made no friends, not even with the relatives she had in the area. She became so desperately lonely that she sent a letter to dozens of strangers, randomly selected from the phone book, pleading with them to befriend her.

When Thernstrom traveled to Ethiopia to find out who this young woman really was, she couldn’t; Sinedu apparently had no friends there either. Indeed, her family seems never to have known her — or to have wanted to. Thernstrom described Sinedu’s family as rigid and strangely surface-oriented; even their expressions of grief implied a refusal to look at anything beneath the immediate surface. They praised their dead daughter, but almost as though she was a stranger, in terms of her accomplishments. They categorically refused to accept that Sinedu committed murder or suicide; they buried her with the words “While she was studying at Harvard University an unfortunate accident happened.”

The way Thernstrom came to know Sinedu was through her diary. Through it, we see a picture very different from the dull, conscientious, diffident student described by observers — and it is a picture of a soul in unspeakable pain. We see that Sinedu burned in a private hell of loneliness more profound than most of us can imagine; she never felt loved (and it seems likely that she was in fact not loved) and so did not have an ability to feel love or to relate to others in even the most fundamental way. She could not feel her heart and she knew it. As she put it in her hopeless public letter, “I am like a person who can’t swim choking (sic) for life in a river.” Desperately, she tried to school herself in ways to “make people like you,” writing to herself in the third person with instructions like, “Do not show what you really think. Put on a mask,” or listening to inspirational tapes. When these steps failed, she anguished about what she poetically called her “heart-failer thing,” the way she felt “dead and it is hard to warm myself up.” When she met Trang, Sinedu believed that finally she had found someone with whom she could have a genuine relationship. When that failed and Trang rejected her, it was more than she could bear.

Thernstrom is meticulous and empathic in drawing interwoven portraits of the two women. She is compassionate in showing us how much pain the murderer was in, even expressing a degree of respect for her doomed attempts to cope: “She left behind an extraordinary record: that of an intelligent, insightful, strong-willed person using all those capacities to fight as hard as she could for mental health — and losing, day by day, hour by hour.”

Thernstrom is at her best when she examines Harvard’s handling of the catastrophe (and courageous, considering that institution’s influence). The official response was one of complete mystification, but in fact the school had at least one loud, clear warning. One of the people to whom Sinedu sent her pleading letter was acquainted with an administrator at Harvard, and she forwarded it to that acquaintance for obvious reasons — the letter reads like a fire alarm. The administrator sent it to the dorm where Trang and Sinedu lived. The house master read it and filed it. Contrary to what Harvard officials claim, Sinedu sought counseling at the university’s mental health center, and got it — one day a month. (Her therapist is under a gag order from the university.)

Thernstrom builds a case against Harvard by arguing that the university is ill-equipped and even negligent in dealing with students’ mental problems. As part of that argument, she characterizes Sinedu as mentally ill, bringing in a host of psychiatrists — none of whom ever met Sinedu — to make diagnoses based on her diaries. And this is where Thernstrom loses her compassionate voice. Her discussion of Sinedu’s diaries is proscriptive and mechanical; it almost seems as if she’s willfully ignoring the emotional sense Sinedu makes, trying to interpret it according to a definition of sanity that does not brook human extremes or even metaphor.

“Her imagery is bizarre,” says Thernstrom of a diary passage. “She writes that what keeps her from acting out her murderous desires is the feeling of being ‘being hand and leg cuffed to a couch stuck in the ground.’ And then she adds, as if by way of explanation: ‘Sometimes even if a bomb falls beside me, I would be scared at first, and then not even bother to see what happened.’

I don’t understand why Thernstrom finds any of this “bizarre.” It reads to me like an accurate metaphoric expression of exhaustion, entrapment and pain. It is not rational because it is not describing rational feelings. I find Thernstrom’s pedantic, ham-fisted attempt to decode it stranger than anything in the passage itself. Her weirdly literal-minded insertions (“perhaps a therapist’s couch”) would be funny if they were not so soulless and so blind.

Sinedu may in fact have been mentally ill and I don’t mean to argue with any certainty that she was not. But the letter and the diaries presented by Thernstrom don’t convince me that she was. She says extreme, scary things, the most striking of which is her statement that “the bad way out is suicide, the good way killing, savoring their fear and then suicide.” This is an ugly, vicious and desperate thing to say, but human beings can be all of those things without being crazy.

One of the kindest, sanest people I know once told me that when her girlfriend was blatantly conducting an affair with another woman, she often made a point of putting kitchen knives away because she was afraid that if a knife happened to be on the counter at the wrong moment, she would kill her girlfriend. I’ve never had to hide knives, but I have experienced similar impulses, albeit fleetingly. Those impulses may be grotesque, but they are also human; people can feel that way when they are very, very hurt and very, very scared, and I do not believe pain and fear equals illness, even if the pain and fear appear irrational. It’s true that when I had those feelings, I didn’t even come close to acting on them — but I had far greater internal support than Sinedu did. This is because when I was growing up I was given a sense of myself as a loving person who could receive love. If I had not had that, I’m not sure what I would’ve done, and it is clear that Sinedu did not have that.

Thernstrom compares Sinedu’s pain to Trang’s, saying that, unlike Sinedu, the hardship Trang experienced seems to have strengthened her. She fails to see the obvious; Trang was loved. In contrast, Sinedu writes, quite rationally, about how she felt hated and attacked by her mother, how there was no feeling in her family, how they constantly ridiculed her as ugly and “very black.” Thernstrom notes repeatedly that Sinedu’s childhood did not feature unusual abuse. But lack of feeling can be the greatest agony of all, especially for someone with a profoundly emotional nature. What Sinedu describes sounds to me like pure hell.

“While Sinedu’s childhood was clearly not ‘good enough’ for her,” says Thernstrom, “it may well have been good enough for someone with a different biopsychic makeup, and indeed it was apparently adequate for her siblings — none of whom became murderers.” Well, yes, and they didn’t go to Harvard either. They didn’t come out of a cookie cutter mold. Yes, Sinedu’s family may’ve been good enough for others — so what? What does that have to do with her? How does that make her biopsychically ill?

It’s isn’t that I think mental illness doesn’t exist; I know it does. I’m not sure exactly what it is though, nor does it seem to me that many people do. Even if Sinedu was mentally ill, I think if we could have truly looked inside her, we might be shocked to see how like us she really was. This is why I am disturbed by Thernstrom’s eagerness to lock her into standard-issue categories out of a diagnostic manual; she seems to want to put Sinedu in a place of otherness, somewhere far away from us and our normal lives, in the province of doctors, where we can feel sorry for her, then dismiss her.

I fully understand this impulse; I even share it to some extent. Truthfully, I would like to believe that a person who would act as Sinedu did must be insane because it would make life a lot safer if it were so. But reality does not support that belief. The Serb soldiers who raped, tortured and murdered their Muslim neighbors were ordinary citizens, family men who had lived in peace with Muslims for years. The rapists and murderers known as the Klu Klux Klan were average citizens too — people who may have loved their children and had moments of kindness like the rest of us. Does anyone believe that these people would’ve behaved differently if only there had been enough doctors on hand to prescribe medication? Literature, from Dostoevsky to Russell Banks, is full of stories about average people who commit terrible acts, and they are not stories of mental illness. They are stories of human frailty and suffering.

Finally though, my argument here may be semantic. Whether you call it illness or suffering, Sinedu clearly needed help. It does seem possible that a gifted therapist or pyschiatrist could’ve saved her — and thus saved Trang. I may not like the way Thernstrom discusses mental health, but in fact, if all she wanted was to define Sinedu’s behavior as mentally ill, I wouldn’t be writing this. However, Thernstrom goes farther than that. In an attempt to place the event in a deeper moral context, she blurs Sinedu’s “illness” with evil, almost equating one with the other, creating an artificially profound effect. She doesn’t even do this directly. She takes the equation from other people’s mouths, and then, instead of questioning it, supports it with manipulative descriptions of the two women’s grave sites. Here are the mouths, with Thernstrom’s commentary woven in:

“We can never say why certain patients — rather than other patients with similar or more serious diagnoses — are the ones who actually commit some terrible act,” Dr. Longhurst says. “Sinedu’s diaries are clearly very disturbed, but they are less disturbed than other patients who didn’t commit murder and suicide.” If she wasn’t more disturbed than others all along, then, at some point she crossed over. What caused that crossing? “If you push psychiatrists far enough,” Dr. Longhurst says, “you’ll find most of them believe in evil.”

Thernstrom follows this with a clergyman talking about the evil “out there” as opposed to within, and then checks in with the law:

Assistant District Attorney Martin Murphy says that if Sinedu had lived she would have been charged with first degree premeditated murder. There would’ve been a trial, he says, in which the defense would have argued that she was insane and his office would have argued that she wasn’t and the jury would have made a decision as to which of those two boxes to put her in.

If she wasn’t mentally ill, what was she? What is the second box?”

He flounders momentarily. “Bad,” he says.

A paragraph later, Thernstrom is at Sinedu’s grave in Ethiopia: “On either side of Sinedu were finished graves: long white marble mausoleums, guarded by a cage of iron to keep the marble from being stolen. The head of each mausoleum is inlaid with a small black and white photo of the dead face. Forty days after the burial, Sinedu’s gravestone was to be put in: I pictured the familiar photo of her, glimpsed between bars, caught for all time under a swirl of thick glass.”

On the last page Thernstrom closes with an image of Trang’s grave and a final summation: “I walk for a long time through the labyrinth of plots and flowering hedges, birds calling to each other in every direction, but it’s Trang’s grave I find my way back to. The earth has closed over now, the gravestone inlaid, flat as a jewel. I remember the grave at the funeral, the tear-shaped blossoms sifting slowly down over the onyx casket. I pluck a flower and stand staring down at the grave. The reality of the loss is so overwhelming that all reflection seems to collapse into a sense of inevitability: Sinedu was possessed by spirits or psychosis; Trang was perfected and ready to enter the Pure Land; Harvard couldn’t prevent anything.”

“Collapse” is an appropriate word here; Thernstrom threw away the care with which she painstakingly drew the two women and opted for a cartoon of good and bad in which one smiles down from heaven and the other is consigned to hell, “between bars, caught for all time.” It’s a very easy resolution, and one that many readers will doubtless approve of, and even experience as moving. But think about it: How does Thernstrom dare to comment on other people’s souls?

It’s a heavy way to put it, especially since Thernstrom doesn’t make any such comment directly or use the word “soul.” However what she does is actually trickier because it’s less conscious; it’s emotion-based in the shallowest sense. All the stuff about birds, flower petals and floating blossoms juxtaposed against the “dead face … under a thick swirl of glass” — it goes right under the thought-wire and heads straight for prejudice. To say directly what she aggressively suggests would require that she ask a lot of hard questions, and for whatever reasons, Thernstrom didn’t choose to do that.

And she is not the only one. “Evil,” as some mysterious force beyond the scope of normal people, is invoked with increasing frequency in the media as an explanation for crimes ranging from Jefferey Dahmer’s cannibalism to the terrorism of Timothy McVeigh. We seem to have a hearty appetite for hearing about such crimes, yet we don’t want to think they have anything to do with us. It is true that for a society to feel safe, such mental boundaries around that which seems unthinkable are necessary, to a point. But if we are going to look at such crimes with any real depth, we need to be able to look past those boundaries; to do otherwise constitutes a kind of moral irresponsibility. Many of the reviews of “Halfway Heaven” have lauded its “compassion,” and in the context of the current hellfire mood, it is relatively compassionate. But to me, the compassion in the book seems like a thin, sugary layer. It is not deep enough or tough enough for the subjects it raises — especially the subject of human evil.

It’s one thing to call a person’s behavior evil — and I do call murder evil — but to call someone evil in their entirety is a judgment we as fellow humans are not qualified to make. Most of us will never commit murder. But who of us has not been cruel? Who has not inflicted pain on another, even if just with words or with an expression in the eyes? On a practical human scale, there is a huge difference between murder and verbal cruelty. On a cosmic scale, I’m not sure the difference is as vast as we would like to think. Two of Christianity’s most powerful precepts are that sin felt in the heart is as bad as sin acted upon, and that, without divine grace, we are all equally guilty, even those of us who appear perfect. Even non-Christians secretly feel the truth in this — but it is a hard truth which we find convenient to forget.

On the night I finished “Halfway Heaven,” I lay awake, thinking of Trang and how terrible her last moments must have been. My body grew rigid with fear and when a cat screamed outside my window, I nearly jumped out of my skin. I turned on the light, but the horrible images were still in my mind. I thought, maybe Sinedu really was evil. Then I thought, Sinedu isn’t here. Whatever evil you are feeling is in your own head. That realization was harder to face — and sadder — than my fear.

It is true that we live in a practical world. We can, and should, protect society from people who murder, and that usually means locking them up. But we should never lock these people out of the common humanity, “under a swirl of thick glass.” We should not pretend that they are so different from us, that they can only be understood in terms of diagnosis and illness because when we do that, we lock out a part of ourselves, the part that most needs our guidance and love. We lock ourselves into smugness. We cheat ourselves of the tenderness and humility that comes from allowing ourselves to feel the depths of human fallibility, including our own.

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Mary Gaitskill is a novelist and short story writer. Her most recent collection is "Because They Wanted To."

Blood Sport

As much as she'd like to wallow in the pleasures of Michael Dorris-bashing, Anne Lamott cannot bring herself to. She knew the man, and she remembers their talk last year on the banks of Idaho's Big Wood River.

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I am writing this from the same place I met Michael Dorris last year, in Idaho beside the Big Wood River, in the shadow of the Sawtooth Mountains. When we met he was still a highly regarded man, had a number of bestsellers and beautiful children, honors and gratitude heaped upon him for a life of energetic activism. After he killed himself in April, we in the literary world first reacted with an outpouring of sadness and tribute. But within days, the allegations in the media began, and Michael became this season’s Old Testament goat.

Maybe it would all have been sort of strangely exhilarating if he had been someone I didn’t know or care about; or if he had been a member of the writing community with whom I felt competitive or jealous. But when you’ve sat by the river with a man and listened to him grieve the end of his marriage, it’s ever so slightly harder to get off on his ruin.

Normally, I enjoy a little group Schadenfreude as much as the next narcissist — I keep remembering the line of an old poem by Charles Bukowski that ended, “Thank God it’s you baby, and not me.” But a picture keeps coming up on the screen in my mind, of him with his family outdoors in the winter, the older children making angels with their bodies in the snow. I tried to cheer him up that day by the river, with assurances that all was not lost — he still had these beautiful daughters. Retrospectively — if the allegations are true — I must have seemed like Hayley Mills trying to cheer up Robert Maxwell over a bounced check notice from the bank.

Cottonwood fluffs flocked upward through the sunbeams as if hearing a call, and children ran around the edge of the river like little bankers, gathering stones and pebbles, grasses and twigs. He had to have been in a chronic state of dread by then. The jungle drums must have been beating loudly as we sat in the sun. I remember learning that in Sweden they call 4 a.m. the hour of the black dogs, for those who are awake in the dark, and it must have been the hour of the black dogs most of the time for Michael. If the allegations against him are true, his visible life was secretly one of utter ruin. And yet there is all that good he did for all those poor women and children, in all those benighted households that had no voice except for his. Certainly there are times when I could feed off a story like this — hero to goat, and oh how the mighty have fallen — I just normally love that kind of thing, because I participate in the human condition. But I sat with Michael beside the river that day, and now I’m so troubled. I am most troubled by all of my feelings of disgust toward him. He is still an innocent man. Maybe he was the human condition in its gravest perspective, but most of his dark stuff is present to a greater or lesser degree in me, too. I wish I were more like Jesus more of the time, but I’m not. I am more often more like the poem by Carl Sandburg on the wilderness within; that deep down inside me there is a wolf, and there is a lion, too. And if there wasn’t, would you want to read the stuff I write?

In Idaho this year, the moon rose so full and burned so yellow that it colored the sky green between itself and the snow-capped mountains. This was where I recently started to hear that all sorts of posthumous tributes to Michael were going to be rescinded, this was when I began to feel most troubled. Everyone suddenly seemed to feel, “Well, yeah. We don’t dedicate to, bestow upon, endow in the name of,” a man said to do what Michael has been accused of. What about all the good he did, too? Has someone without my knowing it pushed the great delete key on his good works, literary and political? God, the mob reaction is terrifying, like the crowds in Julius Caesar roaring their approval for Marc Antony one minute, then just as loudly for Brutus. But this mob is made up of people like me, people who write, media types, and I do not know many of them who are in any position to judge Michael Dorris.

Don’t even get me started on the double lives of writers. You want to hear some really bad shit about damage to spouses and children? You want stories of cruelty, infidelity, child abuse and neglect? I mean, thank you for stopping by, but bore me later — bore me three weeks from now. Start with me, with nice sober Christian princess me, you’ve got enough material for a nice long magazine article or two.

Now, if what Michael is charged with doing to his kids is true, it’s objectively — whatever that means — worse than anything I’ve done. It’s experiences they’ll never recover from, that burden them with stuff they had the right not to be burdened with. They had the right to expect their dad to protect them from evil, and instead, he may have perpetrated it against them. But he was my friend, and he was bleeding to death: I think back to the day by the river, and I remember Alan Arkin in the movie version of “Catch 22,” hearing the frantic voice over the intercom in his bomber.

“Help him,” the voice says.

“Help who?”

“Help the bombardier.”

“I AM the bombardier.”

“Then help him.”

And each time this conversation starts up again, we find Arkin getting closer and closer to discovering the extent of the tail gunner’s wounds. First he finds that it is in fact the tail gunner who needs help, and then that the man has a horrible leg wound. Arkin bandages it with a real sense of tenderness and purpose, but when he is done, he notices a tiny trickle of blood at the top of the soldier’s flak suit. You know even before he does that it’s going to be bad. It’s going to make the leg wound look like child’s play. And of course when he finally unzips the flak suit, 20 pounds of viscera pour out.

No one knew to unzip Michael’s flak suit. No one knew how badly he was injured, damaged. But now that stuff is spilling out, I see around me — and sometimes in me — a mesmerized and almost pornographic response. Such disgusted rejection! And I want to find less poisoned ground to stand on.

Elie Wiesel says there are some events so heinous that the only appropriate response is to stand before them in silence. But this one is so hard to stop talking about. It’s so — juicy. I mean, thank GOD it’s you baby and not me. But in this imperfect world, we only know a small part, and knowing that to be true, it ought to leave room for mercy and it ought to leave room for humility, and I would have to say that I am only now beginning to feel angstrom units of either. I’ve been having a very noisy judgmental opinion for just about everyone involved, except for all those little children making angels in the snow.

This is one thing I know for sure: Feeling contempt and judgment closes the door on my being able to notice the tendrils or tiny green shoots of redemption or grace that would almost certainly spring up out of this man’s sorrow. I don’t know how that will happen, but it will, it could, it may. If all the answers were in the world, we wouldn’t need to have sought God. If we hadn’t — if you ask me — we would be fucked unto the very Lord. Because then we would be at each other’s mercy.

Maybe Michael just ran out of time. I keep thinking that if he’d lived, he would have found a way to rectify some of the damage he’s said to have done in the world. But I don’t think he believed in God; most of my friends don’t. Or rather they seem to feel that if they can’t believe in a God who finds you parking spaces, what’s the point?

Here’s what I think the point is: that there’s no sin too grave to be forgiven. Or there’s only one, at least according to old Uncle Jesus. It is to have bad intentions, and refuse to have them lifted. It is to have a total resistance to love, it is to come in kicking and shouting, “Screw you! I’m innocent, I’m fine.” A manic-depressive Irishman I know put it, “The only unforgivable sin is to avoid God until you’re in good enough shape to fool him.”

But I don’t believe Michael had bad intentions — I don’t think he was as depraved, say, as the Sean Penn character in “Dead Man Walking,” who got lucky and did not run out of time. Lots of people find their way out of all that darkness of double lives. I know a lot of drunks and addicts who came into recovery after a lifetime of bad behavior, all self-justification and self-contempt. Believe me, no one came in on the wings of victory. A lot of people like me came in with not much left of us but buttons and hair, believing that everyone would always hold the bad things we’d done against us. I think this must have been how Michael felt. But all the sober drunks and clean addicts and ex-hookers who were there to greet me just said, No heroes here, and no demons; just us people. Just us people who are accepted exactly the way we are, and the one fly in the ointment is that you’ll need to be sober to believe it. In the meantime, we welcome you and have no taste for any excuses you may have, nor any patience for bad words said against you.

I’m almost sure that someday we are all going to move into compassion for Michael, as soon as we are done with all this bullshit. I think we will move into a place where we stand silent before this, humbled, saddened, because lives have been lost, the lives of children, some grown. I’m thinking that I may move toward that place now, and wait for the trunks and satchels to arrive. I know that over and over terrible stories change into something beautiful. A little time must pass. Just yesterday up here, for instance, looking at one mountain peak in daylight, I saw something very masculine, American, a craggy snow-covered peak. Hillsides swelled beneath it like a lion’s claw ball, but later, in the moonlight that turned the sky so green, I no longer saw it dimensionally, no longer saw its muscles. I saw instead a pristine mountain, delicate and feminine as Fuji, or a deer.

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Anne Lamott is the bestselling author of seven novels, including "Blue Shoe," "Crooked Little Heart" and "Imperfect Birds," and five works of nonfiction including "Grace (Eventually)," "Bird By Bird" and "Operating Instructions." Her new memoir, "Some Assembly Required," is now available.

Beyond Kevorkian

The Supreme Court says there's no right to die. But the debate on doctor-assisted suicide will only continue, state by state. Salon talks to two advocates on either side of the issue.

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The day after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state laws that prohibit physician-assisted suicide, Salon spoke with people on both sides of this volatile political and moral debate.

Wesley Smith, a consumer advocate, hospice volunteer and author of the recently published “Forced Exit: The Slippery Slope from Assisted Suicide to Legalized Murder” (Times Books), opposes all physician-assisted suicide. John Brooke, a minister in the United Church of Christ, is head of the California-based Americans for Death with Dignity — which sponsored the l988 and l992 ballot initiatives on physician aid-in-dying in California, both of which narrowly failed.

From your perspective, what are the ramifications of this decision? Smith: I think this decision is great news for patients. We are about to move into a very detailed discussion of the whole issue of end-of-life care. We have been so focused on whether or not doctors should be legally allowed to kill patients that we have ignored the fact that rather than having to choose between an agonizing death and assisted suicide, doctors and hospices and other professionals can give tremendous care and comfort to a patient. A lot of people don’t know that there is such a thing as a board-certified pain control specialist, people who are very advanced in their ability to treat pain.

The problem is that the medical profession is not doing a good enough job. Not enough doctors are trained in pain control. We’ve got HMOs that are putting tremendous financial pressure on doctors to restrict care. The wrong people are making health-care decisions — health insurance executives. We’ve got to get doctors to take good care of their patients.

Do you think the media has done a fair job covering this debate? Smith: The media has been so caught up in the sensationalism of Kevorkian that they’ve missed a big part of the story — pain management — which I think now will come to the forefront. Brooke: The one thing that has bothered me about the coverage is that every newscast about the decision led with the response of Jack Kevorkian’s attorney. Really, what we are proposing would provide regulation and protocols established in law, rather than being left to an individual physician, however well-meaning. Without these laws, that leaves the decision up to the paternalism of one physician, with no review, which greatly increases the risk for abuse. On Friday, The New York Times described the decision as “a tentative first step, rather than a definitive final ruling.” Do you agree? Smith: This decision is by no means “a tentative first step.” It is the beginning of the end of the euthanasia movement. This is the first blow against euthanasia, because there is no constitutional right to be killed by a doctor. Already I’m noticing a positive change in the way the matter is being discussed. I noticed in the New York Times and other papers that there is a lot more talk of the positive alternatives, and even Dr. [Timothy] Quill [one of the plaintiffs in New York] said we have to focus more on the alternatives. This is not a minor case. It is a very important and historic case. Brooke: I agree completely with the New York Times’ summation. It’s not an ending but a new beginning of the debate on this issue. I think that in the past, state legislators have been reluctant to deal with the issue at all, because it was perceived as a “no-win” issue for them to take a position on. Now the level of the debate has been raised by the Supreme Court, which basically said this matter should be adjudicated by the states. Will this decision drive doctors who are in favor of assisted suicide — Jack Kevorkian being the most prominent example — underground? Smith: First of all, Kevorkian is not a doctor — his license was taken away. Hopefully now, instead of killing patients, doctors will realize that they have to take care of patients. Do you realize that only five medical schools out of about 126 have mandatory end-of-life medical training in pain management? We need to call on doctors to start doing more residencies in hospices. It seems to me that a doctor who says, “The only thing I can do to help a patient is to kill that patient” needs to send that patient to a better doctor. Brooke: Any physician who assists a patient in death will continue to be in the position of being a closet felon and risking their career. I don’t foresee anyone being any more underground than they already are. This decision simply maintains the status quo. Are there any situations where physician-assisted suicide should be allowed? Smith: No. If you talk to the really well-trained end-of-life doctors, they say it is not necessary. They tell me that there is always something that can be done to alleviate suffering. I’m a hospice volunteer, and I notice that when people know they are cared for, that they are not going to be abandoned, then they reach a level of acceptance. It’s just remarkable how people respond to being loved and cared for in the dying process. Hospice is about life. Euthanasia is about death. Are there any situations when physician-assisted suicide should be outlawed? What are they? Brooke: Of course there are situations where assisted suicide should not be permitted. I think those who are in support of this issue draw it very narrowly. Assisted suicide should only be available as an option for people who are in the dying process, who are competent to make a decision for themselves and who are subject to a number of safeguards, such as receiving more than one opinion by a doctor on their diagnosis. They should also be offered every other option of hospice and palliative care available. There also should be waiting periods to make sure the patient’s decision is not an impulsive one. Is it difficult to be a clergy member advocating the right to die? Brooke: I think there is much more support with the religious community and among the clergy than you would guess — even within the Catholic church, where the hierarchy has been strongly opposed but the clergy is just about as split as among Protestants. I’m from the progressive wing of Protestantism and I would say that the folk who agree with me on issues of social justice and peace, by and large, would agree with me on this.

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Lori Leibovich is a contributing editor at Salon and the former editor of the Life section.

Remembering Michael Dorris

Friends and colleagues celebrate the writer's life -- and take issue, sometimes angrily, with those who have raised dark questions about it.

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“Leave-taking, I’ve decided, is quite beside the point. Memory, though, is not.” These were the words of historian Simon Schama, speaking at a memorial service Tuesday evening at New York’s Donnell Library for writer Michael Dorris, who killed himself in late April. The service, which followed one held earlier this month at Dartmouth, where Dorris was an adjunct professor of Native American studies, was attended by close to 100 of Dorris’ friends, family members and colleagues, and featured a series of testimonials from a range of figures in the publishing and media world.

With his simultaneous acknowledgment of the impossibility of reconciling oneself to an untimely death and his insistence that remembering is a necessary and valuable project, Schama aptly described the mood of the service as a whole. Dorris’ friends adopted a tone that might be termed celebratorily mournful, capturing the full weight of Dorris’ absence by talking about the pleasure they had taken in his presence.

Even as they remembered their friend, the speakers challenged — in some cases subtly and in others more explicitly — the wave of bad press and scandal that followed Dorris’ suicide. It’s almost certainly true that one memorial service is very much like another. Grief may be always original, but the words we use to express it are not. But this service seemed different, as much a reaffirmation of Dorris and of his friends’ faith in him as it was a memorial.

The Michael Dorris who emerged from his friends’ recollections was, unsurprisingly, a complicated figure. A committed activist and a serious novelist whose early work, in particular, was well-received critically, Dorris was also a man obsessed with the business of buying and selling books. Bill Shinker, his publisher at HarperCollins, described Dorris as “a dream author” who could, nevertheless, be “maddening as hell to work with.” For Shinker, Dorris was at once a “real operator,” a man who served as his own agent, publicist and marketing director, and someone who retained “a naive, even childlike quality about him” long after he had become famous.

More tellingly, the speakers at the service stressed Dorris’ thirst for human contact, his appetite for conversation and exchange. They described a man who needed people, perhaps, too much. Kate Wimmer, a producer at ABC’s “20/20″ who met Dorris while producing a segment on fetal alcohol syndrome (the subject of Dorris’ book “The Broken Cord”), said of him, “He needed talk the way others of us need food or need air.” What Wimmer left unspoken was the question, “What happens to someone who needs talk when the person he most wants to talk to leaves him?” Schama answered that question: “I think in the end he could not imagine a life without the woman he loved best of all.” Dorris’ wife, Louise Erdrich, left him almost a year before the suicide and had custody of their children.

Schama, the evening’s most eloquent and moving speaker, spoke most explicitly to the responsibility he felt for Dorris’ decision. “I curse my sluggish obtuseness, my cowardly laziness,” he said. While Schama described Dorris as a man of “incredible douceur,” he did not shy from the torment that must have racked Dorris at the end of his life. In those last months, Schama said simply, Dorris “was certainly in deep water.”

Erdrich did not attend the service, but a letter from her was read. In it she wrote of her attempts to figure out how to speak to “our children” about their father’s death, and suggested that each time the story was told it came out differently. “His death,” she wrote, “leaves us gasping.”

Hovering over the service, of course, was the specter of the barrage of negative stories that filled the pages of the national press in the weeks after Dorris’ suicide, stories that included allegations of child abuse, revelations about Erdrich’s decision to end their marriage and rumors about other scandals in Dorris’ past. ( Salon ran a story about these charges and rumors.) If Dorris’ suicide was, as some have suggested, an attempt to spare his family the ordeal of public examination, it obviously failed. But those who spoke on Tuesday were resolute in their insistence that recent press accounts offered only a reductionist and distorted picture of their friend’s life. Schama was visibly upset at the idea that Dorris, whom he described as “trying to find the good or at least the saving complexity” in things others had long since abandoned, should have “his innocence called into question.” Erdrich, meanwhile, suggested simply that Dorris’ existence added up to “much more than the notoriety and confusion of the last few months.”

The strongest attack on the media came from Bob Edwards, a reporter for National Public Radio who befriended Dorris after meeting him on an early book tour (curiously enough, Edwards and Dorris had also gone to the same high school). “In the last month, there have been more positive words printed about Timothy McVeigh than about Michael Dorris,” Edwards said. He labeled the recent stories “fiction,” while blasting “the media buzzards and the lawyer buzzards” who were circling over Dorris’ grave. As a counter to “the man the revisionists have invented,” he offered a vivid picture of a man invested in the minutiae of the everyday, a man dedicated to his family, a man who “loved everything about being a writer.”

One might say that Dorris’ suicide stands as mute testimony to the fact that the picture was more complicated than that. But one suspects that enough has been written about Dorris’ shadow side. On this day, for his friends, it was a time for remembering something different.

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James Surowiecki is a regular contributor to Salon.

M. Scott Peck

The Road Best Traveled: In his latest book, 'Denial of the Soul,' M. Scott Peck argues against the conventional wisdom that euthanasia and assisted suicide are often the right choice. Bill McKibben describes how Peck might actually change your mind on the subject.

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m. scott peck’s “The Road Less Traveled” has been on and off the New York Times bestseller list since approximately the Precambrian Era, which of course means I came to his new book prepared to dismiss it as fluffy self-help. And I disagreed with him about the issue at hand, euthanasia, which was a second strike against him, since we read mostly to confirm our own wisdom.

All of which is to say what a bracing shock it was to actually plow through “Denial of the Soul” and discover not only that it was stern and serious stuff, but that Peck had managed to change my mind about the subject of dying.

It’s not a question I’d given endless thought, but like most people I know I pretty much assumed that Dr. Jack Kevorkian was, well, right. That is, though Doctor K seems like a certifiable loon, it seemed logical to me that people nearing the end of their lives should be able to choose to kill themselves. More, it seemed logical that they should. Now I’m not so sure.

One of the first stories in Peck’s book concerns a young Air Force sergeant with a brain tumor whom Peck treated 30 years ago in his early days as a military doctor. Tony slipped into a coma, breathing through a respirator. He was kept “alive” only by massive doses of adrenaline, but he was clearly dying: “What disturbed me more than anything was the copious amount of frothy light brown liquid that had begun to ooze out along the edges of his tracheotomy. It seemed to me that Tony’s body had clearly begun to rot.”

So, disobeying a direct order from the Army doctor above him, Peck clamped the IV tube supplying Tony’s body with drugs, and 10 minutes later Tony was dead. Peck defends such decisions squarely; he is no advocate of “heroic measures,” and in the past few decades most other doctors have joined him — pulling the plug is no longer unusual practice in most cases. Peck and his wife have living wills asking that medical technology not be used to prolong his life “at the expense of our humanity by maintaining us as ‘vegetables.’”

So he is not in any way an absolutist, nor is he a sadist — the next chapter of his book is devoted to physical pain, and it reads like a script and a screed. The script is for morphine, Demerol, codeine. The screed is against the many doctors and hospitals that dole them out in stingy, inadequate doses and on inflexible timetables that leave patients shivering in fear. Everyone should read this section, whatever their interest in questions like euthanasia; it is a valuable user’s guide to the hospital and its pharmacy.

Left to their own devices, with a handy pump that allows them to deliver their own dose of morphine, Peck says patients often use less of the drugs than a doctor would supply; even if they use more, the fear of addiction is insufficient cause to deny them relief from pain. In fact, he writes, it is “torture,” “malpractice” and “a crime.” “If I ever encountered a patient suffering serious chronic pain for which there was no hope of relief, I would consider euthanasia — physician-assisted suicide — a valid option,” says Peck. But that justification is “purely theoretical for me” since “I’ve never actually encountered such a patient.”

So far, so good — all right-minded people can agree. But why does Peck go on to say that sometimes he hopes for a lingering death? His answer lies in the realms of theology and psychology, and in some sense it is aimed at those Americans who feel they have souls — something inside them connected to a larger reality. Which, as he points out, is the vast majority of this professed religious society — even a great number of those who would never go to a church buy books about caring for their souls. But as he also points out, we simultaneously live in an essentially secular society, where even most of those who identify themselves as religious are in fact good materialists. Peck thinks euthanasia may be the best issue to shake that secularism a bit — to make the culture think seriously about something beyond convenience and comfort.

To take seriously the notion that we are creations of God, he points out, imposes certain limits on us. “This is not solely my life to do with as I see fit. To kill myself is to deny God, to deny Her timing and right to my life,” he writes. Peck argues not that we can’t kill ourselves — free will gives us every opportunity to do so — but that we shouldn’t.

But why on earth not? Is there any really convincing reason, one that might infect even a non-religious person with doubt? Peck doesn’t take the intuitive (and hideous) Protestant position that dying is one more trial that God throws at you and you should show your toughness by dealing with it bravely. No, his argument is considerably weirder. For Peck, dying is, well, educational. In fact, it’s “the opportunity of a lifetime for learning and soul development.”

This is not glib happytalk. All Peck’s books are pretty fierce, especially for therapeutic bestsellers. They are about relinquishing one’s illusions, about “doing the work of depression.” They are about giving up parts of ourselves: arrogance, unrealistic fantasies, a habit of sarcasm. This one in particular is about defeating the very ego that most of his psychological colleagues stoke and soothe. It’s about killing off parts of yourself before you die.

Peck says that the stages of dying that Elisabeth Kubler-Ross identified in her book “On Death and Dying” (denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance) are the schema for any of these kinds of ego-death — in individuals, in marriages, even in national traumas like Vietnam. (Of Vietnam, he writes, “Only recently, 25 years after the fact, does it look as if we have done some portion of the work of that depression by learning to relinquish a shred of our arrogant desire to control the world and come to some modicum of humility in our international relations.”)

Of all the opportunities for denying the ego, for reaching the religious understanding that “ego is its own worst enemy,” none is so powerful as one’s death. Kenosis, which Peck describes as “the process of the self emptying itself of self,” is the exact opposite of a consumer understanding of the world, and so in this culture it is hard for most of us to engage in it short of extremity. But at its end is a kind of acceptance that he claims is beautiful to watch — and that many of us have had the privilege to see in those deaths we call “good.”

Why not simply plan your death so as to cut off the last few weeks of unpleasantness, by orchestrating your demise so as to make it neat? Because in two or three or four weeks at the end of your life, with your physical pain controlled by morphine, hopefully in your own home or a hospice, you might learn about “how to negotiate a middle path between control and total passivity, about how to welcome the responsible care of strangers, about how to be dependent once again … about how to trust and maybe even, out of existential suffering, at least a little bit about how to pray or talk with God.”

To me, that is a powerful idea — it is not even necessary to share Peck’s belief in some form of afterlife to feel its power. It accords with all that I intuit about the world: most crucially, that our survival as a species and our happiness as individuals demands that we mature beyond the mindless consumerism that we currently identify as “human nature.” A culture that begins to understand death in new ways would almost certainly begin to understand life in new ways, too.

Peck has not solved every issue about euthanasia. In fact, he’s not convinced me that it shouldn’t be a choice for those who don’t care about any of the questions he discusses. And there are cases (ironically, many of those addressed by Kevorkian) that do not fit his model: people who may linger helplessly but consciously on the edge of death for years or decades, which seems rather a long semester to learn these lessons. There are difficult economic questions, too, in a society that feels it can’t afford to provide decent basic health care for Americans with many potentially happy years ahead.

But I’ve never read anything that made me think more seriously about my own death and what it might involve, and for that I am very grateful. Death — God willing a long ways away — scares me a tiny bit less than it did before I picked up this book.

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Bill McKibben is the Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, and founder of the global climate campaign 350.org. His latest book is "Eaarth: Making a Life on a Tough New Planet.".

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