Taliban

“Taliban” by Ahmed Rashid

A veteran journalist relates the full horror -- brutality, oppression of women and genocide -- of the new Afghanistan.

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Sometime in 1994, as Afghanistan tumbled into disarray in the wake of the civil war that followed the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, there emerged a highly secretive and heavily armed group known as the Taliban. Its declared purposes were to restore peace, to enforce traditional law and to defend the Islamic character of Afghanistan. The world now knows the rest of the story. After the cleric-led movement captured Kabul, the nation’s capital, in September 1996, it became clear to all observers that the Taliban represented a very troubling development in Islamic radicalism.

The Taliban, which springs from the Sunni branch of Islam, began a genocidal campaign designed to wipe out Shiite Muslims from much of Afghanistan. It openly countenanced international terrorism, harboring the criminal mastermind Osama bin Laden and giving him virtually free rein to plan bombings and assassinations. And it imposed a disturbing and deeply fundamentalist form of Muslim culture on the nation. Under the Taliban regime, girls’ schools were closed and women were forced to quit their jobs (at one time, 40 percent of Afghan doctors were female) and to wear a head-to-toe garment known as the burkha. Movies, television, videos, music and dance — all were banned.




This is a story that needs telling to a wide audience, and journalist Ahmed Rashid, who has covered the Afghan wars for more than 20 years as a correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Daily Telegraph, is well equipped to do that. Getting it was not an easy task: The Taliban is about as impenetrable a political organization as exists anywhere in the world. Its acknowledged leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, has never met with Western reporters or diplomats and has never even been photographed.

The tale is even more complicated, though. There’s also the matter of oil — specifically the desire of international oil companies to build a pipeline from the Caspian oil-producing region (home to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and several other small nations) to serve potentially massive markets in South Asia. The route goes directly through Afghanistan, and the result has been what Rashid refers to as “romancing the Taliban”: For years, he reports, U.S. economic interests, driven by oil, took precedence over human-rights concerns; only very recently did pressure from American women concerned about the repression of Afghan women finally lead to a reversal in policy. Rashid was on the scene all along, covering what he calls the new “Great Game” in Central Asia, a late 20th century version of the late 19th century colonial struggle for hegemony. “Policy was not being driven by politicians and diplomats,” he writes, “but by the secretive oil companies and intelligence services of the regional states.”

The chief virtue of Rashid’s account is his ability to delve beneath the surface of events without falling prey to a one-sided Marxist-style economic analysis. Oil is important — but so is geopolitics, including the American desire to play off Afghanistan against Iran; and so are the obvious issues surrounding the oppression of women by the Taliban. As Rashid places the Taliban in its historical and social context, he accomplishes the difficult task of maintaining a degree of empathy while still excoriating the organization as cruel, barbaric and repressive. Its members aren’t even good Muslims by anyone’s standard except their own:

The Taliban are poorly tutored in Islamic and Afghan history, knowledge of the Sharia [Islamic law] and the Koran and the political and theoretical developments in the Muslim world during the twentieth century. While Islamic radicalism in the twentieth century has a long history of scholarly writing and debate, the Taliban have no such historical perspective or tradition … Their exposure to the radical Islamic debate around the world is minimal, their sense of their own history is even less.

In Rashid’s view, the members of the Taliban “divest Islam of all its legacies except theology — Islamic philosophy, science, arts, aesthetics and mysticism are ignored.” Even the theology is ignored when it’s politically expedient: The organization has permitted opium, prohibited under Muslim law, to thrive as one of the disintegrating nation’s few cash crops. The Taliban also seems unconcerned with the day-to-day issues of governing, Rashid points out. Although Taliban leaders live simply and do not fatten their checkbooks on government revenues, their inefficiency is staggering; they seem to have no concept of economic policy beyond “Allah will provide.” The result is an Afghanistan that is rapidly falling back into the Middle Ages, a country where life expectancy is only about 44 years and 1.7 of every 100 mothers die in childbirth.

Unlike some opponents of the Taliban, Rashid does not dismiss the group as a mere puppet of the neighboring state of Pakistan; he emphasizes that it is primarily an indigenous Afghan movement that, in fact, poses an imminent threat to Pakistan. All in all, Rashid marshals the vast amount of information he has accumulated over decades of covering the area into a long, sad story and tells it with finesse. His book is a gripping account of one of the horror stories of post-Cold War politics.

Jonathan Groner is an editor at Legal Times in Washington.

Pakistani purge

The coup in Pakistan seems to have wide popular support -- with the proviso that military rule should be temporary.

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Pakistan plunged into a deep political uncertainty after the
military staged a successful coup Tuesday to dismiss the 32-month-old government
of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Major political parties and people at large have
welcomed the army takeover. But while they hold Sharif responsible for the
current turmoil, there is also a growing concern over how long army chief Gen.
Pervez Musharraf will hold power.

“Last time, the army took over in 1977 and
promised to hold elections within three months, but it took them 11 years to leave,” said Mohammad Hussain, a retired bureaucrat. “I wonder how long this regime will stay — the victim will only be democracy, which has failed to take roots in the country.”

Sharif’s ouster casts a shadow of doubt on the upcoming peace negotiations with
India. The two nuclear powers have had a protracted fight over the region of
Kashmir, and tensions have resulted in threats of nuclear attacks in the past.

Two-time prime minister and Pakistan People’s Party chairwoman Benazir Bhutto called on the military to hold elections and go back to the barracks. “I fully blame the prime minister,” she said from her home in London,
where she is in exile; Pakistan’s courts have charged her with corruption. “But the existing situation is fluid and dangerous. Pakistan appears to be in a state of civil war.”

Tahirul Qadri, the head of the Pakistan People’s Movement, an Islamist party, said, “It was Sharif’s blunders that forced the
army to take over, I congratulate the army a hundred times for getting rid of
this fascist ruler.” The Pakistan People’s Movement is one of 19 parties that
formed a Grand Democratic Alliance last month to oust the Sharif government.

Sharif’s is the fifth government since 1985 to be dismissed before its
constitutionally mandated five-year term was up. Four others were axed by the president
under special constitutional powers scrapped by the Sharif government soon after
it took over. The military has ruled Pakistan for more than 20 of the 52 years
since the nation’s founding.

Political analysts believe the coup grew out of a series of miscalculations and political blunders by Sharif’s government. They note in particular the mishandling of the ongoing conflict in Kashmir — particularly Sharif’s decision to withdraw troops from the disputed territory after an agreement with the United States in July.

“Sharif ordered the pullout when the Kashmiri
mujahedeen were at an advantageous position against the Indian Army, The government decision had caused much resentment among the army ranks,” said Daudur Rahim, editor at a local news agency — adding that he is saddened to see his
countrymen look to the military to intervene in issues that should be sorted out
politically and in a democratic way.

“Sharif had become an unpopular leader due
to his authoritarian attitude,” commented Afasarul Mulk, a local leader of the
Pakistan People’s Party. “Although I would oppose army rule and favor the
democratic process, I have no regrets for Sharif’s ouster. He was a dictator in
the garb of democracy.”

In addition, critics said Sharif had failed to control a recent upsurge in the
sectarian violence that has left more than 50 people dead, with a majority of the victims coming from the minority Shiite community. This led the religious political parties,
particularly those representing Shiites, to call upon the army to intervene.

“The Sharif government’s failure to control the situation further eroded its
credibility — the government should have resigned,” observed Babar Ali Sher,
a Shiite and owner of a car rental business in Islamabad.

Sharif also made enemies with many Muslim groups inside Pakistan
when he blamed Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban party for involvement in sectarian violence in Pakistan. The radical Taliban, who are Sunni Muslims, enjoy massive support among the strong Islamist lobby within the army — the same lobby that opposed Pakistan’s withdrawal from Kashmir this July. Sharif had asked the Taliban to shut down terrorist training camps and stop the influx of terrorists to Pakistan — indicating a change in Islamabad’s position. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the only countries that have recognized Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan.

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Days of rage (cont.)

Filmmaker Stephen Talbot fires back at David Horowitz over his PBS documentary '1968.'

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My greatest transgression, it seems, was not including David Horowitz in my article and documentary about 1968. “Me, for instance,” he volunteers when proposing the ’60s veterans I should have interviewed. Talk about narcissism! And Horowitz doesn’t even have the excuse of being a baby boomer.

It reminds me of the joke his former colleagues tell. Back in the ’60s David had a reputation for being arrogant and self-obsessed. And now that his politics have flipped 180 degrees, he’s still arrogant and self-obsessed.

Once a polemicist for the left, now a polemicist for the right. Some things never change.

Not that Horowitz hasn’t made some valid points. His perspective on the revolutionary delusions and excesses of the New Left, after 1968, and his revelations of thuggery within the Black Panthers are important to understanding the full story of what happened to the protest movements of the ’60s. In fact, if PBS or anyone else offers me funding to do more films on the ’60s, especially the late ’60s-early ’70s period — what Todd Gitlin calls “the days of rage” — I would like to interview Horowitz and other ex-revolutionaries.

On the subject of 1968, however, Horowitz is so focused on his personal odyssey from red-diaper baby to anti-communist crusader that he misses the significance of the year for most young people who were involved in the anti-war and civil rights movements. As a self-described “pre-boomer,” Horowitz by 1968 may have been a cynic trying to manipulate innocents like me — certainly I remember reading his tomes denouncing U.S. imperialism and being influenced by them. But when Horowitz claims “we had declared war on … the democratic system,” he’s talking about himself, not the thousands of young, idealistic activists who sought to end the war in Vietnam by campaigning for Sens. Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy or marched with Martin Luther King Jr. to end segregation in the South.

Horowitz’s diatribes would be more convincing if he got his facts right. For instance, he accuses me of making films “into the ’80s celebrating Communist insurgents who were busily extending the Soviet sphere in Africa. America, bless its generous heart, has already forgiven Steve Talbot for that. So why lie about it now?”

What on earth is he talking about? What lie? I have made two documentaries about Africa — one about Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress (“South Africa Under Siege,” 1986) and one called “Namibia: Behind the Lines” (1981), about that country’s struggle for independence from South Africa. Both films are straightforward and honest and were praised for their reporting. One awful mistake that Horowitz’s hero Ronald Reagan made was to assume, incorrectly, that the ANC was a tool of Moscow and as a result he allied U.S. policy with the apartheid government. Even Newt Gingrich came to see that Reagan was on the wrong side of history — too bad Horowitz never saw the light.

In fact, Horowitz is still praising Oliver North (of all people!) and the Afghan “freedom fighters” — a phrase he might want to modify in light of what the Taliban are now inflicting on women and non-believers, and the revelation that one of those CIA-sponsored “freedom fighters” is the infamous Osama bin Laden.

Horowitz is less concerned with the narrative of 1968 than he is with his personal “God that failed” story. And when he gets so many details wrong it makes me suspicious of everything he writes.

For instance, how does he know whether I was “following” Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968? Without a shred of evidence, he claims I wasn’t. In fact, I was devoted to King’s cause — which is why I was so distraught at his death. Among other reasons, I was deeply impressed by King’s courageous decision to speak out forcefully against the war in Vietnam — a move strongly endorsed by Horowitz’s own Ramparts magazine. It’s true that many young blacks in urban areas of the North, and some leaders of the New Left, were growing impatient with King’s nonviolent strategy. Even King had doubts and was despondent. I said so in the documentary.

Horowitz’s fantasy that Tom Hayden destroyed the Democratic Party in 1968 is preposterous. Lyndon Johnson, Richard Daley and Hubert Humphrey bear the lion’s share of that burden. Cold War liberals were afraid to admit that they had made a tragic mistake in Vietnam. Horowitz and I agree that both sides, the protesters and Mayor Daley’s police force, were spoiling for a fight at the Democratic Convention that year — and that many people in the anti-war movement stayed away from Chicago for fear of violence. But while some radicals were eager to riot, most of the demonstrators were not, including anti-war leaders Dave Dellinger and Rennie Davis. Mayor Daley’s cops didn’t mind whether they clubbed a Yippie, a McCarthy delegate, a reporter or Hugh Hefner.

There is one sentence in Horowitz’s rant that I find encouraging. “It would be nice,” he writes, “if we could use this 30th anniversary of the events of 1968 to end the cold war over our past, and start restoring a sense of the tragic to both sides.”

Surely there was tragedy on both sides of the Cold War, and there is enormous room now for reconsideration and changed opinions. That’s exactly what Todd Gitlin did in his excellent book reassessing the ’60s and his more recent writing decrying “identity politics.” In my documentary Gitlin even says he was wrong not to vote for Hubert Humphrey in 1968.

If Horowitz were more honest himself and less of an ideological blowhard, he might make a useful contribution to this ongoing reevaluation of the ’60s.

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Stephen Talbot's summer movie picks are "Smoke Signals" and "Bulworth."

In the Footsteps of Alexander the Great

The tale of journalist and filmmaker Michael Wood's journey via Landrover, camel, foot and boat in the path of Alexander the Great.

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By early spring Alexander was ready to go. He had to cross the Hindu Kush, the great rampart of mountains which rises north of Kabul — the “killer of Hindus” as it was called by the Muslim conquerors who came this way in the Middle Ages. This was the great route used by all invaders of the subcontinent. There are about sixteen passes, some up to 5 or 6000 metres in height, but only three have really counted in history. The main one today is the Salang Pass, now a modern road and tunnel used by the Russian convoys on their way up from Termez. The second route is westwards to Bamian, one of the most extraordinary sites in Asia — the Valley of the Great Buddhas. This hauntingly beautiful place, with its gigantic statues carved into the cliffs, was visited by Marco Polo and by the Chinese explorers who came overland to bring back the Buddhist sacred texts from India. But this, and the Salang, were probably barred to Alexander because Bessus had devastated the countryside beyond them all the way to Balkh, the capital of Bactria. Alexander’s intelligence would have informed him that supplying his army was out of the question on those routes. That left him one obvious alternative — the Khawak Pass. This is the eastern route rising up on a gentle gradient. It was used by Tamerlane, Genghis Khan and other invaders of India. This was the route we decided to take.

We prepared for our expedition by renovating the old BBC Landrover and getting hold of a back-up Jeep, with spare axles and tyres (no mean feat in Kabul these days). Then, as the storm-clouds of war gathered over Kabul, with Taliban attacks growing in intensity, we headed north towards Chakrikar and the Panjshir valley to follow once more in Alexander’s footsteps.

At Begram, near Charikar, he founded Alexandria under the Caucasus, with several thousand retired veterans, invalids and press-ganged locals. It is a wide and pleasant plain, 2000 metres up, but sheltered in the lee of the great spurs of the mountains. Fertile and well-watered, the vine and the olive will grow here, some compensation, perhaps, for the men Alexander forced to stay behind. He then continued up the Panjshir valley and into the mountains. The Greeks called these ranges the Caucasus, believing them to be close to the ends of the earth. Here, the army entered mythical space and time: marching under mountains where, so it was said, the Titan Prometheus had been tortured for aeons by Zeus for revealing to humankind the secret of fire and the arts of civilization. Here, as elsewhere with the tales of Hercules and Dionysus, real and mythological history merged in the impressionable mind of the young Alexander.

It took us two days on a very rough road to negotiate the 80 kilometres of the Panjshir valley, driving slowly under great brown ridges which keep the sun off the valley bottoms for the fist two hours of the morning. All along the road we passed ruined Russian gear (this had been one of the main routes by which the Mujahaddin resistance kept up pressure on the invaders). It is a harsh terrain for modern armies, and wrecked APCs (armoured-personnel carriers) lay everywhere. They had met fierce resistance here and, in the end, for all their technological superiority the poor Russian conscripts from Omsk and Tomsk just couldn’t take it. The Macedonians though, like Afghans, were a mountain people, hard as nails. The valley was beautiful: the cold blue water of the river, green gardens and fields, neat brown mud-brick houses, with vivid splashes of colour from the maize and apricots drying on their roofs. And above, the great bare-ribbed mountains.

Alexander’s army must have moved forward only slowly; an immense column miles long; a logistical headache for the high command and for the quartermasters who had to supply and feed them. Even by Landrover it was slow progress, crossing and recrossing the river. The vehicle broke down, ran out of petrol and, at one point, a landslide blocked the route for a night. Then, towards the end of the valley, the stony track began to rise up into the mountains and we passed single lines of travellers on foot and on horseback. Suddenly, it was easy to imagine the Macedonian army stretched out all the way down the Panjshir.

Finally, on the third day, we reached the village of Ao Khawak. It stands at the junction of two fast-flowing mountain rivers. Ahead the path goes up into the mountains of Nuristan, and to the north a rough dirt-track led off towards the Khawak Pass. From there it is about 80 kilometres down into the Pul i Kumri valley. We crossed the Khawak river by a wooden bridge and entered what looks like a nest of brigands and footpads: a huddle of hovels, stables and warehouses of squat stone, timber roofs weighed with heavy stones. There were clusters of dank hostels and smoke-blackened shanties where meals are cooked round the clock for traders and travellers. In the street, there was a great hubbub of activity for, although much of the goods and the people are brought here by truck, this is the jumping-off place for an older kind of travel, by foot and horseback on one of the ancient routes between India and Asia. From here, to get to north Afghanistan, we would have to walk.

In the middle of all this, surrounded by roaring waters and overlooked by the pyramid peak of Deh Parian, we found an open space for hundreds of horses, thin ribby animals with cloth nosebags, wicker panniers, ropes and harnesses. Their drivers are mostly young (old men would not last such a hard life). Wiry young jockeys, thin and sun-blackened, they charge 60,000 Afghanis (about # 12) to take you and your baggage across the mountains. In charge is the redoubtable commander Khalil, a shaggy giant of a man with a long black beard and a gimlet eye. He chose our horses, drivers and arranged for armed guards to accompany us the following day, to ward off the bandits which he said might attack us on the path. We were five strong, Peter, Tim, David, me, and Hanif Sharzat, an Afghan friend and journalist, who had gamely volunteered to be our translator. Hanif speaks Pashto, Farsi, Uzbek, Urdu and Russian, which he reckoned should be enough to talk our way out of the clutches of the various warlords across our path, and get us through to the Afghan-Uzbek border.

We were travelling now only with what we and three horses could carry. Before we set out I experienced another sharp pang of excitement. Once again, as nearly as we could, we were about to experience what the Greeks had gone through, and the sense of treading right in their footsteps was palpable. We had stripped down to essentials: a warm jacket, rucksack, sleeping bag, some emergency food (apples, nuts, and some stony chunks of dried mulberries) and, as always, Arrian and Curtius. We loaded the camera stock-box and the other film gear into rope and cloth panniers, and in the early afternoon our drivers led the horses off over the bridge and up the river valley alongside the rushing torrent. Soon we were into the ravines, then up a narrow dirt path on the first precipitous climb above the river. By three in the afternoon the air was unexpectedly chilly, and the valley bottoms were already in deep shadow as we left Nuristan behind us, the Land of Light, and headed north towards the snowy peaks of the Hindu Kush and, beyond, the fabled Oxus.

That first afternoon, to my surprise, all along the route we saw people — on camels, horses and mules, on foot, too. There were traders, smugglers, refugees, and travellers. We even met some newly-weds, a man with his two wives on horseback, covered from head to foot in billowing robes as their horses gingerly crossed rickety plank bridges and sometimes waded chest-deep through the raging torrent. Sometimes we went up narrow earth paths along towering hillsides over the river gorge, across the face of long stony screes, down which any stumble could have been fatal, but the horses knew the path well. So, I reflected, the Khawak — an ancient route used throughout history — was still a great thoroughfare today. It seemed unbelievable, at first, as I took in the terrain, but the ancient armies were so tough and mobile, that for them this was a serviceable route.

That night we stopped at a cluster of stables and mud-brick dormitories which we shared with our fellow travellers. We ate bread and gruel by oil lamp with the local headman. We were, he told us, the first Westerners to come through since the war with the Russians. During the war the conditions here had been terrible. The people of the Pass had lived in caves by day, emerging only at night to cook and bake their bread. It must have been like that in 329 BC, too: killed if you didn’t give up your precious winter stores to the invaders, killed perhaps even if you did.

Later, as I stretched out on our hostel floor, I turned over the pages of Arrian in the light of a Tilly lamp and reflected once more on the character of Alexander and his men. The Macedonians were inured to war but, even so, the journey was tough. It took the army sixteen days from front-to-tail to get over the Khawak Pass; it was January, bitterly cold at night. For food, they could plunder the winter stores of the locals, but two weeks of food for an army that size runs into several thousand tonnes — and unless they carried it with them they would starve. Reading Arrian in that spot, it also occurred to me that it is virtually the same Afghanistan now. The long vicious war with the Russians has brought them back almost to the same subsistence level. They have got guns now, but otherwise the equation is the same. The same mountains, same harsh climate, same hard people.

Next day we said goodbye to the commander. The situation was tense, with trouble expected ahead, but Khalil had been as good as his word. The local headman left us with two gunmen to hold off bandits reported to be lying ahead in ambush. The path was higher and colder now, the wind more biting. We can guess from the Greeks’ accounts that they, too, found it harder as the land grew more barren. They were into something of a logistical nightmare by now. As we walked on, I found myself trying to make rough calculations: how long does it take an army to march past a single point? Their army could have been spread over 25 kilometres or more. It was for this reason that their crossing of the Khawak had run into a second week; then the supply corps had found it could no longer feed the long line of troops funnelling into the Pass form the Panjshir valley. the army had run out of food.

The quarter masters asked for permission to start killing the pack animals, but there was no wood on the bare hills to make cooking fires, and they were reduced to eating the flesh raw. This they did, but to offset illness, says Arrian, they used the juice of a plant which grew on the mountains, apparently to chew with the meat. Historians have often wondered about this tale. Tall story? Propaganda? Perhaps. But the army doctors would have been trained in the use of herbal medicines — this is still the basis of the Yunnani medicine, practiced in Afghanistan by the hakims who, as I have already mentioned, claim descent from the doctors who went with Alexander. In the event, we only had to ask our horse-handlers to find the answer. There, on the Khawak, grew a plant which fitted the bill. Arrian called it sylphion; we know it as asafoetida — a resin obtained from the roots of plants of the genus Ferula. It grows in the spring and is widely used as medicine. In the Middle Ages it was produced in bulk and sold in the bazaars of Merv and Bukhara. Even during the Russian occupation, we were told, the guerrillas used it to heal wounds and cure stomach upsets. The Greeks had not been telling fairy tales.

We stopped at midday in rarefied air at a subterranean stone-roofed chai-stop where the horsemen took food and the horses grazed on the thin grass. Smoke curled from a cairn of stones over the roof, recalling the Greek story of Afghan houses so bedded down in rocks that only smoke from chimneys showed where they were. We ate hot coarse bread and drank green tea flavoured with cardamoms; someone brought some grapes washed in the icy blue stream below the path. Inside, under a smoke-blackened brick vault, was an ancient samovar, a rice-steamer and various teapots. Along the wall, there was a crowd of turbaned men with bandoliers and guns. In the air was the sweet resinous smell of firewood. On hearing why we were there, an old man told a story that many Greeks had died on Alexander’s passage through the Pass, and that a circle of stones with tattered flags on the way to the top marked the graves of his troops.

We pushed on up the long slope, as the wind started to course down between the hills. Sixteen kilometres up from Ao Khawak, at a little under 4000 metres, we reached the summit. In thin air and a chill wind, we were surrounded by snow streaked peaks with creamy white clouds coming over the tops. The last few metres drew us on to see the view the Greeks had seen all those years before. Again, there was that eerie feeling of standing on the very spot where Alexander had stood. He knew at that moment he had got through, that his gamble had paid off. The Pass had been undefended. Below us, the road snaked down, still sunlit towards northern Afghanistan and the Oxus, beyond which lay the great plains of central Asia.

“Nothing put him off,” said Arrian. “Starvation, the freezing cold, nothing — he just kept coming on and on. And in the end his enemies were struck with fear and amazement.”

Standing shivering on the top of the Khawak Pass, it was easy for us to see why. Once again Alexander had shown that left any chance he would take it. As we set off we met a group of Tajiks and Uzbeks coming up from Cental Asia. The way was clear, the highwaymen had been chased off. “Get a move on and you’ll be in Anderab by nightfall,” one said.

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INTO BACTRIA

For Alexander, the way to Bactria lay open. He could now rest and recuperate in the fertile valleys around Kunduz while the tail of his exhausted and starving army filtered through. These lands are particularly fertile. The great traveller Ibn Battuta, when he crossed the Khawak in 1333, stopped here for forty days, and speaks of their “fine pastures and herbage.” We rested at Pul i Kumri with the hospitable local warlord, an Ismaeli Shia. It was an unlikely meeting in such a place and time. Jaffar went to school in Harrow and once delivered pizzas in Detroit. He and his clan have protected their valleys from the war around them, and from the passage of armies, while Afghanistan has fallen back into its ancient regional divisions. Such warlords seem to be affectionately regarded by their people, but they inhabit a strange world. Some I have met mix intermittent bursts of warfare with prodigious drinking sessions on Russian vodka and Johnny Walker, enlivened by Tajik girls and the latest CDs from the West. I guessed the Macedonians were no different. In his villa Jaffar showed me antiquities, a great Greek inscription from a nearby site, medieval bronzes from Balkh, Greek coins from lost cities on the Oxus. His, I suspect, was a world not unlike that of 330 BC, a time of shifting allegiances as local hard men try to keep their position like the satraps of old. Back in Alexander’s day, however, the difference was that the outside power — Alexander’s power — was so overwhelming nobody could resist him.

After a few days of Jaffar’s hospitality, we decided to push on. As we set out to head north once more, I experienced a sudden sharp taste of anxiety. Jaffar’s tanks were rumbling through the streets belching black oily diesel smoke and the wind was whipping up fierce eddies of dust as they began to move their forces towards the mountain passes we had just crossed. On BBC World Service radio we heard that the Taliban were closing in on Kabul. We were besieged by ever-present thoughts of war; so much of Afghan history has been — and still is — foreign invasion and civil struggle. Once the Russians had been beaten, no one seemed to care any more if the land was torn to pieces. So the cycle of history comes round. Poor Afghanistan.

We had hired a battered Russian pick-up to make the run north to the Oxus. It had no rear windows, which made it pleasantly draughty by day when the sun scorches, but freezing by night. We were also beset by all the usual worries about breaking down as we headed on in Alexander’s footsteps.

As soon as Alexander’s army had recovered from the crossing of the Khawak, he moved quickly towards the Oxus river, which divides present-day Afghanistan from the former Soviet Central Asia. Following in his track through northern Afghanistan, you go through a string of fertile valleys between barren ranges of hills; then enter huge gorges which lead down to the Oxus plain.

That nightfall we came to Tashkurgan, the Greek Aornos, to find the town shattered by war. The ancient citadel, with its great mud-brick castle which stood over lush orchards, had been pounded to bits in the fighting; the lovely wooden souk, and the bazaar whose ceiling had been delightfully inlaid with blue Chinese porcelain bowls, had been levelled; the old town was a wasteland of devastated mud-brick buildings. This was no time to explore. The town is held by Hisbe Islami who have been known to kidnap Westerners and seize their gear — especially cameras. Suddenly our driver muttered urgently that we should get out of the place. We attempted to, but, unbelievably, we broke down on the outskirts just by an armed post. Providence intervened. At that moment the muezzin sang out the call for Friday prayers and our potential captors melted away, just as a dust-storm whirled down the street and hid us from prying eyes. Five minutes tinkering under the bonnet by torchlight and we were on the road again. After a couple of more hours huddled in cold bumpy darkness, we entered Mazar. We had made it across Afghanistan from Kabul to the north. Given the fact that we were only five people, and unarmed at that, it seemed an achievement. At the UN rest-house, a kindly diplomat gave us half a crate of Turkish beer and we had a quiet celebration.

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