Demonstrations without formal approval have essentially been banned there since 1967. And so the uprising last month, with illegal protesters controlling the streets and publicly denouncing the Egyptian government, was like nothing Cairo had seen since the 1970s.

As hopes for a quick war and a decisive peace in Iraq largely fade, governments in the Arab region face a challenge that they’ve come to dread: With vivid pictures of Iraqi destruction and death on every television, they are under pressure to do something about it — and sometimes, the anger expands beyond the British, beyond the Americans, to scald their own home governments.

Thanks in many cases to repressive methods for controlling dissent, none of the governments are likely to fall. Some, in fact, have little at all to fear. But how the war plays out outside Iraq in the coming weeks could say a lot about the future stability of governments in the region, and that, in turn, could directly affect how those regimes deal with the United States.

Mubarak’s reaction to the Egyptian dissent was predictable, violent, and very effective, at least for the short term. The day after protesters captured the central square, a crowd assembled at Cairo’s al-Azhar mosque for Friday afternoon prayers and prepared to march again. This time, thousands of police officers surrounded the building and trapped the crowd inside. Protesters broke windows in order to escape into the streets, only to be met by cannons, tear gas and attack dogs.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian police forces fanned out across the city, arresting approximately 1,500 people, some of whom had been part of the first protest and some who were simply well-known political activists, including two members of the Egyptian Parliament. According to Human Right Watch, many of those arrested were beaten, tortured and threatened with rape.

How effective was the crackdown? The next week in Cairo, a much smaller, properly sanctioned demonstration occurred after the Friday prayers, as policemen escorted a well-behaved crowd away from downtown as they chanted anti-American and anti-British (but not anti-Mubarak) slogans and then peacefully dispersed. Days later, Mubarak changed his rhetoric about the war, suggesting the U.S.-led battle for Iraq would likely produce more terrorist threats: “If there is one [Osama] bin Laden now,” he warned, “there will be 100 bin Ladens afterward.”

Mubarak’s momentary flip-flop illustrated what has long been a difficult balancing act not only for Egypt but also for Arab regimes such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. On the one hand they depend on the United States for economic and security aid, but on the other they have to at least pay lip service to the passions of their people. Arabs see the hypocrisy, and the bowing to the West, and they seethe.

“All the Arab governments have been so emasculated and discredited and humiliated by this war,” says Sheila Carapico, who teaches Middle Eastern politics at the University of Richmond in Virginia. “Nobody there expects their governments to do anything about it. People are just mad.”

Granted, the passions of the masses can be, and usually are, ignored by the autocratic Arab administrations. But when the issue is of war and peace, and when that war involves a nearby Arab nation being invaded by U.S.-led troops, the pressure from the street is dismissed at leaders’ peril.

Even for Arab governments without a strategic alliance with the United States, such as Iran, Syria, and Yemen, there are fears that a protracted war could bring instability at home. At the opposite end of the spectrum, though, are the anomalies of the region, such as Kuwait and Qatar, which have openly welcomed American troops without the slightest concern about a backlash.

For now, most eyes are on the major Arab players who have to walk a tightrope between the Middle East and the West. “It’s still too early in the game to say any of these Arab governments are in danger,” says Chris Toesning, editor of the Middle East Report, a scholarly monthly. Indeed, considering the nonstop images Arabs are seeing on television of bombed-out Iraqi marketplaces and news accounts about an Iraqi maternity hospital being hit by coalition forces, the political mood on the streets remains calm, relatively speaking. “Demonstrations are to be expected,” says Judith Miller, a Middle East analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington. “But for now it’s a wait-and-see attitude.”

“The key is how long the war lasts,” says P.S. Singer, a fellow at the Brookings Institute, a foreign policy think tank. “How deep is the sentiment? What other domestic issues could get fed into the protests, and are there groups that can mobilizes that anger? The reverse is, what tools do the governments have for clamping down? A good security force? Do they have state-run media to help people blow off steam” by printing angry anti-American editorials?

Here’s a look at the countries in the region, and how the war is likely to play out in coming weeks.

Saudi Arabia

During Gulf War I, the Saudis stepped up as the key U.S. ally among Arab states. This time they begged off, choosing to work quietly behind the scenes to aid the military campaign. Despite press reports that Saudis are privately furious about the war, don’t look for antiwar protests in the streets, since demonstrations, not to mention political parties, are outlawed.

Of all the regimes in the region, the Saudi royal family has the least to fear, simply because it exerts such complete control over all elements of public and political life. While other Arab governments have at least made a pass at creating democratic-looking, representative-type institutions, the Saudi monarchy never bothered.

“They have always operated in their own special atmosphere,” says John Voll, professor of Islamic history at Georgetown University. That political silence has been paid for with oil revenues, or more specifically with Saudi’s famously cushy cradle-to-grave welfare state. Recently though, even that has been showing signs of strain, leading in part to a rise in Islamic fundamentalism.

Egypt

For 22 years Mubarak has ruled the largest Arab country in the world (its population today is 70 million), and without his iron grip Egypt would almost certainly swing hostile to America. And he has used a brutal security force to maintain his power and his country’s stability. Throughout the 1990s, his forces waged a relentless crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, in order to prevent their fundamentalism from taking root. Today he remains firmly in control of all aspects of government, faces no viable opposition party, and is grooming his son to succeed him.

Still, Toesning notes, “the Egyptian regime has been getting more erratic and unpredictable over the years  [The] indiscriminate nature of the recent Cairo crackdown tells me they’re freaked out about what’s going on and taking drastic measures to tone the protests down.”

As his bin Laden quote shows, Mubarak is also adept at playing the Egyptian masses. Recently, Al Azhar in Cairo, the most venerable institution of Islamic learning, called for a jihad in order “to defend themselves, their doctrine and lands,” against an American invasion of Iraq. Mubarak certainly OK’d that proclamation before it was issued. The government can also use its press to help Egyptians vent their anger. “Dreadful massacre in Baghdad,” read a recent banner headline in Egypt’s mass circulation Akhbar al-Yawm newspaper.

Yemen

In 1990, when Yemen was a member of the U.N. Security Council and voted not to support the Gulf War, it was famously told by a U.S. representative that the country had just cast the most expensive vote in history. One of the poorest countries in the Arab world, with a 30 percent unemployment rate, Yemen lost billions in U.S. aid. “The plan next time around was to support the United States come hell or high water,” says Carapico at the University of Richmond. But with war opposition cutting across the political spectrum, Yemen again begged off. Unlike Egypt, Yemen does not enjoy a strong internal security force and therefore must tolerate more dissent at home, particularly from Islamists who are upset about getting maneuvered out of power, says Singer.

Even without ties to the U.S., Yemen’s government has been battling its people in the streets since the war started. Three protesters were killed last month. “It’s not like Egypt,” says Carapico, who describes heavily armed Yemen as the “wild, wild West.” “You shoot at a crowd in Yemen, they shoot back.” Last week the U.S. State Department, citing terrorist threats, renewed its warning about travel to Yemen, authorizing the voluntary departure of nonessential embassy personnel and family members. Yemen remains a favorite base for al-Qaida terrorists, who like a country that’s next to Saudi Arabia, whose government does not control every mountain and valley, and where walking around with an automatic weapon does not necessarily draw attention.

Jordan

King Abdullah, whose public base of support is much weaker than his late, famous father’s, enjoys the backing of a strong riot police, general and special security services, and a force of secret police. He may need it in the weeks ahead. Located between Iraq and the West Bank, Jordan plays home to a very large Palestinian population that’s beginning to see in the U.S. occupation of Iraq similarities to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. Also, several southern Jordanian trucking towns rely on commercial trade routes to Iraq for their livelihood, and those routes have been blown apart by the war.

“Most people think Jordan is in the tightest spot,” Toesning notes.

“Jordan is the place where major urban demonstrations can get out of control,” Voll says. In 1991, Jordan remained neutral in Gulf War I. Today though, the king is desperate to maintain ties to the West in hopes of boosting Jordan’s sagging economy. In 2000, Jordan acceded to the World Trade Organization and signed free-trade agreements with the United States. For now, Friday sermons continue to be pre-approved by government officials.

Syria

A counter to the official voices of moderation that spring from the capitals in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Syria has long prided itself on taking a hard line against the West, Israel, and more recently the Iraqi war. While other Arab leaders are afraid to speak out, Syrian President Bashar Assad has stepped to the forefront as the Arab ruler most willing to denounce the war, labeling the invasion a “fiasco” and suggesting American officials be tried for crimes against humanity.

“He’s definitely playing to the street,” says Charles Kimball, chair of the Department of Religion at Wake Forest University in Winston-Salem, N.C. Assad may also be using the war to divert attention from Syria’s rigid police. There’s still lingering resentment that the liberties granted during the so-called Damascus Spring of 2001, such as allowing political opponents to meet, were sharply reversed last year and marked by mass arrests.

If the war in Iraq does take months, that may be good news for Damascus, since some analysts believe the United States may want to extend its regime-change program to Syria. But will Americans have the stomach for another Middle East military adventure if knocking off Iraq ends in a victory that’s bloodier and messier than expected? “If Syria is on the list,” says Voll, “the longer the Iraq war goes on, the less likely the United States is to invade Syria.”

Turkey

Thursday’s terrorist attacks on the British embassy in Istanbul highlighted what government leaders there have known for weeks: The Turkish people uniformly oppose the war. Politically, the good news is that by denying the United States access to Turkish military bases to launch a northern offensive against Baghdad, the Turkish Parliament can say it stood up for popular opinion. The bad news is that defiant stance cost Turkey billions in critical economic aid, which the country’s faltering economy desperately needs. And then there’s the unknown surrounding Turkey’s politically powerful military, which was in favor of letting in U.S. troops. “The military is the giant anaconda behind Turkey’s door,” says Mary Ann Tetreault, professor of international affairs at Trinity College in San Antonio, Texas. If in coming weeks Saddam’s regime collapses and Kurds in northern Iraq begin to make advances toward creating an independent Kurdish state, thereby stirring unrest among Kurds in Turkey, the giant anaconda could strike.

Iran

Saddam’s army killed 1 million Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and today, Iran has no love for its western neighbor. But as a charter member of Bush’s axis of evil, Iran doesn’t trust the United States, either. That helps explain why a new, state-run TV station being broadcast to the Iraqi people from Tehran is both anti-Saddam and antiwar.

Ironically, the U.S.-led war to liberate and democratize Iraq is hurting Iran’s youth-led democracy movement, which for years has been trying to institute reforms by wrestling power away from conservative, anti-American clerics. “Part of the youth revolution movement is to create economic recovery through closer relations with the United States and the West,” explains Singer. In the current climate, where the United States is seen as waging an illegitimate war against Iraq, any such talk puts Iranian youths at risk of being painted as pro-American.

“The war strengthens the conservatives’ hold on power,” says Singer. And with war casualties mounting, many Iranian progressives themselves, once hopeful of having a democratic neighbor to the west, have become disillusioned with America.

Pakistan

Pakistan is not an Arab country, but it is widely regarded as one of the big pillars of the Islamic world most at risk from an invasion of Iraq. Following the Sept. 11 attack on America, Pakistan emerged as a key regional ally in the war on terror, helping the United States root out the Qaida-friendly Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan. President Pervez Musharraf made the overt alliance at the risk of provoking powerful Islamic radicals in his country.

Fast-forward to this week, and those Islamist groups held the largest rally in Pakistan’s recent history, with a quarter of a million people protesting against the war in the city of Peshawar. Then the Pakistani senate unanimously passed a resolution expressing solidarity with the Iraqi people, deploring the war on Iraq, and demanding that the U.N. Security Council step in and end it. Similar to the dynamics in Iran, the war in Iraq means liberal, secularist Pakistanis are afraid that today’s anti-western mood makes it politically impossible for them to debate Islamic militants, since pro-democracy activists are dismissed as pro-American apologists. As the war rages on, Musharraf himself is being denounced by the religious right as an American stooge and viewed suspiciously by some of his officers.

Kuwait

Like Iranians, Kuwaitis understand first-hand the brutality of Saddam, having suffered through his 1990 invasion. They still feel residual goodwill toward American troops for leading the coalition forces to liberate Kuwait during Gulf War I. That’s one reason the U.S. finds an unusually warm welcome there. Today, the Iraqi replacement government assembled by the White House is in Kuwait waiting for its call to duty.

“Kuwait has special status because it was invaded, and it’s a status that other Arab countries recognize — that Kuwait has a different view of the war,” says Tetreault. Not that the Kuwaiti government isn’t concerned about a prolonged war and a possibly messy peace. “Collateral damage doesn’t look collateral to most Arabs, including Kuwaitis,” she says. “It’s very difficult for people to deal with women and children getting killed.” If resentment ever boiled over into the form of public protests in oil-rich Kuwait — even peaceful protests — the White House will know for sure it had completely failed to win and hearts and minds in the region.

Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates

All three tiny, wealthy Arab outposts enjoy close relations with the United States and have little to worry about in terms of local unrest, proving once again how money and good leadership can smooth over almost any problem. “There’s been an admirable redistribution program from oil revenues, so there’s no huge deprived class of unemployed people on street corners plotting uprisings,” says Tetreault. That generosity has also helped to put on a lid on Islamic fundamentalism.

(By contrast, fundamentalism is rampant in Saudi Arabia, where there’s open tension about where all the oil revenue goes, and how much trickles down.)

The other factor behind America’s warm welcome is that these miniature countries need the United States for protection, both from outright invasions like Iraq’s 1990 move on Kuwait and during periodic border disputes. “If they throw the U.S. out,” Tetreault asks, “who’s going to protect them if they get picked on?”

Wooed by such a wealthy suitor, Guinea may not be able to afford ideology.

Such are the naked politics of checkbook diplomacy, currently on gaudy display as the Bush administration tries to pull from among the 15 members of the U.N. Security Council the nine votes required to authorize an invasion. In the tug-of-war over the six undecided countries that will determine the final outcome, the U.S. is brandishing its wallet as a weapon. Guinea, Mexico, Chile, Angola, Cameroon and Pakistan all face the same dilemma this week: Ignore mounting opposition to war at home, or face the wrath of Washington?

Turkey has been offered $6 billion in direct aid, plus billions more in loans, if it will allow the U.S. to base soldiers there in advance of an invasion. But promises are flowing to nations far from the war front. A no vote by Chile could jeopardize a bill now pending in Congress for increased trade access — a measure worth billions of dollars over time. For Cameroon, a proposed 670-mile oil pipeline from Chad to be built by Exxon Mobil and ChevronTexaco is at stake. Poland stands to win $3.8 billion in loans for military aircraft. Bulgaria has no doubt heard hints that it could win a chance to host a new U.S. military base, which would inject millions into its economy. Guinea’s army rangers continue to need U.S. training to prevent attacks from neighboring Liberia.

Such mercenary diplomacy is a long-accepted fact of international relations, and it is so widely practiced that few are shocked by it. As employed by the Bush administration, such largesse has helped build a coalition of approximately 40 nations to back the Iraq war effort. But some analysts find one fact especially striking: Despite the aid, and despite the underlying threat that comes with every offer, the administration has still not locked up the Security Council vote. Given the amount of cash being dangled, “it raises questions that the administration has not made a persuasive case,” says Nick Ziegler, an associate professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley. “You’ve got to pay a lot of money to convince people to go along with you when you haven’t given them a more convincing reason to do so.”

According to a recently released report by the left-leaning Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, the nebulous coalition represents barely a tenth of the world’s population — and many of the countries didn’t join out of an idealistic commitment to the liberation of Iraq. “Almost all, by our count, join only through coercion, bullying, bribery, or the implied threat of U.S. action that would directly damage the interests of the country,” the report states. “Far more impressive is the list of nations that have stood up to U.S. bully tactics and stand opposed.”

Turkey is only the most prominent example of how strong-arming hasn’t worked. Turkish public opinion has been staunchly against the war. The day Turkey’s parliament voted against allowing the deployment of 62,000 U.S. troops for the development of a northern front against Iraq, the country lost a potential $26 billion in future aid. One week later, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a trade bill that assists Pakistani rugmakers but omitted provisions aiding Turkey.

If the U.S. remains true to form, the punishment is likely to get worse if Turkey doesn’t reverse its vote. Past U.N. negotiations have proven that the U.S. deals harshly with those who oppose its considerable will. In 1990, Yemen made the mistake of opposing the U.S. in a Security Council vote authorizing the Gulf War. Three days later, the U.S. cut off nearly all aid to that country. More recently, a vote on an early version of the U.N. resolution on Iraq contained a similar threat for Mauritius, which held a temporary seat on the council last year. When Washington complained about less-than-enthusiastic support, Mauritius recalled its U.N. ambassador for “continuing to convey the mistaken impression that his country had reservations about the U.S. resolution against Iraq.”

“We support the United States,” Mauritian Foreign Minister Anil Gayan said at the time. “Our position is not neutral.”

Although the current Bush administration vehemently denies it, bribery is not abnormal U.S. foreign policy. In “The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992,” former Secretary of State James Baker writes frankly of his coercive role in the U.N. Security Council vote authorizing the Gulf War in 1990. “I met personally with all my Security Council counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling, extracting, threatening, and occasionally buying votes,” he recalled. “Such are the politics of diplomacy.”

White House press spokesman Ari Fleischer tried to argue at a Feb. 25 news briefing that the current administration is above such venal forms of persuasion. “You’re saying that the leaders of other nations are buyable,” he sniffed. “And that is not an acceptable proposition.” The Washington press corps literally laughed him out of the room.

The fine art of quid pro quo is not just about foreign aid. Cameroon and Guinea are both eligible for preferential access to U.S. markets through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act enacted in 2000 — provided they do ”not engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security of foreign policy interests.” Voting against the U.N. resolution could result in loss of U.S. preferential status, but voting for it would almost certainly sour relations with France, a top trading partner and primary lender for many West African nations.

For Angola, which did not qualify for the growth and opportunity act because of an anti-corruption clause, future eligibility is one of several issues at stake. Angola exports more oil to the United States than Kuwait, and future International Monetary Fund loans for developing that critical industry may pivot on its vote. Angola’s U.N. Ambassador, Ismael Gasper Martins, has remarked coyly about his country’s position. ”For a long time now, we have been asking for help to rebuild our country after years of war,” he said recently. “No one is tying the request to support on Iraq, but it is all happening at the same time.” On Feb. 20, the U.S. Agency for International Development approved $15.4 million in annual aid for the war-ravaged country, which France is unlikely to match.

Even Mexico, normally a firm ally, has been pressured over its unwillingness to line up in the yes column. On a recent trip to Mexico, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned that Washington would be “very unhappy” if Mexico voted no at the U.N., and unnamed U.S. diplomats have been widely quoted as saying that a “No” vote could “stir up feelings” against Mexicans in the United States. For Mexico, which sends 80 percent of its exports to the U.S. market, the economic and social consequences of a no vote seem dire.

Oman, Jordan and Bahrain are militarily dependent on the U.S. through arms purchases and training. “New Europe” countries in line for NATO membership — such as Albania, Estonia and Romania — face the possibility that the U.S. could block them from joining.

If the muck of diplomacy more frequently displays Machiavellian than Wilsonian ethics, that’s nothing new. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development website, “U. S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering America’s foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world.” Pragmatically, USAID’s first emphases were on countering the spread of communism, particularly the influence of the People’s Republic of China.

The idea that anyone would consider such naked haggling unethical is “ridiculous,” according to Danielle Pletka, a scholar at the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute and former Republican staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the 1990s.”Foreign aid is not charity,” she said in an interview. “There are costs of going to war, and there are costs of siding against the U.S. At the end of the day, they’ll do what’s in their best interest.”

But the scope of available options for checkbook diplomacy has just increased dramatically. In the first major change to the distribution of foreign assistance since the Kennedy administration four decades ago, President Bush last month submitted to Congress his plan for the Millennium Challenge Account, which links foreign aid to “performance markers” to be determined by U.S. administrators. “To be eligible for this new assistance, countries must demonstrate commitment to three standards — ruling justly, investing in their people, and encouraging economic freedom,” Bush said in his message to Congress.

The accompanying budget request of $20 billion — beginning with $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2004 and stabilizing at $5 billion per year by 2006 — translates to a lot more diplomatic horsepower. “It is clear that this administration has taken development off the back burner and placed it squarely at the forefront of our foreign policy,” said Andrew S. Natsios, USAID administrator, before the House International Relations Committee on last week.

And even if the U.S. persuasions are insufficient to win a war authorization in the Security Council, Bush has made clear that it will have the backing of a “large coalition of the willing.” Although the White House refuses to release a list of these allies, administration officials approximate that about 40 countries are involved. “There are many ways to form international coalitions,” Fleischer explained Monday. “The United Nations Security Council is but one of them.”

The following list, culled from reports by the U.S. State and Commerce Departments, along with other studies, includes some of those ways to form a coalition:

Albania is in line for NATO membership, which would bring not only international legitimacy but also more aid. But because NATO requires a unanimous vote to add a new member, Bush could easily block their membership.

Angola is the ninth-largest exporter of oil to the U.S., and future International Monetary Fund loans for developing its oil industry are at stake. Additionally, U.S. officials have threatened to cut back humanitarian aid to Angola — $20 million in the current fiscal year — because of its stained human rights record.

Bahrain, a small Persian Gulf state, is militarily dependent on the United States through arms purchases, training and the presence of U.S. bases on its soil.

Bulgaria, a member of the U.N. Security Council, is owed about $1.7 billion by Iraq, dating back to the Cold War. The Bush administration has promised that postwar Iraq will repay the debt. The U.S. has also promised to favor Bulgarian engineering and construction firms for contracts to rebuild the country after a war, in addition to helping Bulgaria become a member of NATO.

Cameroon, another U.N. Security Council member, is eligible for preferential access to U.S. markets through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act enacted in 2000 — provided it ”not engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security of foreign policy interests,” one criterion of eligibility. Additionally, a proposed 670-mile oil pipeline from Chad to be built by Exxon Mobil and ChevronTexaco is at stake.

Chile, a Security Council member, is hoping a new free-trade agreement with Washington is approved by Congress. Such an agreement would give Chile the same trade status as Canada and Mexico — a deal worth billions over time.

Costa Rica is negotiating a free-trade agreement between Central America and the United States. Negotiations began in January.

Estonia is in line for NATO membership.

Guinea, a Security Council member, received $3 million in U.S. military grants last year and is expected to get $20.7 million in development assistance this year. It is also eligible for preferential access to U.S. markets through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act enacted in 2000 — provided it ”not engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security of foreign policy interests.”

Hungary looks forward to potential arms deals in exchange for hosting a U.S. training mission for Iraqi exiles.

Israel is seeking $4 billion in new grants and up to $10 billion in U.S. government guaranteed loans in exchange for shared intelligence and the guaranteed restraint by the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in the event of an Iraqi attack.

Jordan stands to win $460 million in aid and loans in Bush’s 2004 budget proposal, up $150 million from last year.

Kuwait is militarily dependent on the U.S. through arms purchases, training and the presence of U.S. bases.

Latvia, in line for NATO membership, has granted requests for U.S. military use of its airspace.

Lithuania, in line for NATO membership, has granted requests for U.S. military use of its airspace.

Macedonia, in line for NATO membership, has granted requests for U.S. military use of its airspace.

Mexico sends 80 percent of its exports to the U.S. market. Trade, increased aid for anti-drug-trafficking initiatives, and immigration negotiations are all at stake for the U.N. Security Council member.

Pakistan, another key vote on the U.N. Security Council, saw a 15 percent increase in clothing and textile exports to the U.S. in late 2001, worth $500 million to Pakistani manufacturers. Bush has also promised $1 billion in debt forgiveness this year.

The Philippines received $71 million in USAID money in 2002. On Feb. 21, the U.S. announced it would send an additional 1,700 troops to help fight terrorism.

Poland is being courted to host a new U.S. base. It recently received a $3.8 billion U.S. government subsidized loan to finance the purchase of Lockheed Martin F-16 combat aircraft.

Qatar is militarily dependent on the U.S. through arms purchases, training and the presence of U.S. bases.

Romania is in line for NATO membership.

Saudi Arabia is militarily dependent on the U.S. through arms purchases, training and the presence of U.S. bases. It is also under pressure to improve relations with the U.S. that have been strained since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

Slovakia is in line for NATO membership.

Slovenia is in line for NATO membership.

Turkey failed to pass a first vote to allow U.S. troops access to the Turkey-Iraq border, but it is likely to approve a second one — if the U.S. can sweeten the proffered $26 billion in aid and loans with a promise to protect Turkey from an insurgency by Iraqi Kurds.

United Arab Emirates is militarily dependent on the U.S. through arms purchases, training and the presence of U.S. bases.

Not only that, said triumphant law enforcement officials, but the 20-something Arab-American men made up a deadly sleeper cell awaiting instructions from al-Qaida to attack Americans. “The significance is huge,” said one anonymous law enforcement official in describing the arrest to the Buffalo News. “It can’t be overestimated.”

Indeed, Michael Battle, the U.S. attorney for Buffalo, suggested the Lackawanna men could one day face charges of treason — and the death penalty — in connection with the case, which was so important that President Bush reportedly gave the order himself to round up the suspects.

“They appear to be soldiers who’ve been trained by an organization that’s declared war on us, that’s acted on that declaration, and that’s killed thousands,” says Michael Stone, coauthor of the new book “The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot.” “They need to be treated as soldiers in wartime.”

Yet as the initial press-and-prosecutor frenzy slowly fades, some legal experts, while conceding that not all the information has been made public, wonder if the “Buffalo Cell” will eventually fizzle out and end up like Jose Padilla, the so-called dirty bomb terrorist, and John Walker Lindh, the so-called American Taliban. Both men were initially touted by prosecutors and government officials as pivotal players in the war on terror; only later, as the facts intervened, was it clear they were more like bit players. Even White House officials have privately conceded that Attorney General John Ashcroft grossly overstated the case against Padilla when he first announced the arrest at a press conference.

Skepticism surrounding the Buffalo cell stems not only from the government’s past track record, but from the fact that the case revolves around a new and relatively untested anti-terrorism law. And, more simply, prosecutors have offered no substantive evidence that the men were planning any sort of attack. Nor were the recent Lackawanna High School graduates involved in other activities usually associated with Middle Eastern terrorist cells, such as stockpiling weapons, forging identifications, surveying possible targets, learning new skills, receiving overseas payments, communicating with al-Qaida, or moving around to different locations.

According to news accounts, five of the six arrested men were born in America; the sixth became a naturalized citizen. All are avid soccer players; some are Buffalo Bills fans. Two were standout players for the Lackawanna High School soccer team, while another was voted friendliest in his graduating class. Five of the six men are now married, and at least three have children. One reportedly attends a community college, another works as a telemarketer, another as a counselor to disadvantaged youths; some are unemployed. Some among the Arab-American community in Lackawanna reportedly noticed a change in the men when they returned from their 2001 trip, such as growing beards.

Some observers suggested prosecutors would unveil new, incriminating evidence against the men at their bond hearing held Wednesday and Thursday. But among the scant new information produced was a cryptic e-mail one of the men sent in July which, the prosecutor suggested, proves the cell member knew about a pending terrorist attack. The e-mail read in part: “The next meal will be very huge. No one will be able to withstand it, except for those with faith. There are people here who had visions, and their visions were strong. They’re visions were explained, that this will be very strong. No one will be able to bear it.”

Prosecutors suggest “the next meal” is code for the next al-Qaida attack.

The lack of concrete charges against the Lackawanna men stands in sharp contrast to recent terrorism arrests made in Detroit, for instance, where suspected terrorists were charged with planning to attack a U.S. air base in Turkey, while another group there were charged with collecting guns, recruiting members and creating false IDs.

Prosecutors say the core of the case is that the Lackawanna men attended a seven-week camp during the spring of 2001. There, they received some weapons training, but left weeks before their training was complete. They returned to Lackawanna, where they worked menial jobs or were unemployed. Months ago, questioned by the FBI, the men denied ever going to Al-Farooq, the al-Qaida training camp in Afghanistan. But last week two of them changed their stories and admitted they did attend. The arrests were then quickly made.

“Whenever law enforcement captures some of these guys, the knee-jerk reaction is to assign great significance,” says Tom Sanderson, deputy director of Transnational Threats Initiative at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It is significant, but we need to see more.”

“My impression is they’re a bunch of wannabes,” adds one terrorism expert who asked to remain anonymous. “I don’t get the sense they’re the sharpest knives in the drawer.”

For now, the six men are charged only with attending Al-Farooq. By doing so, prosecutors say, they gave “material support” to an organization that had been designated by the State Department as a terrorist operation. Prior to 1996, it was a crime for an American citizen to support a specific act of terrorism carried out by an outlawed organization. After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which was passed in the wake of the Oklahoma City terrorist attack, it became illegal to support a terrorist organization, period. Those convicted of providing “material support or resources” to entities designated as “foreign terrorist organizations” faced 10 years in prison. That sentence was recently increased to 15 years under the USA PATRIOT Act, passed in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks.

The prosecution of the Buffalo cell will likely center on what constitutes “material support.” Or, as John Molly, an attorney for one of the Lackawanna men arrested, put it to reporters: “If you go to a camp in Afghanistan, is that enough to commit a crime?”

Prosecutors say if the camp is run by al-Qaida, the simple answer is yes. Even if the men went training for battles against the Northern Alliance and not America, they still committed a crime. Because according to the law, prosecutors don’t have to prove motivation. They simply have to prove material support to a terrorist organization. Besides, prosecutors argue, bin Laden had already declared war on the United States in 1998 and had been linked to the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, which killed 17 American sailors — facts the men must have known before they set foot in Al-Farooq.

“They may be committed terrorists and ready to attack, but they may also be young guys who said, ‘Let’s go there,’ and got in over their heads and came back and that was it,” says David Cole, professor at the Georgetown University Law Center. “The law makes no differentiation.”

Under the current statute, “material support” is defined as “currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.”

But the evidence revealed so far does not show that the Lackawanna men provided any of those things, but only that they attended Al-Farooq. And prosecutors have used that to charge them with providing training and personnel to al-Qaida.

“I think it’s a stretch,” says Leon Friedman, professor of constitutional law at Hofstra Law School in New York. “If they were sergeants and giving training, that’s a much more plausible argument.”

Cole also wonders how receiving training can be prosecuted as giving support. “The real question is: What thing of value did they give al-Qaida?” Cole says. “If anything, they received something from al-Qaida — free training. If you send your kid to school to be educated for free, are you giving the school something of value?”

According to prosecution guidelines set forth in the United States Attorneys’ Manual, the weight seems to be on giving training, not receiving it: “A person may be prosecuted under [the law] if and only if that person has knowingly attempted or conspired to provide instruction tothe organization designed to impart one or more specific skills.” [Emphasis added.]

As for the definition of “personnel,” the manual instructs prosecutors that “only individuals who have subordinated themselves to the foreign terrorist organization, i.e. those acting as full-time or part-time employees or otherwise taking orders from the entity, are under its direction or control.”

Does attending three weeks of a seven-week training camp make the Buffalo men “employees” of al-Qaida? At least one of the Lackawanna men left just days after hearing bin Laden’s fiery anti-American speech.

As one of the suspect’s friends told the New York Daily News, the men originally traveled to Pakistan last year on a religious studies trip with Tablighi Jamaat, a sort of Muslim Jehovah Witness group, before taking a side trip to Afghanistan. “They were looking for spiritual guidance,” the friend said. “Instead, they got political dogma and they knew it.”

“The fact they left early may be an indication they were not willing to support al-Qaida,” says Laurie Levenson, professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles. “Prosecutors have to find something they did at the camp that shows material support.” Still, Levenson says, “in the current climate, the defense faces an uphill battle. Judges will likely find the broadest definition of material support.”

American John Walker Lindh attended the same Al-Farooq training camp in 2001. But unlike the men in the alleged Buffalo cell, Walker trained for three months, eventually fought alongside Taliban soldiers against U.S. forces, met personally with bin Laden, and was informed that bin Laden had sent suicide bombers to America. Walker was initially charged with the same “material support” charges, but they were dropped as part his final plea agreement, when he pleaded guilty to fighting for the Taliban.

Just weeks before that agreement was struck, U.S. Judge T.S. Ellis, denying Walker’s initial motion to dismiss the charges, addressed the question of material support in some detail. As Levenson noted, Ellis used a very broad definition and rejected Walker’s defense that the “material support” statute was too vague, and that he did not provide “personnel” to a terrorist organization.

Prior to last year’s terrorist attack though, U.S. District Judge Audrey B. Collins, while upholding much of the 1996 anti-terrorism law, ruled that the prohibition against “training” and “personnel” was too vague to be constitutionally acceptable, and entered an injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld her ruling.

It’s likely that the issue of material support will soon be revisited in court. For now, though, law enforcement agents say they have a solid case. “We have the key players in western New York,” said Peter Ahearn, FBI special agent in charge in Buffalo. “They worked together, they socialized together, they lived within blocks of each other. It’s a trained group of individuals that were trained in Afghanistan. It’s an al-Qaida-trained cell.”

But Cole, at Georgetown, isn’t so sure. Thanks to the current law, he says, “the government is able to say, ‘We got some terrorists.’ But the question is, Did they really get terrorists or just misguided youths?”

Following the 1998 embassy bombings, the United States launched a worldwide manhunt for suspected international terrorism mastermind Osama bin Laden, whose name will inevitably be associated with the bombing until the culprits of the USS Cole attack are identified and apprehended. The bombing is embarrassing for Yemen, a developing Middle Eastern nation that has sought to squelch terrorism and build ties with the United States and the West to strengthen its economy. It also raises questions about the soundness of the U.S. Navy’s policy in docking its ships in civilian ports and the strength of American intelligence operations in the region.

Though the USS Cole blast hasn’t been officially designated a terrorist incident, that is certainly how the U.S. is treating it. Speaking at the White House in the Rose Garden Thursday, President Clinton said, “If, as it now appears, this was an act of terrorism, it was a despicable and cowardly act. We will find out who was responsible and hold them accountable.” And Friday, Navy explosives experts confirmed that the explosion had come from outside the USS Cole, lending credence to theories that it was a terrorist act. Still, no group has come forward to claim responsibility.

Salon spoke with Jamie Etheridge, analyst for Middle East and African affairs at Stratfor, about the USS Cole tragedy and the danger of terrorism in Yemen. Stratfor is an influential Austin, Texas, intelligence consulting firm that made its name by exposing inconsistencies in the official American explanation of its erroneous bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia. It has since become a fast-rising and reputable source of international military intelligence.

There is a known terrorist risk in Yemen. It’s only been in recent months that we have used the deep port at Aden for refueling stops. Why does the U.S. military use the port when there is a known threat of terrorism?

There’s a strategic interest in the U.S. military in Yemen, and using the refueling station is an important step in building military relations and a military presence in Yemen. The U.S., Russia and China all compete for control of the strategic shipping lanes around the world, and the U.S. and Russia have both been in competition for a presence in Yemen because it’s a choke point. Its location at the tip of the Arabian Peninsula is extremely important for shipping oil out of the Persian Gulf as well as traffic through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Within the last year, the Russian defense minister paid a visit to Yemen to build a strategic alliance. China also recently began building up a presence of corporations and businesses in the Suez Canal region.

Which terrorist organizations have representatives in Yemen?

We identified eight, including two of the main Palestinian terrorist organizations that are designated by the State Department as such — Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The Algerian Armed Islamic Group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya also have a presence. There are also a few smaller, local groups that are listed as terrorist organizations. The largest opposition group in the government is a party called Islah. One of the party’s leaders, Abdul Majid Zandani, has been reported to have been a close associate of Osama bin Laden. It’s said that he sent fighters to Chechnya to fight against Russia, and allowed bin Laden to train some of his Al Qaida fighters there. Zandani has also met with Hassan Turabi, an Islamic fundamentalist leader and the former speaker of Parliament in Sudan.

Have any of these organizations in Yemen been directly linked to terrorist acts against the United States in the past?

The spiritual leader of Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, was tried and convicted for the World Trade Center bombing in New York.

Do you think the inevitable speculation that bin Laden might have been involved is premature?

I think it’s a natural reaction to associate him with any terrorist attack. It doesn’t mean that he is involved, but there have been numerous reports that link him to Yemen. Saudi Arabia and Yemen are neighbors, and he is a former resident of Saudi Arabia with supposed Yemeni heritage. I’ve certainly seen enough indirect evidence to say that he has a hand in it. Al Qaita, his umbrella organization of terrorist organizations, is active in Yemen. It seems to be similar to Sudan in the mid-’90s — it’s a place of commonality for a lot of different terrorist organizations. And he is a major player in several of those organizations. He’s also spent time in Yemen, though I haven’t seen anything recent.

There’s been talk of an Iraqi “October surprise” terrorist attack during the presidential elections. Do any of the terrorist groups you’ve mentioned have ties to Saddam Hussein or Iraq?

I have seen no ties and no evidence to link any of these organizations to Saddam Hussein.

When did the U.S. start building ties with Yemen?

I wouldn’t say that we have close diplomatic ties. But we have been developing some type of relationship with them since at least 1993, when U.S. forces used the port of Aden as a base for military operations into Somalia.

This appears to have been a well-planned attack that was probably in the offing before the conflict in Israel flared up. Do you think that reduces the chances that this had something to do with our criticisms of the Palestinians and general support for the Israelis?

The port had several days notice that the ship was coming in for refueling. Granted, it would take some planning, but U.S. ships dock regularly there — it’s standard practice. Even though there are security measures, there are factors that help any terrorist. Remember, the boat was assisting with the mooring and helping with the refueling operation. It wasn’t as if it came out of nowhere.

But shouldn’t the U.S. screen nonmilitary ships that are used in the servicing of our fleet before allowing them to come so close to our warships?

The security designation for Yemen wasn’t the highest, and I wouldn’t imagine that they could check every boat that was helping them moor beforehand. That would be impossible.

Is it common for civilian boats to be used in mooring?

Well, the Navy uses the port facilities, and the port is responsible for mooring the ship. They establish a security agreement with the port authority.

We have the most advanced intelligence gathering operations in the world — we’ve even successfully foiled many terrorist attacks — how do you think this went under the radar?

U.S. forces and U.S. interests are all over the world. You have U.S. military ships and installations maintaining security everywhere. You’re going to have some problems — it’s impossible to catch everything.

Do you think the U.S. military and State Department will revise their security measures as a result of the attack?

The State Department temporarily closed embassies in several African countries immediately following the incident. Security postures will be on a higher alert throughout the world and especially in the region. And other changes will likely come.

Do you think the U.S., if it’s able to determine the origins of the attack, will retaliate?

It’s been our policy in the past to do so. When the U.S. embassies in Africa were bombed, we responded by bombing a pharmaceutical company in Sudan because the investigation linked groups there with the bombing. But whether we will retaliate with force against Yemen for this? It’s possible but unlikely given the tense situation in the Middle East.

- – - – - – + From ABC News
A labor dispute over American Airlines’ acquisition of Reno Air led hundreds of pilots to call in sick, grounding 2,500 flights and stranding about 200,000 people. On Wednesday, a federal judge intervened, ordering the pilots to go back to work or possibly be held in contempt of court. The dispute stems from the pay differential between the pilots from the two airlines; some American Airlines pilots make twice as much as those at Reno — a difference in pay the American pilots want corrected as soon as possible.

- – - – - – + From the Washington Post
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- – - – - – + From the London Times
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- – - – - – + From the Miami Herald
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- – - – - – + From CNN
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