That’s the circular logic of a recent ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that simply remaining silent is not enough to protect American citizens from self-incrimination. Though it’s received scant media attention, the decision has serious implications for criminal prosecutions, legal experts say. It came on June 17 in Salinas v. Texas, which concerned the nature of police questioning in a 20-year-old murder investigation that led to the conviction of a Houston man.

In January 1993, Genovevo Salinas was brought in for police questioning about the murder of two brothers. Police found shotgun shell casings at the scene, and Salinas -- who was not arrested and not read his Miranda rights -- agreed to let police inspect his shotgun. When police asked if the shells would match his shotgun, Salinas did not answer the question. He stayed silent, looked down at the floor, shuffled his feet and bit his bottom lip.

Salinas was later arrested on an unrelated traffic warrant, at which time police decided there was enough evidence to charge him with the murders. Salinas did not testify at the trial, but his reaction to police questioning -- the fidgeting, lip-biting, etc. -- was used as evidence. In other words, Salinas’ silence was used against him, a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, or so he thought.

Salinas was convicted and received a 20-year sentence. On direct appeal, he argued to the Court of Appeals of Texas that the prosecutors’ use of his silence as part of their case was unconstitutional, but the court rejected that argument. The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court, where in a 5-4 decision last week, the court found that Salinas’ self-incrimination privilege had not been violated, mainly because he never flat-out said, “I’m invoking my right to remain silent.” This despite the fact that Salinas was not under arrest at the time of questioning, and was therefore not read his Miranda rights.

From the plurality opinion, written by Justice Samuel Alito:

“Petitioner [Salinas] cannot benefit from that principle because it is undisputed that his interview with police was voluntary. As petitioner himself acknowledges, he agreed to accompany the officers to the station and ‘was free to leave at any time during the interview.’ Brief for Petitioner 2 - 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). That places petitioner’s situation outside the scope of Miranda and other cases in which we have held that various forms of governmental coercion prevented defendants from voluntarily invoking the privilege.”

The Supreme Court had previously held that mere silence is not sufficient for a suspect to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment rights. The difference here is that Salinas was not a suspect at the time he went silent; he was merely a witness brought in for questioning.

Alito was joined in his opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts. While the ruling has been overshadowed by this week's Supreme Court’s decisions on affirmative action, the Voting Rights Act, the Defense of Marriage Act and Prop 8, it’s received its share of criticism in both journalistic and legal circles.

Erwin Chemerinsky, dean of First Amendment law at the University of California, Irvine School of Law,wrote on the ABA Journal Tuesday that criminal defense lawyers will now have to take extra care, advising their clients to explicitly speak up if they wish to remain silent. He added that the new ruling is also likely to cause unnecessary confusion.

“Constitutional protections should not be just for those who have legal training and know what they need to say to the police to invoke their rights,” Chemerinsky wrote. “From a common sense perspective, Salinas was penalized for exercising his constitutional right to remain silent in the face of police questioning. This should not be tolerated under the Fifth Amendment.”

Read the full syllabus for Salinas v Texas here.

Atlantic Records is going to need a good spin doctor.

The group is suing the borough of Norristown, Pa., on behalf of a battered woman who said police threatened her with eviction after they were summoned to her home for a domestic disturbance.

In a lawsuit filed Wednesday in the U.S. District Court for Pennsylvania's Eastern District, the ACLU, its state chapter and a local law firm challenged a Norristown ordinance they say punishes tenants who require police assistance during domestic disputes. The civil-liberties organization blasted the ordinance as “unconstitutional,” saying it violates tenants’ First Amendment right to petition the government. In the complaint, filed by the Pepper Hamilton LLP law firm, the ACLU also said the ordinance violates the Violence Against Women Act, a 19-year-old federal law that increases protections for victims of domestic violence. The law was renewed by the U.S. Congress in March after a brief lapse that caused widespread criticism of Republicans in the House of Representatives.

“After her first ‘strike,’ Ms. Briggs was terrified of calling the police,” Park wrote. “She did not want to do anything to risk losing her home. So even when her now ex-boyfriend attacked her with a brick, she did not call. And later, when he stabbed her in the neck, she was still too afraid to reach out. But, both times, someone else did call the police.”

In a statement released Thursday, Robert Glisson, Norristown’s interim municipal administrator, said he was unable to comment specifically on the lawsuit, as the municipality had not yet seen it. He added that the provision in question -- part of Norristown’s Rental License Ordinance -- was designed to reduce incidences of disorderly behavior by requiring landlords to “assist” in their reduction.

Exactly how the provision does that is unclear. IBTimes reached out to Glisson to request a full copy of Rental License Ordinance, but he did not immediately respond. Updates will be posted here when he does. In his statement, however, he did deny the ACLU’s claim that the ordinance punishes victims of domestic violence.

“The ordinance provision allegedly being attacked by the lawsuit does not, in any way, discriminate against any persons, nor does it punish victims of domestic violence,” Glisson wrote. “Domestic violence is abhorrent to society, and the Norristown Police Department remains constantly vigilant for those crimes. Until the lawsuit is served and reviewed by legal counsel, Norristown cannot respond to specific allegations.”

Park disagrees. In her blog post, she said the ordinance “specifically includes ‘domestic disturbances’ as disorderly behavior that triggers enforcement of the law.” She also said that Norristown is among an increasing number of cities and towns adopting so-called nuisance ordinances. Indeed, a recent study of such ordinances was published in theAmerican Sociological Review, and the results are not encouraging. In the study, Harvard University’s Matthew Desmond and Columbia University’s Nicol Valdez assessed the consequences of nuisance ordinances in cities and towns in every region in the U.S., including Dallas, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh and Seattle, among dozens of others.

In most cases, these ordinances threaten property owners with fines if they fail to put a stop to nuisance behavior that takes place in their units. But the authors found that, out of 59 municipalities, only four took precautions to exclude domestic violence from the list of acceptable nuisance activities. Meanwhile, a full 39 ordinances “include assault, sexual abuse, battery, or domestic violence among their list of nuisance activities,” according to Desmond and Valdez.

A full copy of the ACLU’s complaint is available here. According to Justia.com, Glisson is also named in the lawsuit, along with Norristown Police Chief Russell J. Bono and others. Click here to read the Borough of Norristown’s initial response to the lawsuit.

“We really just want New Yorkers to wake up to traffic violence,” he said.