To Lilla, the public has taken a libertarian turn. It is characterized “radical individualism”:

During the Clinton years the country edged left on issues of private autonomy (sex, divorce, casual drug use) while continuing to move right on economic autonomy (individual initiative, free markets, deregulation).

Americans have become more libertarian on some social issues, such as those related to gay rights, but not all. Lilla notes abortion (correctly). There are others. Consider these recent Gallup data and the continuing unpopularity of, say, extramarital affairs.

The bigger problem is Lilla’s assertion that the public has “moved right” on economic autonomy. In the very short run, there has been some increase in the percentage who believe that government is doing “too much,” although majorities are perfectly happy to have the government regulate Wall Street banks. Populism cuts in both directions.

But Lilla’s argument is over the long term (“brewing for decades”). Here the evidence is much more equivocal. I previously noted that, as of 2004, the percentage of people who thought that the government should provide “more services” was double that who thought the government should provide fewer — and this reflected an increase in support for government over time. And, as of 2008, even conservatives seem reluctant to cut many government programs. It is hard to reconcile such findings with some decades-long increase in the desire for autonomy from government.

Lilla also finds the origins of the Tea Party in a growing distrust of government:

Ever since the Seventies, social scientists have puzzled over the fact that, despite greater affluence and relative peace, Americans have far less trust in their government than they had up until the mid-Sixties. Just before the last election, only a tenth of Americans said that they were “satisfied with the way things are going in the United States,” a record low. They express some confidence in the presidency and the courts, but when asked in the abstract about “the government” and whether they expect it to do the right thing or whether it is run for our benefit, a relatively consistent majority says “no.”

This mischaracterizes the trend in trust in government, which I previous described here. See also these data. I’ll reprint the graph, just for the sake of illustration:

In short, the level of trust in government sharply increased in the 1990s, back to levels not seen since the early 1970s. If Lilla were writing this piece in 2000, he would be remarking on the massive turnaround in Americans’ confidence in government. I will say it again: there has been no secular decline in trust in government. It waxes and wanes with economic growth. If the Tea Party’s origins are tied to distrust of government, this is a short-term, not a long-term, phenomenon.

Lilla, citing this book by Marc Hetherington, buttresses his case with this “astonishing fact”:

in 1965 nearly half of Americans believed that the War on Poverty would “help wipe out poverty” — a vote of confidence in our political institutions unimaginable today.

Really? Quick quiz: what percent of Americans believe that “changes the new law will make to the country’s health care system will be generally good for the country”? Nearly half.

Lilla goes further: he sees people alienated from a variety of institutions. This leads to several other assertions that are inaccurate or incomplete:

Democrats have edged slightly more left on political and economic issues, whereas the views of independents, the largest and fastest-growing group of voters, have not changed much over the years.

…as voters have become more autonomous, less attracted to parties and familiar ideologies, it has become harder for political institutions to represent them collectively

Italics mine. Regular readers know what I think of such assertions. I’ll say it again, again. Most independents are loyal partisans. Only about 10 percent of the public is truly independent. And party loyalty among voters has become stronger in both presidential and congressional elections. More importantly, the partisan complexion of Tea Party activists is consistently Republican.

Lilla is also wrong about parties in political institutions:

The disappointment only grew in subsequent decades, as Congress seemed less and less able to act decisively and legislate coherently. There are many reasons for this, some of them perverse consequences of reforms meant to make government more open and responsive to the public. New committees and subcommittees were established to focus on narrower issues, but this had the unintended effect of making them more susceptible to lobbyists and the whims of powerful chairmen. Congressional hearings began to be televised and campaign finances were made public, but as a result individual congressmen and senators became more self-sufficient and could ignore party dictates. Coalitions broke apart, large initiatives stalled, special interest legislation and court orders piled up, government grew more complex and less effective.

Italics mine. Lilla is basically describing the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. But 40 years have intervened. In that period, the parties have become more ideologically homogeneous and also ideologically distinct from each other (see this post). As a consequence, the parties’ rank-and-file have been more willing to empower party leaders. This is conditional party government theory. Small wonder, then, that party unity has increased.

Because Lilla gets this wrong, he gets the consequences wrong too:

And Americans noticed. Not recognizing themselves in the garbled noises coming out of Washington, unsure what the major parties stood for, they drew the conclusion that their voices were being ignored. Which was not exactly true. It’s just that, paradoxically, more voice has meant less echo.

The percentage of Americans who “think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for” has actually increased over time. Here is one graph of data through 2004:

This makes sense, given that the parties are increasing ideologically distinct.

Similarly, over the period from 1988-2004, the percentage who think that “public officials don’t care much what people like me think” has not increased in any linear fashion. An apparent increase from 1952-86, when the question’s response options were different, has not continued during the past 20 years.

Ultimately, Lilla sees Americans as disconnected from many institutions: public education, as they increasingly opting for home schooling; and the medical establishment, as they refuse vaccines. Americans, he says, believe that “expertise and authority are inherently suspect” and instead harbor “fantasies of self-sufficiency.”

These are very broad claims, and so naturally they are leaky. Yes, the public is less confident of some institutions, like the medical establishment (Lilla cites these GSS data). But not the “scientific community.” And they actually seem to have become more, not less, deferential to authority in other respects. The GSS also asks “would you say that people should obey the law without exception, or are there exceptional occasions on which people should follow their consciences even if it means breaking the law?” The percentage who said “obey the law without exceptions” was higher in 2006 (55 percent) than in 1985 (43 percent).

Ultimately, Lilla thinks Americans have lost confidence in political parties, government, and other institutions, but gained faith in themselves. In fact, they have not lost their partisanship and see the parties as increasingly distinct, perhaps taking their cues from today’s ideologically polarized parties. In fact, they have lost and gained and lost and gained and lost confidence in government. In fact, they oppose government regulation and spending in theory, but often accept it in practice. In fact, they have lost confidence in some institutions but not others, and do not reject authority in principle.

The Tea Party is not the outcome of a rootless America. I would locate its origins elsewhere, in what Lilla describes only briefly. It is the outcome of a specific set of events: a deep recession and the government’s interventions to address that recession, an attendant financial crisis, and health care reform. If it did find fertile ground in attitudinal currents — such as distrust of government — those too are short-term products of the recession. It also grew from the objections of prominent conservative politicians and opinion leaders; Lilla cites Fox News as one example. This is a final oddity: Lilla emphasizes the alienation of Americans from parties and “familiar ideologies,” yet it is the fervor of Tea Party activists for an entirely familiar ideology and certain familiar ideologues that makes them distinctive.

3. Given that the economy is still weak, how are incumbent Democrats dealing with it? Ignoring the issue in favor of others? If so, which issues? Talking about the economy but using particular kinds of frames to frame it in more favorable terms (e.g., blame Bush)? Lynn Vavreck’s book suggests the importance of how presidential candidates do or do not discuss “the fundamentals.” Her theory could be usefully applied to congressional candidates as well.

4. How much will congressional races reflect a nationalized agenda, particularly coming from the GOP?

5. On the flip side, what are the local dynamics in key races? Nationalized agendas are often visible to political commentators but not to voters. For example, in 1994 polls showed that most voters weren’t familiar with the Contract with America.)

6. When times are bad for the president’s party, the opposite party should be able to recruit more qualified challengers. Is this happening? It should be evident in their prior political experience, fundraising, name recognition, etc.

7. It is challenging to identify the effects of key congressional votes on voters’ decisions, and its those votes that often make up a nationalized agenda. But such effects appear to exist — especially for members of Congress who remain loyal to the president on these votes even though their districts lean in the opposite direction. (In 1994, vulnerable Democrats suffered in they voted for the Clinton budget, NAFTA, and/or the crime bill, according to research by Gary Jacobson.) Will Democratic incumbents suffer for their support of the president’s agenda?

We also talked about useful things to do with the sort of qualitative data she’ll be gathering in her interviews. I suggested returning to the same place more than once and interviewing the same people if possible. We also discussed the value of following on voters’ comments with questions that force them to explain or justify their views. That’s a bit tricky because clearly a reporter doesn’t want to seem antagonistic, but it takes advantage of the in-person interview by doing something that pollsters rarely do.

I welcome other suggestions in comments.

Three months after the earthquake in Haiti, it is clear that it’s not only domestic problems that  receive this kind of attention. Indeed, a comparison of New York Times stories about three recent natural disasters — Hurricane Katrina, the 2004 Indonesian tsunami, and the earthquake in Haiti — shows that the issue-attention cycle characterizes news coverage of each.

The graph below begins seven days before each disaster and continues for 90 days thereafter. With the exception of Hurricane Katrina, which garnered a few stories as it approached the Gulf Coast, coverage began in earnest right after each disaster struck. In each case, it then quickly reached a peak (which is, unsurprisingly, highest for Katrina, the lone domestic disaster) before quickly declining. In the case of Haiti, it declined to a trickle, with perhaps one story a day.

 

 

These cases match Downs’ account well. He described how the cycle begins with an “alarmed discovery” of a problem that had long existed. Of course, natural disasters are by their nature sudden, but the problems they illuminate — vulnerable levees, dire poverty, weak political institutions — are chronic. The Onion’s headline about Haiti was fitting: “Massive Earthquake Reveals Entire Island Civilization Called ‘Haiti.’”

“Euphoric enthusiasm” ensues, as citizens and governments muster aid. But as the “cost of significant progress” becomes clear, few people or leaders are willing to make the necessary sacrifices. There is a “gradual decline of intense public interest” — perhaps not even gradual in these cases. And the news knows it. Not two weeks after the earthquake, CNN’s Sanjay Gupta told the New York Times: “We all know what’s going to happen. People are just going to lose interest in this as a story. They’re going to stop watching.” 

News coverage can even help assuage people’s guilt. Two weeks after the disaster, the New York Times saw “signs of revival in Haiti.”  Seven weeks after that, the Dallas Morning News found “signs of normal life.”  Such signs may be real, but these sorts of stories aren’t likely to sustain the public’s interest.

Sometimes, in Downs’ words, the cycle begets “new institutions, programs, and policies” that “persist and often have some impact even after public attention has shifted elsewhere.” This may be Haiti’s best hope, and certainly relief efforts continue. But will they prove sufficient?

About a week after the earthquake, economist Tyler Cowen wrote that Obama looked like the “Haiti president”:

Obama will (and should) do something about this situation … Yet he will have a festering situation on his hands for the rest of his term … Obama now stands a higher chance of being a one-term President. Foreign aid programs are especially unpopular, especially relative to their small fiscal cost … Just as it’s not easy to pull out of Iraq or Afghanistan, it won’t be easy to pull out of Haiti.

But it’s now clear that Haiti won’t affect Obama’s political future in any significant way. In part, this is because the worst fears about the earthquake’s aftermath weren’t realized; Haiti didn’t descend to utter lawlessness. Still, it faces extraordinary challenges. The problem is that these are largely invisible in American news and thus among American voters, who are therefore less likely to hold Obama accountable for Haiti’s struggles.

The seeds of Haiti’s irrelevance were always there, in the surge and decline of the issue-attention cycle.

Maeve Carey assisted with research for this piece.

But there’s a problem for Pawlenty and the activists who cheered him: Rank-and-file conservatives actually like big government.

In 2008, the American National Election Study asked a national sample whether federal spending on 12 different programs should be increased, decreased or kept about the same.

As the graph above illustrates, the respondents who identified themselves as “conservative” or “extremely conservative” had little appetite for specific spending cuts.

Very few conservatives said they favored reducing (or cutting out altogether) spending on any program. The least popular program proved to be childcare — with a grand total of 20 percent of conservatives saying they’d slash it. The most popular is highways; only 6 percent want to cut spending there. Even bugaboos like welfare and foreign aid fare well, attracting the ire of only 15 percent of conservatives. Amazingly, the survey found that, on average, 54 percent of them actually wanted to increase spending.

Political scientist James Stimson has suggested that a fifth of the country consists of what he calls “conflicted conservatives,” those who might respond positively to a broad appeal like Pawlenty’s, but not once specific windows start getting smashed.

At CPAC, Glenn Beck turned to 12-step lingo: “Hello, my name is the Republican Party and I have a problem! I’m addicted to spending and big government.” But why blame the GOP? After all, the party is being enabled by its own base.

John Sides is a professor in the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He blogs at the Monkey Cage (http://www.themonkeycage.org/).

Correction : The data in the above graph is based on a report from the American National Election Study that was later corrected. The percentages for each category are not accurate. ANES subsequently published an erratum, which can be viewed here.

A corrected graph can be found here. Foreign aid and welfare are more unpopular among conservatives than the original graph suggested. About 50% of conservatives want to cut or eliminate foreign aid and 35% feel similarly about welfare.

From Sides : The broader point does not change: for most programs, the percentage of conservatives who want to cut spending is small. In fact, it’s striking that even foreign aid and welfare attract as much support as they do, especially given the long history of conservative opposition to these programs. The fraction of conservatives who want to increase spending — an average of 54% — is unchanged. The disjuncture between the views of activists and rank-and-file conservatives remains.