Judith Greer

What really happened at No Gun Ri?

An Army major says the Associated Press' Pulitzer-winning story of American soldiers massacring Korean civilians is grossly exaggerated and dishonest.

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A few months before Robert Bateman’s book “No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident” came out, his editor at Stackpole Books, Col. Edward Skender, received an incendiary letter from Charles Hanley. Hanley was the senior Associated Press writer on the Pulitzer Prize-winning story detailing an apparent massacre of hundreds of South Korean civilians in the early weeks of the Korean War. Hanley maintained in that letter, and in later voice and e-mail conversations with me, that Bateman’s book, which criticizes the AP’s coverage of the incident, was — among other over-the-top pronouncements — “a fairy tale,” “a rape of the truth” and an “atrocity.”

Bateman, an active-duty Army major who taught history at West Point and is currently on a yearlong fellowship at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says that the original September 1999 AP article and the AP team’s later book on the incident were exaggerated and sensationalistic, more concerned with engaging the reader’s emotions and advocating for the Korean victims than telling an honest story. Although Hanley was far more vitriolic and intemperate about Bateman in his conversations with me, each man sincerely believes the other to be, for whatever reasons, deliberately purveying falsehoods.

There is only one thing that the two books agree on: Some number of South Korean civilian refugees were killed by confused, exhausted and jittery American troops of the 7th Cavalry near the village of No Gun Ri, South Korea, between July 26 and July 29, 1950. But Bateman says the number of civilians killed at and near the bridge was probably somewhere around 35, while Hanley and his team reported witness estimates of a death toll exceeding 350. The refugees were fleeing advancing North Korean troops along a railway track toward the bridge, where American troops were dug in.

Hanley heard about Bateman’s book when someone forwarded part of an early draft to him after Bateman offered it to some members of the military community for their comments before publication. Some veterans were “disgusted,” Hanley wrote in his letter to Skender, and they felt that Bateman’s book was an “immature, sneering, unprofessional approach” to the incident. Other veterans disagree. Bateman’s book boasts a foreword from retired Gen. Harold E. Moore, whose exploits with the 7th Cavalry in Vietnam were recently featured in the movie “We Were Soldiers.”

Despite this disagreement among veterans of the 7th Cavalry about the value of Bateman’s book, Hanley warned the Stackpole editor that publishing the book would besmirch Stackpole’s reputation and perhaps even expose the publisher to legal action. But, Hanley told me later, contrary to the implications of a San Francisco Chronicle story about his letter, “I wasn’t denying anyone’s ‘right’ to publish; I was interested in a publisher’s responsibility to the truth.”

Batemen and Hanley disagree on three central aspects of the No Gun Ri story: the credibility of the witnesses for the AP version (particularly in the original article), the evidence that U.S. aircraft and troops were ordered to fire on the Korean civilians as the Koreans were fleeing along the railroad tracks toward the bridge, and the reliability of the AP witnesses’ estimates that over 350 civilians were killed.

Bateman spends more than a few pages in “No Gun Ri” outlining his interactions with Hanley regarding the credibility of Edward Daily, one of the star witnesses in the original AP story. Daily, whose specific and emotional testimony the AP team later disavowed in their book “The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War,” was not anywhere near the infamous railroad trestle on the day of the incident, and certainly could not have been one of the two machine gunners at the bridge, as he originally claimed. In fact, Daily was an ordnance mechanic during his military service, didn’t join the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry until 1951, and probably never saw a day of actual combat while he was in Korea. He recently pled guilty to defrauding the U.S. government of over $300,000 in veterans’ disability benefits for combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder.

Bateman argues that Hanley and the other AP reporters gave preferential credibility and prominence in their original story to veterans who made the most “quoteworthy” statements and allegations, and that when doubts began to arise about Daily, they tenaciously refused to acknowledge them. The AP team received Daily’s official record in December 1999, almost a month before the AP’s story was submitted for the Pulitzer Prize in January 2000. In his book, Bateman offers two March 2000 e-mails he received from Hanley to show that even then Hanley maintained his belief in Daily’s story on the basis of flimsy evidence provided by Daily himself. Two weeks later, the AP story won the Pulitzer.

Hanley feels that the questions raised by Daily’s record did not — and still don’t — significantly undermine the story. “Three months after we published [the original story],” he wrote to me, “we learned of the discrepancy in Daily’s record: despite our inquiries it remained an unresolved discrepancy for us and the Pentagon investigators, like many other discrepancies in the personnel records and documents, until long after No Gun Ri was submitted for and awarded a Pulitzer.”

In his March correspondence with Hanley, Bateman outlined several reasons for questioning Daily’s story, such as the extremely unlikely placement of Daily’s supposed machine gun, and the fact that he could find no evidence whatsoever of Daily’s presence in any of the documents he was examining for his book. These were documents that the AP team could have examined themselves to corroborate Daily’s story, but they apparently didn’t — even after they had received Daily’s official record and doubts about his veracity had been raised — until Bateman brought the discrepancies to their attention.

Hanley claims now that Daily is entirely unimportant. He was, Hanley says, neither the first nor the only 7th Cavalry veteran to acknowledge the truth of the AP story about the No Gun Ri incident. Bateman’s book, Hanley says, “perpetuates a pointless obsession” with Daily. “He is totally irrelevant against a background of more than 60 American and Korean witnesses.”

Bateman argues that Daily remains a significant figure in the debate over what really happened at No Gun Ri because of his influence over the other witnesses. He suspects Daily of inducing wholesale “source contamination” among the other veterans the AP interviewed. Bateman believes that Daily, as an intensely social and prominent member of the 7th Cavalry regimental association, successfully “planted” inaccurate memories of No Gun Ri — including memories of Daily himself being there. When confronted with the fact that Daily could not have been at No Gun Ri, one of the AP’s other notable witnesses, Eugene Hesselman, repeated over and over again, “I know that Daily was there. I know that. I know that.”

Hanley counters that many of the veterans the AP contacted were isolated from the 7th Cavalry community over the intervening years, and some of them, like Pfc. Delos Flint — another veteran whose story Bateman attempts to impeach in his book — came up with “spontaneous, emotional and isolated recollections” when they were initially contacted. (Bateman in turn argues that Flint could not have been present at No Gun Ri, a claim he bases on a minor difference between two military records made during days that he himself admits were administratively chaotic.)

How and why the shooting started remains a subject of fierce debate. The AP book suggests that someone on the scene gave a direct order to the American soldiers to shoot at the refugees, but the evidence it offers is weak. On the other hand, Bateman’s claim that the melee was set off by gunfire coming from the refugees’ side is equally unconvincing. Both assertions rely heavily on the conflicting or uncertain testimony of a few soldiers who can be reliably placed at the scene. Both books quote witnesses who report that the Americans’ shooting was a spontaneous response to gunfire that came from within the group of refugees, although Hanley’s team downplays that possibility.

Bateman states (with a troubling air of absolute certainty) that there were armed communist guerillas or North Korean infiltrators among the civilian crowd. He claims that the entire No Gun Ri area was a known hotbed of Communist activity, and that the Americans had captured both a Japanese rifle and a Russian submachine gun from the area, citing records from the headquarters supply section acknowledging their receipt.

But, Hanley noted in his conversation with me, there is no record at all of where, when, how or from whom the guns were acquired or even which regiment they came from. Another document records the capture of two enemy fighters in the division’s area of operations who might have been carrying those weapons. Regardless, it also seems unlikely that armed men within a crowd of several hundred civilians would have fired upon a line of entrenched American forces, knowing the overwhelming response it was likely to draw.

In any case, says Martha Mendoza, another of the AP reporters on the No Gun Ri story, even if shots had been directed at the American troops from somewhere near or inside the group of civilians — if, say, guerrilla combatants had been deliberately using the people as a human shield — shooting indiscriminately into the crowd of refugees was still criminal.

Establishing whether the refugees were deliberately attacked from the air and how many died are other thorny problems. Aerial reconnaissance photographs taken Aug. 6, 1950, about a week after the Americans pulled out on their retreat toward the Naktong River, provide significant evidence. One shows signs of recent strafing along two points of the railroad tracks, probably made by aircraft in two separate runs along the same flight path. The photograph also shows what may be signs of mortar explosions closer to the No Gun Ri bridge.

Bateman concedes that American troops dug in near the bridge fired mortar rounds that landed among the refugees fleeing along the tracks, but he says that this was a tragic error (“the initial call for fire from the mortars was perhaps the dumbest possible action that could have been taken”), not a deliberate act of murder. And although veteran witnesses note that someone did give orders to fire warning gunfire over the panicked civilians’ heads to prevent them from passing American positions, there was, Bateman insists, no explicit order from any of the officers of the unit to actually shoot at the civilians.

The recent strafing visible in the Aug. 6 photograph could have taken place when the North Korean army passed through the area in pursuit of the retreating Americans. But it also accords with the testimony of the Korean victims, who claim they were strafed and “bombed” while they were walking along the railroad tracks. However, the 7th Cavalry had no ability to “call in” a deliberate strafing run against the refugees, as some allege, since their radios were incompatible with those used by the Air Force.

Bateman, in his book, credibly notes that the relatively brief strafing runs were unlikely to have killed 100 civilians, as some of the American and Korean witnesses claim. But he is wrong when he states that the strafing aircraft would not have made the runs at low altitude because “there was no report of ground fire in the area.” If there was little danger from ground fire, a very low altitude strafing run — and, almost by definition, a more deadly one — was more likely.

Virtually all the witnesses acknowledge that the 7th Cavalry fired mortars at the refugees (the exploding rounds were probably thought by many of the civilians — or conflated in memory later — as having come from the aircraft). Bateman claims that the mortars were only meant to scare the refugees and prevent them from advancing further toward the American lines. Perhaps because the refugees were suddenly running toward the Americans, away from the strafing, or because of a delay in aiming and firing the rounds (Bateman’s theory) they didn’t land in front of the refugees but among them.

It’s clear that the Americans felt it necessary at that point in the conflict to put a stop to the refugees’ movements. In some cases during the Korean War, the policy against refugee movement across American lines was explicit. One of the 7th Cavalry’s “sister” units in the No Gun Ri area, for example, received a telephoned instruction relayed on June 24 by a regimental liaison at the division’s headquarters: “No refugees to cross front line. Fire everyone trying to cross line. Use discretion in case of women and children.”

This order, Bateman notes, is not recorded in any of the other regiments’ existing message logs, or in the division log itself. But it is impossible to say if the same sort of message reached the 7th Cavalry because — significantly, the AP reporters say — the unit log of the 7th Cavalry for this crucial period is missing. Even if no one can find any documentary evidence that any such order was given to the 7th Cavalry, numerous documents on the Web site for the AP reporters’ book show that the deliberate targeting of refugees was almost standard operating procedure in the early days of the conflict.

Then there’s the grisly question of the disputed body count. The most significant finding of the analysis of the Aug. 6 aerial reconnaissance photos is that the bodies that were supposed to be lying around in the open until approximately Aug. 10 — according to one of the Korean villagers who returned to the site — are nowhere to be seen. Nor was there any evidence in the photos of soil excavation, funeral pyres or mass graves. Even most of the abandoned American foxholes in the immediate area, which might have served as expedient graves, were still open to the sky.

This finding was so troubling to Korean government investigators when they were shown the photographs during the joint Korean-American investigation prompted by the AP story that they essentially accused the U.S. government of having forwarded bogus images. Hanley, too, in an e-mail, noted that the South Korean technicians “suggested to [Sang-Hun Choe, the South Korean reporter on the AP story] the photos were tampered with.” Understandably, the U.S. government categorically repudiated that suggestion.

When I asked Hanley about the fact that the National Imagery and Mapping Agency’s examination of the photos did not find any bodies lying around in the open, he told me that the bodies weren’t out in the open by that point, because the No Gun Ri villagers had found the burial job facing them too overwhelming. Instead, he says, they opted to temporarily stack the dozens of bodies in the tunnels formed by the concrete trestles of the bridge and cover them there with a layer of soil. Most of the individual burials did not take place until much later, and some of the bodies remained under the bridge “through the winter.”

When I told Bateman about this theory regarding the lack of bodies out in the open, he scoffed. If 100 or 200 people had been killed under the bridge, he said, there would be literally tons of human remains to cover. Even covering them shallowly would take a lot of soil, and that soil would have to have been dug from somewhere near the bridges, excavations which would have appeared in the photos. Covering 200 corpses within the confines of the tunnel space would be like covering half a dozen Volkswagens. “Don’t you think they would stick out just a little?” he asked me. “That photo, taken at a mild slant angle, shows 10 to 20 feet under the bridge but there’s nada there. And as for excavations outside the bridge, hell, do you see any large excavation at all?”

I didn’t. But something else in the government report on the photographs did catch my eye. The river that flowed under the railway bridge ran toward No Gun Ri, not away from it. It is extremely unlikely that the people of No Gun Ri would have left dozens of bloody, putrefying human bodies in the streambed of a river that led directly past their village. Even a brief flurry of rain in the nearby mountains could have washed the carrion onto their doorsteps.

Hanley dismissed my observations regarding the watercourse as “amateur hydrological analysis,” and returned to his theme: the witnesses’ testimony — and the AP reporters’ ability to discern the truth from those accounts and their own examinations of the site — trumped everything, even expert imagery analysis. “You haven’t been to the NGR area. We have. Many times. You haven’t seen the lay of the land. You haven’t talked to the villagers … I simply don’t buy the idea of some unnamed analyst 50 years later, viewing photos based on 50-year-old technology, never having been to the area … making some judgment about what he saw there.”

But the age of the technology is moot, says Bateman, when the photos’ resolution is good enough to discern individual railroad ties. And, he says, “if the NIMA, which discovered mass graves in Bosnia from overhead reconnaissance, is not qualified to evaluate [the film], who is? Hanley?”

Never mind the pictures, Hanley said. The photographs and the flow of the river are virtually irrelevant to the question of how many were killed at No Gun Ri: “There are many possible answers, but dismissing the word of honest local villagers who remember bodies stacked under the trestle … GI after GI remembers bodies stacked under the bridge when they were pulling out! … and basing that on divining water volume and flow a half-century later, is not an answer.”

For his part, Bateman believes that many of the stories the villagers told the AP reporters about coming under deliberate American fire are essentially true, and certainly some civilians did die under that railway bridge on July 26 and during the following days. But he also believes that at least some of the South Koreans’ memories refer to other incidents and were conflated with the No Gun Ri incident when a South Korean author gathered them together into a 1994 “novel” that seeded the AP’s interest in the event.

“I believe that the accounts of the South Koreans are a collage of several different events that occurred at several different places over the course of a few days,” he writes in “No Gun Ri.” And in fact, American troops had mistakenly fired on a large group of refugees accompanied by friendly Republic of Korea forces only a day or two earlier, in another nearby area, thinking they were the vanguard of a North Korean advance. The incident at the bridge was a tragedy, Bateman says, but it wasn’t the “massacre of war crimes proportions” that most people thought it was after reading the AP team’s story.

The argument really shouldn’t come down to how many civilians were killed at No Gun Ri, but inevitably it does. Cynically speaking, after 50 years, the AP story would not have been Really Big News, much less warranted the Pulitzer Prize, unless the death toll of the No Gun Ri incident was high enough to qualify it as a “massacre” that was being covered up by the U.S. government.

“The number of dead at No Gun Ri has been — as was clear in our September ’99 journalism — a secondary matter and a question we knew would never be resolved with precision,” Hanley wrote to me while on assignment in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. “The primary matter is the policy within the U.S. high command to officially, in writing, target refugees and other civilians.” Bateman’s book, Hanley says, “seems aimed at knocking down the casualty estimate to below 100, ‘up to 70.’ All to what end? Is the killing of 70 somehow more acceptable than the killing of 400? As [Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor] said after the investigation, the numbers are just a matter of degree.”

The horror, the horror

Civilian massacres like My Lai and No Gun Ri are inevitable in the exceptionally ruthless Western way of war. So why can't we just face up to it?

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The horror, the horror

The sixteen-year-old clawed away at bodies, pulling aside arms and legs to hide herself beneath the dead. “I could hear blood flowing down, the sound of blood gurgling out of the bodies,” she remembered. Her throat was burning; she gulped down what she found on the floor. “I drank like a mad person … The horrible thing was that blood kept flowing down from the bodies above me. So I couldn’t really tell whether I drank blood or water.”

There are a lot of ways to tell the story of human warfare, and each will tend to give us a different view of when, how and why we should go to war. One way, almost guaranteed to make a knee-jerk anti-war activist out of any reader, is the personal, face-down-in-the-dirt testimonial, like that quoted above, of Park Hee-Sook, a bewildered South Korean refugee featured in “The Bridge at No Gun Ri” by Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Chose and Martha Mendoza. In July 1950 Hee-sook was forced out of her home by American soldiers, strafed and rocketed by American aircraft on the road she was directed to take and then pinned down by American sniper fire under a concrete railroad trestle for three days amidst the bodies of her dead and dying family and friends.

Another way to frame the narrative of war is by rational analysis — or rationalization — of the factors that lead to success or failure in combat. This kind of treatment flings aside the question of why or whether war should be initiated, and concentrates instead on how it is won. Military historian Victor Davis Hanson, in his new book “Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power,” gives us the vulture’s eye view: vast panoramas of hacked, charred, and waterlogged bodies are essentially abstracted to putrefying rectangles on battlefield maps, picked over to illustrate the clear superiority of Western cultural values when it comes to the prosecution of successful bloodbaths.

Hanson’s view in “Carnage and Culture” is grim but elevated, because he claims to believe that Western military dominance has nothing to do with morality. Instead, he insists that the West has usually achieved its goals in war because its methodology is so seldom shackled by any consideration other than military necessity. While it graphically describes many military events, his book remains a kind of aerial survey of the landscape of war, one in which Hanson, according to the New York Times’ review of the book, “more than makes his case” that a uniquely Western ruthlessness, spawned by uniquely Western cultural values, has led to a world in which Western military forces reign supreme.

In “The Bridge at No Gun Ri,” on the other hand, the story takes us down onto the killing fields for days at a time, sharing the wartime experiences of individuals. So we find ourselves cowering with them in a pitch-black ditch to avoid a ferocious rain of “friendly fire,” or watching as another young woman, Yang Hae-sook, plucks her own dangling eyeball off the string of her nerves.

“The Bridge at No Gun Ri” is an expanded version of a Pulitzer Prize-winning story about the large-scale massacre in 1950 of unarmed South Korean civilians by U.S. troops, a story broken by a team of Associated Press investigative reporters in 1999. The slaughter was just one part of the hot, sweating military debacle that unfolded during the first few desperate weeks of the Korean War. As their communist North Korean opponents drove them relentlessly backward down the Korean peninsula from Seoul, the inexperienced American troops and their Republic of Korea allies retreated to what they hoped would be a defensible corner of the country called the “Pusan Perimeter.” With them and behind them was a displaced and panicky civilian populace, many of whom had been driven from their villages.

As soon as the allies crossed the Naktong River into the Perimeter that August, they turned around and blew up the refugee-choked bridges to prevent the enemy from crossing behind them, in the process killing hundreds of screaming civilians on the spans and stranding the remaining thousands of refugees between the river and the North Korean guns. Then the Americans, under written orders, began systematically shooting any refugees who attempted to cross the water. Although the 7th Cavalry Regiment’s slaughter of civilians at No Gun Ri, which is at the heart of the AP journalist’s book, occurred a few days earlier and farther back along the line of retreat, the “reasoning” behind it was much the same as that which drove the order to shoot civilians trying to cross the Naktong river. The American high command feared that among the throngs of refugees were North Korean infiltrators trying to get behind American lines where, it was thought, they would abandon their civilian disguises and fall upon the allies from the rear.

That was the story, anyway. However, while enemy infiltration is certainly a realistic concern once warfare has degenerated into guerilla operations, there was little reason for the North Koreans to resort to such subterfuges at that point in the conflict. The allies were so thin on the ground and so lacking in discipline and experience that conventional North Korean forces easily outmaneuvered them. Some parts of the American front were literally miles apart, permitting the North Koreans to make flanking incursions between two parts of the army. The demolition of the Naktong River bridges was arguably a military necessity, but the North Korean troops were still miles away when the bridges were dynamited. There’s little doubt that the more immediate concern at that moment was to stop the refugees from crossing into the Perimeter.

Hanson would be likely to see the Korean refugees’ ordeal — being shot at and blown up by the very forces that were supposedly sent to save them — as an example of “cultural crystallization,” where “insidious” and “murky” elements of Western culture become “stark and unforgiving in the finality of organized killing.” That’s a fancy way of saying that the stories Americans were telling themselves, true or untrue, when they came to Korea — about who they were, why they were in this war-torn Asian nation, and who they were dealing with — were the driving force and underlying structure of the nationwide massacre in which No Gun Ri was only a bloody blip. The stories, which focused Western cultural values and fears on the refugees, were the justification for the killings.

And a sense of justification for inflicting widespread death seems to be crucial for Western warriors, despite Hanson’s claim that the cutthroat qualities of Western warfare are merely pragmatic or “amoral.” We in the West have in fact created whole systems of moral justification for our conduct of warfare, which Hanson acknowledges — and even contributes to — whether he realizes it or not. First, the war stories he chooses to tell us highlight the qualities of Western culture most Westerners — or at least conservative Westerners — would consider positive: the concepts of individual freedom, decisive efficiency, consent of the governed, private property, innovative technology, capitalism, voluntary discipline and the tolerance of dissent and critique. In the end, Hanson makes a seductive case for the idea that because Western warfare has been incredibly murderous, it has also been relatively speedy and decisive, and has served arguably “good” long-term causes — the important one by his lights, of course, being the advancement of the more treasured elements of Western civilization.

While Hanson honestly admits that, as in the case of the British invasion of Zululand, there is often little or no moral justification for the initiation of the conflicts he dissects, the stories he tells nonetheless almost uniformly congratulate and justify the “amorally” bloody Western way of war. It is only when warriors abandon their good — or at least extremely practical — Western principles, Hanson says, that they begin to lose.

That seems to have been the case with the early losses in Korea, a ground war that American military doctrine had only the year before dismissed as neither necessary or winnable. Most of the Army units sent so hastily into battle were green and untrained (so much for Western “discipline”), their equipment was old and inadequate (“superior technology” it wasn’t), their numbers were underwhelming (hardly an application of “decisive” strength) and their leadership was either incompetent or disastrously overconfident (there wasn’t a “self-critiquer” in the lot). Even the pervasive racism that underpinned such events as the No Gun Ri disaster was a repudiation of the basic respect for individuals and their personal freedoms that Hanson believes is the foundation of Western military strength.

Racism, per se, isn’t one of forms of “cultural crystallization” that Hanson itemizes as having an impact on military operations, Western or otherwise, but his survey of nine “landmark” battles shows again and again how it leads to arrogance, a lack of self-examination and, inevitably, an underestimation of the enemy. Cortis’s underestimation of the Aztecs at Tenochtitlan and Chelmsford’s inattentive attitude toward the Zulu at Isandhlwana are two of the most obvious examples. In Korea, the Americans referred to the Koreans (unimaginatively, given that the same characterizations had been trotted out a decade earlier to describe the Japanese) as “trained monkeys” and “the most barbarian of peoples.” The intelligence chief of the 8th Army called them “half-men with blank faces,” and most of the lower ranks routinely referred to them by the all-purpose epithet for Asians which apparently arose among U.S. troops in the Philippines during the American takeover — er, “reorganization” — in 1905: “gooks.”

If any of these Americans had felt the need to examine their assumptions, the earlier history of the 7th Cavalry Regiment would have proven instructive. The regiment’s signature tune, “Garry Owen” which gave them their nickname of “The Garryowens,” had been adopted by the regiment’s early commander, Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer. Custer first had it played to accompany an attack on a Cheyenne encampment on the Washita River in Oklahoma in 1868. But in the 1950s the regiment showed little interest in a realistic assessment of Custer. Instead, as part of their orientation to the 7th Cav, recruits sent to Occupied Japan for their largely ceremonial “praetorian guard” duty were shown the Errol Flynn movie “They Died With Their Boots On,” a patriotic version of the events at Little Big Horn, where in reality Custer’s military arrogance and his racist assumptions about his Native American enemies led to his destruction.

The film depicts Custer as a tragic hero and celebrates his success in ridding the American West of “hostiles.” The idea behind the stirring, uncomplicated propaganda dished out to the newcomers, said Sergeant “Snuffy” Gray, was to “get them to love the regiment,” and to be unreservedly proud of their past. It seems to have made the desired impression on Norm Tinkler, who was a 19-year-old machine gunner at No Gun Ri. “We just annihilated them,” he said of the Korean civilians — mostly women, children and older men — killed in the incident. “It was about like an Indian raid, back in the old days.”

Pumped full with martial pride as they were — even though they were largely untrained and completely inexperienced in combat — when the Garryowens were suddenly sent to Korea in July 1950, they were confident that they would be returning to their comfortable quarters in Tokyo in a matter of weeks. They partook of a “military superiority complex” that had come down from the headquarters of the “acting emperor” of Japan and Supremo of the Far East Command, General Douglas MacArthur. As soon as the North Koreans saw them coming, they told themselves, there would be a rout.

But even as the 7th Cav was arriving in Pohang on July 22, other teenaged Americans from the 35th Infantry Regiment were drowning in a panicky scramble across a rain-swollen stream as they tried to get away from a North Korean attack. Such terrified retreats of Americans from positions where they were outgunned and about to be overwhelmed in the early days of the Korean conflict were so frequent they prompted a new coinage, “bugging out,” and the troops often left a shameful trail of dropped weapons, equipment, food, helmets, cartridge belts and even combat boots along the line of flight.

The Garryowens’ first night in the combat zone wasn’t much more commendable. Cooked by the tropical heat, eaten by rice-paddy mosquitoes, revolted by the smell of human excrement used in the fields and primed with lurid tales of sneak attacks, infiltration and atrocities, the Garryowens dug in a few miles behind the front, which was slowly being withdrawn from the environs of the town of Yongdong, captured that day by the North Koreans. As soon as darkness fell, the nervous soldiers began shooting at anything that moved or made a sound. One second lieutenant was killed by his own troops when he lit a cigarette in view of the raw, jittery kids in their foxholes.

Meanwhile, several miles away on the Yongdong road, Park Hee-Sook, Yang Hae-sook and their families were being rousted out of their villages by other Americans attempting to clear the area between the armies, to create what was to become known as a “free fire zone” in another conflict a generation later.

In the wee hours of the next night, the Garryowens were ordered to pull back toward No Gun Ri in a routine maneuver designed to straighten and strengthen their front line. But when the order reached the anxious company commanders, they thought it meant there had been a North Korean breakthrough and that they were in danger of being overrun. Soon a mad, blundering fire fight broke out in the inky blackness between two different units of the American forces who each thought they had encountered the enemy. A story circulated amid the melie that the refugees and their carts and oxen, which the Americans could hear moving behind them as they withdrew, were either actual enemy troops and tanks or a shield of civilians being deliberately pushed forward in front of advancing North Korean troops.

As morning dawned, the crowd of refugees, under a small American escort, was approaching the “exhausted, unnerved and hungry” Garryowens, who had settled in on the heights at either side of the road that paralleled the rail line coming east from Yongdong. Orders had been sent down two days earlier from Division headquarters. “No refugees to cross the front line,” the order read. “Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children.”

Most commanders, however, had heard the same stories Gil Huff, the regiment’s executive officer did, over and over again. Refugee women, it was rumored, were being caught with weapons and radios hidden in their supposedly pregnant bellies or under the babies on their backs. “I never saw one,” Huff said later. “But it makes a good story, a colorful story.” In any case, it was one that was certainly believed by the skittish recruits at No Gun Ri.

The Air Force was not invited to make exceptions for women and children as they saw fit. Their pilots had been ordered to fire on all refugee parties approaching American positions, whenever they were seen and whoever they might be. Turner Rogers, operations chief of the 5th Air Force, had his doubts about the policy. His fliers were complying, he wrote in a July 25 letter to his superior, but the carnage was likely to attract unwanted press attention sooner or later, and that could prove “embarrassing.” Furthermore, Rogers was annoyed that the Army was not taking care of the problem of refugees themselves, on the ground. He couldn’t understand why they weren’t “screening such personnel or shooting them as they come through if they desire such action.” Besides, Rogers, said, there were many targets of much greater military utility that the Air Force should be addressing instead.

But the policy was still in place on July 26, 1950, when, according to witnesses, U.S. planes either strafed or dive-bombed the refugee column as it rested near the railroad bridge at No Gun Ri. On the higher ground above the crossing, the stressed-out Garryowens apparently took the Air Force attack, and the refugees’ mass flight toward the relative shelter of the high tunnels of the bridge, as the signal to fire — and keep firing — on the bleeding, hysterical, screaming crowd.

The Americans escorting the refugees were caught in the crossfire, too, and several of them took shelter with some of the terrified refugees in a small culvert not far from the railway. Somebody starting firing in at them. “It was like a hornet’s nest in there,” said Pfc. Delos Flint. “One of my buddies got hit. Shot off part of his privates. Hurt him bad. We was in there hours.”

The new 8th Army refugee plan had been radioed down to the divisions just that morning, essentially contradicting Flint’s mission to clear the area and herd the civilians south: “No repeat no refugees will be permitted to cross battle lines at any time.” Still, no evidence has been uncovered that points to anyone in the chain of command giving a direct order to fire on the refugees at No Gun Ri. “The word” just “came down the line,” and most of the troops assumed that someone, somewhere, must have gotten an order, since everyone was shooting.

It continued, on and off, for a couple of days. Many, but not all, of the Garryowens understood that they were to continue to “hold” the railroad bridge against the civilians by firing into the people huddled below it whenever they spotted movement.

Some of the Americans thought they were being sporadically fired on from underneath the trestle, but the bullets they thought were aimed at them were probably from the guns their buddies were firing into the other end of the 40-foot-tall concrete arches. Norm Tinkler, the teenaged machine gunner, detailed how he was able to shoot the refugees under the spans. “I ricocheted them in there,” he said. “I knew how to shoot. Oh, I could see about that much of the wall that was going into the tunnel, and I put it on that.” In any case, the regimental diary compiled after they withdrew on July 29 reported no guns captured or North Korean soldiers killed at the bridge.

There’s a reason that FUBAR (“Fucked Up Beyond All Recognition”) began its life as a military acronym. In desperate, fearful situations where confused people — people toting guns, grenade launchers and mortar tubes — think their lives are at stake, deaths will occur, usually on a wholesale scale, whether or not they are “supposed” to according to the official rules of engagement.

In any case, as Hanson says from his chilly “Carnage and Culture” viewpoint, the dividing line between “honorable” and “criminal” killing in warfare is essentially arbitrary. “Due to our Hellenic traditions,” he writes, “we in the West call the few casualties we suffer from terrorism and surprise ‘cowardly,’ the frightful losses we inflict through open and direct assault ‘fair.’” Incinerating thousands of Japanese civilians in the kind of bombing raids recently cheered in the film “Pearl Harbor” is usually seen by Westerners as not nearly as ghastly as the summary beheading of the parachuting B-29 fliers in China when they were captured.

The whole concept of “civilized warfare” — the idea that certain forms or targets of military violence are unthinkable or immoral — is a convenient mythology that not incidentally permits Western military strengths full rein. It also offers opportunities for us to tell good stories about the “devious,” “shameful” and “sickening” atrocities perpetrated by our enemies — and only by our enemies. As with other mythologies, the “civilized warfare” fantasy and the idea that Americans have, can and should practice it, is an article of almost religious faith.

That accounts in large part for the furious reaction of military partisans when incidents like No Gun Ri garner publicity in the West. And then we must assure ourselves, with another good story, that even if such things did happen (My Lai, anyone?), they were “isolated incidents” and that most “civilized” Westerners don’t kill unarmed women and children. We can’t ever admit the expedient nature of our cherished folklore. Hanson’s view of warfare, one that concentrates exclusively on the clash between armed belligerents, only tells part of the story. We believe in the concept of civilized warfare, and that allows us to pretend that civilians are not or should not be targets. Yet they always suffer and die in wars, and in some cases, as in bombing raids on cities, they are also unquestionably targets.

At the same time, Hanson claims that many of the war stories we’re telling ourselves these days limit our ability to apply our particularly Western warmongering gifts of annihilating firepower and utter ruthlessness. He takes the story of the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam as a case in point. North Vietnam’s multi-focal surprise effort, hitting simultaneously at locations all over South Vietnam during a holiday cease-fire (underhanded! dishonorable! Hanson notes), was actually a military failure for the attackers. Few South Vietnamese joined in the staged “uprising,” and tens of thousands of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army lives were lost. Their death toll was especially heavy in their expulsion from the “Citadel” at Hui and during the siege at Khe Sanh, and there were relatively few losses on the American side.

But while the military effect of Tet was minimal, culturally it was devastating. The way the tale was told by Western journalists, from the inevitably grim street-level view of the common soldier (and with few countervailing facts concerning the larger military situation), shocked and demoralized Americans and South Vietnamese alike. The effect of the offensive was particularly devastating coming as it did after Gen. Westmoreland’s confident statements the preceding November that the Vietnam war was “winding down” and that he could see “light at the end of the tunnel.”

The demolition of Westmoreland’s pleasant fiction of imminent victory accelerated what Hanson otherwise sees as the Western virtues of dissent and self-critique about the conduct of warfare. In some of his landmark battles, the participants’ internecine fighting over intent and methodology actually improved their strategy and tactics, and the pooling of brainpower helped them avoid pitfalls. But in retrospect, the deep divisions between the military and its civilian controllers over matters of mission and scope in Vietnam created a military no man’s land where there was no possibility of victory. The stories our journalists were telling us — “We’re doing this for nothing” or “We’re making no strategic progress” or “We’re perpetrating more horrors than we’re stopping” — Hanson maintains, essentially prevented the military from acting in accordance with other, more crucial Western characteristics like our preference for direct, pitiless and decisive battle, and our tendency to systematically continue any given slaughter until the enemy’s ability to return to the field is completely obliterated.

Our leaders’ acceptance of convincing scenarios about the potential entry of China or the Soviet Union into the Vietnam conflict also warped our military decisions and responses. We hesitated to mine North Vietnamese harbors or to effectively bomb military and industrial facilities or to stringently and directly interdict supply lines in Cambodia and Laos.

Worst of all, according to Hanson, we didn’t let ourselves even dream of invading North Vietnam itself with the full, efficient weight of our military superiority. A completely serious Western-style military assault on the North would have been horrifically costly on both sides, of course, but the overall human losses might have been significantly less in the long run (especially if we add the deaths that occurred after the fall of South Vietnam). But we didn’t have the will to win that way, and we didn’t have the grace to quit.

The stories told in both “Carnage and Culture” and “The Bridge at No Gun Ri” foster two entirely opposite dangers. Hanson pretends that he has laid aside questions of morality, but his thesis actually presents a moral justification for gigantic, no-holds-barred, scorched-earth warfare by arguing that this strategy makes the most productive use of resources, is most likely to achieve definitive victory and is soonest over. Shooting or bombing refugees who might conceivably have posed even the slightest danger to the allied troops is therefore perfectly in consonance with his principles of “amoral” efficiency. “The Bridge at No Gun Ri,” on the other hand, demonstrates what Hanson’s businesslike sort of warfare involves at the human level, and is likely to make Westerners protest the use of such brutality in the future.

In the Western way of war, there is a constant tension between utility and justification, which has only grown greater as our culture has developed. The Western principles of individual freedom and the consent of the governed weigh heavily on the kinds of stories we are able to tell ourselves about why and how we will make war. A free press protected by the ideals of democratic government and a mass media created by capitalism and innovative technology can now widely disseminate war stories, like that of No Gun Ri, that bring us face-to-face with the realities of combat and utterly destroy our ability to believe in the gallant mythology of “civilized warfare.” Thus Western culture might now have “crystallized” to the point that our growing interest in honesty and truth about war could hamper our future ability to apply the ugly but pragmatic principles of our past triumphs.

Hanson is right that Western civilization, such as it is, was built and maintained on carnage of the most obscene and terrifying kinds, up to and including firebombings of cities and distraught kids killing refugees — and their own buddies — in battlefield backwaters. The question now is whether Westerners can view blood-chilling true stories of retail warfare like “The Bridge at No Gun Ri” with a clear eye and still recognize the necessity, when and if the time comes, to use our superb abilities — and our will — to kick ass and take names.

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Dive-bombing FDR

With the release of "Pearl Harbor," conspiracy theorists have resurrected the canard that Roosevelt had advance warning of the attack.

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Dive-bombing FDR

On many mornings during the late 1980s, when my husband and I drove down to Hickam Air Force Base, the luminous view from the road above Pearl Harbor made us think of how it must have looked when the torpedo planes came buzzing in on Dec. 7, 1941.

It was “a date which will live in infamy,” President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared before Congress the next afternoon, and 60 years later, Americans are talking about that infamous event again. Not because the anniversary has inspired a thoughtful reconsideration of midcentury America’s racist assumptions about the Japanese, or a review of the military and diplomatic miscalculations leading up to the debacle, or an attempt to address tricky strategic questions of isolationism vs. engagement. No, we’re discussing Pearl Harbor because of the hype surrounding a technically brilliant but soulless movie.

Only in America could such a terrifying, humbling historical event become little more than a deus ex machina plot device, a thunderbolt from the blue that conveniently resolves a hackneyed romantic rivalry. Haven’t we seen this before? Explosions, sinking ships, tremulous avowals of love …? Oh yeah, now I remember — but this time there’s no iceberg.

To avoid giving offense to any group of potential ticket buyers, “Pearl Harbor” gives us a new, anxiety-free, “shit happens” version of the disaster, a no-fault view exemplified by the movie’s portrayal of Adm. Husband Kimmel, the senior Navy commander in Hawaii. In the movie, Kimmel — a dark, stooped, doughy figure in real life — becomes a clean-cut, prow-faced golden boy who had all the right instincts, but was somehow helpless to escape his destiny. Like all the other pretty heroes and heroines in the movie, Kimmel ended up as a blameless victim of, like, you know, fate.

In contrast, most of the long history of Pearl Harbor revisionism has concerned itself with nailing a scapegoat. The sheer scale of the screwup guaranteed that shrapnel dodging and finger-pointing would ensue, and it became a matter of some political desperation to name one person or group of persons who could take the rap and — not incidentally — let the rest of America off the hook.

The most persistent of the various mythologies that grew out of this frantic buck passing was the belief that FDR not only deliberately provoked the Japanese attack but knew when and where it would occur. The story goes that FDR deliberately kept that information from his commanders in Hawaii so the attack would sway American public opinion from its intransigent isolationism. (No one has quite explained how being alert and prepared to beat off the attack would have significantly diminished its political effect.)

The “FDR knew” conspiracy theory was revived again last week in a tendentious article in the New York Press by the left-wing contrarian Alexander Cockburn, who also revives the usual dishonest rhetorical habits of FDR’s accusers. Cockburn cites, for example, a 1999 article in Naval History magazine that claims to “prove” FDR’s prior knowledge by citing the fact that the Red Cross secretly ordered large quantities of medical supplies to be sent to the West Coast and shipped extra medical personnel to Hawaii before the attack.

These facts, like so many of those cited as proof of FDR’s vile plot, can be explained quite readily without resort to the idea of a conspiracy. FDR had pledged to keep America out of foreign wars. At the same time, he was aware that our diplomatic efforts with the Japanese were only likely to buy us time, not permanently prevent war. No responsible leader could neglect the responsibility to be ready for any eventuality, but FDR also wouldn’t have wanted the press to become aware of the necessary preparations. That would have been a political disaster and might have derailed his effort to quietly enhance our capabilities before war broke out.

Populist horsefly Gore Vidal, in the course of a book review in the Nation in September 1999, and again in a November 1999 (London) Times Literary Supplement article titled “The Greater the Lie,” also lent credence to the “FDR knew” theory by praising — I can only assume without having read — the most notorious recent restatement of the theory, Robert B. Stinnett’s book “Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor,” first published in 1999 and new in paperback this month. (Vidal also presents the theory in his latest novel, “The Golden Age.”)

Stinnett — whose previous historical work was a suck-up treatment of the elder George Bush’s war years — purported to have new, recently declassified documents to support the idea that FDR was involved in a depraved political plot against our brave boys in uniform. But despite the book’s surface appearance of being an earnest and meticulous investigation — complete with lengthy footnotes and reproductions of dozens of important-looking bits of paper — it’s not hard for a careful reader to see the bilge water pouring out of it.

It’s not just that Stinnett’s “evidence” — if it can be dignified as such — is at best ambiguous and circumstantial. It’s not just that his theory, like most classic conspiracy theories, conflicts with reams of other available evidence and tries to make us believe two or more mutually exclusive things before breakfast. It’s also not just that he — for all his apparently knowledgeable blather and the truckload of “documentation” he dumps on us — apparently doesn’t understand some important realities of cryptology and signals intelligence. It’s not even that it is impossible to believe that Roosevelt — who was, without a doubt, wily and subtle — might have perpetrated such a Machiavellian plot. No, the real reason to think there’s no pony in this pile is Stinnett’s relentlessly dishonest — dare I say “deceitful”? — characterizations of documents, incidents and testimony.

As with other such conspiracy books, “Day of Deceit” received reviews in responsible academic journals like Intelligence and National Security that demolished it, citing its nonexistent documentation, misdirection, ignorance, misstatements, wormy insinuations and outright falsehoods. The consensus among intelligence scholars was “pretty much absolute,” CIA senior historian Donald Steury told me in an e-mail. Stinnett “concocted this theory pretty much from whole cloth. Those who have been able to check his alleged sources also are unanimous in their condemnation of his methodology. Basically, the author has made up his sources; when he does not make up the source, he lies about what the source says.” In other words, even if Roosevelt were genuinely guilty of these charges, “Day of Deceit” couldn’t possibly convict him.

Typical of the kind of porous and dishonest evidence “FDR knew” theorists promote are the “coded naval intercepts” Vidal praised Stinnett for having “spent years studying.” Again, Vidal either never actually read Stinnett’s book or was — in spite of his intellect — somehow dazzled by the book’s hurricane of bullshit exhibits. Stinnett’s supposedly assiduous study of Japanese intercepts amounts to only a series of rhetorical scams. The most contemptible of these comes during his jumbled discussion of whether the Japanese maintained radio silence during the approach to Hawaii. (It is a crucial argument of conspiracy theorists that the Japanese fleet was detected on its way to Pearl Harbor by radio direction finders around the Pacific, and that FDR supposedly deliberately withheld the location and movements of the Japanese carrier task force from his Hawaii commanders. But if the Japanese did not use their radios en route — and they have always insisted they didn’t — they couldn’t have been found by the radio direction finders.)

After noting several incidents that prove little more than that there could have been a late transmission on Nov. 26, Stinnett goes on to say that he, the intrepid investigator, discovered 129 intercept reports that indicate that the Japanese didn’t maintain radio silence during the approach to Hawaii. (None of them are reproduced in the book.) Stinnett then blandly states that these intercepts came from a three-week period from Nov. 15 to Dec. 6. In other words, all of them could have been obtained before the fleet ever left Japanese waters, and before radio silence was imposed. I don’t know how Stinnett could believe that his readers wouldn’t notice this critical detail, but then, most of the book displays little respect for our intelligence.

Nevertheless, like other conspiracy books before it, Stinnett’s was eagerly clasped to heaving right-wing bosoms from sea to shining sea. One enthusiastic reader at Amazon.com, for example, opined that people who could not accept Stinnett’s thesis were obviously “brain-washed with liberal red fascist, left-wing extremist, pagan atheistic infanticidal merchant of death beliefs that won’t let them face the real ugly truth.”

There is probably little hope of reasoning with people like this, but the real problem is that despite dozens of careful debunkings of Stinnett’s book and others like it, the “FDR knew” idea still retains its currency with people like Cockburn and Vidal — who certainly share neither the rabid rage nor the right-wing ideology found in many of their fellow believers. Cockburn (perhaps tellingly) does not even mention Stinnett in his column, yet repeats as gospel many of his most questionable contentions, like the claims of one Robert Ogg — who is linked by marriage to Adm. Kimmel’s family — to have pinpointed Japanese radio traffic from the Hawaii-bound fleet in the North Pacific.

Cockburn and Vidal are certainly intelligent enough to recognize the holes in a poorly supported thesis if they choose to educate themselves about it. But they seem to want to believe it anyway — and, worse, to actively promote it. Many other ordinary people I talked to about the theory also seemed to implicitly believe it, most of the time without having read a single book outlining the accusations.

Why? One theory is that conservative hostility to FDR’s New Deal continues to the present day, and has over time succeeded in slipping the meme of Roosevelt’s political depravity in under the radar of our national consciousness, sabotaging our ability to apply logic to the situation.

Given FDR’s notorious “government interference” initiatives like Social Security, banking and securities regulation, farm price supports and — worst of all — that pesky minimum-wage and collective-bargaining legislation, it’s not surprising that conservative capitalists in the ’30s and ’40s felt a level of hatred for him that wouldn’t be matched until the days of Bill Clinton. (My grandmother, the daughter of a banker ruined in the crash, once told me that the sulfuric name of “Roosevelt” was never uttered at her family’s dinner table. Like Clinton in many ’90s households, FDR was always referred to only as “that man in the White House.”)

To make matters worse, when Roosevelt emerged after Pearl Harbor as the “one who’d been right all along” about our vulnerability to fascist militarism, the isolationist Republican Party — already staggered by the commie horrors of the New Deal — was banished to the ninth circle of political hell for the duration (and then some). It accordingly launched an effort to transfer the ultimate responsibility for the debacle at Pearl Harbor from the military commanders in the field, Adm. Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter Short, to the Roosevelt administration.

But given that one of the most fundamental duties of military command is ensuring readiness to meet attack, the only way to completely exonerate Kimmel and Short was to make a case that they’d been deliberately set up. Thus was born the first wave of Pearl Harbor conspiracy theory, which was America’s favorite paranoid fantasy until the Kennedy assassination. It became such a cherished conservative myth that Sen. Strom Thurmond, R-S.C., instigated yet another official investigation of Pearl Harbor (the 10th) in 1995.

Despite that 1995 investigation coming to much the same conclusion as all others before it, the contrarian “FDR knew” meme lived on, and reached its apogee of respectability when the new Republican-dominated Congress recently passed a resolution absolving Kimmel and Short of any responsibility for the tragedy and restoring them posthumously to their highest ranks. It was a move that many people believe was extremely unwise. Military tradition, which runs much deeper than military law, has always held that whatever happens on your watch is your responsibility and that it is your duty to accept the consequences, however unfair they may seem. Congress’ official endorsement of buck passing has not gone over well with everyone.

Truth be told, there was plenty of blame to go around, both in the field and in Washington. The constant tension between ensuring secrecy and giving operational units access to essential intelligence may not have been resolved in the best possible way before Pearl Harbor, and in any case, intelligence functions were tragically fragmented and dispersed. Robin Winks, professor of history at Yale University and author of “The Historian as Detective: Essays on Evidence,” agrees with the conclusions of other investigators that there was a “massive operational failure” to use the intelligence we did obtain to good effect. “I believe we had the information, that it was not understood by those who had it, that those who most needed to have it didn’t see it, and that FDR did not know, though perhaps by only the margin of a very few hours.”

Yet the rumor persists, and is usually based on the idea that we had access to the Japanese navy’s operational codes and not just the “Purple” diplomatic code that was the basis for the famous “MAGIC” intelligence reports. Vidal, for example, makes a typical flat-footed declaration about it (based on the Stinnett book) in his discussion in the Nation: “Although FDR knew that his ultimatum of November 26, 1941, would oblige the Japanese to attack us somewhere, it now seems clear that, thanks to our breaking of many of the 29 Japanese naval codes the previous year, we had at least several days’ warning that Pearl Harbor would be hit.” The idea that we were reading more than consular communications is also obliquely alluded to but not developed in the movie “Pearl Harbor.”

But researcher Stephen Budiansky, in an article for the Proceedings of the Naval Institute, details evidence rebutting that contention, which he found while researching his book “Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II.”

In March 1999, Budiansky found documents that had been declassified some years ago but not yet processed by the National Archives staff, and thus not listed in the finding aids for researchers. The papers turned out to be contemporaneous, month-by-month reports on the progress of the Navy code breakers, each date-stamped, covering the entire period from 1940 to 1941. They showed, Budiansky said, that the first JN-25 code (designated “Able,” or JN-25-A) was laboriously cracked with help from the new IBM card-sorting machines (and some lazy Japanese encoders) in the fall of 1940.

But then, heartbreakingly, the Japanese switched to a new version of the code (“Baker” or JN-25-B — in a typical display of ignorance, Stinnett claimed in his book that there was no such thing as a JN-25-B code) in December 1940, a year before the attack on Pearl Harbor. At that point the code breakers completely lost their ability to read the operational communications. Going back to the drawing board, and with the aid of a supersecret collaboration with British cryptologists in Singapore, the Allies managed to recover a small fraction of the code groups and additives (which changed again that summer) by Dec. 1, 1941 — but most of what they could read by then was numerals, not words.

Yet, in classic conspiracy theory fashion, the rumor that we had access to Japanese naval communications has been sustained down the years by portentous reference to documents like a March 1941 message from Adm. Thomas Hart, commander in chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, which Stinnett reproduces in “Day of Deceit.”

Stinnett claims the message indicates “solutions” to the JN-25 code were being shared with the British. Clearly, however, what is being shared is only preliminary data and some bits and pieces recovered from an accumulation of old communications in earlier additive groups. The admiral, encouraged by the prospect of British help, directs his code breakers at Cavite (Corregidor) to work exclusively on JN-25. The only thing this document proves, then — other than Stinnett’s dimwittedness — is that this crucial Japanese operational code was not solved once and for all in 1940.

Another of the common tricks used to sustain the “FDR knew” theory is the publication of supposed “smoking gun” diplomatic messages in the “Purple” code (a more “routine” consular code) that naval intelligence often waited days to read. These messages were regarded as relatively unimportant and weren’t decoded or translated until after the Pearl Harbor attack — sometimes not for years afterward. It’s a phenomenon Budiansky is familiar with. “It became a joke at the Archives,” he wrote in a message to a military history mailing list, “to see how many people would rush to show John Taylor, the national security archivist, their ‘discovery’ that the U.S. was reading JN-25 before Pearl Harbor … John would point to the date of decryption at the bottom of the sheets and watch the researcher’s face fall.”

One of the things that is most notable about the way the “FDR knew” theory is sustained is that its methodology parallels that of so-called creation science. The trick in both instances is to assiduously ignore all the mountains of evidence in favor of the theory you are trying to disprove and to focus instead on tiny apparent discrepancies and supposed “missing links” in the record. “True to the M.O. of all conspiracy theorists,” Budiansky notes, “the ABSENCE of further documentary evidence actually confirms [the] thesis by proving that a ‘cover-up’ has taken place.”

The conspiracy buffs always point to the fact that there are apparent gaps in numbered message series, that the National Archives has not gotten around to declassifying all the millions of pieces of paper from the war, that certain material provided to congressional investigations in the early days of the Cold War was perhaps too compulsively censored and that some supposedly crucial material is missing, such as the log of the passenger liner SS Lurline’s radioman Leslie Grogan, who claims that he heard Japanese radio traffic in the North Pacific just before the Pearl Harbor attack. (“They were just blasting away.”)

But the SS Lurline was on a southerly route to Honolulu from Long Beach, Calif., so the radio signals Grogan heard coming from the northwest could have been from Japan’s shore-based radio facilities, not the carrier task force. Grogan claims he took his original log to naval authorities in Hawaii after the Lurline arrived on Dec. 3, but they didn’t seem particularly interested. The Lurline’s radio log was checked out of the National Archives without a date or signature sometime in the ’70s, about the time another Pearl Harbor conspiracy theorist, John Toland (“Infamy”), was doing his original research.

But this “mysteriously” missing material could just as easily provide definitive proof that the “FDR knew” gang is full of it. Given that conspiracy theory has become, in the words of Paul Miles, Tomlinson Fellow in the History of War and Society at Princeton, a “cottage industry,” it struck me that some of the documents in question could have been spirited away by people with another agenda entirely. Look at me! I can concoct conspiracies too!

“Anyone who does intelligence history (as I do),” says Robin Winks, “knows it is very difficult, highly technical and open to conspiracy theory, because inevitably some material is missing, and at times some material deliberately lied with a view to disinformation.” For example, and apropos of the SS Lurline material, the Japanese later stated that they attempted to produce bogus radio traffic right before Pearl Harbor in the hope that it would confuse intercept agencies about the location of the silent fleet. It might not have fooled military professionals, but Leslie Grogan was an amateur.

The conspiracy theorists, in parallel with the creationists who maintain that God must have placed fossils in the ground to test his people’s religious faith, also think that Roosevelt and his political allies managed not only to cover up their dastardly deeds but to fabricate thousands of linear feet of documents in order to camouflage the truth. It is perhaps remotely possible that some kind of massive effort of that kind was instituted here in America in the midst of wartime, but unless we want to believe that our former enemies have destroyed or manufactured material to burnish Roosevelt’s reputation, evidence from Japanese archives also backs up the idea that the attack was a surprise to FDR.

Linda Goetz Holmes, for instance, a Pacific war historian with the Interagency Working Group at the National Archives and author of the book “Unjust Enrichment: How Japan’s Companies Built Postwar Fortunes Using American POWs,” told me about the findings of a Japanese historian whose research in his country’s recently declassified files only became available in the U.S. in 1998. He revealed considerable documentary evidence of Japanese satisfaction with how well “our magnificent deception” was working in Washington.

Yet the “FDR knew” meme continues to thrive with supporters like Cockburn and Vidal, whose credibility should suffer from such carelessness, but somehow never does. The case of Vidal is particularly shocking, because he prides himself on demolishing cultural mythology, debunking “court historians” and pursuing the truth. Yet he embraces a dishonest “researcher” like Stennitt and lends his literary aura to a tissue of lies.

In 1941, both military and civilian authorities were operating from extremely bad — and, it’s important to note, very racist — assumptions when it came to the Japanese. We simply couldn’t believe that the “little beasts” had gotten the drop on us, or as Stanford historian David M. Kennedy indicates in his book “Freedom From Fear,” that we as a people had made “systematic, pervasive and cumulative” mistakes that led to the disaster.

That there are rational, wide-reaching and comprehensible reasons for our failure to be prepared at Pearl Harbor is not an idea that sits well with most Americans. We’d much prefer to believe that the calamity wouldn’t have happened if we weren’t deliberately set up. In that sense the “FDR knew” theory is very comforting. It essentially absolves everyone except the nefarious Roosevelt and his diabolical cronies; it implies that everyone else, and all their procedures, decisions, organizations and attitudes, were impeccable. If only a better man had been in charge, this fairy tale goes, the yellow horde wouldn’t have succeeded.

Such a view handicaps our ability to learn desperately needed lessons from the debacle. I’d much rather we admitted our mistakes — all of them — so that when future military men and women look out over Pearl Harbor in the morning they will be reminded, as I always was, of how quickly our smug assumptions can be blown out of the water.

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Between pro-life and pro-choice

Richard North Patterson tries to write a "fair" abortion novel in "Protect and Defend," but there's no such thing.

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On Web site after Web site, pro-life forces routinely cast their crusade against legalized abortion as a moral battle, the equivalent of the fight to abolish slavery. They piously intone about their hopes that the political divide over the issue of abortion does not cause “another Civil War.” One Cynthia Hallen, for example, posted a grisly takeoff on that self-congratulatory song of the Union cause, “The Battle Hymn of the Republic.”

Mine eyes have seen the gory pictures
of dismembered babes;
They have pulled them from their mothers,
and then harvested their brains;
They have burned them in incinerators,
dumped them without graves,
While Right goes marching on.

From the beauty of the body,
they are suctioned into bits;
Or they’re sliced in ragged pieces
to a mass of broken limbs;
Or the saline poison stops their hearts
and broils their fragile skins,
But Right goes marching on.

It is also common for pro-lifers to claim that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe vs. Wade is the equivalent of its notorious ruling in Dred Scott vs. Sandford. The court’s 1857 ruling justified the return of a runaway slave from a free state on the grounds that Africans were private property, subject to their owner’s disposal and discretion, and not legally protected “persons” under the Constitution.

This emotionally powerful but misleading analogy — which deliberately ignores all the most important differences between the two issues — is typical of today’s increasingly sophisticated anti-abortion rhetoric. Grotesque imagery and persuasive misdirection have often succeeded in producing what popular novelist Richard North Patterson, author of the current bestseller “Protect and Defend,” calls “a yawning — and frequently inhumane — gap between myth and reality.” Patterson’s novel is intended to fill that gap.

Against the background of a new president’s controversial Supreme Court nomination, “Protect and Defend” tells the story of Mary Anne Tierney, a pregnant teenager with a hydrocephalic fetus. Tierney is denied a third-trimester abortion by both the law and her parents, even though delivering the effectively brain-dead child at term might endanger her future fertility. With the help of Sarah Dash, a standard-issue Brilliant Young Lawyer, Mary Anne goes to court against her own parents — pillars of the pro-life community — in an attempt to overturn the law. The result is skillful and intellectually thorough, but also far too calculated, conventional and pious.

Patterson wants to educate and persuade his readers politically, and he isn’t afraid to say so. He believes that American politics has fatally distorted the question of abortion, especially the two elements of the issue that are still in the legislative arena: late-term, so-called partial birth abortions, and parental consent. Patterson feels that here the pro-lifers have seized the imaginative initiative, reaching the public first with their own blood-chilling version of “the official story” of late-term abortion. Pro-lifers have, he writes, been able to “intimidate politicians while casting pro-choice activists as, at best, oblivious to the moral implications of abortion, even at its most extreme.” Patterson designed “Protect and Defend” to tell the story of a contested late-term abortion in a way “that was neither pro-choice nor pro-life, but pro-truth.”

Since all of our major religions use storytelling to frame their moral ideas, it makes sense that fiction, popular and literary, plays a role in how we understand moral, and therefore political, questions. As critic Susan Sontag put it in an L.A. Times symposium on “Politics and the Novel” last summer, “If you start with the concept of the truth, then fiction takes its place among other kinds of instructive testimonies.”

Of course the political fiction that lasts tends not to be overtly polemical. From Voltaire’s “Candide” (a kind of 18th century “Forrest Gump”) to Robert Penn Warren’s novel of moral crisis in the political realm, “All the King’s Men,” great literature recognizes the human frailty that propaganda prefers to ignore. Nevertheless, when we don’t have personal experience of certain moral issues, and when we find it hard to imagine being entangled in them, a simple, well-told tale of Good vs. Evil can be much more persuasive than logic.

So it was with Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 1852 anti-slavery melodrama “Uncle Tom’s Cabin.” Michele Wallace, professor of English at City College of New York, noted in a recent article for the Drama Review that Stowe’s book appeared at a time when the philosophical debate between North and South had reached a deadlock. Republican rationality and abolitionists’ religious arguments weren’t working. “In their place,” Wallace wrote, “Stowe substituted the moral power of sentimentality and domesticity, the authority of the human heart.”

As a result, “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” proved to be “the most influential novel of social purpose in the nineteenth century,” according to Bill Andrews, Adams Professor of English at University of North Carolins at Chapel Hill. Abraham Lincoln credited the book — an international bestseller that was promptly adapted for the stage — with significantly increasing abolitionist sympathies in the United States. When Lincoln met Stowe at the White House while the Civil War was raging in 1863, he is said to have greeted her by saying, “So this is the little lady who started this great big war.” Patterson can only dream of having such an impact.

Stowe, like Patterson, always claimed that she tried to present a balanced picture of slavery. True, she did portray several benign slave owners and some relatively contented slaves — and the most beastly character, Simon Legree, was a Yankee — but no one could doubt her novel’s true intent. “Slave holders were not appeased,” Andrews said, “and anti-slavery readers knew a condemnation of slavery when they saw one.” Amazon.com “reader reviews” of “Protect and Defend” indicate that pro-lifers know a condemnation of their position when they see it, too — even before they read it. “It appears that this book is for the left-wingers out there,” said one potential customer from Texas. “Thanks anyway, I’ll pass.”

Patterson takes a more crisp and cerebral approach to his pet issue than Stowe took to hers, but his strategy is more or less the same. He introduces reasonably sympathetic pro-life characters such as Mary Anne’s father, Martin Tierney, the equivalent of one of Stowe’s sympathetic slave holders. Martin personally conducts the court battle to force his daughter to bear his damaged grandson. (Patterson was an accomplished litigator before he wrote the first of a half-dozen legal thrillers, and some of the most effective elements of “Protect and Defend” are its lawyerly intellectual precision and the realistic emotional ups and downs of the trial scenes.)

In the novel’s central trial, Martin Tierney brings in witnesses to testify to the small possibility that Mary Anne’s child may turn out to be normal after all (medicine does make mistakes), and to the idea that even if the baby does prove to have little or no brain, he might somehow be able to live a great life anyway. One physician’s bleak estimate of the danger to Mary Anne’s future ability to bear normal children is characterized as another potential medical miscalculation.

Tierney is essentially arguing that it’s impossible to know the future, so we can’t really judge ahead of time whether terminating a given pregnancy would be “for the best.” Therefore, women must be forced to err on the side of uncontrolled nature, and to let their reproductive chips fall where they may. The fact that most people would not take this radically fatalistic position in any other aspect of their lives — people can opt for a risky medical treatment, for example, without the assurance of a guaranteed outcome — is, apparently, irrelevant.

Though we are clearly meant to grudgingly admire Martin Tierney’s single-minded dedication to life — any kind of life at any cost — we still disdain his actions, because Patterson stacks the deck against him so meticulously. Given the situation the author sets up, Mary Anne’s decision to terminate her pregnancy is just too easy, both morally and rationally. Her case is a flawless object lesson in the pitfalls of legislating on the basis of inflammatory, unexamined, one-size-fits-all assumptions, but so what? Real life rarely offers perfect examples like Mary Anne’s; it tends to be messy. But “Protect and Defend” doesn’t get into those gray areas, or into the larger, grayer area of how involved the state should be — if at all — in the enforcement of “normal” pregnancies.

In fact, Patterson deals somewhat dishonestly with the other, more routine abortions that figure in the book. The story’s young, Kennedyesque Irish-American president, Kerry Kilcannon — who takes the standard liberal “hate it but don’t legislate it” attitude toward abortion — is a case in point. We first met Kilcannon in Patterson’s earlier political novel, “No Safe Place.” (If you don’t want to know important details of the stories in Patterson’s earlier novels, you should stop reading now.)

In “No Safe Place,” Kerry Kilcannon’s bid for the presidency is threatened when his rival in the primaries leaks damaging evidence about him to an abortion rights group. Kilcannon had an adulterous affair with a political reporter, Lara Costello, and — very much against Kilcannon’s wishes — Costello had an abortion and fled the relationship, thereby maintaining both his political viability and her own career. Costello’s defiance of her lover’s wishes is mirrored in “Protect and Defend,” when a well-meaning, pro-life Republican senator’s drug-addled daughter aborts her illegitimate child. Though the men in Patterson’s stories always object strenuously to abortion, they nevertheless benefit from the independent determination of their women to undergo the procedure — benefit, that is, as long as the abortion is kept secret.

Here’s where abortion differs from slavery when it comes to political fiction. Slavery, for most of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s readers — even the people who considered themselves abolitionists — was a distant and abstract thing. The majority had never even met a black person and had no personal stake in slavery as an institution, for or against. In the North, white individuals simply didn’t have to take a position on slavery, and those who did generally approached it as a matter of passionate principle, not lived experience. What Stowe’s story did was furnish her readers’ imaginations with emotionally freighted images — abused slaves and brutal masters — giving them something, in modern parlance, they could “relate to.”

However, most Americans have some kind of immediate experience of problem pregnancy and thus have a genuine personal stake in the abortion issue — even if public dishonesty prevails. There have been some 35 million abortions in this country since it was legalized in 1973, so anyone who thinks he or she has never known anyone who felt compelled to end a pregnancy has probably been lied to at least once. Slavery was a very public, visible institution; abortion, even when legal, is not.

Men in particular are unlikely to know whether their female friends, co-workers or relatives have ever had an abortion, and they sometimes assume — if they even think about it at all — that the “good” women they know have never even considered the option. In those subcultures where abortion is most strongly condemned (the fundamentalist community, for example), the secrecy runs even deeper, which reinforces the political sanctimony. Thus we have the Amazon reader who thought that it was “over the top” for Patterson to portray three out of more than a dozen women in his book as having had an abortion.

The pro-life movement papers over this secrecy with a story as reductive as the romanticized and symbolic struggles of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s characters. In the pro-lifers’ favorite fairy tale, women seeking abortions are always the equivalent of Simon Legree: selfish, cruel and opportunistic. Their sexual irresponsibility, the story goes, results in pregnancies they find merely “inconvenient,” and therefore these “bad” women should pay for their sins with pregnancy and childbirth.

Meanwhile, real women, sensitive to this widespread mythology, often avoid admitting their own experiences with abortion or even their intimate knowledge of another woman’s abortion decision — unless they can hedge it with elaborate disclaimers of disapproval. Given this climate, an abortion in a political candidate’s past is guaranteed to sink his or her career, which is probably why Patterson lets Kerry Kilcannon and his fiancie “get away with it”: Lara’s abortion remains a secret and Kerry is able to maintain his virtually faultless public image. But by sparing Lara and Kerry the ordeal of public exposure, Patterson reinforces the idea that abortion is unspeakable. Of course, Roe vs. Wade defined the choice to have an abortion as a private matter. But the sad truth is that as long as abortion remains secret there’s no way to counteract the pro-life movement’s campaign to brand all women who seek abortions as capricious and morally unserious.

What’s even worse is the way Patterson lets his heroes off the hook, that is, by means of an unlikely confluence of coincidences involving, among other things, blackmail, a lone gunman and a well-timed diversionary scandal (though, naturally, Kerry’s underlings handle all the dirty work, just as Lara took on terminating her pregnancy all by herself). Because Kerry and Lara are too damn lucky, they never actually have to confront the unsolvable conflicts at the intersection of our unrealistic ideals, the public pretenses that we indulge in to maintain them and our “bad woman” abortion myths. The one woman whose past abortion gets plastered all over the newspapers in “Protect and Defend” is one of those naughty, alcoholic, irresponsibly sexual teens the pro-lifers seem to feel would most benefit from an enforced pregnancy. She winds up drunk and dead. Of course, if Kerry and Lara weren’t quite so lucky, they’d be dragged through the mud too, and Patterson wouldn’t deliver the happy ending his kind of fiction is required to have.

The African-American writer James Baldwin once famously dissed “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” and the whole tradition of “protest novels” in American literature — including, shockingly, those of his mentor, Richard Wright — for, as Bill Andrews put it, “schematizing American reality,” concentrating on “issues” and what was essentially sociological observation rather than the portrayal of full, individualized human beings. Protest novels, Baldwin lamented, tended to reduce all of America “to the compulsive, bloodless reality of a guy named Joe.” Ironically, this kind of simplification tends to reinforce the pernicious stereotyping it protests.

Likewise, Americans want our political campaigns and legislative battles to be a variation on the melodrama of “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” and “Protect and Defend,” the equivalent of exciting Western shootouts, desperate romantic rivalries or come-from-behind sports sagas. We want to believe that virtue, however severely challenged by the forces of evil, will inevitably triumph and that losers just weren’t “good” enough, and therefore didn’t deserve to win. And to win, a hero or heroine has to be truly good, almost perfect except for a few likable shortcomings.

That’s what makes for satisfying genre fiction and movies, but the laws that protect and regulate abortion don’t get applied to perfect, fortunate characters like Mary Anne Tierney and Kerry Kilcannon; they dictate the lives of real, flawed, unlucky people. And as long as Patterson is writing about “ideal” cases like Mary Anne and Kerry, no matter how balanced he tries to be, he’s not writing about the reality of abortion, and he still encourages us to believe that the world would be fine if we could just “fix” a few things politically, by tinkering here and there with our communal machinery. Meanwhile, our individual struggles with these official myths — and especially the secrets we keep — remain unchallenged and unchanged.

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Linda Tripp addresses her people

Speaking out for the first since the impeachment saga, Linda Tripp gets a hero's welcome from like minds at a Free Republic meeting.

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During a break Saturday in the meeting of the South Carolina Chapter of the Free Republic near Charleston, one of my pleasantly bourgeois luncheon companions told me that 75 percent of my tax money goes to pay the interest on the federal debt. I might have quickly swallowed my mesclun and quibbled with that figure if he hadn’t stunned me into silence with his next solemn assertion: The debt wasn’t run up to orbital heights in the ’80s by Reagan’s deficit spending, but by the Federal Reserve Bank, deliberately, so that “12 international bankers” could make gobs of money at our expense.

Apparently the tax burden this evil internationalist scheme has laid upon my acquaintance made it impossible for him to live his life to the fullest, even in his particularly upscale subdivision of my own overpriced Charleston suburb. Did I know, he asked, that Kennedy was shot because he was planning to dissolve the Fed, and that conditions in this country today parallel those which led to the rise of Hitler?

Welcome to Freeper World.

My neighbor’s astonishing take on history and economics was just one of the bizarre views from the day, ending in an emotional evening banquet to raise funds for Linda Tripp’s legal team. Tripp, speaking publicly for the first time since impeachment (which she set in motion by surreptitiously recording the anguished ditherings of presidential fellateuse Monica Lewinsky) and just days after criminal wire-tapping charges from the Monica tapes were dropped against her in Maryland, promised to continue her fight against the Demon Spawn, aka the Clintons. They had made such a shambles of her life, Tripp said, that she would never recover, economically or emotionally.

Yet she seemed remarkably cheerful Saturday, freshly face-lifted and looking forward with optimistic glee to getting more Clinton depositions on videotape in the course of her irony-impaired civil suit against the White House for — yes — invasion of privacy.

Free Republic is a loose, grass-roots style organization founded in 1996 by Jim Robinson, a Fresno, Calif., conservative. Its mission, as explained by Bob Johnson, the slender, well-spoken head of the fledgling activist arm of the organization, is to “reverse the trend of unconstitutional government expansion” and bring about “a restoration of our constitutional republic.” Specific, long-range goals include the repeal of the 16th Amendment, which established the IRS, and the complete withdrawal from the United Nations. Intermediate goals include the rollback of gun control laws, dissolution of “unconstitutional” government departments, renunciation of many international treaties and repeal of regulations on business. However, according to Johnson, these ambitious efforts won’t succeed if the organization fails to reach its primary goal of “ending liberalism as a significant cultural influence.” In pursuit of that aim, it is bent on “leveling the playing field” in the media, and “balancing” the media’s supposed 80-20 slant in favor of liberalism.

Johnson also plans to hit the “Achilles heel of the left”: funding. Most left-wing organizations are not only generously supported by government money, Johnson claims, but by private entities who hand out grants, matching funds and other bennies to liberal causes. “Why,” Johnson asked the assembled Freepers, “do we buy products from an organization that is giving money to our enemies?” He thinks those corporations should be induced to stop the handouts, or to give right-wing entities an equal amount.

Finally, Johnson said, the right needs to “retake our institutions,” such as education, and higher education in particular, which is “dominated by liberals, fascists, communists, Marxists and other assorted luminaries.” Young people these days come out of college with a “headful of mush,” Johnson claims, and it takes them at least 10 years to “solidify all that Jell-O in their brains.”

To quicken the congealing of liberal minds from rubbery picnic desserts into more respectable concrete blocks, Free Republic’s busy Web site offers article reprints and media archives, as well as a lively — some would say virulent — forum for public discussion and “critical analysis” of current news and political issues. Free Republic has vociferously supported Tripp from the beginning of the impeachment crisis, calling her a “Hero and Patriot,” and leading the effort to fund her legal defense. It’s no wonder she felt comfortable making her first speech to the Freepers, because, as her lawyer Joe Murtha told us, she was sure what she said before these fiercely loyal partisans would not be criticized or harshly judged.

Not that criticisms and harsh judgments of other players in the impeachment drama are in short supply at Free Republic. One of the most startling aspects of their rhetoric is their poisonous, personalized, visceral hatred of the Clintons, particularly the hysterical expressions of outraged horror and disgust they direct toward Hillary Clinton. The aggression aimed at the president, supposedly the greatest criminal mind to ever occupy the White House, is almost jocose in comparison.

Freepers will, as they actually did Saturday, stand en masse and bellow in unison, making a bullhorn of their hands: “Bill Clinton! We have you surrounded! Drop the cigar, step away from the intern, and come out with your pants up!” But when it comes to Hillary, the humor takes on a seriously hostile edge. She is “Queen Hillary the First,” the moral equivalent of Hitler and Stalin, and, it seems, the worst thing that ever happened to the United States of America.

Yet only liberals assume the worst about their fellow human beings, says Van Jenerette, a candidate for the Republican nomination in South Carolina’s First Congressional District. In the course of a rousing stump-style lesson on the “divinely inspired” Constitution, Jenerette floated a common Freeper concept of the philosophical differences between left and right. Conservatives, he said, are self-disciplined people who follow rules, have a conscience, uphold a moral code and assume that other people are just like them, and therefore don’t need to be supervised. Liberals, on the other hand, have no internal mechanisms of belief, no value structures (“William Jefferson Clinton is an example of that”), and because they assume that others are immoral ghouls like themselves, they naturally think people need to be watched and “micro-managed.”

I was confused. Conservatives might not think people need to be supervised, but they demonstrate an alarming propensity to declare that liberals need to be controlled. (The inescapable conclusion, of course, is that they don’t think liberals are really people.) It is also a truism of political science — or at least it was when I used to teach it — that conservatives think human nature is inherently selfish and naughty (remember Original Sin?), and it’s the fuzzy-headed liberals who think people are naturally good. Jenerette’s speech made my head spin.

Before Linda Tripp arrived at the banquet that night, one of the people at my table described the “disguise” he’d seen Linda wearing as she passed by him earlier in the evening. She’d looked like a “scarecrow,” he said, wearing a funny black straw hat and a black trench coat. I thought that was peculiar indeed, given that the day’s glaring, Deep South heat would cause anyone wearing a black coat to melt down into a puddle of saline and rendered lard.

She must be desperate not to be recognized, I thought (as I added to my own ample stock of lard with the marvelous dinner featuring Southern classics like pork barbecue, fried chicken, coleslaw and corn custard), but surely such a get-up in this climate would only call attention to her.

When Tripp entered the room some time later (greeted with a standing ovation and a chant of “Linda! Linda! Linda!”) she was wearing the black hat, perched on the back of what looked like a varicolored ash-blond wig that curved curiously around her narrow, heavily made-up face. One of the reporters I talked to at a table in the back assured me that the thick, too-shiny lankosity on her head was her real hair. He was a man, though, and perhaps a Linda partisan (he made some friendly remarks to her later), so I took his opinion with a grain of salt. Not that I would accuse a fellow journalist of pulling my leg or anything.

Tripp had on a black coat-dress incongruously belted with a wide, studded cummerbund of brown leather, like a fancy weight-lifter’s back support. The delicate skin under her eyes was still stretched and sunburned-looking from the surgery, but leaving aside the makeup and the clothes, she looked good: pleased at the adulation she was receiving, a little sweaty with excitement and quite self-assured, like an aging movie star surrounded by fans.

(The minor news note in the evening was that Tripp and her lawyers only recently discovered, on May 25, that the Department of Defense inspector general had determined that Tripp’s Pentagon bosses, Ken Bacon and Clifford Bernath, had violated the provisions of the Privacy Act in telling New Yorker reporter Jane Mayer that Tripp had not reported a youthful arrest on her application for employment. In spite of the IG’s determination, the DOD Office of General Counsel asked the Department of Justice to authorize private counsel for Bernath at government expense to fight Tripp’s civil suit, as his error had been made in the course of his official duties. Tripp’s civil lawyers, David Colapinto and Stephen and Michael Kohn, wrote to Attorney General Janet Reno on Saturday, requesting that the authorization for private counsel be denied, and any money that had already been spent on Bernath’s defense be returned.)

The surprising thing about the Freepers, given the surreal quality of their rhetoric and their alarming obsession with the Clinton Reign of Terror, is that they seem, on the whole, to be Very Nice People. They are not twitching freaks. You don’t have to wear cloves of garlic or pack heat to feel safe among them. They are friendly, verbally accomplished and for the most part apparently intelligent people. Skewing generally older and more prosperous than the general population, they have sparkling eyes, good senses of humor and engaging smiles. They display emotion as freely as Miss America contestants, weeping with joy, weeping with anger, weeping with deeply felt patriotic reverence for the sacrifices of our forefathers and Linda Tripp’s unspeakable sufferings.

They struck me as the kind of sweet, well-dressed and peripherally charming crowd you’d find in a suburban Presbyterian church on any given Sunday. These people, in short, don’t demonstrate any immediately visible sign that they are — as we used to say in the Air Force — “et up” with their own peculiar sense of themselves. But, as with the Presbyterians, once they start talking, you begin to catch on.

Linda Tripp did a lot of talking. She told a piteous tale of being misunderstood and vilified by the press, of how her personal appearance was used against her, her ugliness being emphasized, she claimed, as a means to discredit and demonize her in general. I’ll buy that. It was ever thus. Appearances count, and we tend to perceive people we don’t like as physically unattractive. It’s an old game, and women take a bigger hit.

But it apparently doesn’t occur to Tripp that the distaste much of the press felt for her might have been based upon their own genuine feelings about her and her actions. She seems to think that the media’s opinion of her as an ugly, perhaps jealous woman who betrayed her pretty young friend was entirely the fault of the “spin” projected from the Clinton White House.

Tripp also shares the Freepers’ total disgust for/obsession with Hillary Clinton. “We have all,” she said, referring to herself and other Clinton accusers, “been in the cross-hairs of Mrs. Clinton, whose orchestration of [our] destruction is well known in the White House. She calls the shots, she spearheads the strategy, and she … is … in … charge. Please don’t ever doubt that.” Tripp’s main objection to Hillary seems to be that she became a “de facto co-president … whose power and influence only increased each and every time the president found himself in trouble.”

During the question and answer period following her formal talk, she noted in an answer to a question about Al Gore that Hillary had even originally wanted to occupy the vice president’s traditional office in the West Wing. Tsk tsk.

Tripp was also queried about her observations of the personal relationship between President and Hillary Clinton. “Did she manhandle him?” the questioner asked, drawing a laugh from the crowd and a loud aside from someone up front, opining that Hillary might “beat him like a rented mule.” More hilarity ensued.

Finally Tripp was able to answer the question, outlining the way she was able to observe the first couple from her few months near the Oval Office early in the first administration, and later when she was shuffled to an office nearer Hillary’s.

“I saw signs,” Tripp said, “that Mrs. Clinton, on some level, loves her husband. I saw no signs, on any level, that Mr. Clinton has any respect or feelings for his wife.” No one, Tripp seemed to be implying, could possibly love such a slavering monster as Hillary — not even her long-term partner in crime.

Speaking of unrequited love, someone asked about Tripp’s grand jury testimony that Kathleen Willey had an initially thrilled and smiling reaction to the president’s alleged “sexual assault.” It was clear that Tripp was choosing her words carefully. “Kathleen and I don’t dispute what happened at all,” she said. “We dispute, if anything, her reaction to it that day. And I think over time — and she’s had several years to put this in perspective — I think what she has come to learn is that this wasn’t a romantic encounter of any kind. In fact, it was an abusive encounter, and she felt very used.”

“So I don’t think that we see things so differently when you look at it through the lens of time. Perhaps, as many seem to be, she was flattered by the attentions of the president of the United States. I can’t figure out why, but there are women who like that sort of thing.” She went on to say that “the bottom line” was that Willey was assaulted, and “no one believed her.”

It’s interesting that Tripp, with her professed abhorrence of “spin,” would deploy such an egregious example of it in order to support Willey today. But it seems that Tripp, too, has “reconsidered” the past. What we want to believe about one thing (“President Clinton is the antichrist”) will alter our perception of the truth about something else (“Kathleen Willey is Polly Pureheart”). It’s as if both the left and the right are looking into a funhouse mirror warped by their prejudices, and thinking they see the enemy, but really only seeing a distorted version of themselves. It’s not unlike my friend at lunch who somehow sees the mad, inflationary Germany of the 1930s reflected in the relatively calm and prosperous present. He doesn’t like what he thinks is happening, so evil must be afoot.

Not just some routine political annoyance, a mere swing in the pendulum, but the worst, most fiendish kind of evil. It’s interesting that the far left vilifies Clinton almost as fiercely as the right does, because he hasn’t been, from their point of view, as politically correct and supinely liberal as he should have been.

I found myself thinking, too, of the all peculiar alliances that have caused the far right and far left to climb into bed with each other, in recent campaigns against things as varied as pornography and Kosovo. My neighbor was taken aback when I said his concept that the media contained nothing but institutionalized, self-serving distortions was amazingly similar to that of a famous “leftist”: Noam Chomsky.

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