Michael Massing

We are the Thought Police

Orwell's Big Brother never showed up. Instead of centralized Iraq war propaganda, we have an America in which the public and the press jointly impose their own controls.

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We are the Thought Police

At first glance, the war in Iraq would seem to represent the realization of George Orwell‘s darkest fears. In “Politics and the English Language,” he expressed alarm over how political speech and language, degraded by euphemism, vagueness, and cliché, was used to defend the indefensible, to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable. Three years later, in “1984,” Orwell offered an even grimmer vision, one in which an all-powerful Party, working through an all-seeing Ministry of Truth, manipulates and intimidates the public by pelting it with an endless series of distorted and fabricated messages.

The Bush administration, in pushing for the war in Iraq, seems to have done much the same. It concocted lurid images to stir fear (“weapons of mass destruction,” the prospect that the “smoking gun” could become a “mushroom cloud”). It asserted as fact information known to be false (the purported ties between Iraq and al Qaeda). It clipped and cropped intelligence data to fit its policy goals (dropping important qualifiers from the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq). It worked up snippets and scraps of unsubstantiated evidence into a slick package of deception and misrepresentation (Colin Powell’s speech at the United Nations). And it created a whole glossary of diversionary terms — “preemptive war” for unprovoked aggression, “shock and awe” for a devastating bombing campaign, “coalition” for an invading force that was overwhelmingly American — all of which helped win the White House broad domestic support for a war that most of the rest of the world had decisively rejected.

Yet in many key respects, the Iraq war has diverged from Orwell’s dystopic vision. Orwell had expected advances in technology to allow the ruling elite to monopolize the flow of information and through it to control the minds of the masses. In reality, though, those advances have set off an explosion in the number and diversity of news sources, making efforts at control all the harder to achieve. The 24-hour cable news channels, the constantly updated news Web sites, news aggregators like Google News, post-it-yourself sites such as YouTube, ezines, blogs, and digital cameras have all helped feed an avalanche of information about world affairs. In Iraq, reporters embedded with troops have been able via the Internet to file copy directly from the field. Through “milblogs,” soldiers have been able to share with the outside world their impressions about their experiences on the ground. Even as the war has dragged on, it has given rise to a shelf-full of revealing books, written by not only generals and journalists but also captains, lieutenants, privates, national guardsmen, and even deserters.

In short, no war has been more fully chronicled or minutely analyzed than this one. And, as a result, the Bush administration has been unable to spin it as it would like. The spreading insurgency, the surging violence, the descent into chaos — all have been thoroughly documented by journalists and others, and public support for the war has steadily ebbed as a result.

Yet even amid this information glut, the public remains ill-informed about many key aspects of the war. This is due less to any restrictions imposed by the government, or to any official management of language or image, than to controls imposed by the public itself. Americans — reluctant to confront certain raw realities of the war — have placed strong filters and screens on the facts and images they receive. This is particularly true regarding the conduct of U.S. troops in the field. The U.S. military in Iraq is an occupation army, and like most such forces, it has engaged in many troubling acts. With American men and women putting their lives at risk in a very hostile environment, however, the American public has little appetite for news about such acts, and so it sets limits on what it is willing to hear about them. The Press — ever attuned to public sensitivities — will, on occasion, test those limits, but generally respects them. The result is an unstated, unconscious, but nonetheless potent co-conspiracy between the public and the press to muffle some important truths about the war. In a disturbing twist on the Orwellian nightmare, the American people have become their own thought police, purging the news of unwanted and unwelcome features with an efficiency that government censors and military flacks can only envy.

Sometimes the public defines its limits by expressing outrage. The running of a story that seems too unsettling, or the airing of an image that seems too graphic, can set off a storm of protest — from Fox News and the Weekly Standard, bloggers and radio talk-show hosts, military families and enraged citizens — all denouncing the messenger as unpatriotic, un-American, even treasonous. In this swirl of menace and hate, even the most determined journalist can feel cowed.

Kevin Sites can attest to this. A freelance cameraman, Sites in November 2004 covered the second battle of Fallujah for NBC News. On Nov. 13, he followed a squad of Marines into a mosque that had been the scene of intense fighting. On the ground lay several badly wounded Iraqis. Seeing one of them move, a Marine shouted, “He’s fucking faking he’s dead,” then shot him, making sure that he was. Sites caught the moment on tape and sent it to NBC. The network aired the clip but halted it at the moment when the soldier actually began firing. “NBC has chosen not to air the most gruesome of the images,” anchor Brian Williams explained. Other networks did the same. (On the Arab satellite networks, the clip was shown in full, and repeatedly.) Even with this editing, Sites received thousands of death threats and pieces of hate mail. “Dear Liberal Media Scumbag,” went one, “I hope the next video clip out of Iraq I watch is an insurgent placing your severed head onto your back.” Bloggers accused him of being a traitor and an antiwar activist.

Since then, the networks have aired very few clips that approach even the truncated version of Sites’ report. Sites himself no longer works for the networks; rather, he’s out on his own, posting video reports from around the world on Yahoo.com, where his audience is a fraction of what it once was. To find truly revealing footage about the war, it’s necessary to seek out documentaries such as “The Ground Truth” and “The War Tapes,” which play mainly before small elite audiences in art houses in the nation’s largest cities.

In other cases, the public sets the limits of its tolerance through indifference and inattention, responding to reports of a shocking nature with a yawn and a sigh and thus causing these stories to wither and fade. The Haditha massacre is a good example. In March 2006, Time magazine reported that four months earlier, a group of Marines patrolling a remote village in western Iraq had lost one of its men to a roadside bomb. Furious, the soldiers had gone on a rampage, killing 15 unarmed men, women, and children. Initially, the Marines involved in the attack claimed that the civilians had died from the insurgent bomb, and the military accepted their report. But Time had obtained a copy of a videotape of the attack’s aftermath and, based on it, and on interviews with eyewitnesses, concluded that a massacre might have occurred. “What happened in Haditha,” correspondent Tim McGirk wrote, “is a reminder of the horrors faced by civilians caught in the middle of war — and what war can do to the people who fight it.”

All in all, it was an explosive report, presenting strong evidence of a Marine atrocity. Yet it stirred little public reaction, prompted no demands for an investigation, received scant follow-up from other news organizations. It was only two months later, when Rep. John Murtha denounced the slaughter at a press conference, declaring that the Marines had “killed innocent civilians in cold blood,” that politicians began to pay attention to the episode, and that journalists began to write about it. Forced to investigate, the military determined that the Marines had killed not 15 but 24 civilians, and it initiated proceedings against eight of the soldiers.

From that point on, the massacre — validated as newsworthy by a leading congressman — received extensive coverage. Even so, it was framed as a rare exception, as an aberration from the otherwise commendable behavior of U.S. soldiers in Iraq. But, as William Langewiesche found in an investigation for Vanity Fair, the incident was not all that exceptional. The initial failure of the Marines to fully investigate the killings was due not to any conspiracy or cover-up but to the fact that the bloodshed was not regarded as anything out of the ordinary. “The killing of civilians,” Langewiesche wrote, “has become so commonplace that the report of these particular ones barely aroused notice as it moved up the chain of command in Iraq.” The debacle in Haditha grew out of the “normal operations in the war,” he observed, operations that “make such carnage routine.”

Few other publications, however, were willing to explore this. Doing so would require acknowledging that U.S. soldiers in Iraq are not necessarily paragons of virtue, that they do not always show respect for Iraqi civilians, that at times they harass, abuse, injure, and even kill them. It would require acknowledging that the Iraq war, like most wars, is a savage, pitiless affair in which American soldiers have been forced to do many un-American things. Most Americans prefer not to confront this. They want to be able to maintain their belief that Americans are an exceptionally virtuous, freedom-loving people and that their soldiers are a uniquely compassionate, well-meaning force. Any assertions to the contrary can rouse the beast, and the press, well aware of this, tends to tread warily around it.

Needless to say, many U.S. soldiers do behave in an upright fashion. Intent on doing good, they have distributed toys to children, cleaned up streets in poor neighborhoods, and arranged medical help for the injured and ailing. But these soldiers have been placed in an extraordinarily perilous environment with minimal preparation, and as the security situation has deteriorated and the population has grown increasingly belligerent, they have responded in ways that do not always conform to the standards taught in Army field manuals.

For a truly unsanitized look at the nature of the occupation, one must consult the many books that have been written about it. Just as the most graphic footage from Iraq has been tucked away in documentaries, so has the rawest reporting been relegated to books that only the most motivated will seek out. Especially revealing are the many firsthand accounts produced by ordinary soldiers. Among them are “My War: Killing Time in Iraq,” by Colby Buzzell, a pot-smoking admirer of Charles Bukowski, Ralph Nader, and George Orwell and the operator of one of the most widely read milblogs (until it was shut down by the military); “Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the U.S. Army,” by Kayla Williams, a freewheeling, foulmouthed military intelligence specialist; “The Deserter’s Tale,” by Joshua Key, a private from Oklahoma who, appalled by the brutality and cruelty of his fellow soldiers, left his unit and fled to Canada; and “Operation Homecoming,” a collection of eyewitness accounts, private journals, and short stories by U.S. soldiers sponsored by the National Endowment for the Arts. In these books are recorded not only many acts of courage, self-sacrifice, and benevolence but also many deeply disturbing aspects of the U.S. presence in Iraq — realities that tend to get airbrushed out of news accounts. Among them:

  • The prevalence of drug use among U.S. troops. From these books, it seems clear that heavy drinking, hash smoking, and pill popping (especially of Valium, which is widely available in Iraq) are commonplace among U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Near universal is the use of “dip,” or smokeless tobacco, which causes soldiers to spit out thick gobs of brown goo everywhere they go.
  • The ubiquity of pornography. Before the invasion, porn was all but unavailable in Iraq, but the presence of 130,000 U.S. troops has helped create an active market in it. Many Iraqis have since developed a taste for it as well, and soldiers freely trade porn for alcohol and pills. They also use it to motivate their Iraqi counterparts, promising a peek at a skin magazine in return for their going out on patrol.
  • The frequency of stealing from Iraqis. Despite strict prohibitions against this, U.S. soldiers on raids or at checkpoints sometimes unburden Iraqis of cash, jewelry, knives, electronic equipment, and sunglasses. Cars and motorcycles are sometimes seized as well.
  • The widespread contempt in which Iraqis are held. This is evident in the lexicon of racially charged terms used to refer to them: ragheads, camel jockeys, sand niggers, terrorists, and “the fucking locals.” Many soldiers come to regard Arabs as “smelly, awful people,” Kayla Williams writes. The labels for Iraqis are but a subset of the raw, thoroughly profane language many soldiers in Iraq use, a trait that generally goes unmentioned in journalistic reports from the field.
  • The routine mistreatment of Iraqi citizens during house raids. U.S. forces have undertaken thousands of these actions, hoping to find insurgents, weapons, and intelligence. In carrying them out, they often break down doors, bust up furniture, rip up mattresses, round up sleeping children from their beds, and arrest and zipcuff every able-bodied male in sight. These men are frequently punched, kicked, burned with cigarettes, and generally roughed up. In these books, a Marine brags of punching prisoners in the face or groin when no one is looking; a detainee is repeatedly kicked in the face in an effort to make him stop laughing; a prisoner suffers a broken jaw; another dies in custody. The vast majority of those detained turn out to be innocent. From these accounts, it seems clear that the types of abuses committed at Abu Ghraib were not the work of “a few bad apples,” as most Americans insist on believing, but common occurrences throughout the archipelago of detention facilities maintained by the United States in Iraq.
  • The killing of innocent Iraqis at checkpoints. Throughout Iraq, U.S. soldiers set up roadblocks to check for weapons and prevent car bombs, but the sites are often so poorly marked that Iraqis do not realize that they are supposed to stop at them. When they fail to do so, they are often fired on and not infrequently killed. These books are filled with gruesome accounts in which U.S. soldiers, worried that they were coming under attack, gunned down innocent Iraqis.
  • The high civilian death toll in Iraq. Checkpoints are but one type of encounter in which innocent Iraqis die at the hands of U.S. soldiers. Convoys of U.S. military vehicles frequently run Iraqi cars off the road, causing injury and sometimes death. U.S. soldiers, when shot at, routinely respond by opening up fire and pumping round after indiscriminate round into hamlets, towns, and urban neighborhoods. When a location is suspected of harboring insurgents, it is often pounded by artillery rounds or air strikes, with often devastating results for civilians. In “The Deserter’s Tale,” Joshua Key observes that each military company in Iraq is responsible for dealing with the bodies of the civilians it has killed, and it fell to him to build a shack to hold the bodies of Iraqis slain by his unit until someone came to claim them.
  • In contrast to the deaths from car bombs and suicide attacks of the insurgents, most of the civilian deaths caused by Americans are unintentional. That does not, however, make them any less wrenching for the victims and their families. In the Arab news media, this ongoing slaughter receives constant coverage. In the American media, it receives very little. One can watch the evening news shows for nights on end, one can scour U.S. papers week after week, and not find any acknowledgment of the many civilians who have been killed by GIs. Writing in the Washington Post in July 2006, Andrew J. Bacevich, a professor of international relations at Boston University and the author of two highly regarded studies of U.S. foreign policy, expressed dismay at the indifference shown by both the military and the American public toward the ongoing slaughter of Iraqi noncombatants by U.S. soldiers. Observing that nobody has even bothered to keep a tally of the victims, Bacevich surmised from his own readings that the number “almost certainly runs in the tens of thousands.” Aside from the obvious moral questions this raises, he went on, the violence against civilians has undermined America’s policies in Iraq and the Mideast generally by “suggesting to Iraqis and Americans alike that Iraqi civilians — and perhaps Arabs and Muslims more generally — are expendable.”

    How can such a critical feature of the U.S. occupation remain so hidden from view? Because most Americans don’t want to know about it. The books by Iraqi vets are filled with expressions of disbelief and rage at the lack of interest ordinary Americans show for what they’ve had to endure on the battlefield. In “Operation Homecoming,” one returning Marine, who takes to drinking heavily in an effort to cope with the crushing guilt and revulsion he feels over how many people he’s seen killed, fumes about how “you can’t talk to them [ordinary Americans] about the horror of a dead child’s lifeless mutilated body staring back at you from the void, knowing you took part in that end.” Writing of her return home, Kayla Williams notes that the things most people seemed interested in were “beyond my comprehension. Who cared about Jennifer Lopez? How was it that I was watching CNN one morning and there was a story about freaking ducklings being fished out of a damn sewer drain — while the story of soldiers getting killed in Iraq got relegated to this little banner across the bottom of the screen?” In “Generation Kill,” by the journalist Evan Wright, a Marine corporal confides his anguish and anger over all the killings he has seen: “I think it’s bullshit how these fucking civilians are dying! They’re worse off than the guys that are shooting at us. They don’t even have a chance. Do you think people at home are going to see this — all these women and children we’re killing? Fuck no. Back home they’re glorifying this motherfucker, I guarantee you.”

    “Generation Kill” recounts Wright’s experiences traveling with a Marine platoon during the initial invasion. The platoon was at the very tip of the spear of the invasion force, and Wright got a uniquely close-up view of the fighting. In most U.S. news accounts, the invasion was portrayed as a relatively bloodless affair, with few American casualties and not many more civilian ones. Wright offers a starkly different tale. While expressing admiration for the Marines’ many acts of valor and displays of compassion, he marvels at the U.S. military’s ferocious fire-power and shudders at the startling number of civilians who fell victim to it. He writes of neighborhoods being leveled by mortar rounds, of villages being flattened by air strikes, of innocent men, women, and children being mowed down in free-fire zones. At first, Wright notes, the Marines found it easy, even exciting, to kill, but as the invasion progressed and the civilian toll mounted, many began to recoil, and some even broke down. “Do you realize the shit we’ve done here, the people we’ve killed?” one Marine agonizes. “Back home in the civilian world, if we did this, we would go to prison.”

    In an interview he gave soon after the publication of his book, Wright said that his main aim in writing it was to deglamorize the war — and war in general. The problem with American society, he said, “is we don’t really understand what war is. Our understanding of it is too sanitized.” For the past decade, he explained, “we’ve been steeped in the lore of The Greatest Generation” — Tom Brokaw’s book about the men who fought in World War II — “and a lot of people have developed this romanticism about that war. They tend to remember it from the Life magazine images of the sailor coming home and kissing his fiancée. They’ve forgotten that war is about killing.” In “Generation Kill,” he noted, he wanted to show how soldiers kill and wound civilians. In some cases, he said, the U.S. military justified such killings by the presence of Iraqi fedayeen fighters among the civilian population, but, he added, “when you see a little girl in pretty clothes that someone dressed her in, and she’s smushed on the road with her legs cut off, you don’t think, ‘Well, you know, there were Fedayeen nearby and this is collateral damage. They’re just civilians.’” The “real rule of war that you learn — and this was true in World War II — is that people who suffer the most are civilians,” Wright said. “You’re safest if you’re a soldier. I’m haunted by the images of people that I saw killed by my country.”

    As Wright suggests, the sanitizing of news in wartime is nothing new. In most wars, nations that send their men and women off to fight in distant lands don’t want to learn too much about the violence being committed in their name. Facing up to this would cause too much shame, would deal too great a blow to national self-esteem. If people were to become too aware of the butchery wars entail, they would become much less willing to fight them. And so the illusion must be maintained that war is a noble enterprise, that the soldiers who wage it are full of valor and heroism, that in the end their intentions are good and their actions benign.

    In his reflections on politics and language, Orwell operated on the assumption that people want to know the truth. Often, though, they don’t. In the case of Iraq, the many instruments Orwell felt would be needed to keep people passive and uninformed — the nonstop propaganda messages, the memory holes, the rewriting of history, Room 101 — have proved unnecessary. The public has become its own collective Ministry of Truth — a reality that, in many ways, is even more chilling than the one Orwell envisioned.

    The elephant in the room

    Presidential candidates are silent on the failure of the U.S. war on drugs.

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    The elephant in the room

    With little fuss or fanfare, the United States is preparing to sharply escalate the war on drugs. Over the next two years, the Clinton administration is planning to spend a whopping $1.3 billion in Colombia to disrupt the production and export of drugs to the United States. Most of that money will go for military purposes, including 30 Blackhawk helicopters and training for two rapid-deployment battalions. Given that Colombia is embroiled in a bitter civil war involving leftist guerrillas linked to the drug trade, American lives will clearly be at stake.

    One would expect such a risky venture to spark some debate. It hasn’t. Few members of Congress have raised questions about the new aid package. The press has greeted it with a yawn. And the presidential candidates have all but ignored it.

    On the campaign trail, the overwhelming concern regarding drugs has been who used what when. And no one can qualify for the label drug-free. George W. Bush drank heavily until he was 40, when he found Jesus, and he continues to be dogged by rumors of cocaine use. John McCain’s wife, Cindy, was once addicted to prescription drugs and was even caught trying to steal some. Bill Bradley has acknowledged experimenting with marijuana as a youth, and Al Gore has admitted to even more.

    This is progress of a sort. Eight years ago, Bill Clinton felt compelled to maintain that he didn’t inhale. Now we’ve learned that Gore was nearly a pothead. And it hasn’t damaged his political prospects. Actually, the fact that he served capably as vice president for eight years would seem to show that smoking marijuana does not necessarily fry the brain.

    Yet anyone looking for a reasoned discussion of marijuana on the campaign would be disappointed. Asked about marijuana last October, for instance, McCain, citing “scientific evidence,” said that “the moment it enters your body, it does damage” and “can become addictive.” McCain also embraced the view that marijuana is a “gateway drug” leading inexorably to harder stuff, despite the fact that more than 50 million Americans have tried it without moving on to heroin or cocaine. This darling of the liberal media supports tougher penalties for selling drugs (including the death penalty for drug kingpins), increased funding for border interdiction and restricted availability of methadone. In short, McCain would clearly intensify the drug war. Bush has had less to say on the matter, but it’s apparent from his record as the governor of Texas that he supports severe penalties for even minor drug offenses.

    The Democrats have struck a more moderate note. Bradley has come out against mandatory sentences for first-time, nonviolent drug offenders, and Gore has criticized the federal statutes that punish crack offenses far more severely than they do those for powdered cocaine. Bradley has said he would spend more money on drug treatment and Gore has expressed support for more after-school programs.

    Beyond that, though, the candidates have been mute. The unrelenting violations of civil liberties in the name of drug enforcement, the noxious spread of intrusive drug-testing programs, the government’s continuing refusal to fund needle exchanges — on all these crucial matters, silence has resounded. Over the last 10 years, the federal government has spent more than $150 billion to fight drugs, yet no one seems to care what we’ve gotten for our investment.

    A closer look would reveal it’s not much. In the name of fighting drugs, the United States has dispatched troops to Bolivia, built a paramilitary base in Peru, eradicated crops in Colombia, sent AWACS spy planes over the Caribbean, installed X-ray machines along the Mexican border, erected an electronic curtain around South Florida and invaded Panama. It has dismantled the Medellmn and Cali cartels, the two great Colombian cocaine syndicates said to control the flow of drugs into the United States. Despite it all, the cocaine market is glutted as always, and heroin is readily available at record high rates of purity. And, while the number of casual drug users has decreased, the number of hardcore, addicted users hasn’t. In the face of such futility, the Clinton administration, led by drug czar Barry McCaffrey, is set to embark on the most ambitious, and dangerous, operation in the history of U.S. drug enforcement. And no one’s issued a peep.

    The political timidity surrounding the drug issue is breathtaking. It has been 15 years since Nancy Reagan first admonished Americans to “Just say no.” In that period, the nation has grown markedly more tolerant on subjects ranging from gay rights and abortion to cohabitation, interracial dating and oral sex in the Oval Office. On drugs, however, the reign of terror prevails. When New York Gov. George Pataki proposed a modest revision of the state’s notoriously strict Rockefeller drug laws, it was the Democrats — possibly fearful of appearing weak-kneed — who objected. Just as the charge of being “soft on communism” helped keep pols in line during the Cold War, the label “soft on drugs” enforces support for the drug war today.

    Happily, there are some signs of change. Voters in more than a half-dozen states have approved ballot measures to allow the use of marijuana for medical purposes — a clear sign of rebellion against the regime of Reefer Madness. In Arizona, a referendum to mandate low-level drug offenders to treatment instead of prison carried by a decisive margin, and the program has been so successful that even some law-enforcement officials have endorsed it. And Gary Johnson, the governor of New Mexico, has urged a radical overhaul of the nation’s drug laws. So, even as national politicians fiddle in Washington, the fires of rebellion are beginning to burn at the grass roots.

    Progress toward ending the drug war, however, continues to run into one major obstacle: the lack of a clear alternative. If we are to end the war on drugs, what should take its place? The most frequent answer is legalization. If the drug war is failing, as it’s commonly asserted, then legalizing drugs is the only alternative. On the surface, the idea of legalization has much appeal. If drugs were legalized, the whole noxious network of drug traffickers, smugglers, and money launderers stretching from the jungles of South America to the streets of our inner cities would suddenly disappear. Drug agents would no longer barge unannounced into apartments, teenagers would no longer be busted for smoking pot and black motorists would no longer be stopped on the New Jersey Turnpike.

    Yet legalization entails some real risks. If hard drugs like heroin or crack were suddenly sold in state stores or made available through prescription, use — and abuse — could increase. The end of Prohibition, for instance, resulted in a sharp rise in alcohol consumption, along with many unfortunate side effects. And, while no one wants to revive that disastrous experiment, it does suggest that the sudden legalization of an intoxicant can lead to a spurt in consumption. It is this prospect that makes many Americans recoil from the idea of legalizing drugs — or at least hard ones. (A far more convincing case can be made for legalizing, or at least decriminalizing, marijuana, a much less toxic substance.) As long as legalization is seen as the main alternative to the drug war, the movement toward reform will stall.

    Fortunately, there is another way. It consists of viewing drugs as not a law-enforcement issue but a public-health one. Under such an approach, hard drugs would remain illegal, but, rather than make punishment our main weapon against them, we would rely on treatment, rehabilitation and prevention.

    Under a public-health approach, we would recognize that the main threat from drugs comes not from teenage pot smokers or adult casual users but from chronic, addicted users. Nationally, there are an estimated 4 million hardcore users of heroin, cocaine, crack and methamphetamine. While making up only 20 percent of all drug users in the country (the rest being occasional users), these hardcore users account for two-thirds to three-quarters of all the drugs consumed in the United States. They also account for most of the crime, medical emergencies, HIV transmission and child neglect associated with drugs.

    Currently, our main strategy for dealing with such users is arrest, prosecution and incarceration. A public-health approach would instead offer a network of services to help these addicts lick or control their habits. In particular, it would provide ready access to an array of treatment programs — methadone clinics, residential centers, outpatient programs, detox units and short-term sobering-up stations.

    Many Americans are skeptical about the value of drug treatment. This is understandable, given the frequency of relapse. Relapse is so common that the idea has been incorporated into the very definition of addiction: a “chronically relapsing disorder,” it’s called. Even so, a vast literature has accumulated showing that, dollar for dollar, treatment is the most effective means of reducing drug use. A 1994 study by the RAND Corporation, for instance, estimated that, for reducing cocaine consumption, treatment is seven times more cost-effective than domestic law enforcement, 10 times more effective than border interdiction and 23 times more effective than counter-narcotics programs in Latin America. Even if someone relapses immediately upon leaving a program, RAND found, treatment is a good bargain, since the savings from reduced crime, medical problems and other harmful effects far outweigh the cost of the program. (Studies show that no one form of drug treatment is superior to the rest; addicts differ widely in their needs, so it’s important to offer a wide range of programs.)

    Despite the effectiveness of treatment, it is often hard to get. In cities across the country, it can take weeks or even months to find a bed. In Baltimore, one of the nation’s most afflicted cities, long-term residential treatment is virtually unavailable. In Washington, hundreds of drug offenders whom judges have mandated to treatment are forced to remain in prison due to the lack of beds. In several states, methadone is completely unavailable, forcing people to drive hours to get it. Even in cities that do have many beds, like New York, the red tape, lack of coordination and insurance requirements can discourage even the most determined addicts.

    The unavailability of treatment reflects the government’s spending priorities. Fully two-thirds of the $18 billion federal drug budget goes for law enforcement, criminal justice and international intervention. Just one-third goes for treatment and prevention. At the state and local levels, the imbalance is even greater. If the government changed its priorities and redirected money from law enforcement and interdiction into rehabilitation, treatment could be made available to all addicts who want it. Cities could also set up “central intake units” offering immediate attention to addicts and quick referral to programs. And more could be done to find addicts jobs after they complete their programs — a key point on the road to recovery.

    In a public-health model, more attention would also be paid to prevention. At the moment, drug prevention consists mainly of “This is your brain on drugs”-type messages aired on television or taught in classrooms. Research shows, however, that such messages by themselves rarely work. To be effective, prevention must provide alternatives to at-risk kids, such as after-school programs. Rather than busting kids for smoking pot, as Mayor Rudy Giuliani is now doing in New York, we should convert our schools into around-the-clock community centers offering youths a refuge from the troubled streets around them.

    Finally, under a public-health model, we would have as our drug czar somebody who actually knows something about drugs. Since the Office of National Drug Control Policy was created in 1989, it has been headed by a moralist (William Bennett), an ex-governor of Florida (Bob Martinez), a police chief (Lee Brown) and a four-star general (Barry McCaffrey). Certainly it’s time we had a drug czar who has a background in drug addiction, psychopharmacology or, at the very least, medicine.

    Once, we did actually have such a drug czar. And the results were remarkable. This occurred during the presidency of Richard Nixon, of all people. Personally, Nixon detested drugs, especially marijuana, which he felt was poisoning the nation’s youth. It was Nixon who actually launched the war on drugs. But Nixon was also a pragmatist. During the 1968 presidential campaign, he promised to reduce the nation’s crime rate and, once in office, he ordered his domestic policy staff to find a way to do that. Studying the issue, his advisors found that heroin addicts were committing much street crime and that the fastest, most effective way of getting them to stop was to get them into methadone programs or other forms of drug treatment. In 1971, the Nixon White House set up a special-action office to prevent drug abuse and, to head it, named Dr. Jerome Jaffe, a psychopharmacologist widely recognized as the nation’s leading expert on drug addiction.

    Jaffe was given hundreds of millions of dollars to open up treatment facilities around the country, and by the summer of 1972 treatment was available on request. Almost immediately, crime, heroin overdose deaths and hepatitis transmission rates declined. And the treatment network Jaffe had set up was given much of the credit.

    That network remained intact throughout the 1970s, and the nation’s drug problem remained largely under control. In the 1980s, however, the Reagan administration — believing that the government had no obligation to help addicts — gutted the federal treatment budget. By the time crack hit, in the mid-1980s, treatment facilities were completely overwhelmed, and the many new addicts who wanted help were turned back onto the street, there to commit more crime and cause more mayhem.

    While federal spending on treatment has increased some over the last 10 years, it remains entirely inadequate. Nothing could do more to reduce the harm that drugs cause society than to make treatment available on request. That $1.3 billion being proposed for Colombia could fund the creation of many more treatment beds in our nation’s cities. Surely it’s time to call a halt in the drug war and pursue a strategy that attacks the real source of the problem — our nation’s inexhaustible appetite for drugs. At the very least, it’s time for a rousing national debate on the issue. Rather than pester presidential candidates about their past drug use, journalists should begin posing the really important questions about drugs: “Do you think the war on drugs has been a success? If elected president, what would you do differently?”

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