Walter Mayr

Pakistan’s deal with the devil

Beheadings, martial law, kidnappings: The Taliban is making its presence felt at the gates of one of Pakistan's biggest cities.

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The situation changed overnight in Peshawar. The villas in the posh suburb of Hayatabad, hidden behind acacias, palms and oleander bushes, are now directly on the front line. The Pakistani security forces have declared war on the Muslim fundamentalists who are said to have taken up positions in the immediate vicinity.

Eight armored vehicles belonging to the Pakistani Frontier Corps stand ready to move out in the courtyard of Peshawar’s Beaconhouse School. Riflemen are positioned behind sandbagged emplacements at strategically important intersections. Pakistani anti-terror units and paramilitary forces in black uniforms are on patrol in the area, their submachine guns at the ready.

But where is the enemy? Outside the city, in the direction of the Khyber Pass, the sound of exploding heavy artillery rounds can be heard every few seconds.

Roger Sarfaraz listens as the monotonous recurrence of muffled detonations keeps breaking the silence of an oppressively hot summer day. He is standing on the edge of Hayatabad and looks like someone who could tell you right down to the last decimal point what this war is costing him. This smart-looking, athletically built man wearing a Playboy T-shirt is a real estate agent.

With property prices currently at around $315 per square meter in the suddenly embattled development, a secure environment has to be part of the deal. Several years ago, a security wall was built around the settlement — a three-meter-high concrete wall capped off with barbed wire. It was originally intended to protect the Hayatabad’s well-off inhabitants from undesired contact with their neighbors — people from the tribal areas of the Northwest Frontier Province whose mud houses can be seen from here.

The Empire of the Taliban

Now, in addition to the wall, three Pashtuns from the paramilitary Frontier Corps stand guard on the demarcation line with Chinese-made grenade launchers shouldered and ready to fire. But like the concrete wall and the barbed wire, they won’t be able to do much to stem the tide of onrushing Taliban forces. The fighters from the tribal areas have no need to climb over the wall. They simply drive their SUVs and pickups in on the main road — direct from the empire of the Taliban.

What the inhabitants of Hayatabad know about the world that exists just a stone’s throw away from them is what they read in the newspapers or are told on television: that black-bearded, kaftaned mullahs preach to their disciples the need to wage war to defend the strict moral code of Islamic fundamentalism or that “spies” are beheaded with butcher knives, tribal elders shot, and infidels persecuted barbarically.

Still, the Pakistani government didn’t get around to ordering troops into Peshawar to counteract the threat until the very end of June. By then, the rich suburb of Hayatabad had long since become a testing ground for the Islamists’ advance. Last November a suicide bomber blew himself up outside the home of former Political Affairs Minister Amir Muqam after being stopped at the gate by security personnel. Four people were killed in the attack — and since then the settlement has been on the alert.

Now, though, the bearded Taliban come into town in broad daylight, crowded together in the beds of their pickup trucks. After repeated hit-and-run raids, including the abduction of half a dozen prostitutes, this rich section of town has grabbed headlines in the press as a “kidnappers’ paradise.”

Massive Pressure

Real estate agent Roger Sarafaz’s brother was abducted by the Taliban just a few days ago. Together with 16 other hostages, all of them members of Pakistan’s Christian minority, he was dragged off to the tribal areas, where he was beaten with rifle butts until he was unconscious. He was released only after massive pressure was brought to bear on the Taliban, not least of all by Western players. Since then the Pakistani government has been carrying out a military operation aimed at putting a stop to brazen attacks of this kind by the ethnic Pashtun fundamentalists who are at home in the regions along the border close to the Khyber Pass.

Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province has a population of 21 million. It’s the country’s Achilles’ heel and one of the burdens left behind by British colonial rule. In 1893 the British drew the Durand Line dividing what was then British India from Afghanistan. Since 1947, the line has been the internationally recognized border between Afghanistan and Pakistan — but it also goes right through the middle of the Pashtun tribal areas. East of the Khyber Pass up to the outskirts of the city of Peshawar the effects of the British Raj live on — Pakistani law is not recognized in the “ilaka ghair,” or the “land of the lawless,” as the tribal areas are known.

For centuries decisions on right and wrong have been made here by a “jirga,” a council of tribal elders — an institution that is today monitored by a “political agent” appointed by the Pakistani government. At least that was the case until the Taliban began seeking refuge in Pakistan in 2001. Mehmood Shah, Pakistan’s former security chief in the tribal areas, refers to this as the “human fallout” of the war against Afghanistan.

The radical Islamic militants who fled across the border found everything they needed for a new beginning — brothers in arms from the time when they were allied against the Soviet regime in Afghanistan, a large supply of madrasa students who were now without jobs and a small group of “Maliks,” tribal elders who were paid for their loyalty to the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf. The Taliban cut into the traditional structures of Pashtun society like a sharp ax into soft wood.

The fact that the backward region between the Khyber Pass and the banks of the Indus has become a focus of worldwide attention has to do with the fact that the Pakistani government has finally started its military operations there. And with the growing impatience of the U.S. administration, given its conviction that the al-Qaida leadership is holed up somewhere in the tribal areas. The trail Osama bin Laden and his accomplices have left behind in the service of jihad reaches all the way to Hayatabad.

The One-Armed Sheik

Take the case of Algerian-born Sheik Abu Suleiman al-Jaziri, for instance. The May 14 death of this key strategist for al-Qaida missions around the world went largely unnoticed. He died on Pakistani soil along with 13 others in the rubble of a house that belonged to a former Taliban minister. A U.S. drone fired the missiles that took them out.

The one-armed sheik had been known to the authorities in Peshawar for a long time. According to the Pakistani secret service Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), a house registered in his name in Hayatabad was occupied in 1986 by an inconspicuous but very wealthy guest from Saudi Arabia — Osama bin Laden. It was during a time when an international Islamic resistance force was gathering to fight the godless Soviets in neighboring Afghanistan.

It was also in Peshawar, on August 11, 1988, that al-Qaida was established.

An Incubator of Radical Islamists

It’s not difficult to follow the threads spun by al-Qaida since then to the spider web of terror we have today. At the end of June video footage went around the world showing two Afghans who had been sentenced to death as “American spies.” One of them was forced to kneel and then was beheaded while surrounded by a crowd of cheering Taliban. What was not mentioned was who the alleged spies were said to have betrayed — al-Qaida’s Sheik Abu Suleiman.

It seems to be only gradually dawning on the Pakistanis just what the full meaning is of their “pact with the devil,” as some observers have called it — one entered into with the full support of the secret service, the army and the government. More than a thousand members of the Pakistani armed forces have been killed in the tribal areas since 2001. Eighteen police officers have recently lost their lives in clashes on the outskirts of Peshawar. Suicide attacks and summary executions have become common occurrences. And jihadists have been blowing up schools at the rate of two a day.

As usual, Pakistan’s political leaders are standing next to this powder keg with a fuse in one hand and a fire extinguisher in the other. There is currently talk of negotiating with the Taliban and of using force only as a last resort. Media-friendly mullahs are allowed to give television interviews before they — having been given plenty of warning of a pending military raid — flee into the mountains.

According to retired general Talal Masood, who served as a field officer during the military dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq and later as an advisor to Benazir Bhutto, the army — despite the iron grip it has often had on the country since independence — has suffered considerable damage to its reputation as a result of its constant interference in government affairs. He says the armed forces are holding back now and that the new government is too preoccupied with itself, leaving the Taliban to do pretty much as it pleases: “A small group of extremists is holding an entire country hostage,” he says.

A Dangerous Lack of Focus

Indeed, political Islamabad does not give the impression that Pakistan is currently facing one of the deepest crises in its history. Asif Ali Zardari, co-chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party and widower of Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, the political head of the Pakistan Muslim League, and President Pervez Musharraf seem more interested in settling old scores.

For a country under attack from the Taliban, it seems a dangerous lack of focus.

The power vacuum has been an invitation to the fundamentalists, and they are responding by advancing ever further into the border regions. They have moved down from the mountains and toward Peshawar, bringing pious messages and undisguised threats.

The Taliban already come and go with perfect ease in Peshawar. They rely on their pin-prick tactics: here a threatening letter to a CD dealer; there a brief visit to a Sufi shrine where Allah is worshipped with undue pomp; now and then a black veil painted over a woman’s face on advertising posters — all of which generates a tangible fear that the Taliban may soon arrive in force.

There is a certain irony in the fact that Islam is being reinvented in Peshawar, of all places. Two thousand years ago, the city was the center of the Buddhist empire known as Gandhara. Alexander the Great also swept through the region. But in addition to the irony is the danger. A tendency in the city toward submissiveness could win out in the end. As one politician from the Pakistan People’s Party put it: “I’m afraid that when the time comes, the inhabitants will simply go out and welcome the Taliban.”

Things haven’t gone that far yet, though. Daily life continues as though nothing has happened — including on narrow streets deep inside the bazaar where traders, black marketeers, and rumormongers are on their home ground, where spices and trinkets, gold and silk are bought and sold in the daily hustle and bustle. Nisar Ahmad, the spokesman for the business owners in the Saddar Bazaar, who himself sells lipstick and women’s apparel, promises on his honor that he hasn’t yet received any threats from the Taliban.

But why has he recently started pulling the shoulder sash, veil-like, across the entire face of his store window dummies? “Just a precaution,” Ahmad says.

At the Afghan market closer to the tribal areas, things have evolved a bit further. In addition to those clandestinely selling weapons, drugs and whiskey, a number of merchants made their living with the open sale of pornography. Sex films copied onto Chinese CDs were sold for 15 rupees apiece, the equivalent of 15 cents. The price for these films has since doubled and now they are kept hidden under the counter. The films that are officially for sale are of the kind used to prepare volunteers for jihad. They show, for instance, the Taliban beheading “traitors” who are restrained in straitjackets. Or a teenage boy being prepared over a period of weeks for his big day — his being sworn in by experienced fighters wearing black hoods reminiscent of the Ku Klux Klan; an otherworldly smile when he sees explosive charges that have been wired together; and finally the ball of fire that consumes an American Humvee in Afghanistan when the boy detonates the bomb that was mounted in his Toyota pickup.

Paradise Is Near

The final scene of the film shows the face of the young martyr suspended together with clouds in the sky. A white dove takes to the wing. Paradise is near. A message shown in the final sequence says: “This is an example for you to follow.”

According to sources in Pakistan’s academic circles, the worse prospects become for the future of young people and the more illiteracy there is, the more young men will be willing to volunteer to become jihadists. Indeed, on a recent morning in Akora Khattak, a dusty little town 29 miles to the southeast of Peshawar, a group of nine-year-olds from the Waziristan tribal area were standing outside in the summer heat at the infamous Darul Uloom Haqqania madrasa, which in Pakistan is also known as the “University of Jihad.” They call out to passersby with a childlike mixture of pride and defiance: “We are Taliban! We are mujahedin! “We are al-Qaida!”

Some 4,000 students are instructed here free of charge and, on graduation, are awarded government-recognized qualifications. It’s not clear where the money comes from to support the school. The training its students receive is, on the other hand, very clear. The madrasa, run by Sami ul-Haq — often referred to as the “Father of the Taliban” — is seen as an incubator of radical Islamists.

Earlier this decade, the school even granted an honorary degree to Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. It is the only honorary degree ever bestowed by Darul Uloom Haqqania, but Sami ul-Haq says it was nothing more than the recognition of a person with special qualities — exactly as is done in all cultures. “We honored Mullah Omar for his contribution to peace, just like your universities did with Mother Teresa,” he says.

“Fight Against the American Occupiers”

Is the call for jihad against America and its allies justified? “As justified as the one against the Russians,” Sami ul-Haq growls. Do prospective suicide bombers ask him if the Koran provides a basis for their actions? “Am I a mufti that I have to give them advice?” the Islamic scholar bellows. “They make their own choice to fight against the American occupiers.”

In the seventh year of the war in Afghanistan anti-Americanism is stronger than ever. Hamid Mir, the country’s most popular journalist and the only person in the world to have interviewed Osama bin Laden after September 11, 2001, says: “We didn’t have any suicide bombers before 2001. We were doing fairly well economically. But then General Musharraf gave in to the Americans — who have always supported dictators in Pakistan.”

From an American perspective Pakistan was little more than a set of map coordinates that deserved attention for three reasons: It borders on Afghanistan; it’s engaged in a smoldering conflict with a nuclear-armed India over Kashmir; and it possesses nuclear weapons of its own and has passed its technology on to “rogue states.” Washington’s announcement that it intends to triple its financial assistance for civilian projects would seem to be a signal that for the first time a proud Pakistan is going to be taken seriously on its own merits.

But this turnaround could be coming too late for many people. For instance, for those hundreds of thousands of people in the tribal areas who may be followers or potential followers of bearded mullahs — such as former fitness trainer Baitullah Mehsud in Waziristan, former bus driver Mangal Bagh from the Khyber Pass area, and ski lift assistant Mullah Fazlullah in the Swat Valley.

Most of the children who live in the tribal areas have no conception of the world that exists beyond the concrete wall in Hayatabad. All they know are their own rules and their own convictions, and now they want to take these with them into the cities.

The roads leading from the tribal areas into Peshawar are still blocked. Word is that the military operation is to be continued for the time being. The death toll among the Taliban is reported to be high. But clashes with Pakistani troops aren’t the reason. Since taking refuge in the valleys and mountains of the tribal areas, the Taliban have been fighting among themselves.

They have decided to wait a while before they return to the city.

Translated from the German by Larry Fischer

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This article has been provided by Der Spiegel through a special arrangement with Salon.

Vlad the terrible

Two years ago Russia's Vladimir Putin was a celebrated champion of democracy. Now he's being called "the Mussolini of Moscow."

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Editor’s Note: This story marks the beginning of a new collaboration between Salon and Der Spiegel, the leading German news publication. Like Salon’s arrangement with the Guardian of London, this new agreement with Der Spiegel will ensure that Salon readers are offered more insightful coverage of the world.

It’s only 10 years old, but the Dec. 12 holiday has become one of Russia’s most important. Introduced by former Russian President Boris Yeltsin 10 years ago, the day commemorates the ratification of the Russian constitution. In other words, it was on that day in 1994 that the Soviet Union was buried for good.

Or was it?

Ten days ago, 143 million Russian citizens celebrated the constitution holiday for the very last time. The celebration has been canceled, eliminated, relegated to the dustbin of Russia’s short post-Soviet history. Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted it so.

The choreography, however, continued. On exactly the same day, Putin signed into law a bill that critics view as a massive assault on the spirit of the 10-year-old constitution. Putin now has the power to directly appoint the presidents and governors of Russia’s 88 provinces and republics — his reach, despite ruling out such a law as recently as two years ago, now extends into the highest political offices in the most far-flung corners of his land.

The new law is part of an anti-terrorism package announced in the wake of early September’s hostage crisis in Beslan, which saw an entire elementary school taken hostage and claimed at least 330 lives. The crisis was preceded by a series of bomb attacks on two passenger aircraft, on subways and on railroads. In truth, however, the package was prepared long before Beslan, and shortly before Putin’s reelection in March 2004. Otherwise, the Kremlin could never have managed to push it through parliament in just under four months.

The powers of a king … or dictator
The powers granted Putin under the new laws are immense. Imagine if George Bush could suddenly fire the governor of New York and dissolve the state legislature. Or that German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder suddenly had the power to order the removal of the prime minister of Bavaria and to dissolve the Bavarian state assembly, even in the face of its triple veto. Until now, the popular election of governors has stood for the idea of the decentralized state and a departure from a Soviet-style concentration of power. That power is now concentrated once again.

To be fair, nobody is talking about what popular election of regional rulers had meant for Russia. When Yeltsin urged governors to “take as much sovereignty as you can manage,” many regional potentates interpreted the suggestion as an invitation to set up miniature fiefdoms far away from Moscow. The far-flung corners of the land no longer had such a tight bond to the Kremlin.

Now, however, the primacy of Moscow in Russian politics is to be emphasized. In addition to Putin’s new powers of appointment, a new, restrictive party law is also going into effect. In the future, the parties’ central offices will decide who is placed on party lists for elections to the state Duma, or lower house of parliament. This translates to a system of purely proportional representation — a party with 25 percent of the vote gets a quarter of the Duma seats — which makes it more difficult for candidates to be directly elected to office by local constituencies. Until now, directly elected representatives occupied half of the Duma’s 450 seats. The new law spells the end of independent candidates with no party affiliation. Who this helps in the short term is obvious: Putin’s party, United Russia, already controls two-thirds of the Duma.

When the law comes into effect, the minimum party membership will be five times higher than was required in the past. In addition, the minimum threshold for entry into parliament was increased from 5 percent of the vote to 7 percent. An almost coy-sounding supplementary requirement that at least two parties be represented in parliament shows that Russian lawmakers are clearly aware of the potential consequences of their actions.

An American two-party system?
Western diplomats believe that Putin’s political strategists are, in the long term, aiming for a two-party system based on the American model. But with one significant difference: The Kremlin would establish and control both parties. Valery Bogomolov, deputy secretary of the United Russia party, recently met with veteran German politician and Social Democrat Rudolf Scharping to get advice on establishing a Social Democratic party in Russia. It’s like the Republicans huddling with neoliberals to start a new left-of-center party.

The recently enacted laws extend the list of earlier incursions during Putin’s first term in office to construct a “vertical power structure.” During his first term, the Russian president already managed to deprive the Federation Council (Russia’s upper house of parliament) of its powers. Today, it’s hardly more than a collection of retired bureaucrats. He brought the Duma into line, subjugated the independent judiciary, and brought the independent multiregional media to its knees. In a cabinet meeting last Thursday, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov raged that “the stupefaction of the people must end.”

Nevertheless, the characterization of Putin as “Moscow’s Mussolini” by Jimmy Carter’s former national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has found little resonance in Russia. There is certainly evidence of growing dissatisfaction in the country. According to research conducted by the Levada Center, a public opinion research group, the level of popular dissatisfaction has increased by 150 percent within less than one year. In fact, a slim majority of Russians now believe that Russia has embarked on the wrong path.

Russians have few political alternatives on the horizon, even if there are signs that they wish there were — for now, they are more concerned about their daily bread and the loss of an adequate social security system. Four regions will hold gubernatorial run-off elections this Sunday for the last time because the Kremlin’s candidate failed to garner a sufficient number of votes in the initial elections. In the Volgograd region (formerly Stalingrad), more voters in the initial election checked the box on their ballot forms marked “Against all candidates” than voted for the Kremlin party’s candidate. In Kaliningrad, the regional Duma even rejected Putin’s proposed legislation for a new election system.

More than a thousand opponents of the administration, led by former chess world champion Garri Kasparov and including liberals such as economist Grigory Yavlinsky and former Yeltsin advisor Boris Nemzov, as well as communists, recently came together at a conference titled “Russia for Democracy and Against Dictatorship.” But despite their calls for solidarity, there was little evidence that the opposition camp’s resistance to the development of Putin’s now virtually unlimited power has been particularly effective.

Which is why Putin’s proposals to introduce a so-called citizens’ council must be a bitter pill to swallow for Russian liberals — it will become their only forum for dissent following the silencing of their voices in both the parliament and the media.

And even the citizens’ council is controlled by the Kremlin. As a precaution, Putin’s proposal calls for a third of the 126-member council to be appointed directly by the president. This first third would then select another third of the council’s members, while the remainder would be selected in conferences throughout the country. To prevent it from obstructing Russia’s powerful secret service agencies, which are exempt from all public scrutiny, the council would play an advisory but not a supervisory role.

The renaissance of the so-called social employees, a relic of the Soviet era, is an indication of the direction in which Russian civil society is heading. Their job is to exchange information about their fellow citizens with the police at so-called public order supervision offices. It’s been reported that there are 680 of these offices in Moscow alone. The system, reminiscent of the old “Stukatch” system of government informers during the Stalin era, has been popular throughout the country. Armed with video cameras and notebooks, some local groups, such as a group in the western Siberian city of Tyumen that calls itself the “Putinzy,” are even invoking their idol, the Russian head of state.

“We must all realize that the enemy is at the door. The front lines pass through our city, through every street and every house,” the deputy chief of the Kremlin administration, Vladislav Surkov, announced in September. The lively Surkov, former press attaché for oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky and a one-time liberal, is now considered an agitator and a powerful member of the Putin administration. He says that what Russia is now dealing with is a “fifth column of left-wing and right-wing radicals, false liberals and real Nazis.”

Fighting terrorism is a top priority
The government’s 2005 budget reflects the Kremlin’s overwhelming emphasis on fighting terrorism. It includes substantial increases in spending for defense, the police force, the secret service and the judiciary, along with reductions in spending for education and social programs. Russians infected with HIV, for example, estimated at 1 million by the director of the federal AIDS center, can expect even further cuts in state expenditures. They’re currently allotted an annual budget of 77,000, one-fortieth of what experts consider to be necessary.

The Kremlin’s policy of regaining control over the Russian political landscape and social order is being supplemented by strategic efforts to reestablish state control over the country’s globally unmatched raw material reserves and its key industries.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former head of Yukos and, with former assets of $8 billion, once the richest man in the world’s biggest country, may have been the first victim of this policy. Khodorkovsky, accused of tax evasion and fraud and imprisoned for the past 14 months, is consistently taken to court appearances in handcuffs and paraded in front of the media as if he were a sexual offender.

Putin now appears to be taking steps to counter accusations of his allegedly one-sided harsh treatment of Yukos. VimpelCom, the country’s second-largest wireless telephone provider, with annual revenues of  billion, has received initial demands for payment of back taxes in the amount of 9 million for 2001 alone — almost four times its net earnings for that year.

VimpelCom’s shares temporarily lost about a third of their value. Oil multinational TNK-BP faces demands for payment of back taxes in the amount of 8 million, also for 2001. Oligarch Mikhail Fridman controls both TNK-BP and VimpelCom. Each new attack launched by the federal tax authorities represents a disagreement between the affected parties and the prevailing system. Fridman apparently ran awry of the Russian telecommunications minister’s business interests.

Once again, the country’s wealthy class is reacting by taking its capital elsewhere — about $12 billion this year alone. On Dec. 9, when the demands for payment of back taxes against VimpelCom became known, the Moscow Stock Exchange, already a relatively modest operation, experienced its most dramatic decline for the entire year. And according to industry reports, foreign investors are pulling out of the Russian market in droves.

Russia no longer an economic basket case
Nevertheless, oil continues to flow in the world’s second-largest oil-producing country, and at prices that favor the producers. Russia’s foreign currency reserves have increased to $120 billion. Only six years after Boris Yeltsin declared that Russia was bankrupt, the rating agencies have now upgraded the country from the status of a borrower nation to that of a lender nation.

The 6.7 percent growth in the Russian economy this year serves as an indication of macroeconomic stability. However, the country is completely dependent on its oil and gas production, and even Deputy Minister of Economic Development Andrei Sharonov is now warning that the rate of growth could drop by half as early as next year if the state continues to intervene in economic affairs, using the tax authorities as its enforcer. Without foreign investment, Putin’s blunt demands for a doubling in the gross domestic product within ten years will remain unfulfilled.

The president has repeatedly made it clear that he’s more than willing to trade with the West. But its efforts to give him a lesson in democracy are unwelcome. And his actions reflect this sentiment. Despite some political signs to the contrary, it does appear that new fences are being erected between Russia and the outside world.

Members of the lower and upper houses of the Russian parliament have prepared draft legislation on ways to limit the spread of Internet content in Russia. United Russia has now submitted a bill in the Duma that would impose new restrictions on foreigners entering and leaving the country.

Under paragraph 19 of the bill, anyone who comments unfavorably on “spiritual, cultural” or other recognized social values in Putin’s realm, or who “seeks to damage the international reputation of Russia” is to be denied entry.

This language appears to leave little room for interpretation. And even less for criticism.

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Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

This article has been provided by Der Spiegel through a special arrangement with Salon. ) For more from Europe’s most-read newsmagazine, please visit Spiegel Online at http://www.spiegel.de/international or subscribe to our daily newsletter.

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