But to leave your country, join a terrorist organization and live in Waziristan with no prospect of ever returning to a normal life in the West is also a risk?

Those types of people think that there is nothing worthwhile left for them to come back to. There are others, of course, who have families and prefer to live in the West and be armchair radicals…

Like you, when you were a member of the Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir?

In a way, yes. I was a political activist, and Hizb ut-Tahrir didn’t advocate that we join the battlefield.

From your experience, once you really enter that Islamist ideology, how does it change you?

It gives you moral and political certainty. Understanding geopolitics for a 15-year-old is very difficult — but all of a sudden everything is very easy: Ah, this is why they are all fighting against us!

Radicalization is a process. It’s not like you are a moderate on Monday, but wake up on Tuesday as a would-be-terrorist. Can this process be stopped once it has started?

Yes, the process can be stopped, if these people are exposed to alternative points of view before it’s too late. Before they will only socialize with people who supply them with radical answers to the questions that drive them. Basically these people are looking for answers and they often find radical answers most convincing because they seem to explain everything. This is the point where they need to be confronted with information that contradicts the Islamist narrative. There’s also a scriptural aspect to this: You have to show to them that Islam as such does not support many of the Islamists’ arguments.

Generally, what role does religious knowledge play in the process of radicalization? A lot of jihadist leaders, for example, talk a lot about faith without having much in the way of a theological education. Even Osama bin Laden and Aiman al-Zawahiri fall into that category.

Religion is not what motivates people. They don’t pick up the Quran and say: Ah, this is what I’ve got to do! They are motivated by politics. But when Islamists show their worldview they always provide some scriptural justification. As a rule, 90 percent of their speeches are political, but they will also say: And the Quran supports this, and the Prophet supports this, so as to make the argument look Islamic.

What were the main factors that made you turn away from radical Islamism?

I managed to keep an open mind even when I was an activist for Hizb ut-Tahrir. That allowed me to analyze different perspectives. I also read a lot about history independently, I analyzed politics independently and I kept speaking to Muslims who followed different ideas. So I had access to quite a wide variety of information, which eventually made me realize that I was following a very narrow interpretation at best. But a lot of people won’t expose themselves to all that; they feel too comfortable with their new truths and new friends.

Was this narrowness of interpretation decisive for you? Or was it also a matter of truth and historical accuracy?

Some of what I used to believe was definitely false. Islamism is a modern idea, and it was influenced by European movements like Marxism and Socialism. Islamists reinterpret Muslim history according to their ideology. And that leads to a complete misreading of, for example, the Ottoman Empire’s history.

At the Quilliam Foundation you are looking at ways to counter radicalization. You also make use of religious authorities. How does that work?

We will take up a specific issue and then we’ll try to get respected scholars to take a clear position in opposition. We have done this, for example, with suicide bombings or the concept that all Muslims must be united under one leadership. We want to show that what radicals believe is in fact a very narrow politically motivated religious standpoint that needs to be exposed for what it is. We don’t want to unite everyone under one alternative idea, though.

When the Quilliam Foundation was set up, as a think tank staffed with former radical Islamists, did you find it difficult to enter the public debate? Or was yours a voice that all sides were eager to listen to?

It was actually quite easy to enter the public debate. People were definitely looking for new and original voices on this topic.

Since you started the project, have you actually managed to convince radical Islamists to break away from their groups and their ideology?

Yes. We have individually spoken to people we knew and managed to take away between 30 and 40 from these organizations, some even from senior positions. We have also tried numerous times to engage these organizations in public debates with us, but they haven’t accepted the offer. But I think we are on the right track. They are definitely not as confident anymore as they used to be.

The Quilliam Foundation is unique in the sense that there are no comparable institutions outside the U.K. Do you have plans to expand?

On the long term, yes. First we want a solid base in Britain that will be a working model that we can then export to Europe and the U.S.

This article has been provided by Der Spiegel through a special arrangement with Salon. For more from Europe’s most-read news magazine, visit Spiegel Online or subscribe to the daily newsletter.

Still, the maxim uttered by Lawrence — who was later immortalized in the film “Lawrence of Arabia” — does have a present-day application when speaking of the ongoing fight against terror groups like the Taliban, Hezbollah, al-Qaida. And Hamas. Lawrence was essentially describing the problems that result when a regular army comes up against an irregular fighting force. In military parlance, such a conflict is called “asymmetrical.”

Armies and governments prefer to avoid such conflicts. They often end without a clear victor; nobody capitulates, there is no white flag waved, no peace treaties signed. Other rules apply. One of them is the following: If the militarily inferior rebel group manages to survive, it is seen as the victor.

Two years ago, the truth of this rule was brought home to Israel after its summer war with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The Israeli army attacked with the goal of ending the Hezbollah threat after the terror group kidnapped two Israeli soldiers at the Lebanese border. But the war, pitting the ultra-modern Israeli force against a few thousand irregulars from Hezbollah, dragged on for weeks. Now the war is seen as a disaster in Israel, and Hezbollah came away seen as the victors, and its image in the Middle East was only strengthened.

Nevertheless, Israeli officials are once again resorting to the all-or-nothing rhetoric heard in 2006. This time around, Defense Minister Ehud Barak has spoken of a “war to the bitter end” and of an “all-out war.” This time, the opponent is Hamas.

Israel’s anger is understandable. On Dec. 19, Hamas elected not to renew a fragile six-month-long cease-fire with Israel and began once again lobbing explosives at random across the border into Israel. Those rockets have killed four people this week. But the question remains: Is a vast military offensive of the kind we have seen this week the best way for Israel to proceed?

It is certainly risky. Most experts on asymmetrical warfare warn that it is virtually impossible to eliminate a group like Hamas — with its military and social components — merely with superior firepower. Furthermore, the offensive strains Israel’s relations with its neighbors Jordan and Egypt — bonds that have never been very tight. It also weakens the positions of those Palestinians who were in favor of a negotiated peace with Israel.

The last five days of Israel’s bombardment of the Gaza Strip, which have seen over 350 Palestinians killed and many more wounded, have highlighted the problems inherent in such an asymmetrical operation. Planes have targeted mosques because Israel thinks they are being used to cache weapons; apartment blocks where high-ranking Hamas members live have been destroyed, almost guaranteeing civilian casualties. The university was destroyed because it espoused the Hamas ideology. Each one of these targets presents a dilemma — and the images they create are unhelpful to Israel. Indeed, the only targets that make sense are the smuggler tunnels under the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.

It is also unclear that the offensive brings Israel a single step closer to its ultimate goal of eliminating Hamas entirely. Indeed, the more intense the Israeli bombing campaign has become, the more Palestinian rockets have flown across the border into Israel. Hamas may be briefly weakened as its commanders are knocked off and its weapons depots destroyed. But, in the long run, it is difficult to see Hamas not benefiting the same way Hezbollah benefited from the 2006 war. Their aura as resistance fighters can only be strengthened.

Some have argued that the bombing campaign makes it clear to the Palestinians exactly what their support of Hamas can result in. Whether the demonstration of power will make Palestinians more interested in a peace deal with Israel, though, is doubtful.

It is always the case that, when the situation in the Middle East escalates, the world holds Israel to a different standard than its enemies. Israel, surrounded by enemies though it may be, is a democratic society based on the rule of law. Whereas nobody expects much from Hamas, one can hope that Israel would have more regard for civilian casualties. And one can hope that it would learn the lessons of the past.

Mark Regev, a spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, said that the country’s leaders “view it as important to keep up the pressure on Hamas,” according to the New York Times. Preparations are still being made for a possible ground invasion of the Gaza Strip.

Should it come to that, no one should be surprised if, in a few months, another investigative committee — as happened after the 2006 Lebanon war — comes to the conclusion that the conflict was a mistake.

This time, to be sure, the entire Israeli government was brought in to the decision-making process. But, in 2006, one of the primary criticisms was that Israel had not sufficiently defined its war aims before marching into southern Lebanon. “War to the bitter end,” certainly doesn’t sound any more precise.

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Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaida’s No. 2, is planning an “open interview” on a handful of Islamic Web sites. The international terror network’s propaganda arm announced the unusual event in mid-December and questions are apparently going to be passed on to the terrorist leader on Jan. 16.

Anyone interested — regardless of whether one is like-minded, a brother in arms, a member of the media or an organization — can pitch questions to the Egyptian terrorist mastermind. The administrators of four known jihadist Web sites have been authorized to collect and forward the questions, “unedited,” they pledge, and “regardless of whether they are in support of or are against” the terrorist organization. Though it gave no details of how al-Zawahiri will respond to the Q&A, al-Qaida’s al-Sahab propaganda division did say that the doctor-turned-terrorist would respond “as quickly as possible.”

Since the announcement, no other issue has been as hotly debated on the al-Qaida-sanctioned jihadist sites. Of course, it doesn’t happen every day, either, that one is granted more or less direct access to an al-Qaida leader.

There’s no doubt that this is a propagandistic act. And terror experts and analysts around the world agree that al-Zawahiri is probably seeking two things: to attract attention, especially in the international media, and to create the impression that his network is wired and uses the latest in communication technologies. As it builds its Web community, al-Qaida is apparently also looking for user-generated content.

Despite reports to the contrary, it’s not the first time al-Qaida leaders have engaged in Web 2.0 activities. Three years ago, al-Qaida’s Saudi Arabian wing called on supporters to send e-mails with proposals for terrorist attacks, which would later be reviewed by terror leaders and matched up with the people best suited to carry them out. The anonymous questions and suggestions were then openly answered by Saudi al-Qaida in ways that often sounded as mysterious as they did dangerous. “Yes, Abu so and so, continue with your project,” one response read, “but avoid the place where the X has been marked.” It’s possible al-Zawahiri will provide similar answers, leaving people around the world scratching their heads wondering if he’s just given a mandate to volunteer suicide bombers.

It’s more likely, though, that the Q&A will reveal little about the Egyptian. Indeed, few will be holding their breath for any deep insights. “OK, it’s true, we really are having money problems.” An unlikely confession. Or: “No, we probably won’t succeed in annihilating Tel Aviv.” Ain’t gonna see it. “Where am I now? The search for fissile material has been harder than expected.” Doubt it. “Hm, Osama? Hm, I have no idea where he’s hiding. The last time I talked to him he sounded seriously ill.” Get real.

More interesting, perhaps, are the questions that have already been submitted to the sites. There are tons: On just one of the four authorized sites, the related postings fill up 53 printed pages with hundreds of questions that touch on myriad topics. This sampling of questions provides a fascinating insight into the community of al-Qaida fans: what drives them, what they don’t know and what they are hearing. In order to ensure an accurate portrayal of the questions, we have selected them at random:

Will Islamic armies join in Palestine?

Why aren’t the mujahedeen in Saudi Arabia making any more statements?

Is there a branch of al-Qaida in Kashmir? Have you ordered them to suspend operations?

Are there plans for an action to liberate the prisoners in Cuba (editor’s note: a reference to Guantánamo) and Saudi Arabia?

Is Yemen suited for jihadist operations? And, if yes, why are we hearing that an order has been given that action should not be taken there?

Why is it that you never mention the Muslims living in Syria?

How is the morale of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan these days, especially the Arabs among them?

Should women be allowed to carry out suicide missions?

Is there a branch of al-Qaida in Palestine?

What is your opinion of Tablighi Jamaat? (A Muslim missionary group that some experts consider to be a conduit to al-Qaida)

How do you feel about the killing of innocents and wards (meaning Christians and Jews in Arab countries) in the context of attacks? Who is responsible for their deaths?

Why don’t you attack the Jews in Tel Aviv directly?

What will the movement’s priorities be in the next phase?

Why is Saif al-Adel (al-Qaida’s No. 3) currently in Iran, when Iran is killing our brothers?

Has al-Qaida or the Taliban in Afghanistan taken any Western prisoners of war? If yes, then why haven’t they been swapped for al-Qaida detainees who have been arrested?

Why haven’t we been seeing any attacks against Iran? Iran is, after all, fighting against the Sunnis.

Who is the actual leader of the “Islamic State of Iraq”? (Al-Qaida in Iraq announced the creation of this “state” just over a year ago.)

Without trying to overanalyze these questions, three trends seem to prevail. For one thing, many jihad fans want to know what the terrorist situation in certain regions is. After all, the jihad project isn’t as undifferentiated and global as some might think.

Second, there appears to be a need for the clarification of theological-moral questions. In other words, there appears to be a small clientele that takes al-Zawahiri seriously as a religious scholar. And lastly, it appears that within the cyber-jihadist community, there is a certain expectation that spectacular or at least symbolic terrorist attacks should take place.

Some critical questions have also been asked — in most cases, ones about the legitimacy of killing innocent people. It’s just another indication of the theory that al-Qaida risks losing supporters if it becomes too brutal or bloodthirsty.

What you won’t find in a quick scan of the questions are any from Arab, Western or any other journalists. Apparently they don’t hold much faith in al-Zawahari giving any honest answers. Still, it will be interesting to see how supporters respond to his Q&A.

This article has been provided by Der Spiegel through a special arrangement with Salon.

Five and a half years have passed since Sept. 11, 2001, and the beginning of the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The physical presence of Osama bin Laden’s network was largely destroyed at the time — the terrorist camps, which had trained an estimated 20,000 men, quickly reduced to rubble. Two years ago, the White House crowed that two-thirds of al-Qaida’s leadership had been eliminated. “We’re winning,” President Bush claimed recently. “Al-Qaida is on the run.”

But are those terrorists really on the run? Of course, there can be no doubt that the network no longer has nearly the capacity it had when it organized the 9/11 attacks. But the attempts to reorganize are obvious, and the new camps are an indication that the efforts have been successful. According to Time magazine, each of the camps has the capacity to train between 10 and 300 jihadists. “We know they exist, but it’s like finding a needle in a haystack,” the magazine quotes a U.S. military official in Afghanistan as saying.

The border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. Michael D. Maples of the Defense Intelligence Agency recently said, is “a refuge for al-Qaida.” Germany’s foreign intelligence agency agrees, calling the region a “deployment zone for the new al-Qaida.”

The CIA and Vice President Dick Cheney have already made their concerns clear to the Pakistani government of President Pervez Musharraf. To back up their claims, they brought along marked-up maps. Not much is visible on the black-and-white images at first glance. However, the maps show small but significant settlements; the camps U.S. intelligence believes are al-Qaida’s new training facilities are often little more than farmlike structures consisting of two or three houses surrounded by high walls.

Pakistan has always had trouble controlling the so-called tribal areas where the camps are located. Tribal leaders operate here as they please and offer shelter to members of al-Qaida and the Taliban. Although some U.S. military officials are already discussing air attacks on Pakistani territory without Musharraf’s approval, those who prefer not to undermine the authority of the country’s military leader any further still have the upper hand at the Pentagon. “We believe they could do more,” U.S. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell said bluntly in February, referring to the America’s Pakistani allies.

Al-Qaida has proved to be extremely robust in recent years. The network’s reaction to the war in Afghanistan came in two parts. The veterans, bin Laden ordered, were to return to their home countries and continue the organization’s work from there. Terrorism experts dubbed the phenomenon “al-Qaida comes home,” in an effort to make sense of the network’s sudden presence virtually everywhere, as attacks were executed globally — from Bali, Indonesia, to Madrid, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to London.

The second response was to open up the network to its sympathizers. Al-Qaida leaders made it clear that all the organization’s supporters should feel free to commit acts of terror in the name of the network, and they provided both the ideology and the necessary know-how.

Although it acknowledged both tactics with horror, the Western world was convinced about one thing: that at least al-Qaida’s former headquarters had been wiped out.

But apparently al-Qaida was also capable of finding ways to revitalize itself in this respect. A whole new generation of al-Qaida fighters has moved up the ranks, intelligence services warn.

Ayman al-Zawahri, bin Laden’s second in command, could be pulling more strings than was previously believed. According to CIA agents operating in Pakistan, the Egyptian man has the capability to respond to inquiries from other field commanders within 24 hours. “The days of rigorous caution seem to be over, and men like al-Zawahri are becoming more self-confident,” a Western intelligence official recently said in Islamabad, Pakistan. In one case, intelligence agents even intercepted instructions on how to deal with prisoners. “The chain of command has been re-established,” the New York Times quoted a U.S. official as saying.

It was the investigations that followed on the heels of terrorist attacks in the West that brought the intelligence agencies to the conclusion that al-Qaida must have a stronger organizational structure than previously thought. Last summer, Islamists planned to blow up several passenger aircraft en route from London to the United States. The plan was thwarted, but the tracks led, for the first time in a long while, back to a known al-Qaida heavyweight. According to the Times, Egyptian Abu Ubaidah al-Masri is viewed as a key figure in the planned attack. He is considered a possible successor to Hamza Rabia, the al-Qaida operations chief who was killed in 2005 and was already the fourth successor of the legendary Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Other known al-Qaida cadres are beginning to resurface. They act as liaisons in Iran, travel frequently back and forth between Iraq and Pakistan to exchange information, and regularly cross the border into Afghanistan.

No one assumes that al-Qaida is as well organized today as it was before 9/11, when there were paychecks, memos from bin Laden and regulated vacation periods. Even the new camps are not comparable to the terrorist schools of days gone by. But there is a clear resurgence nonetheless.

There are too many uncontrolled areas for al-Qaida to be driven completely out of the region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The organization is relatively safe there, and Western intelligence services believe that some of its members are busy developing new international attack scenarios.

Berlin-based terrorism expert Guido Steinberg of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs also sees a “clear trend toward reorganization.” But he points out that it is not clear how close the ties are between certain named individuals and al-Qaida.

Steinberg does not see a new al-Qaida headquarters developing. “If there is reorganization, it will take a new form,” he believes. In his view, the most recent developments can best be described as a “Pakistanization of al-Qaida.” Steinberg notes that the importance of Pakistani militant groups has grown tremendously in recent years. For example, the July 7, 2005, London subway and bus bombings and the prevented attacks of July 21, 2005, were traced back to Pakistan. “There is a Pakistani terror infrastructure and there are Pakistani volunteers,” says Steinberg. “What is new is that al-Qaida is taking advantage of this.”

The London connection does appear to be turning into an important one for Islamist terrorism. Britons, the Times reported, are increasingly being accepted into Pakistani military camps. U.S. intelligence czar Mike McConnell recently conceded that attacks against the West are most likely being planned in Pakistan.

Steinberg believes nonetheless that the revival of al-Qaida in Pakistan is not as clear-cut as some believe. But his argument is no less disconcerting.

He points out that Algerian jihadists, for example, recently changed the name of their organization to “Al-Qaida in the Islamic West” — another indication that bin Laden’s network is still viable. Steinberg believes that al-Qaida attacks on Europe could just as easily be planned in North Africa as they are in Pakistan.

According to reports in the pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat, French intelligence agencies share similar concerns; they are worried that jihadists in Algeria or Morocco could be planning to use the French presidential election slated for May to stage a spectacular attack modeled after the 2004 Madrid train bombings, which also took place shortly before an election and, as predicted by al-Qaida strategists, led to a change in government and Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq. Like Germany, France has troops stationed in Afghanistan. The April 11 bomb attack in Algiers is further proof of al-Qaida’s resurgence in North Africa.

In light of recent developments, American terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman said that “Al-Qaida is more dangerous than it was on 9/11.” But Berlin expert Steinberg favors a more sober way of looking at the situation. “Al-Qaida,” says Steinberg, “has demonstrated that it cannot simply be extinguished. That in itself is a triumph — because terrorists only need not to lose in order to win.”

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Mr. Frangi, you’re now in the Gaza Strip. On Monday morning there are said to have been more shoot-outs between supporters of Hamas and supporters of Fatah. What is the situation like?

Things have improved a great deal since the cease-fire that was negotiated Monday night. It’s true there was an incident yesterday. But the Egyptians mediated very well. And I think both organizations are trying to seize this opportunity. This time all indicators suggest the cease-fire will hold. I’ve just read a communiqué from our boys stating they seriously want to observe the cease-fire.

When you say “our boys,” do you mean the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which is close to Fatah and was involved in the fighting?

I mean Fatah as a whole.

The last cease-fire didn’t last long. Afterward, things got even worse. There were kidnappings, skirmishes, coldblooded murders. Why are you more hopeful this time?

What happened during the last few days was the worst we’ve experienced in Palestinian history. It has deeply upset the entire Palestinian society. The people are against every person who continues to want to escalate the situation.

So who was responsible for this escalation?

Hamas is responsible for the government. It won the elections one year ago. And Hamas is therefore also responsible for developments in the Palestinian territories and in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has not succeeded in making the streets safe. Hamas still deals with other parties and organizations as if it were the political opposition. But it has to face up to the responsibility that it now has.

You’re the representative of Fatah in the Gaza Strip. It’s clear you tend to attribute blame to Hamas. But we’re also hearing about how Fatah militants and members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Bridge have been far from restraining themselves. Are these forces out of control?

The bloodshed that has occurred makes it very difficult to restrain people. The number of dead and wounded on the side of Fatah is much larger than that on the side of Hamas. And of course the reactions are driven by the corresponding emotions.

So no one can control these forces, including yourself.

Under these circumstances, it’s very difficult to control people. But we have resolved to do it; we want to; and we’re trying. I haven’t heard any shooting since 4 a.m. yesterday morning. Hope is growing.

Why do these outbreaks of violence keep occurring in the first place?

The reason is that we haven’t succeeded in forming a unified government or developing a common political program. And so everyone tries to defend their position. Unfortunately, they don’t always do so by democratic means; they also use force of arms.

High-ranking politicians from both side have been targets in the conflict again and again. Do you fear for your life?

Everyone in a position of responsibility, whether from Hamas or Fatah, has suffered due to these events. The commitment and the responsibility to end this confrontation are therefore all the greater.

You already mentioned Monday’s successful mediation by Egypt. At the same time, Saudi Arabia is also trying to mediate. There is talk of a summit meeting between Hamas and Fatah in Mecca.

That’s the best thing Saudi Arabia could do. That’s why the suggestion was immediately accepted by both Hamas and Fatah. The Hamas delegation will be led by Khaled Meshal, the leader in exile. Our delegation will be led by Abu Ala, the former prime minister. Saudi Arabia carries great weight. That became evident in 1989, in Lebanon, when the Taif Agreement was reached between the Lebanese camps, under Saudi mediation. The agreement has lasted until now. The Saudis can surely help set the reconciliation process in motion.

On Monday, there was a suicide attack in Israel for the first time in nine months. Several Palestinian groups claimed responsibility. Does this endanger the efforts of the Middle East Quartet, which is meeting in Washington on Friday?

I don’t believe so. Even Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has promised not to react with major military offensives. Everyone knows — both in Israel and in Palestine — that the current situation wouldn’t hold up to a further escalation.

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