Terrorism

Death rattle?

Sept. 11 may have been the last gasp of militant Islam -- but while it's dying, it could strike again and again.

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Death rattle?

Is the kind of militant Islamism that inspired the attacks of Sept. 11 a grotesque aberration of an otherwise peaceable faith or the logical extension of the religion’s warlike undercurrents? Do Osama bin Laden and his fellow terrorists speak for any significant percentage of Muslims? What do they want? How big a threat are they to the West?

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, these questions and others sent flocks of Americans to college classes and public lectures, promoted cable channel documentaries to the status of appointment viewing, and landed once-obscure university press books on national bestseller lists. Yet what answers we got were often vague, unsatisfying and driven by agendas that ranged from the obvious to the covert. Some authorities seemed more intent on quelling an anticipated tidal wave of virulent anti-Muslim sentiment than on explaining how the religion came to be used to justify such horrible acts; others seized on the attacks as a confirmation of their dire scenarios about a “clash of civilizations” (after Samuel P. Huntington) and the irredeemably savage nature of Islamic culture. Paranoid dispatches from the shadowy realms of the spook-watchers got equal play with the abstract pronouncements of eminences grises.It just didn’t add up.

Although some of the hunger for information has subsided, the books keep on coming, with Bernard Lewis’ “What Went Wrong” currently leading the pack at No. 15 on the New York Times bestseller list. Lewis is a professor emeritus of Near Eastern studies at Princeton, an esteemed but polarizing historian (he is more supportive of Israel and less sympathetic to the Palestinians than many of his colleagues) who is said to have been frequently consulted by the White House and Pentagon since Sept. 11. “What Went Wrong” was written before the attacks and doesn’t specifically address them, but its survey of 300 years of the decline of Muslim civilization (relative to the West) is meant to offer some broad cultural and historical explanations for the angry faces and Osama bin Laden T-shirts we see in footage from Middle Eastern and Asian streets.

Lewis’ book, the major portion of which consists of three lectures given in 1999, describes Islam’s ascendance over the West in the early medieval era and its subsequent long decline. He ties Islam’s failure to embrace the concept of secularism to its eclipse by the West. Still, there isn’t much in “What Went Wrong” that shows how the humiliation of dar-al-Islam (the house or world of Islam, which is how the faithful envision the part of the world occupied and governed by Muslims) led 19 Arab men to make a suicidal assault on two mammoth symbols of American power. And it doesn’t provide a sense of how prevalent or deeply felt this kind of Islamic militancy now is in the Middle East and other Muslim regions.

Early jitters about the instability of Gen. Musharraf’s hold on power and the threat of an Islamist takeover of Pakistan and its store of nuclear arms seem to have subsided, notwithstanding this week’s terrorist blast in Karachi that killed 14 people, including 11 French citizens. How serious was the danger to begin with — in Pakistan, in the Philippines (where the U.S. has sent troops and counter-terrorist advisors), and in places like Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria, where so many of the al-Qaida fighters in Afghanistan originally came from?

Gilles Kepel’s “Jihad” answers more of those questions than Lewis’ book does; it makes an ideal companion to morning newspapers filled with frustratingly context-free briefs from the war on terrorism. Kepel is French, a professor of political studies who has traveled extensively in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, observing first-hand the evolution of Islamism as a political force and interviewing many of the participants in its various struggles. His “Jihad” is a far cry from the lofty assessments of cultural differences delivered by Lewis and Huntington. This is a decidedly grounded book; it’s political in the most elemental sense of the word. Although Kepel clearly believes in the Western ideal of civil society, he puts himself in the place of ordinary Muslims in the nations he writes about, rather than viewing their problems from a Western perspective.

Kepel (who does address the Sept. 11 attacks in “Jihad”) makes the provocative argument that militant Islam is in serious decline, a decline that’s been going on for 10 years, despite a record that “might at first glance give the appearance that the power of political Islam was growing in all areas.” This may seem like good news to everyone who’d prefer not to see big segments of the population in Muslim nations enlisting in repressive Islamist movements. But if you read between the lines in Kepel’s book, the bad news is that the failure of political Islam doesn’t mean that anti-American terrorism is dwindling as well. In fact, it’s quite likely to get worse.

Kepel’s approach to his subject — a remarkably detailed but never tedious 25-year history of the political fortunes of Islamism in such nations as Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Bosnia, Iran, Israel, Turkey and others — allows Western readers to see that the terrorism used against us is more a byproduct of power struggles within those nations than it is a reaction against “our way of life.” The West, and specifically the U.S., often resembles a cop trying to break up a bitter private fight who winds up being attacked by whichever combatant seems to be getting the worst of the contest. (We don’t always take the right side, either.) Of course, Muslim antipathy toward Israel — and, by extension, the U.S. — has become a constant, but the real roots of Islamist extremism lie in fury directed at other Muslims.

What “Jihad” illustrates (and what often gets lost or glossed over in other books on the subject) is how foolish it is to generalize about Islam. Beyond the familiar schism between the Sunnis and the Shiites, the faith is spectacularly diverse, from the mystical brotherhoods of the Sufis, to the puritanical Wahabbites, to (what remains of) the relatively secularized cosmopolitan elites of more developed countries like Egypt. It makes as much sense to draw conclusions about all Muslims on the basis of the beliefs of the Taliban or bin Laden as it does to expect a Quaker to light candles to Santa Barbara or a Unitarian minister to plant bombs in abortion clinics simply because other people who call themselves Christians do so.

Militant political Islam was born in the early part of the 20th century; its intellectual fathers are Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian, and Mawlana Mawdudi, a Pakistani (which makes it an Asian movement as well as an Arab one). Although some Western writers have gotten it into their heads that Qutb’s radicalism was inspired primarily by two years he spent in the U.S. and his disgust at the bare female arms and Elvis Presley recordings he encountered here, in fact, his quarrel was always with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalist regime.

Qutb, and the Muslim Brotherhood — an organization of which he was a founding member and which exists in varying forms of varying degrees of politicization in many Muslim nations — wanted to establish a strictly Islamic government based on the original community of the faithful founded by the Prophet and ruled by Islamic law, or sharia. Qutb advocated a clean, revolutionary break with the “impious” establishment (and wound up imprisoned and hung for it), while Mawdudi preferred a more moderate approach and founded the Jamaat-e-Islami political party, still a force in Pakistan today.

The third and most successful Islamic ideologue, as Kepel sees it, was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who led the Iranian revolution in 1979. Kepel depicts Khomeini as a political genius of sorts, the only Islamist leader ever able to successfully and lastingly unite the crazily disparate groups that tend to be drawn to such movements. The essential — and to Kepel’s mind usually unconquerable — challenge facing any Islamist group is to get the poor, young, urban have-nots to work with what Kepel calls the “devout bourgeoisie,” modest, traditional members of the middle class who are shut out of real political power and offended by secularized elites and the Westernized behavior they often adopt.

When push comes to shove, Kepel insists, a political movement only holds onto its supporters when it can give them what they want and need: jobs, education, access to power and other opportunities to better their lots. Muslims, it turns out, aren’t that different from Westerners in this, and the extremity of the Islamist impulse is in direct proportion to how desperate people’s situations have become and how fed up they are with whoever’s in charge. The first real surge of Islamism came when an entire generation had grown up without any memory of the colonial era — and without a shot at the wealth and perks that got redistributed when the European occupiers departed. “The first Islamist onslaught was against nationalism,” Kepel writes, with Egypt being the quintessential case.

As Kepel runs through the history of nation after nation, he finds again and again the same mid-century recipe for an Islamist groundswell: a nationalist government whose fabulous promises of the bounties of independence have devolved into authoritarianism, poverty, no social mobility, corruption and insensitive pushes to modernize. In such straits, “the devout Muslim capitalist could make common cause with the slum-dweller.” The third ingredient was young Islamist intellectuals, educated in universities where militant groups thrive and proselytized, who provided the ideas and propaganda to hold the patchwork alliance together. (These, like the Sept. 11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and early leaders of the Egyptian militants, tended to have engineering and vocational degrees.)

Sometimes Islamists did gain power — in Iran and Afghanistan, and on a smaller scale in Algeria. In other cases, nationalist regimes tried to placate the malcontents with moral crusades. (Quite a few also found the Islamists to be a useful wedge against Marxist and socialist movements.) “By making concession after concession in the moral and cultural domains,” Kepel writes, “governments gradually created a reactionary climate of ‘re-Islamization.’ They sacrificed lay intellectuals, writers, and other ‘Westernized elites’ to the tender mercies of bigoted clerics, in the hope that the latter, in return, would endorse their own stranglehold on the organs of state.” (As a result, many Muslim nations lack the kind of educated, secular-minded thinkers needed to lead the push for democracy, political pluralism and other bulwarks of civil society.)

These orgies of finger-pointing enabled the devout middle classes to take over the elite positions once held by their Europeanized counterparts, while the urban poor got to act as enforcers. In one of his shrewder analyses, Kepel writes that the campaigns “allowed impoverished young men, humiliated and forced into abstinence or sexual misery by the crowded family conditions in which they lived, to become heroes of chastity who sternly condemned the pleasures of which they had been so wretchedly deprived.”

Iraq’s invasion of Iran shortly after Khomeini took power played into his theocratic hands: He used the bloody war with Saddam to systematically eliminate any possible challengers to his authority. The war enabled him to siphon off the potentially destructive energy of the same poor young men by reviving the Shiite cult of martyrdom: “The killing of so many young men brought about the symbolic death of their class as a collective political protagonist in Iran.”

Now, however, the first generation that has known only the Islamic Republic has finally come of age, and the same class of young men who once took to the streets chanting “Death to America!” are now out there chanting “Death to the mullahs!” In most cases, though, the ascendancy of Islamism didn’t last even that long. The “fragile alliance” of the urban poor and the pious shopkeepers was “ill-prepared for any kind of protracted confrontation with entrenched state authorities.” The middle class tended to defect once the regime started offering them tidbits of power, while the underclass Islamists and some of the intellectuals often became so extreme in their views that they frightened and alienated their former allies. Kepel quotes a disillusioned Sudanese Islamist who thinks the movement was “better off when it was frankly repressed” because “when Islamists achieved power, they ignored all democratic procedures” needed to peacefully resolve conflicts.

For Kepel, the emergence of the kind of militant groups that committed acts of terrorism in Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan and other breeding grounds of fanatics, groups like Egypt’s Al Jihad (where Osama bin Laden’s right-hand man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, cut his terrorist teeth) and the fearsomely brutal GIA in Algeria, were signs that Islamism had spent itself as a political force. After several years of grisly terrorism in Egypt, culminating in the massacre of a group of tourists at an ancient temple in Luxor in 1997, he says, the government had learned its lesson. It decisively cracked down on militant groups like the Gamaat Islamiya, and privatized and modernized the economy to woo the pious middle class who once supported the militants.

Yet there were leftover, intransigent jihadists, like Zawahiri, and these seemed inevitably to wind up in Pakistan or Afghanistan, where many of them (funded by the Americans and the Saudis) had fought against the Soviets in what they saw as a resounding triumph and divine endorsement of their cause. This hard core of militants — some the educated products of various Arab homelands, others poor locals brainwashed in the madrassas that provided the only available form of schooling (in addition to free room and board) — are what al-Qaida is made of, although it’s likely that the “al-Qaida troops” currently being mopped up by American forces are all low-level Pakistani and Arab recruits. The group’s brains, the engineers, like bin Laden and Zawahiri, are surely long gone.

When he turns to the likes of bin Laden and his cohorts, Kepel’s energetic political pragmatism hits a bump. “The attack on the United States was a desperate symbol of the isolation, fragmentation and decline of the Islamist movement,” he argues, “not a sign of its strength.” Perhaps so; certainly the attack mostly served to bring on the destruction of the Taliban, meaning there’s one less Islamist regime in the world. But as Kepel points out, the goal of the Sept. 11 attacks remains obscure, and no one has officially taken responsibility for them.

Clearly, Kepel, who sees all the political groups he describes here as serving specific constituencies with concrete needs, finds this baffling. “Resorting to spectacular terrorism was a high-risk gamble,” he writes, figuring it as an attempt to “regain popular favor by way of television, in the absence of any effective work at the grassroots level.” Despite any momentary, purely emotional rallying of the faithful, such terrorism is likely to “engender a far greater, far deeper angst among the devout middle class who feared that such explosions of violence might threaten their vital interests in the long run.”

Ahmed Rashid’s survey of militant Islamism in Central Asia, also called “Jihad,” describes a scenario in that region (the “‘Stans”) that seems, with a few tweaks, to be an instant replay of those that fostered Islamism in the Arab nations 25 years ago: Authoritarian regimes bailing on the promise of post-Soviet prosperity and viciously squelching even the most innocuous display of faith outside of state-sanctioned venues. Kepel, who doesn’t cover Central Asia at all in his “Jihad,” would no doubt predict a bloody efflorescence and a subsequent fading of political Islam there as well.

Kepel sees signs of democratic yearnings in many parts of the world where he feels Islamism has exhausted itself, and he quotes a Malaysian militant who came to embrace Western civil ideals when the regime in his own country turned on him and Western human rights groups became his only defenders. Kepel may be right that eventually more democratic institutions will emerge in the Middle East. Perhaps they’ll even appear in Central Asia (although Rashid would like to see Western powers help those nations skip over the period of violent Islamist insurgency suffered by their Arab counterparts by pressuring their governments for reforms now).

That will be well and good, but it leaves the matter of bin Laden and other anti-American terrorists scarily up in the air. Perhaps highly ideological militant movements like Islamism do all eventually fail to seize any real power, but in the process of flaring up and dying out, they also give off a kind of waste product: deposits of fanatical, even nihilistic men for whom access to political power has become irrelevant.

Initially it strikes Americans as paradoxical to describe Islamism as gravely weakened because it was Islamists who hurt us, and badly. But the lesson of Sept. 11 may be not that militant Islam is a legitimate force in the world that we’ve foolishly ignored, but rather that small, isolated and sometimes frankly crazy elements of the world’s society can nevertheless cause us a lot of pain. That’s the nature of terrorism — the military doesn’t call it “asymmetrical warfare” for nothing. The question of whether terrorism “works,” like the question of how much militancy is inherent in Islam itself, has been batted around a lot since the towers fell in New York City eight months ago, but both are actually fairly irrelevant. Revenge is an end in itself for people who have given up ever seeing the Kingdom of God on earth. It doesn’t take an entire world religion to either hijack a plane or shoot an abortion doctor; it just takes a maniac — or two or 20 — with nothing to lose.

Laura Miller

Laura Miller is a senior writer for Salon. She is the author of "The Magician's Book: A Skeptic's Adventures in Narnia" and has a Web site, magiciansbook.com.

Senate Democrats heroically fund TSA

Democrats score the dumbest political victory of 2012

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Senate Democrats heroically fund TSA (Credit: Reuters/Frank Polich)

On Tuesday, a Senate Appropriations Committee vote effectively highlighted everything that is stupid about politics.

The Transportation Security Administration, a universally loathed government agency, is facing a shortfall, despite its more than $8 billion budget. Instead of having a debate over what effective airport security might actually look like and how much should reasonably be spent on the honestly rare threat of commercial-air-travel-based terrorism, there was a debate over how best to come up with the money needed for all the radioactive naked picture machines and bomb-sniffing dogs. The Democrats suggested passing on the cost of ineffective, cumbersome and intrusive security theater to citizens, via higher fees on airfares. The Republicans, even more predictably, suggested cutting spending that directly helps poor people to ensure there is enough to spend on stopping imaginary future 9/11s.

The newspaper account of the debate in The Hill just reinforced the Republican spin, highlighting the Democrats’ decision to make people spend more money on the hated TSA and downplaying the actual existing Republican alternative to the proposal, which was not “spend less on the hated TSA” but rather “raise money for the hated TSA by slashing needed aid to states.” The Democrats won, or “won,” and now they will earn the fruits of that victory: well-deserved scorn from everyone. And Ben Nelson (D-Troll Town) voted with the Republicans. (Though surely having users pay the fees for supposedly necessary security measures is perfectly conservative, isn’t it? Am I missing something here? I mean besides the fact that the two sides in this debate weren’t actually “liberal” and “conservative” but rather “people who want to come up with a way of paying for the oppressive and useless national security state” versus “people who want there to be an oppressive national security state but hate government spending on feeding and sheltering impoverished people.”)

I don’t know of anyone not employed by the TSA or some other arm of Homeland Security that believes the TSA does a good job and deserves its massive budget, but everyone in Washington apparently feels differently (and is terrified of being blamed for “voting to cut TSA funding” if there is another terrifying and deadly underwear bomber, of course). This is why everyone hates politics and Congress and Washington. This and Iraq. And the drug war.

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Alex Pareene

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

Police arrest artist setting up ‘I Love NY’ work

The installation included a plastic bag with a battery inside of it, hanging from a tree

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Police arrest artist setting up 'I Love NY' work (Credit: http://tmiyakawadesign.com/)

NEW YORK (AP) — An artist who was setting up an “I Love New York”-themed public art display in Brooklyn was arrested after the wired contraption was mistaken for an explosive device.

Takeshi Miyakawa, a visual artist and furniture designer, was arrested Saturday after placing the installation in two separate areas of the same New York City neighborhood. His lawyer and employer both called the arrest a misunderstanding.

The first apparatus was found Friday morning after a caller reported a suspicious package to police. It consisted of a plastic bag that contained a battery and was suspended from a metal rod attached to a tree. The bag, which had the classic “I Love New York” logo printed on it, was connected by a wire to a plastic box that contained more wires.

The area was evacuated for two hours until a bomb squad determined that the device was not dangerous.

At about 2 a.m. Saturday, a police officer discovered Miyakawa on a ladder not far from where the first contraption was found. Police said he was tying a similar “I Love New York” bag to a public lamp post.

Miyakawa was charged with two counts of first-degree reckless endangerment, two counts of placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the first degree, two counts of placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the second degree, two counts of second-degree reckless endangerment and two counts of second-degree criminal nuisance.

A judge ordered him held pending a psychiatric evaluation. His lawyer, Deborah J. Blum, said Monday that she is filing for emergency relief to have Miyakawa released. A court date was set for June 21 to review the results of the evaluation.

“He’s still being held,” Blum said Monday. “I believe that it was a gross misunderstanding and other than that I don’t have any other comment.”

Miyakawa, who was born in Tokyo and is about 50 years old, has worked for a New York-based architect Rafael Vinoly for the last 20 years and also has an independent design practice.

Vinoly’s firm released a statement Monday praising Miyakawa for his “extraordinary brand of professionalism” and said he has been a mentor to generations of young architects.

“Takeshi is a fabulous human being and a person of extraordinary talent,” Vinoly said. “We hope this misunderstanding is cleared up as quickly as possible.”

New York Civil Liberties Union Executive Director Donna Lieberman said in a statement that the charges sounded “like a wild overreaction.”

“It’s hard to understand why a light-up bag in a tree would be treated as an attempted terrorist act unless there’s more to the story than has been reported in the press thus far,” she said.

In 2007, an artist touched off a terror scare in Boston by placing electronic devices around the city as part of a marketing stunt for Cartoon Network. The city closed bridges, roads and public transit before authorities realized the signs were not bombs.

On an average day, the NYPD receives nearly 100 reports of a suspicious package. Last year, there were more than 4,000 such reports. The number generally rises following any word of terror threats in New York and around the world.

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Behind the underwear bomb

The latest airplane terror plot wouldn't have been foiled without airport security -- but not the kind we all know

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Behind the underwear bombTravelers line up at a TSA checkpoint at Los Angeles International Airport. (Credit: Reuters/Danny Moloshok)

Another deadly plot taken down in the planning stages. This time, thanks to the work of a CIA double agent, officials were able to infiltrate a Yemen-based al-Qaida plot to destroy a U.S.-bound jetliner using a nearly undetectable underwear bomb.The moral of the story: Airport security works!Am I being facetious?  Not necessarily.  It depends on your definition of airport security.

In my mind, the key to keeping airplanes safe is, and always has been, stopping acts of sabotage while they are still in the planning stages. Here in the age of the TSA checkpoint, with its toothpaste confiscations and obsession with pointy objects, we tend not to think this way, preoccupied instead with a kind of airport Kabuki — the tedious, fanatical screening of passengers and their carry-ons. Real airport security takes place offstage, as it were. It is the job of the folks at the CIA and the FBI, working together with foreign authorities. And while TSA has an important role here too, we can do without the spectacle of airport guards rifling through innocent people’s bags in a pathological hunt for what are effectively harmless items.

The concourse checkpoint needs to be there.  Just the same, chances are good that once an adversary has made it to the airport, he or she has engineered a way to outwit the system.  And spend as we might, there will always be a way to outwit the system.  ”Even if our technology is good enough to spot it,” said California Rep. Adam Schiff, commenting on the news of the latest underwear plot, “technology is still in human hands and we are inherently fallible.”

That’s one of the smartest things I’ve heard a politician utter in some time.

Getting a handle on this takes us all the way back to Sept. 11, 2001, the day that everything, and yet really nothing, changed.  I’ve said this before, but it bears repeating: Conventional wisdom holds that the 19 hijackers exploited a weakness in airport security by smuggling box cutters onto four Boeing jetliners. But conventional wisdom is wrong. What the men actually exploited was a weakness in our mind-set — a set of presumptions based on the decades-long track record of hijackings and how they were expected to unfold. (In prior years, a hijacking meant a diversion, perhaps to Havana or Beirut, with hostage negotiations and standoffs; crews were accordingly trained in the concept of “passive resistance.”) The presence of box cutters on 9/11 was merely incidental. The men could have used almost anything — a deadly sharp can be fashioned from a broken first-class dinner plate or a ballpoint pen — particularly when coupled with the bluff of having a bomb. The success of their plan relied not on hardware but on the element of surprise. It wasn’t a failure of airport security that allowed those men to hatch their takeover scheme. It was a failure of national security — a breakdown of communication and oversight at the FBI and CIA level.

To put it succinctly: The success of the 9/11 attacks had almost nothing to do with airport security at all — a great and painful irony, of course, to any passenger forced to endure the checkpoint rigmarole in 2012.

Not that frontline guards don’t play a deterrent role.  And, in the opinions of some, the plot uncovered in Yemen underscores the value of full-body scanners — those controversial walk-through machines that allow guards to look beneath a passenger’s clothing. It’s a compelling argument, but the way in which these scanners have — and have not — been deployed is apt to make some of us cynical. For instance, the vast majority of body scanners are found at U.S. domestic airports. Overseas, where a bomb is far likelier to originate, they are rare. Is this really about safety, we wonder, or is it about billions of dollars going into the coffers of the companies contracted to build these machines?

And although the scanners are effective, where does the arms race end?  Not long ago, the idea that passengers would be marched through body scanners and photographed naked before being allowed to board an airplane, would have seemed outrageous. Yet here we are. What might be next?  The stubborn truth is, we can turn airports into fortresses if we want (in some respects we’re well along that path), yet we’ll never be entirely safe. Airport screening alone, no matter how thorough, how expensive, and how technologically advanced, will never defeat a relentless enough, resourceful enough adversary intent on downing a plane.

That isn’t capitulation, it’s reality.  And acknowledging this reality would go a long way toward warding off panic and overreaction when the next successful attack occurs.

Regrettably, too, we often forget that commercial air travel has long been a target of terrorist extremists.  The 1970s and 1980s in particular were, as I like to describe them, a Golden Age of Air Crimes, comparatively rife with bombings, hijackings and other deadly assaults against airplanes and airports. Over one five-year span between 1985 and 1989 we can count at least six high-profile terrorist attacks, including the horrific bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772; the bombing of an Air India 747 over the North Atlantic that killed 329 people; and the incredible saga of TWA Flight 847.  And let’s not forget what might have been, such as the so-called “Project Bojinka,” the 1994 scheme masterminded by Ramzi Yousef (nephew of Kalid Sheikh Mohammad), in which impossible-to-detect (at the time) liquid explosives were to be used to simultaneously destroy a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific Ocean. Fortunately the plot unraveled and Yousef was arrested.

While we can argue, quite persuasively, that many of the current-day security measures have done little if anything to make us safer, we’ve nevertheless introduced measures that have been useful and effective, from explosives screening of checked luggage to the sorts of trans-border partnerships that broke up the most recent plot from Yemen. Whether in spite of, or because of, the attention we’ve lavished on All Things Terrorism, the past decade has seen fewer attacks against commercial air travel than any since the 1950s.What we need to remember, though, is that our success has had more to do with the security measures we don’t see than those taking place in plain view. And if our luck is to hold, we need to better rationalize and streamline our entire approach to airport security. For instance, if we’re going to have those body scanners, let’s put them where they’re needed. If this requires negotiating with foreign authorities whose airports are beyond TSA’s jurisdiction, so be it. Meanwhile, here at home, TSA’s one-size-fits-all approach, in which every single person who flies is seen as a potential threat, is simply unsustainable in a country where close to 2 million people fly daily. Things like taking snow globes from children, haggling over tiny container sizes, or confiscating a dessert fork from a uniformed, on-duty airline pilot (it happened to me) serve no useful purpose whatsoever. On the contrary, they divert valuable time and resources away from the things that could make us safer.  Let’s scale back that concourse Kabuki and retrain guards in the finer points of a more sensible, risk-based assessment of passengers and their belongings.

And lastly, if only as an aside, let’s behold for a moment the term “underwear bomb.”  That was the operative phrase in literally hundreds of articles and broadcasts over the past several days, and nowhere did it raise a snicker.  What does it say about our country, I wonder, that such a preposterous expression is instantly understood and effectively taken for granted?

Strange times indeed.

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Hiding 9/11′s last secrets

The military tribunal for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed means the American people will never know what drove him to terror

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Hiding 9/11's last secrets (Credit: Reuters//Brennan Linsley)

After a Navy SEAL team killed Osama bin Laden at his Pakistan hideout a year ago this week, it flew his body to the Arabian Sea, weighted it down, and slid it silently off an aircraft carrier into the watery depths.

For many Americans, the secret raid provided a measure of revenge and catharsis for the strikes of Sept. 11, 2001. But it didn’t provide the kind of justice and official reckoning that the country needs to gain real closure. Now the government has a chance to achieve that through a full, fair and open trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four co-defendants, so the world can finally see the evidence against him as the true architect of the attacks on New York and Washington. The trial kickoff — an arraignment for the men — is scheduled for this Saturday at the U.S.-run detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

This should be our Nuremburg, the defining trial of the 9/11 era and a fitting coda to it.

Unfortunately, the U.S. government appears to be on the verge of squandering this opportunity, and with it, the best, and perhaps only, chance for the public to understand not only how the attacks came to be, but why Mohammed waged a relentless war against America and how we might stop the next would-be terrorist mastermind.

The problems lie within the reformed military-tribunal system that the Obama administration put in place after losing its fight for a civilian trial in New York. Political compromises have resulted in a flawed military commissions process that from outward appearances is not only rigged against the defense, but hyper-choreographed, censored and hermetically sealed.

“The process is designed to achieve a conviction, and to do it with as little revelation as humanly possible, but with the veneer of due process and justice,’’ said one participant who said restrictive gag orders prohibited him from talking publicly. “You’re talking about the most heinous crime ever, and we’re going to afford them less due process, less discovery, less of everything than we would the guy who shoplifted a pack of gum from CVS.’’

Obama administration officials say their reformed military commissions system is a vast improvement over the Bush administration’s version, which Obama moved to shut down on his first day in office in 2009.

Defense lawyers disagree, and insist they have been hamstrung in their efforts to mount the kind of aggressive defense needed to do their jobs including full and unfettered access to evidence, witnesses and even the accused themselves.

Four of the five legal teams had so few of their key players in place in recent months that they did not file the “mitigation submissions’’ that the government said it needed to decide which of the five men should face the death penalty and other key issues, such as whether to try them together or individually. They recently filed motions asking that the charges be thrown out because of fatal flaws in the system, which they say make it impossible for them to defend their clients.

“It’s window dressing,’’ Mohammed’s defense lawyer, David Nevin, said of the government’s improvements. “I am not all satisfied that it is a fair process. In fact, it is not a fair process.’’

Many of the defense lawyers have quit out of frustration or for other personal reasons stemming from the many delays in the process. Only a few have been there long enough to even begin to understand their clients’ case, not to mention the convoluted military commission process.

And they say they will be unable to effectively challenge confessions obtained when their clients were coercively interrogated in the CIA’s black site prisons, if they can broach the subject at all. This is important for the four men accused of helping Mohammed with the logistics of the plot. Several claim they have been wrongly accused, tortured into confessing, or both.

It is also important with regard to Mohammed, who confessed to dozens of plots while being waterboarded 183 times, and has said he may plead guilty even before the trial begins. Few U.S. counterterrorism officials believe all of his often boastful confessions, and it is important for the public to hear what, exactly, evidence the government has with regard to what he did and didn’t do, and whom he might have been protecting.

The team of Defense and Justice Department officials overseeing the military commission process, and the presiding judge, should quickly address the defense lawyers’ complaints, or a proceeding that some call “The Trial of the Century’’ will be delayed further by legal wrangling — and forever tainted by accusations of being unfair.

A full, fair and transparent trial, above all, will benefit the public. There is much the public doesn’t know about Mohammed, including the details of how he devised the plot, convinced bin Laden to let him do it and then orchestrated it “from A to Z,’’ to use his own words. It was Mohammed who masterminded dozens of other plots and attacks, some while staying a step ahead of the largest-ever criminal manhunt.

Mohammed, not bin Laden, was the one who traveled the world as a kind of “Johnny Appleseed’’ of terrorism, establishing alliances and creating a network of cells and lieutenants that in some cases remains today. And it was Mohammed who personally recruited young jihadist prospects much like a baseball scout, many of them Westerners, tapping into their grievances to turn them to his cause.

The U.S. government has kept the details of what Mohammed did — and how and why he did it — hidden in its most classified files since his capture in Pakistan nine years ago. The government should set the record straight on that, because there is an important lesson to be learned from the largely untold tale of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: It isn’t some monolithic group like al-Qaida that poses a continuing threat, it’s the one intelligent and energetic person who can emerge from nowhere and orchestrate a 9/11 while the world focuses elsewhere.

To that end, the government should declassify as much evidence as possible, and explain how it obtained it. It should call numerous witnesses to testify, especially since the one who has been publicly identified, Majid Khan, claims he was tortured while in CIA custody overseas.

Instead of limiting access to a few closed-circuit TVs, it should consider televising the proceedings. It should ensure that censorship is minimized, and used only to protect intelligence sources and methods, not to save the government from embarrassment. And it should let Mohammed and the others testify at length on their behalf if they so desire.

By doing so, the Obama administration will be able to say it did its best to put on the kind of civilian trial it has wanted all along, and one with a similar outcome to that of the al Qaida members charged with blowing up two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.

Those of us who witnessed that trial in Manhattan in 2001 saw the defendants squirm in their chairs as prosecutors introduced mountains of evidence against them. We saw eyewitnesses point the finger at the accused, and surviving victims glare at them from the pews.

We heard from the terrorists themselves, and learned a lot about why they did it, about how terrorist networks operate and about what might be done to stop people like them. And when the jury convicted them, there was no question that justice was done.

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Josh Meyer is the author, with Terry McDermott, of the new book, "The Hunt for KSM: Inside the Pursuit and Takedown of the Real 9/11 Mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.’’

FBI heroically locks up ridiculous anarchists on May Day

Feds stop inept radicals from carrying out a plot feds helped them conceive and carry out

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FBI heroically locks up ridiculous anarchists on May DayU.S. Attorney Steven Dettelbach, left, and FBI special agent in charge Stephen Anthony walk past a map showing the location of a bridge on Ohio Rt. 82. Five men, pictured on the wall behind the map, have been arrested for conspiring to blow up the bridge. (Credit: AP/Mark Duncan)

Happy May Day, fellow travelers! If you’re not currently disrupting capitalism and/or having your wrists zip-tied for exercising your right to freely assemble, you probably read about the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s latest, not-at-all suspiciously timed terror sting. The Bureau, in an inspired bit of early-20th century nostalgia, has railroaded a bunch of dangerous anarchists. (Or “dangerous” “anarchists.”) America will not waver in the face of the Galleanist threat!

Five young men from Cleveland are now in jail, accused of plotting to “blow up a bridge in the Cleveland area,” according to the FBI’s triumphant press release/criminal complaint. As is always the case with FBI terror stings, the “sting” part involved the bureau’s informant/agent provocateur mostly inventing the plot the accused have now been arrested for. In this case, the five planned to detonate smoke bombs as a distraction as they “topple[d] financial institution signs atop high rise buildings in downtown Cleveland.” But the informant (as usual, a sketchy unnamed character with a checkered past) strongly pushed the group to seriously consider different, more extreme plots. At the end, some or all of them were going to plant C-4 on the Route 82 Brecksville-Northfield High Level Bridge over the Cuyahoga Valley National Park.

So what was initially a political action aimed at financial institutions somehow morphed into a supposed attempt to destroy or damage a piece of publicly owned infrastructure in a national park. Anarchists sure do hate bridges, and parks, I guess. (No parliament of men has the authority to designate which spaces are “national parks”! The whole world is the worker’s national park!)

The FBI’s affadavit suggests that there was never actually a serious “plot.” The gang tossed around the idea of “taking out” a bridge in order to stop people from getting to work, but they also thought maybe they could use their (pretend) C4 on a Klan rally, or a neo-Nazi organization, or an oil well, or the Federal Reserve Bank. They eventually decided to maybe sink a ship. All of their many plans were super serious and well-thought out. (“To prevent capture, he suggested getting tacks that they could throw out of the back of a car if they get in a chase.”) Eventually they settled on the bridge thing, sort of, and bought fake IEDs from the guy they already suspected was a cop.

In other words, these are a bunch of dumbasses even by the standards of amateur “black bloc” dumbasses. Do you know how I know these morons weren’t serious? They planned to download the Anarchist Cookbook and follow its notoriously awful instructions. Every experienced anarchist knows that the Feds have a mole in your group house, but these guys were mainly concerned with having someone’s “hacker friend” explain to them how bitcoins work. Without the FBI’s intervention the most damage these idiots would’ve ever caused is a broken Starbucks window. So thank god they’re off the streets, and congrats to the FBI for getting this tale of dangerous, bomb-planting anarchists onto the news broadcasts on the day of Occupy’s big May Day action.

(At least the Feds are branching out from only targeting Muslims in these ridiculous “stings.” Some day all Americans, regardless of creed or color, will have their circle of friends secretly infiltrated by a paid informant.)

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Alex Pareene

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

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