Iraq

How the left became irrelevant

Christopher Hitchens talks about his beef with the Nation, the "filthy menace" of Saddam Hussein, and how the left ceded its moral credibility by opposing the war against Islamic fascism.

In the weeks leading up to the first anniversary of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, editors at America’s premier left-wing magazine, the Nation, asked their readers to submit letters describing how that day had changed their lives. Hundreds replied and more than 40 letters were published from a diverse group of people who came from different generations, different regions of the U.S., different countries.

Christopher Hitchens, author of the magazine’s “Minority Report” column, read the letters with dismay. Many of the writers offered only a glancing lament for the lives lost that day, or the acts of heroism that saved other lives; few criticized the intolerance and cruelty of al-Qaida and the Taliban. Instead, one letter writer after another attacked the United States. It was “fascist,” said one. The war on terrorism was “flawed and self-serving,” said another. A third seemed to find a grim silver lining: The attacks had weakened the “loony” system over which George Bush now presides.

In 20 years as the Nation’s in-house contrarian, Hitchens had seen the left in all its idiosyncrasy and excess. His frustration was evident in the 1990s during his relentless criticism of — some would say unhealthy obsession with — President Bill Clinton, a charismatic icon for many liberals. But the left’s reaction to Sept. 11 did what Clinton’s misdeeds and his supporters’ defense of them never could: It drove Hitchens away from the Nation. In an interview last week, Hitchens recalled that his reaction to the Sept. 11 letters was decisive: “Well, that’s goodbye. I don’t want to have anything to do with reinforcing that kind of public opinion.”

Earlier this month, he wrote a column that was in some ways an answer to those letters, and to all the reflexively antiwar readers of the Nation. It called Saddam Hussein “a filthy menace,” and reiterated Hitchens’ support for Iraqi and Kurdish opponents of Saddam’s regime. It doubted Bush’s competence to prosecute the Iraq liberation effort. And it questioned whether Western antiwar groups would ever be persuaded by the voluminous evidence that shows Saddam to be a ruthless, murderous tyrant. “I have come to realize that the magazine … is becoming the voice and the echo chamber of those who truly believe that John Ashcroft is a greater menace than Osama bin Laden,” he wrote. Then, abruptly, he ended the column with the announcement that it would be his last.

History may see the column as a small but telling moment for the modern American left. Hitchens’ sentiments were no doubt heartfelt, but it is difficult to imagine that he is anything but delighted with the controversy he has provoked. An ex-Trotskyist, expat Brit living in Washington, a loquacious but unpredictable rebel in the pundit class, Hitchens today finds himself at a singular position: He is friend to neither left nor right, but reserves the right to eviscerate them equally and in due proportion with whatever blade is at hand.

Hitchens was in San Francisco last week promoting his latest book, “Why Orwell Matters” (Basic Books). And in a 90-minute interview on the storied terrace at Enrico’s in North Beach, he nursed a glass of red wine and chain-smoked Rothmans, pausing only to relish a small chocolate souffli with crhme anglais. In the interview — which appears below, condensed in deference to the limits of the reader’s time — Hitchens did not so much answer questions as use them as a springboard for long, impassioned ruminations and fulminations on Orwell, Iraq, terrorism and the state of the left in America.

During the discussion, he acknowledged the inherent “contradiction” at finding himself allied with Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and other Iraq hawks close to President Bush, although he said nothing to embrace them. But he reserved most of his animus for the left. Many will argue it was unnecessary for Hitchens to leave the left, that the left had already left him thanks to his unrelenting attacks on Clinton and his support for impeachment. During impeachment hearings, he provided Senate investigators with an affidavit swearing that White House aide Sidney Blumenthal (formerly a close friend) told him Monica Lewinsky was a “stalker,” contradicting Blumenthal’s sworn testimony. In July 1999, many Hitchens fans were aghast when the Nation columnist teamed up with right-wing Rep. Bob Barr to headline an anti-Clinton Free Republic rally.

Since leaving the Nation, Hitchens says he’s felt “emancipated,” though the relief does not seem to have dimmed his antipathy for the politics espoused by Noam Chomsky, Ramsey Clark and the legions now carrying placards urging “No War on Iraq.” Why, he asks, did they not organize demonstrations against Saddam when he gassed his people, against the Taliban when they imposed harsh religious rule on Afghanistan, or against the al-Qaida attacks at the World Trade Center or elsewhere around the world?

“The term ‘the American left’ is as near to being meaningless or nonsensical as any term could really be in politics,” he says. “It isn’t really a force in politics anymore. And it would do well to ask itself why that is.”

Though it is a risk to summarize Hitchens’ carefully nuanced opinions, it is fair to say that he sees in the left’s reaction to Sept. 11 a failure to understand a profound change in world relations — a failure that makes the left irrelevant. The old political conflicts — and the old paradigm of opposition — are largely fading, and they’ve been replaced by a global conflict of theocratic states or movements against secular states. A conflict between God and reason, perhaps, with Hitchens very much allied with the latter. And that is a natural position for a leftist, he says, but the left has become so mesmerized by multiculturalism that it will not criticize even those cultures that oppose freedom.

“I love it when Muslims go to war with each other, as I do when the Christians do,” he says, “because it shows there’s no such thing as the Christian world and the Islamic world. That’s all crap.”

For Hitchens, clearly, life without a grudge would be no life at all — and he accumulates enemies and nurtures his fights as an oenophile collects fine wines. He won notoriety for a 1997 book that savaged Mother Teresa as a fraud. He is among those pushing to have former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tried as a war criminal. And in the interview last week, he had pointed criticism for figures arrayed from left to right: Not just Chomsky, Kissinger, Clinton and Ramsey Clark, but Pat Buchanan, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, George Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Jacques Chirac, Kofi Annan, Vladimir Putin, Alexander Cockburn, Karl Rove, Jerry Falwell and even former President Jimmy Carter, the recent Nobel Peace Prize winner.

And these days, more than any other, Saddam Hussein.

How do you think Orwell is applicable to our times? Or, as I think the Washington Post phrased it in the past couple of days: What would Orwell be saying if he were alive today?

Well, I’ve no claim to be his ventriloquist in any way, or rather, to be able to ventriloquize him, but I’m sure no one would think I was an opportunist or just trying to sell my book if I pointed out that in the course of the last week, we saw the Iraqi people forced to humiliate themselves by a supposed 100 percent turnout and a supposed 100 percent vote and forced to degrade themselves by a big brother figure who might’ve modeled his regime on Orwell. And the same could be said of the other news that troubled our sleep last week, which is the news from North Korea, which — I’ve been to both of these countries, by the way, so I’m nearly up to speed with the axis of evil — and however much you want to avoid the clichi, there’s no way of spending even a day in a North Korea without thinking about Orwell. It’s as if they took their playbook from him — a completely hermetic state, endless adulation of the leader, literally hate meetings at workplaces about foreign powers and foreigners. The abolition of the private life. The abolition of the sexual life. So what would he be if he were still alive? He’d be a fairly sardonic 99-year-old. I think he might say: “Well look, you, it was easy to see the totalitarian system is a threat not to its own people alone, but to others. And that method of thinking, that method of rule is deadly and has to be opposed.” Then there are things about the language. The great lesson Orwell taught me was the connection between the struggle over language and the struggle for freedom — for free thinking — and that you have to realize that so many traps lurk in the language so that a term like “collateral damage” I think would obviously be easy meat for him as a way of describing dead civilians. I’m impressed that when people hear phrases like that, they think of Orwell. But I think he would also object to people who say: “No war on or with Iraq.” That’s using language for propaganda also, in a very base and I think a very crude and obvious way.

Does it surprise you that that would happen on the left? Would it have surprised Orwell?

It certainly wouldn’t have surprised him because his essay “Politics and the English Language” and his other reflections on this certainly do address themselves to power and the way that power distorts. And in particular most of his favorite examples are from what the French used to call the langue du bois, the wooden tongue, which I’m afraid to say we know under its more farcical pseudo-compassionate form of political correctness. It used to be better known as a language of thuggery used by the Communist left. Actually, a bit of both of these is involved in the witless slogan “no war with Iraq,” or “no war on Iraq.”

If one were to look at your writing, say, since Sept. 11, there are threads of Orwell in it, aren’t there? Whether or not they’re cited?

Well if someone wanted to say that, I wouldn’t feel I had to repudiate it. Because I can’t believe Orwell would’ve been neutral [in the debate] between theocratic aggression and civil society. The idea that something like Afghanistan is the ideal society — I know what I think about that. If it involves smashing planes full of people into buildings full of people, I’m against that too. How tough is that? More surprising I think are the people who would evade that question, or try to change the subject. But I think Orwell was a help in guessing the motive of that kind of masochism, that kind of self-hatred.

In what way?

He was quite clever at analyzing the way that people who repudiate patriotism will transfer that allegiance to other people. They’ll be patriotic about others, or they’ll make excuses about others they wouldn’t make for themselves. It’s a sort of psychological displacement, if you will. There was and there still is a sickening amount of that on what you could call the American left and, of course, never forget, on the American right. After the Sept. 11 attack, the first people to say the USA deserved this, and people who probably believed it in the most sadistic manner, were [Jerry] Falwell and [Pat] Robertson. “Of course what’d you expect, in a hedonistic, multicultural, sexually open country — naturally God will punish that.”

Where does it come from on the left? What’s the source?

I’d have to say — let’s call it honorable. There are people who cannot forget, as neither do I, the lesson of the years of the Indochina War. Which was, first, that the state is capable of being a murderer. A mass murderer, and a conspirator and a liar. For some people that’s definitive. They can’t get over it. So the idea that the United States could use force with moral justification is to them totally alien. They can’t — they can’t go there. They won’t. But that is more a proof of their inflexibility than their attachment to principle. It’s an empty position. It’s a nihilistic position. If they said, “Yes, if bin Laden’s the only revolutionary, he may not be perfect, but we’re on his side,” well, I could sympathize. No — I won’t say sympathize, but I could see it, I could respect it. But they don’t do that. They look for bogus equivalencies that actually lead to a cop-out. “Well, he did this bad thing, but we’ve done this bad thing.” That leaves you exactly nowhere. And surely it should at least condemn both. In fact it appears to excuse both.

And Orwell was clever about this. I mean, there were a lot of people, a very large number in fact, in 1940, for example, not just in England but in Europe and America, who would say, “Well, this Nazi business in Poland is pretty rough, obviously, but look at how the British behave in India. Why should we pick a side?” He sort of knew by the same instinct that I hope your readers have why that stinks as a means of arguing. I could explain why it stinks, but if I had to explain why to someone who didn’t get it right away, I probably would never succeed.

Because it’s obvious on its face?

I would distrust at once someone who didn’t see there was a fallacy there. And those who didn’t I think would not be open to persuasion.

What is the fallacy?

The fallacy is one of moral equivalence. The motive for it, or the ruse of it, is — I prefer to call it masochistic. It’s a self-hatred. It’s a refusal to believe that you would ever be justified yourself in having the arrogance to define and defend yourself against or to destroy an enemy. That would surely make you no better than them. But this is disabling.

It seems to me that the left has a reflexive pacificism –

Well, I wish it was pacifism.

– an unwillingness to fight wars.

If you’re a Quaker, you say: “It’s not that I’m afraid to die — I’m afraid to kill. I don’t think anything would justify it.” That’s fine. But in practice, it isn’t that. The people who tend to raise antiwar slogans will do so generally when it’s American or British interests involved. Ramsey Clark didn’t organize a protest against Saddam Hussein’s attack on Iran, or Kuwait. He’s not antiwar to that extent. And nobody complained about the failure of the West — nobody complained in an organized street-protest way — about the failure of the West to rescue Rwanda. And nobody complained about Milosevic’s invasion of Bosnia — well, that’s not true, a lot of people did — but their juices only kicked in when there was intervention to remove him. Voilè! You see the bad faith of this all the way through. It culminates in the most fatuous slogan yet devised, which is: “Stop the war before it starts.” Which is a protest against removing either al-Qaida from Afghanistan or the Taliban from Afghanistan or both. Well, at this point it has to be said I think that the left has lost every moral and political element that made it a formidable force as an antiwar movement in the 1960s.

I wonder if you can trace for me your disillusionment with the left.

My tradition from the extreme left days is different from that of most mainstream leftists, I think, in that I was a Trotskyist. The group I was a member of, International Socialists, was a dissident splinter of the Trotskyist movement — you were always fighting a war on about five fronts. But it was worth doing. It taught me how to argue, streetfighting, polemic and so forth. With the Clinton years, I realized that the left had moved literally to the right, because it was willing to excuse things that the United States did that it shouldn’t do if it was done by someone claiming to be a liberal Democrat. Horrifying things, like the bombing of Sudan on the international front, and horrifying things on the home front like the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [of 1996], which, if either of these things were done by either Bush or Ashcroft, everyone would know what to say. When they were really being done and they were both worse things.

Clinton didn’t consult the U.N. about bombing Sudan. He didn’t consult Congress. He didn’t consult his Cabinet. He didn’t consult the CIA or the National Security Council. He overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He got a free pass. And every lawyer who wants to throw someone in jail quickly with a minimum of trial knows to charge them under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Against which there’s no defense. And then there was Bosnia. If you are ever going to be confronted with a moral issue in your lifetime, one where there isn’t much wiggle room, it would be: Here’s an attempt to destroy, physically to destroy, a European minority, the third attempt of the 20th century. The first being the Armenian Christians, the second being the Jews, the third being the Muslims of the former Yugoslavia, or Bosnia Herzegovina. If you can’t be against that, when it’s taking place in front of your own eyes, what the hell can you say you are against?

All the Chomskyans and that lot — I call them Chomskyans for short now — said, “No, the problem with that was American imperialism daring to intervene in the Balkans.” As to the destruction of the Muslims, they had nothing much to say. They made weird predictions, like, “It’ll lead to a quagmire, it’ll lead to mass civilian casualties, it’ll lead to a wider war with Russia” — and so on, all of which was false. Then comes bin Ladenism. Suddenly the people who didn’t care about the murder of the Muslims [in Bosnia] say, “You musn’t offend Islam.” Bad faith. Catch them doing it twice, bad faith. It’s a pity there isn’t a term for this pathology. I’m certainly at the point where I think I can tell it when I see it, or smell it or taste it. And it’s summarized most recently in: “No war with Iraq.” In other words, let’s discuss Mesopotamia as if human rights didn’t matter. Well, I’m not willing to accept that invitation. So that’s how gradually one was diverging.

The culmination, it seems, was your decision to quit the Nation.

I got this feeling like a dog being washed all the time in left-wing company and then, just recently, it struck me that the excuses I’d given to myself — well, the Nation is a broad church or a big tent, and it’s all a friendly debate — were ceasing to be true. My quarrel isn’t with the editors. It’s with the readers. The magazine published a special Sept. 11 commemorative issue where they solicited letters from readers, “Tell us what Sept. 11 means to you.” I think they printed three pages of these. The revelation of what readers thought and how they thought was so depressing to me. Most of those letters in an ordinary week would not have been chosen for publication because they just weren’t up to the standard. They were very weak and badly written. Instead of which there were three pages of them, all of which said: “Here’s what Sept. 11 means to me — I’ve discovered I live in a fascist state.” I said, “Well, that’s goodbye.” I don’t want to have anything to do with reinforcing that kind of public opinion. When I can’t persuade myself any longer that I’m just one among the columnists, I think I can’t recommend to anyone that they read the magazine.

Where were you on Sept. 11? How did that day affect you?

I was in Seattle — or, actually, I was on the other side of Washington state, near the border of Idaho, giving a lesson on Kissinger. Scoop Jackson’s old college, Whitman. I knew that the next morning the lawsuit against Henry Kissinger would be filed in Washington, D.C., by the Chilean victims, murder victims, or rather relatives of the murder victims. I signed a few books, had a few drinks, shook a few hands, went to bed feeling I’d done a fairly good day’s work. I got woken up very early by my wife, told to turn on the TV. The plane flew into the Pentagon just opposite of where my daughter goes to school. I was at a very liberal college. And lots of people said things like: “Chickens coming home to roost.” I realized very early in the day that I didn’t believe a bit of that. But you know, I’m a mammal like everyone else. I went through disgust and rage — not fear.

And then, by the end of the day I realized there was something I hadn’t quite identified, it was another emotion waiting to dispose itself — it was exhilaration. I thought, that’s OK, that’s a confrontation between everything I like and everything I don’t like. You got an attack on civil society which indiscriminately kills people of every possible cultural denomination within the society. Upon examination this assault turns out to come from our client states, from the Saudi Arabian oligarchy to the Pakistani secret police, they’re the ones that incubated them. It puts the working class in New York in the saddle. It puts them where they ought to be as the defenders of the country, of the requisite values. It completely exposes the national security state as being pointed the wrong way, and being top-heavy and corrupt. And it creates an international feeling that there has to be a stand made against the worst kind of tyranny that there ever could be, which is religious, the one that the socialist movement came into being to oppose, the religious worldview, it’s what we exist to oppose, so people can actually emancipate themselves. You couldn’t really have wanted a better and more dynamic and radical confrontation. And the American left decides: “Let’s sit this one out.” That’s historical condemnation. To be neutral or indifferent about that, it’s just giving up. You just want a quiet life.

But was that because –

It’s the left turning into a very, very boring, banal, insular form of affectless conservatism and isolationism.

Why do you favor an invasion of Iraq?

I don’t favor an invasion of Iraq. But I favor a confrontation with Saddam Hussein, and I’ve been an ally and a friend, a good enough friend, I hope, to the Kurdish and Iraqi opposition for many years. And I and they have been for regime change for a long time. When all Bushes were against it, and Carter too, the Nobel Peace Prize-winner who incited and paid and encouraged Saddam Hussein to attack Iran, without, as far as I remember, a vote in the General Assembly about it, or Congress. So I’ve been involved with Iraq for more than 25 years, and Kurdistan. And I’ve had an unchanging view of it. I hope it can be done without an invasion.

Do you think it can be?

I think it can be, yes. I think the regime is close to imploding, as was demonstrated by the bizarre events of Sunday with the supposed amnesty [for Iraqi prisoners] that turned into somewhat like an uprising. The regime is already dead. It’s necrotic. Any shove from any direction would collapse it. An Iraqi officer now has to be asking himself every day when he goes to bed and wakes up, “Do I want to be the last person to die for Saddam Hussein?” Obviously that thought is implanted from outside, by the certainty that something will happen. If it’s true that there will be chaos in a post-Saddam Iraq — that was going to be true in any case. The question is, can one have a hand in it and can you do something for the people you hope would win? The answer is yes to both.

But Karl Rove has as much as said that Bush can use this to his advantage in November.

It was a very grave mistake of his, morally as well as aesthetically and strategically, to say, because it invites people to refute it, and I hope with success. I hope that no candidate who runs that way is rewarded. I think there is an equivalent mistake or a symmetrical mistake in saying, “Well, it’s being done for domestic reasons.” Which is an unbelievably, insufferably insular comment. Because Bush is certainly gambling his presidency on this, and has to know — because I know the people who are advising him, or some of them, know — that the gamble might not work out. He could be facing a calamitous outcome, something that no prudent politician would ever embark on.

And you think he’s aware of that potential for calamity?

He has to be.

Well, I think people wonder —

Most of the mainstream press and media spend most of their time emphasizing these dangers. They’re quite right to do it. But they are wrong in thinking these dangers don’t exist independently, so to speak, objectively. The problem of post-Saddam Iraq is a grave one, no matter how the post-Saddam stage is reached.

A question common among some leftists on this subject, just as it’s common among some generals and retired generals, is whether you can devote yourself to taking out Saddam without compromising your attention to the war on terrorism and al-Qaida.

In both cases, the question is thrust on you. Take the third case: How can you deal with North Korea without distracting attention? It was obviously a very unwelcome piece of news. But it’s not one that we can say, “Well, why don’t we concentrate on the other things as if this hadn’t happened?” The question of a post-Saddam Iraq is a very urgent one. We don’t have the option of saying, let’s pretend it’s not so and get after bin Laden. And by the way, the damage done to the bin Laden network I think has been very considerable. I think bin Laden is dead. We know the Taliban is gone and can’t come back.

Although al-Qaida’s been pretty active in the past couple of weeks, don’t you think?

This is the kind of thing — I lived in London and I worked in Belfast during the hot period of the war in Ireland. You were used to a bomb in a restaurant every week or so. It was a regular thing. Any fool can do it. You can blow up a restaurant in America every week — it wouldn’t make the slightest difference. It will come to that anyway. If it’s a war, there will certainly be regular shooting from the other side. But al-Qaida doesn’t have a host country anymore, and its leader is I think dead, and a lot of its militants are dead too, and it will become a lot easier to identify and kill them as time goes by. That has to be done in any case. So it would be like saying, ‘If North Korea invaded South Korea, we shouldn’t do anything about it because we have to concentrate on al-Qaida.’

But why Iraq now? Why can’t it wait a year? Why can’t it wait even two years? I mean, the time is arbitrary –

Anyone who wants to give Saddam Hussein more time is inviting him to get to the stage where he could say, well, I’ve reoccupied Kuwait, and if you want to push me out, be aware that I can let off a nuclear weapon in Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. I wouldn’t want to bet my own house, let alone anyone else’s, on that.

Do you find much opposition to these positions, particularly regarding Iraq? And especially on the left?

The main enemies of my position — the chief enemy is not Tom Daschle, who everyone knew would collapse and fall into line, and who had anyway got up to the same point of saying, “Let’s hit Iraq now,” when it was Clinton asking for it. The opposition of him and Robert Byrd is trivial, sham, something for the New York Times to write about. Everybody knew they would fall into line in the end. They would make a few noises, but they’d already for another president made the same commitments. They just wanted to give it to Bush. Trivial. And nobody gives a shit outside a small constituency what Chomsky thinks anymore, or Ramsey Clark. The main enemies of this regime-change strategy are Bush senior, [retired Gen. Brent] Scowcroft, [former Secretary of State Lawrence] Eagleburger, to some extent Kissinger — status quo forces, who like the Middle East the way it is, basically, clientele of Saudi Arabia — and the isolationist right, Pat Buchanan. And their language of prudence and caution and so on has a lot of echoes in the State Department and some in the CIA and Pentagon. The people who were so useful to us in defending us against al-Qaida. So it’s an argument with the conservatives. And this, more than any foreign policy argument has ever been, in fact, it’s an argument with the imperial conservatives, the Tories, and that’s simply obscured to a lot of people I think by the apparent objection of pacifists and liberals which doesn’t make any difference.

Although it’s —

And then are those who claim to be pacifists — they at least have a conscience about the Palestinians, a very important question — but who I think are being deceived. And then there are those who say, “Well, safety first. Prudence.” But it’s not clear to me their policy is the more secure one. As for the Palestinians, well, I’ve been banging on about the Palestinians for three decades, when a lot of the left thought it was too awkward a question to bring up. And I wouldn’t take any of that back, either. But if you say you can’t do anything about Iraq until the Palestine question is settled, you’re saying that the oldest dispute in the Middle East must be settled before you can do anything about Saddam Hussein, which is giving him a lot of room and time and notice and giving him the incentive to sabotage, which he has the partial power to do, any such settlement from occurring. So it may very well be that those who care for the Palestinians should think of it the other way around. At least it’s as good as the other argument, which has been given a fair try and has not worked. It’s resulted in the Arafat faction and the rejectionists always knowing they’ve got someone else to turn to in Baghdad, for money and for weapons. Without that, they might have to do what they keep saying they won’t do, which is make a deal. That’s another gamble, I’ll admit. It could go wrong. But I think the existing gamble is set in time and schedule to go wrong — it can’t work.

So you see an invasion of Iraq as potentially having positive repercussions in the Israeli-Palestine –

I would prefer to call it an intervention against Saddam Hussein. I think it has many possible unintended consequences that are good. They’re the reason why the conservatives oppose it. One, it destroys the Saudi Arabian monopoly on oil. That’s why Kissinger spoke up against it. It upsets the Turkish oligarchy because, in theory at any rate and possibly in practice, it enlarges the nucleus or the embryo we already have of a Kurdish autonomous state. It takes at least a bit of bet on the possibility that the Iraqi people could produce a better regime than they have. It’s destabilizing, yeah, but that’s what I like about it.

The New York Daily News, in a recent column by Stanley Crouch, suggested that you’ve left the left. The National Review in the last few days said that Christopher Hitchens is no man of the right, but that “We will be in the same trench for years to come.” Do you believe these assessments of your political evolution? Have you left the left?

Both are making the same mistake in a different way. Stanley used, in his youth, to be a keen revolutionary black nationalist and very much isn’t anymore. And so I think he welcomes company from defectors of any kind. And he’s repudiated his past, which I haven’t and don’t. And the same would be true of the National Review. I mean, I didn’t read that, nor have I read what’s in today’s New York Post [National Review Online, actually], where I’m told William F. Buckley Jr. has a very long attack on me and my Kissinger film and I believe also the book. I haven’t read it but I know it’s apparently a full-out attack. So we’re not going to be in the same trenches, are we?

Let me put it in a different way: On the one hand your position on Iraq seems to be a position adopted by many people who are close to Bush, and as a measure that is integral to Israel’s security, which is an unusual position for you to be in, historically. You’ve been an outspoken critic of Israel. Second, it puts you in an alliance — not with Brent Scowcroft and not the various other generals, but with John Bolton and Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle and that cadre close to Bush. Isn’t that an unusual position –

It says to me, look, there is no position now on these matters that doesn’t involve the handling of contradiction. All people’s positions bring them into alignments they would never have believed they would have. In other words, shall we say, Noam Chomsky and Patrick Buchanan. Or Alexander Cockburn and Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson. By the way, I’m very glad to find that those are the ways the planets have aligned for me. I’m not just a critic of Israel, actually. I’m an anti-Zionist. I’m one of those people of Jewish descent who believes that Zionism would be a mistake even if there were no Palestinians, which is a great lie of Zionism, that there is no Palestinian population. The bet made by the Wolfowitz-Perle group is that an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians would be more easily done if the Middle East were cleansed of authoritarian extremist regimes than if it were not. Well, we’ve given the other proposition a fairly fair test, and I think that it’s been a failure.

Last question –

I should say that I think that there should’ve been a Palestinian state 25 years ago and it’s a matter of principle that the Palestinians should have their own self-government, whether that helps with Iraq or not. I think it’s a matter of principle and should be approached in that way. But since no U.S. government was going to do that, and since Bush is the only president to have used the words “Palestinian” and “state” next to each other, I don’t see any reason yet to think his position is worse. And the resort by the Palestinians — some of the leadership and well as some of the rank-and-file — to suicide bombing, I think, had to be presented to them, without any ambivalence, as something that would be suicidal for them.

Is there a left out there that you are still a part of?

No. I don’t actually think there’s a left in America really at all, now. The term “the American left” is as near to being meaningless or nonsensical as any term could really be in politics. It has some memories it can be proud of. It has some veterans who I’m proud to know. But it isn’t really a force in politics anymore. And it would do well to ask itself why that is. Whether or not it revives, I think, is very problematic.

Why –

I hope it would be clear to anyone who reads this that I don’t feel I wasted all my time on the left. That I still think as an internationalist and as a socialist in what you might call the intellectual, the ethical way — I still do. And I accept also the risks of revolutionary strategy even if it’s only a revolution from above. So that, to that extent, I feel much more as I used to in the ’60s, having meetings with the Iraqi opposition and the Kurdish rebels, than I would marching under a banner saying “Leave Saddam Hussein alone.” Actually it’s for them to ask whether they think there’s a left or whether they are in fact just a creepy form of the status quo who’ve made all their own adjustments to power but are still preserving an outdated rhetoric.

Last question: Ten words or less, tell me what your politics are.

I feel emancipated by the lack of any party or ideological allegiance.

Emancipated and not lonely?

Well, loneliness was always — if you’ve ever been, as a I nearly was once, a full-time organizer for a group that is a minority within the Trotskyist movement, isolation has no terror. I have to be careful, in other words — this is more than 10 words — of not succumbing to the view that being on your own may mean you’re right. That of course can be the first sign of madness. [laughs]

Edward W. Lempinen is a senior news editor at Salon.

Our real Iraq losses

We left their nation in turmoil and our own country entangled in an endless "national security" nightmare

A man, left, inspects his destroyed vehicle at the scene of a car bomb attack in Ramadi, 70 miles (115 kilometers) west of Baghdad, Iraq, Tuesday, March 20, 2012. Officials say attacks across Iraq have killed and wounded scores of people in a spate of violence that was dreaded in the days before Baghdad hosts the Arab world's top leaders. (AP Photo) (Credit: AP)
This originally appeared on TomDispatch.

People ask the question in various ways, sometimes hesitantly, often via a long digression, but my answer is always the same: no regrets.

In some 24 years of government service, I experienced my share of dissonance when it came to what was said in public and what the government did behind the public’s back. In most cases, the gap was filled with scared little men and women, and what was left unsaid just hid the mistakes and flaws of those anonymous functionaries.

What I saw while serving the State Department at a forward operating base in Iraq was, however, different. There, the space between what we were doing (the eye-watering waste and mismanagement), and what we were saying (the endless claims of success and progress), was filled with numb soldiers and devastated Iraqis, not scaredy-cat bureaucrats.

That was too much for even a well-seasoned cubicle warrior like me to ignore and so I wrote a book about it, “We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the War for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People.” I was on the spot to see it all happen, leading two Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in rural Iraq while taking part up close and personal in what the U.S. government was doing to, not for, Iraqis. Originally, I imagined that my book’s subtitle would be “Lessons for Afghanistan,” since I was hoping the same mistakes would not be endlessly repeated there. Sometimes being right doesn’t solve a damn thing.

By the time I arrived in Iraq in 2009, I hardly expected to be welcomed as a liberator or greeted — as the officials who launched the invasion of that country expected back in 2003 — with a parade and flowers. But I never imagined Iraq for quite the American disaster it was either. Nor did I expect to be welcomed back by my employer, the State Department, as a hero in return for my book of loony stories and poignant moments that summed up how the United States wasted more than $44 billion in the reconstruction/deconstruction of Iraq. But I never imagined that State would retaliate against me.

In return for my book, a truthful account of my year in Iraq, my security clearance was taken away, I was sent home to sit on my hands for months, then temporarily allowed to return only as a disenfranchised teleworker and, as I write this, am drifting through the final steps toward termination.

What We Left Behind in Iraq

Sadly enough, in the almost two years since I left Iraq, little has happened that challenges my belief that we failed in the reconstruction and, through that failure, lost the war.

The Iraq of today is an extension of the Iraq I saw and described. The recent Arab League summit in Baghdad, hailed by some as a watershed event, was little more than a stage-managed wrinkle in that timeline, a lot like all those purple-fingered elections the U.S. sponsored in Iraq throughout the Occupation. If you deploy enough police and soldiers — for the summit, Baghdad was shut down for a week, the cell phone network turned off, and a “public holiday” proclaimed to keep the streets free of humanity — you can temporarily tame any place, at least within camera view. More than $500 million was spent, in part planting flowers along the route dignitaries took in and out of the heavily fortified International Zone at the heart of the capital (known in my day as the Green Zone). Somebody in Iraq must have googled “Potemkin Village.”

Beyond the temporary showmanship, the Iraq we created via our war is a mean place, unsafe and unstable. Of course, life goes on there (with the usual lack of electricity and potable water), but as the news shows, to an angry symphony of suicide bombers and targeted killings. While the American public may have changed the channel to more exciting shows in Libya, now Syria, or maybe just to “American Idol,” the Iraqi people are trapped in amber, replaying the scenes I saw in 2009-2010, living reminders of all the good we failed to do.

Ties between Iraq and Iran continue to strengthen, however, with Baghdad serving as a money-laundering stopover for a Tehran facing tightening U.S. and European sanctions, even as it sells electricity to Iraq. (That failed reconstruction program again!) Indeed, with Iran now able to meddle in Iraq in ways it couldn’t have when Saddam Hussein was in power, that country will be more capable of contesting U.S. hegemony in the region.

Given what we left behind in Iraq, it remains beyond anyone, even the nasty men who started the war in 2003, to claim victory or accomplishment or achievement there, and except for the odd pundit seeking to rile his audience, none do.

What We Left Behind at Home

The other story that played out over the months since I returned from Iraq is my own. Though the State Department officially cleared “We Meant Well” for publication in October 2010, it began an investigation of me a month before the book hit store shelves. That investigation was completed way back in December 2011, though State took no action at that time to terminate me.

I filed a complaint as a whistleblower with the Office of the Special Counsel (OSC) in January 2012. It was only after that complaint — alleging retaliation — was filed, and just days before the OSC was to deliver its document discovery request to State, that my long-time employer finally moved to fire me. Timing is everything in love, war, and bureaucracy.

The charges it leveled are ridiculous (including “lack of candor,” as if perhaps too much candor was not the root problem here). State was evidently using my case to show off its authority over its employees by creating a parody of justice, and then enforcing it to demonstrate that, well, when it comes to stomping on dissent, anything goes.

My case also illustrates the crude use of “national security” as a tool within government to silence dissent. State’s Diplomatic Security office, its internal Stasi, monitored my home email and web usage for months, used computer forensics to spelunk for something naughty in my online world, placed me on a Secret Service Threat Watch list, examined my finances, and used hacker tools to vacuum up my droppings around the web — all, by the way, at an unknown cost to the taxpayers. Diplomatic Security even sent an agent around to interview my neighbors, fishing for something to use against me in a full-spectrum deep dive into my life, using the new tools and power available to government not to stop terrorists, but to stop me.

As our government accumulates ever more of what it thinks the American people have no right to know about, there will only be increasing persecutions as prosecutions. Many of the illegal things President Richard Nixon did to the famous Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg are now both legal (under the Patriot Act) and far easier to accomplish with new technologies. There is no need, for instance, to break into my psychiatrist’s office looking for dirt, as happened to Ellsberg; after all, the National Security Agency can break into my doctor’s electronic records as easily as you can read this page.

With its aggressive and sadly careless use of the draconian Espionage Act to imprison whistleblowers, the Obama administration has, in many cases, moved beyond harassment and intimidation into actually wielding the beautiful tools of justice in a perverse way to silence dissent. More benign in practice, in theory this is little different than the Soviets executing dissidents as spies after show trials or the Chinese using their courts to legally confine thinkers they disapprove of in mental institutions. They are all just following regulations. Turn the volume up from six to ten and you’ve jumped from vengeance to totalitarianism. We’re becoming East Germany.

What I Left Behind

There has been a personal price to pay for my free speech. In my old office, after my book was published in September 2011, some snarky coworkers set up a pool to guess when I would be fired — before or after that November. I put $20 down on the long end. After all, if I couldn’t be optimistic about keeping my job, who could?

One day in October, security hustled me out of that office, and though I wasn’t fired by that November and so won the bet, I was never able to collect. Most of those in the betting pool now shun me, fearful for their own fragile careers at State.

I’ve ended up talking, usually at night, with a few of the soldiers I worked with in Iraq. Some are at the end of a long Skype connection in Afghanistan, others have left the military or are stationed stateside. Most of them share my anger and bitterness, generally feeling used and unwanted now that they need a job rather than rote praise and the promise of a parade.

“We Meant Well” is, I think, pretty funny in parts. I recall writing it as an almost out-of-body experience as I tried to approach the sadness and absurdity of what was happening in Iraq with a sense of irony and black humor. That’s long gone, and if I were to write the story today, the saddest thing is that it would undoubtedly come out angry and bitter, too.

A Member of a Club That Would Have Me

Having left behind friends I turned out not to have, a career that dissolved beneath me, and a sense of humor I’d like to rediscover, I find myself a member of a new club I don’t even remember applying for: The Whistleblowers. I’ve now met with several of the whistleblowers I’ve written about with admiration: Tom Drake, Mo Davis, John Kiriakou and Robert MacLean, among others.

As ex- or soon-to-be-ex-government employees all, when we meet, we make small talk about retirement, annuities and the like. No one speaks of revolution or anarchy, the image of us the government often surreptitiously pushes to the media. After all, until we blew those whistles, we were all in our own ways believers in the American system. That, in fact, is why we did what we did.

My new club-mates represent hundreds of years of service — a couple of them had had long military careers before joining the civilian side of government — and we cover a remarkably broad swath of the American political spectrum. What we really have in common is that, in the course of just doing our jobs, we stumbled into colossal government wrongdoing (systematized torture, warrantless wiretapping, fraud and waste), stood up for what is right in the American spirit, and found ourselves paying surprising personal prices for acts that seemed obvious and necessary. We are guilty of naiveté, not treason.

Each of us initially thought that the agencies we worked for would be concerned about what we had stumbled upon or uncovered and would want to work with us to resolve it. If most of us are now disillusioned, we weren’t at the outset. Only by the force of events did we become transformed into opponents of an out-of-control government with no tolerance for those who would expose the truth necessary to create Thomas Jefferson’s informed citizenry. In meeting my club-mates, I learned that whistleblowers are not born, but created by a government with much to hide and an unquenchable need to hide it.

One of those whistleblowers, Jesselyn Radack, wrote a book about her experiences called “Traitor: The Whistleblower and the American Taliban.” At the dawn of the War on Terror, Radack, an attorney at the Department of Justice (DOJ), wrote a memo stating that John Walker Lindh, the “American Taliban” captured in Afghanistan, had rights and could not be interrogated without the benefit of counsel.

The FBI went ahead and questioned him anyway, and then DOJ tried to disappear Radack’s emails documenting this Constitutional violation. Ignoring her advice, the government tossed away the rights of one of its own citizens. Radack herself was subsequently forced out the DOJ, harassed, and had to fight simply to keep her law license.

As proof that God does indeed enjoy irony, Radack today helps represent most of the current crop of government whistleblowers (including me) in their struggles against the government she once served. Radack and I are now working with Academy Award-nominated filmmaker James Spione on a documentary about whistleblowers.

What Will Be Left Behind

So what’s left for me in my final days as a grounded State Department worker assigned to timeout in my own home? Given my situation, there is, of course, no desk to clean out; there are no knickknacks collected abroad over my 24 years to package up. All that’s left is one last test to see if the system, especially the First Amendment guaranteeing us the right to free speech, still has a heartbeat in 2012.

Though I could be terminated by State within a few weeks, I am otherwise only months away from a semi-voluntary retirement. Since I’m obviously out the door anyway, State’s decision to employ its internal security tools and expensive, taxpayer-paid legal maneuvers at this late date can’t really be about shortening my tenure by a meager four months. Instead, it’s clearly about mounting my head on a pike inside the lobby of State’s Foggy Bottom headquarters as a warning to its other employees not to dissent, or mention wrongdoing they might stumble across. Better, so the message goes, to sip the Kool Aid and keep one’s head down, while praising the courage of Chinese dissidents and Egyptian bloggers. The State Department is all about wanting its words, not its actions, to speak loudest.

Running parallel to the State Department termination process is an investigation by the Office of the Special Counsel into my claim of retaliation, which State is seeking to circumvent by tossing me out the door ahead of its conclusion. State wants to use my fate to send a message to its already cowed staff. However, if the Special Counsel concludes that the State Department did retaliate against me, then the message delivered will be quite a different one. It just might indicate that the First Amendment still does reach ever so slightly into the halls of government, and maybe the next responsible Foreign Service Officer will carry that forward a bit further, which would be good for our democracy.

One way or another, sometime soon the door will smack me in the backside on my way out. But whether the echo left behind inside the State Department will be one of justice or bureaucratic revenge remains undecided. My book is written and my career is over either way. However, what is left behind matters not just for me, but for all of us.

[Disclaimer: The views expressed here are solely those of the author in his private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of the Department of State, or any other entity of the U.S. Government. It should be quite obvious that the Department of State has not approved, endorsed, embraced, friended, liked, tweeted or authorized this post.]

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Peter Van Buren spent a year in Iraq as a State Department Foreign Service Officer serving as Team Leader for two Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Now in Washington, he writes about Iraq and the Middle East at his blog, We Meant Well. His book, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People (The American Empire Project, Metropolitan Books), will be published this September.

Shaima Alawadi’s murder: Hate crime or honor killing?

The murder of an Iraqi immigrant in California has stirred rumors of both a hate crime and an honor killing

Fatima Alhimidi weeps over her mother Shaima Alawadi's coffin as it arrives in Najaf, Iraq. (Credit: AP/Alaa al-Marjani)

EL CAJON, Calif. – On March 21, an unknown assailant shattered Shaima Alawadi’s skull with a tire-iron-like weapon in the living room of her home. An Iraqi immigrant and mother of five, Alawadi was found by her 17-year-old daughter, Fatima, who said she was “drowned in her own blood.” Alawadi was rushed to the hospital, still alive, but she was soon taken off life support and died March 24. It was, by all accounts, a heinous crime. But was it a hate crime?

After her mother’s death, Fatima said she found “a letter next to her head saying, ‘Go back to your country, you terrorist.’” The accusation sparked outrage and brought national media attention to the murder. And yet, within days, publicity-craving Islamophobes Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer were pushing an alternative motive: that Alawadi’s death was, in fact, an “honor killing.” Geller crowed, “I surmised that the murder of Shaima Alawadi appeared to be Islamic, rooted in Islamic teachings and culture …”

I journeyed to Alawadi’s adopted hometown of El Cajon in Southern California to find out more about her death. El Cajon is a microcosm of Iraq, but an Iraq that no longer exists. More than 40,000 Iraqis are struggling to build a new life there, having fled persecution in their homeland. One local described to me a community where “There’s Chaldeans, Yazidis, Mandaeans. There’s Shi’a, Sunni, Kurds. There’s Assyrian and Armenian.”

The first wave of immigration came in the late 1970s on the eve of the devastating Iran-Iraq War. Others, including Alawadi and her family, fled after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, mainly Shi’a who unsuccessfully tried to overthrow a wounded Saddam Hussein at the urging of the senior Bush administration. The third wave was courtesy of the junior Bush’s 2003 invasion, which spawned Islamist militias that have decimated Iraq’s Chaldean Christians, Mandaeans (followers of John the Baptist) and Yazidis (a 4,000-year-old syncretic religion). Out of the millions of Iraqi refugees from the most recent U.S. war, 59,000 have landed on American soil.

Many have found their way to El Cajon. They tell of harrowing escapes from kidnappings, bombings and death squads, years in refugee camps and life savings spent to hopscotch from country to country. Recent arrivals come bearing deep traumas and have landed in a depressed economy where they often sink into joblessness, squalor and depression. They have also discovered not everyone is welcoming.

“There is a hate crime problem in El Cajon,” says Basma Coda, an Iraqi-American who works at the Chaldean-Middle Eastern Social Services. “We have documented six physical attacks since 2007 in which Iraqi refugees were beat up and had broken bones. All had to go the hospital. They were all over 50, and one was a 75-year-old man with Parkinson’s disease.” (The El Cajon police department did not return calls about the alleged crimes.)

“There are a lot of anti-Islamic groups and know-nothings here,” says California State University professor Brian Levin, director of the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism in San Bernardino. Nonetheless, he and other hate-crime monitors are skeptical of some of the alleged details of Alawadi’s death. “Why are the police so quick to say it is an isolated incident? That suggests to me they are looking at other motives. There is the possibility this could be some sort of personal attack or revenge attack.” Mark Potok, senior fellow at the Southern Poverty Law Center, which monitors hate groups nationwide, says that when he first heard about the threatening notes, “I raised an eyebrow. It’s too perfect. It’s highly unusual to have notes that spell out the motive on paper.” As for the crime itself, Potok says, “It is quite unusual to invade someone’s home, especially a woman, and violently beat her to death in the dining room.”

Indeed, in the days after her death several revelations called the hate-crime allegation into question. On April 4, an affidavit for a search warrant about the murder was “accidentally released,” according to the New York Times. The San Diego Union-Tribune, which first received the document, claimed it shows a “family in turmoil and cast doubt on the likelihood that her slaying was a hate crime.” Alawadi was said to be planning on leaving her husband, based on blank divorce papers found in her vehicle. Last November, police investigating reports of two people possibly having sex in a car found Fatima with a 21-year-old man. After her mother was called to pick her up, Fatima allegedly jumped out of the moving car at 35 mph. While being treated at a hospital for her injuries the court records state, “Police were informed by paramedics and hospital staff that Fatima Alhimidi said she was being forced to marry her cousin and did not want to do so she jumped out of the vehicle.”

The document also mentions “a neighbor reported seeing a skinny dark-skinned male running west from the area of Alawadi’s house” on the morning of the murder. According to the affidavit, as of March 27, the police had not confirmed the whereabouts of Kassim Alhimidi, Alawadi’s husband, at the time of the murder. And curiously, “a handwritten note was located at the scene that the family denied seeing before.”

Yet some in the community are still skeptical because there is no suspect, motive or murder weapon. Hanif Mohebi, director of the San Diego chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, says, “There are definitely questions that are brought up by the article, but we should not jump to a conclusion unless there is a real fact provided. Our community is not immune to these issues.”

Some observers worry that the new information in the Alawadi case will be misused. Hanif Mohebi says, “From the beginning we were very cautious about the murder because we are all human beings, and this could go any way. The Islamophobes will exploit this. If there is something that advances their agenda, they will most definitely use it.” Right on cue, Geller and Spencer began their postulations about “honor killings.”

Potok also stresses that, whoever murdered Alawadi, the rise in Islamophobia is genuine. The Southern Poverty Law Center has tracked a 200 percent increase in anti-Muslim hate groups nationwide from 10 such groups in 2010 to 30 in 2011. Potok attributes the spread to “the so-called Ground Zero Mosque controversy in 2010 that was really ginned up by opportunistic activists and politicians … This is a classic case of words having consequences.”

The rumors of notes, in particular, have unsettled Iraqi immigrants to El Cajon. The notes have hurled them back to wartime horrors they seem unable to escape. After the United States occupied Iraq, a favored tactic of extremist militias was to deliver a note to intended victims warning them to leave or be killed. Families would receive letters because a child or husband was collaborating with U.S. forces, or perhaps they were the wrong ethnicity or religion in the wrong part of town. Religious minorities were sometimes given the “option” of converting to Islam.

Basma Coda says, “We have threatening notes in our office that people brought from Iraq.” The notes say things like, “You are an infidel. You are a sinner. You deserve to die. If you don’t leave by a certain time, you and children will die.” Often they would be given a specific day or time to leave. Coda says, “The Iraqi refugees in El Cajon every day they live their fear. They live their trauma. The future is unknown for these refugees.” She says her social service organization is trying to help them, “but one incident like Alawadi’s murder takes them back to the trauma they experienced.”

On March 30, I attended an outdoor prayer service and candlelight vigil for Alawadi. I met one of her neighbors from Iraq. Abbas Almeali, 42, clad in traditional Iraqi garb and headdress, said he knew Shaima and her family from Samawa, the closest city in southern Iraq to the Saudi Arabian border. He fled in March 1991 after the revolt failed, but “was proud to be part of the uprising.” He said Alawadi’s father was tortured by Saddam Hussein’s regime and her uncle was hung during the uprising. “She was a nice girl, she had no problems with anyone,” Almaeli said.

Kamyar Hedayat, a medical doctor of Iranian heritage, spoke at the vigil. Hedayat said as he has practiced critical care for children, “I’ve watched children die, and I know how death affects families.” Hedayat said, “It is ironic that a woman who escaped the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein and the bombs of George Bush, Sr., lost her life in San Diego seeking safety and civility.”

Michelle Fawcett contributed to this report.

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Arun Gupta, a New York writer and co-founder of Occupy the Wall Street Journal, covers the Occupy movement for Salon.

In Iraq and on “The Wire,” it’s all acting for Benjamin Busch

In a lyrical memoir, a novelist's son discusses his strange path into war -- and David Simon's TV masterpiece

Benjamin Busch

Benjamin Busch’s “Dust to Dust” is a remarkable book — part military memoir, part childhood reminiscence, and also an effort to explain his relationship with his father, the celebrated novelist Frederick Busch.

And yet it is also more than all of those things. Busch is filled with complicated and fascinating contradictions. Yes, he’s the son of a famously introspective and domestic writer, who grew up in rural New York obsessed with toy guns and building massive military forts. But he studied visual arts at Vassar, where he confused everyone by joining the Marine reserves — especially his commanders, when he accidentally announced himself in a roll call as part of the “Vassar infantry.”

A man consumed with war, words and images, Busch served two combat tours in Iraq. He proved himself both exceptionally thoughtful and also terribly overconfident. In his first tour, beginning in April 2003, he was the commanding officer of a light armored reconnaissance unit, in a village near Iran. In his second tour, in an exploding Ramadi in 2005, Busch had the impossible job of trying to rebuild a town — and gain its trust — while insurgents and sniper fire added to the general lawlessness and lack of any power structure.

Oh, and in between those two tours, Busch returned home to play Sgt. Anthony Colicchio on “The Wire.” The military man who emphasized listening to Iraqis and learning what he didn’t know played a fictional Baltimore police officer of the exact opposite variety. The over-aggressive Colicchio loved nothing more than making arrests to show toughness and to pump up the Western District’s stats. He’s not interested in getting to know the streets he patrols, and he’s disgusted by covert efforts to legalize the drug trade in a part of Baltimore dubbed “Hamsterdam.”

In an interview this week, Busch said real-life frustrations in Iraq fueled Colicchio’s rage. But the challenge in Iraq, he says, was making sure those frustrations never, ever revealed themselves when working with Iraqis. Both roles, he said, were essentially acting jobs. We also talked about Robert Bales and how soldiers handle pressure, where the war plans went wrong and whether the Marines need more Vassar alums.

You were a student at Vassar during the first Gulf War, the 100-hour action that pushed Iraq out of Kuwait. You write about feeling disappointed that it was over so quickly – that this looked like your generation’s shot at war. You very much wanted to go to war.

I thought that. I pushed the extremes throughout my youth, as you can see from some of the small stories even as a child. I was always venturing into what I either considered unexplored territory or what I considered unwise territory to explore.  And war was certainly one of those things. Its mere existence is entirely an environment of threat. Although, as you learn in war, with the randomness of death, preparation is only partially useful. Looking forward to it, you think that you could develop skills which would make you impervious. I painted myself in that idea, that I had survived the poor wisdom of my youth, and it must be because I had certain endurance. I wanted to believe that that could be extended into an environment as ferocious as war. I covered myself in a certain invulnerability in my first tour as a commander, mostly because my Marines expected it.

There’s a vivid scene in the book where your helicopter is going down, and you see the side of a cliff rushing toward you, the small details of land getting clearer and clearer. But you have Marines in the back of the helicopter facing the other direction who don’t know what is happening. So you just calmly smiled at them.

What else can you do in the face of death but smile.

Some people might scream. 

I’m not a screamer. There’s a certain calm that comes with both a belief that you are invulnerable and a belief that you’re doomed.  It leads to a lack of anxiety: One you can’t affect, and the other you can’t be affected.

And that’s the change you describe during your two tours in Iraq. The first time, there’s an eerie confidence. But the second time, death is omnipresent.

Yes, between the two tours that became very pronounced. My first tour I was wearing it for show; I created my own myth and believed in it. My second tour I was wounded almost immediately and we were taking incredible casualties and Ramadi was just a caustic environment in 2005. It was entirely random; every day you expected that it was going to be your day. We almost had this fatalistic humor about it all. We’d walk out the door and say, “Oh, I’m probably going to be killed today, so you can have my uniforms.” People weren’t surviving.

This is post-insurgency, and in the capital of the Sunni province of Anbar. It was a very bloody time, and you suggest our presence didn’t help, which in some ways is a startling admission from a Marine.

It was teeming not just with insurgents — actual Sunnis which were fighting for their own destiny — but it was also overrun with Syrians who were real pure jihadists. They came across the border to fight and die – they came there for us. Many of them were funded by Saudis. So there was a strange triangle of danger created all around our mere presence. And what we would look at was the families. There were children living there and parents who wanted what everyone wants – a secure day, food on the table. And not to fear that something collateral will happen to them, either by insurgents or by us. It was hard to watch that every day, knowing that they were under threat because we were under threat. And that our job was to protect them and we really couldn’t.

Let me back up for a moment. Your memoir has nine chapters, structured among elements like water, metal, stone and blood. You recount stories involving those materials from your youth, and then connect those materials to your war stories. So how did your childhood prepare you for what you saw when you weren’t playing games?

Endless fascination. I think it was endless fascination that prepared me for everything in my life. I was always paying attention. I was put here to observe and build upon my fascinations.

You make it sound simple. But there’s another scene in the book where you are called to mediate an emergency council meeting in Jassan. Water had been diverted to Saddam Hussein’s family. The town wanted a pipe sealed so their water flow would improve. The people did not know what to do, and insurgents were threatening the village’s leaders and sent a message during the meeting that they would also kill you. How does a young American in that situation know what to do?

It’s my Lawrence of Arabia moment.

It’s also a moment where you teach the meaning of democracy. You empower them to put the matter to a vote, and then act. You see people hungry to solve problems together, and excited to find the power within themselves to do that. That’s in some ways what we said we would do there — and exactly what didn’t happen often enough.

It was my place not to impose that, but to let that native urge be successful. I just felt very early that they wanted direction, and the worst thing that I could do would be to give it, because that would make me in charge. That would make me the ruling class. What had been removed was any sense of structure – the Baath party had been dissolved at that point, and had not been replaced with anything. There was a huge vacuum and all that had been put into it was us. And I knew that our mistakes would be made by creating a dependency upon a new state order that was perhaps not sustainable. I had nothing to offer except advice and bullets. That’s what I had. We couldn’t even get our mail at the time. What I wanted to do was find native solutions to native problems that I could only reinforce their answers to their problems, in some ways.  And that was a big moment I wish I could have celebrated in some ways because it was their choice and it was just that brief moment where they felt like they were in charge of their destiny – they felt like they had done something. They had the power to achieve justice, and they did it against all the odds. We had to replace rule of law in a place that is entirely lawless.

So you pay attention. I just followed my fascinations. Why is the water not running? Where does the water come from? Let’s follow that. And we did. You begin to reverse engineer everything just by seeing what’s wrong at the end. I wouldn’t say that I was good at anything.

Good questions. Too bad we didn’t ask them more often.

We could have saved a lot of time and a lot of loss if we had done so. What I feel the most regret about is that I left those people. We had that place almost stabilized in some ways, and though it was not in any way efficient or in any way without corruption, there was a possibility of being quietly transformative in some of those communities.

How do you see what went wrong?

We tried to define them. It’s what we do. We’re Americans. We find ourselves in a position that’s generally comfortable and our vision can only extend so far as us, and who wouldn’t want to be like us. So, if we just offer this, then it will be accepted and embraced. We don’t have a lot of respect for cultural traditions because we barely have any.

And honestly, our own history, if you watch how we achieved our great comfort, it’s pretty ugly. We’d like to criticize everyone for their stages toward democracy but if you look at ours – we didn’t let women vote, we didn’t let blacks vote, we had slaves. We had issues. We eradicated an entire native population almost.  I went into the place knowing that I was the one with the least information, and so it was my job to spend as much time listening and not talking as I could. I wanted to make sure I kept track of the details, the names. I was rebuilding family trees because the environment was built out of family trees.

Unless you’re going to come in there like the British empire and establish infrastructure and reform an entire place in its image, then you’re going to be wholly ineffective. We are definitely not the British empire in the way that we do business. We went in there awkwardly, we built mistakes upon mistakes. And after a while, you know, we wore ourselves down being wrong about things. It just took a little perspective, and some specialists. The people in the State Department knew all about Iraq. I would have liked to have had them in my vehicle.

All that failure, all that pressure, the consecutive tours. Not everybody handles pressure the way you were able to. What do you think happens when a soldier snaps, like Sgt. Robert Bales in Afghanistan, and allegedly goes on a shooting rampage and kills 17 people.

I can’t diagnose him. We have people that do horrible things all the time. Everyone deals with stress in their own way. There were ideologues over there. There were people who were on crusades. You just name it – look at everyone’s background.

Is this the right way to put a military together? When you look at the background you had, and the very different way you approached problem-solving and building relationships with people, those don’t necessarily seem to be the skills most valued by the military right now. You were a visual artist from Vassar. You probably had many cultural issues to overcome. But would a more diverse military be beneficial? Even some sort of mandated public service of some sort

What I found intriguing was that I met America in the Marines. At Vassar, I met a certain intellectual group. Vassar doesn’t teach you how to do anything. Literally. You come out of Vassar with no skill other than that if you find yourself in any situation you’ll be able to think your way out of it. It’s a critical thinking environment. To constantly question, to constantly try to resolve, and to resolve by not talking over the problem but by engaging in it. Collectively in some ways.  The military obviously has a very hierarchical system, but I didn’t see them any differently. I took the discipline of critical thinking, much to the chagrin of certain people, and I employed it.

Now that led to its own kind of hubris in your second tour, when you thought what had been effective among the Shia might also work with the Sunni. It didn’t.

I said, well, I don’t understand anything that’s happening here, which should tell me something. Shut up and find out. I deluded myself into thinking that because I had been effective in that area, which was very rural, Shia, on the Iranian border, with completely different feelings, that when I went for my second tour in Ramadi, the opposite side of the country, Sunni, I thought I could apply these great collective, cooperative ideas of building a city to a place that was a shooting gallery. And I was exposed for being the most wrong person, ever. It was just one step short of delusional that I could take these ideas and apply them effectively to a place, thinking, Well, this has been effective in a small scale, on a small range, with almost no money. We repaired buildings, we established critical infrastructure, we fixed water lines. We did an awful lot of stuff in a small place and they liked it.

With the irony, of course, that we fixed what we blew up.

Right. I thought that if you give something to someone that they realize is of great value to them, then they will defend it and, in doing so, they will embrace some of the stability that comes with preserving things instead of destroying them. We knew very well what the Taliban did and what the insurgents could do, which was destroy things. They didn’t build things for people; they blew them up. Our message was, “We didn’t do that.” And of course, in order to fight them, we blew things up. So our message was lost in our own struggle, and we never could achieve the support of the locals because we could prove nothing. We couldn’t give them the one thing that was needed for all these things to be effective, which was security, peace. We couldn’t do it. And because they knew we couldn’t do it, they were forced to side with those who would use extreme measures.

“Hopelessness” is certainly a word that comes to mind. I mean, we fought the city every day, as one captain said when we were there. You don’t fight the Battle of Ramadi, you fight Ramadi every day.

An impossible bureaucracy, corrupt institutions, intractable problems — it’s almost like a David Simon TV show.  And in between tours in Iraq, you established an acting career, and played a Baltimore policeman on “The Wire.” How did one experience affect the other?

Sgt. Colicchio fed off that second tour of Iraq where I was so frustrated. Colicchio is the opposite, he has a very black-and-white sense of justice. There is no gray for him, and of course, Iraq was entirely gray. So I got to air all the things I had to bury while I was there.

What was the timeline like on the acting roles, and your military service?

Interestingly, I had just come back from my first tour when I got the role of Colicchio. And for a year, 2004, I did Season 3. Immediately at the end of the filming schedule, I went to Ramadi. For 2005, I came back just in time for the beginning of Season 4 and rushed to grow out some hair on my face. It was literally at the end of one experience and the beginning of a very different one.

How do you handle that psychologically — to go from a real war zone into playing a police officer?

It was all an acting of a certain kind. When you play a role, there is some of you in it, and the rest is what you’re burying yourself in to create a character. I did that in Iraq. I didn’t think I could be killed. I had to prove that by acting that way. And I did the same thing with Colicchio; Colicchio  was airing a lot of frustration I truly felt, that I kept to myself, and he gave it a voice. So it’s interesting that I think the war informed Colicchio in some ways, and then going back, I was once again placed in that environment where I had to create a certain person who was both real and partially imagined to deal with that environment. I couldn’t actively and visually be frustrated with Iraqis, because that was insulting. Even if they were saying the most outrageous stuff imaginable. It’s an area of conversation, most of which is a lie. Asking questions about the lie, you begin to get pieces of the truth, and eventually, you create something close to what’s really going on.

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David Daley is the senior culture editor of Salon.

Iraq war booster urges Syria intervention

Kanan Mikaya insists we must save a besieged people, but that's what he said about Iraq in 2003. Should we listen?

Kanan Makiya (Credit: AP/Manish Swarup)

Outside of the fraudulent Ahmed Chalabi, Kanan Makiya was the Iraqi exile most influential in driving America to war with Iraq in 2003. His 1989 book “Republic of Fear” was arguably the greatest effort to chronicle and categorize the horror of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. His 1993 work “Cruelty and Silence” was a devastating broadside aimed at the Arab intelligentsia’s refusal to admit the horrors of Saddam. Makiya’s unique credibility and eloquence (he is now a professor at Brandeis University) made him a singularly powerful voice among those who believed it was a moral imperative to overthrow Saddam and democratize Iraq. He met with President George W. Bush and spoke at the right-wing American Enterprise Institute to make his case, promising that American troops would be greeted as liberators. Peter Beinart, in his final column as editor of the New Republic, wrote in regret that he supported the war primarily “because Kanan Makiya did.”

Makiya was no academic advocate, however. He returned to Iraq to set up an NGO, and was an advisor to the Iraq interim governing council. He oversaw the drafting of a prototype Iraqi constitution, which called for a secular, democratic state. He argued with Chalabi about pushing Iraq into a civil war. He has been back to Iraq “many times” since the 2003 invasion, he says.

Now Makiya is back as a pundit, talking about Iraq’s neighbor to the west, Syria, a country increasingly engulfed in civil war. All efforts to reached negotiated solution have failed and the government’s attacks on its opponents, armed and unarmed, have widened. An estimated 8,000 civilians have been killed in the past year. In challenging President Bashar al-Assad’s entrenched dictatorship, the Arab Spring has suffered its most violent repression.

Makiya has written a powerful article  for the New Republic, calling international intervention in Syria a “moral and human imperative.” “There is a moral and a human imperative to act that is larger than any nation’s interests and larger than any strategic calculation,” he writes. “That is so obvious it is an embarrassment to have to say it. This is how I thought about intervention in Iraq 20 years ago and it is how I think about what needs to be done in Syria today.”

But, of course, the disaster of the Iraq war that Makiya supported causes many to draw the opposite conclusion: that America should avoid intervening in the Middle East militarily, at least unless it is directly attacked. For Makiya the mistake came not in 2003, but 1991, the year that hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were slaughtered after they rose up to overthrow Saddam Hussein, while President George H.W. Bush and his Allied Coalition sat by, despite having urged the uprising. Many Iraqis understandably felt betrayed. But the first President Bush, unlike his son, had few illusions about America’s ability to govern Iraq after getting rid of Saddam.

Makiya spoke to Salon about these ideas in a recent phone conversation. He wrote the TNR piece, he says, because he has a “sense of déjà vu” that the world is making the same mistakes that it did in 1991. In 1991, the case for intervention was “much, much greater,” Makiya says. The population had risen in opposition, the Iraqi army was devastated, and help was nearby. No help was given.

“The result was, not only did you have an immediate crushing of the uprising, but in the two to four months following that, as the regime retaliated, the result was some 200,000 dead,” he says.

The single biggest problem in Iraq is the devastation that resulted from the failure of the state following the 1991 uprising, Makiya says. “A state that I described as semi-totalitarian in ‘Republic of Fear’ turned into a criminal state. Sanctions took a huge toll, and institutions crumbled. They were totalitarian institutions, to be sure, but they had functioning health and education systems. The infrastructure for all that collapsed.” By the time the Americans did invade, in 2003, “the institutions are a shell of their former selves, and the entire thing collapsed like a house of cards,” he says. That is the lesson Makiya believes we should learn from Iraq. “It’s not a case of intervening too much or too little,” he argues, “but when it happens that matters.”

Makiya says that “what we are looking at in Syria is very similar.” Aside from the failures of the Arab Spring, the cost will be not just victims who have already been killed. The cost of keeping Syrian leader Basher al-Assad, he says, will be “hundreds of thousands dead,” as the regime retaliates over the long term. Not letting that happen is Makiya’s imperative, he says.

His plan relies on the leadership not of the United States, but of Turkey. A safe haven for the Syrian opposition should be established that would be policed by Turkish troops and funded by Arab countries. “Establish a place where the Syrians can be safe from the bombardment and killing machine of Assad, No. 1. No. 2, give them a chance to organize their future.” America uses its political capital, not its military capital, to establish a safe haven protected by the Turks. “It just requires political will, but that is the crucial first step before we can talk about arming the Syrian opposition and finding out who the opposition is. That’s where I would start.”

The solution may not be so simple. The rebels are determined to bring Assad down. Will those protecting them prevent the government’s overthrow? With much of the country targeted, a no-kill zone will have to engulf much of the country. At that point, the Assad government may simply make war on the Turks, lest the government lose control of a majority of the populace. Why the Turks would sign on to such an open-ended venture is unclear.

Hanging over all this is the specter of Iraq. How one evaluates that war often determines how one views the prospect of further involvement in Syria. Makiya still believes the war was worth it; indeed, he wishes it came in 1991.

“2003 didn’t come out of nowhere. It directly follows the tragic outcome of 1991, which only looked on paper like a victory because Saddam Hussein was kicked out of Kuwait.” For the Iraqis who faced retaliation and 13 years of crippling sanctions, it was not a victory at all. “From an Iraqi point of view, containment didn’t work.” For all the horrors of the war and the many mistakes America made,  Makiya says, “Iraqis have a future. They have elections, they are starting to learn politics because their institutions were destroyed by 30 years of Saddam Hussein, and there is hope.”

Many Iraqis disagree with that argument. According to November 2011 polling conducted by Zogby, a full one-half of Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis say they are “worse off” as a result of the war. Eighty-eight percent and 81 percent of Sunni and Shia Arabs, respectively, say “personal safety and security” has worsened. Those figures, of course, do not include the feelings of the many Iraqis dead from the war, nor of the more than 5 million refugees that resulted from the conflict.

Moreover, the war was an unmitigated disaster for the United States. Whatever benefits were accrued from the removal of Saddam Hussein were outweighed by the deaths of 4,486 American troops, the expenditure of at least $1 trillion, the erosion of U.S. credibility and international support, and the bolstering of Iranian power.

Nonetheless, Syria is not Iraq, which was at worst a potential threat to the United States. Syria is undoubtedly a humanitarian crisis. But Makiya concedes Syria is like Iraq in another way: We don’t know much about it.

“It turns out we don’t know an awful lot about what happens after 30 years of a totalitarian regime. We didn’t really understand the legacy of pain and brutalization that this kind of situation in Iraq and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in Syria, have gone through,” he admits.

Trying to replace a dictatorship is something the United States should avoid, given its disastrous history in the region. Only the people of Syria can do that and the world community may have to protect them in order to avoid an even great massacre and a wider war. Makiya’s plan hinges on Turkey taking a leading role. It’s difficult to see how it would work but such a scheme may be the only hope Syria has left.

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Jordan Michael Smith writes about U.S. foreign policy for Salon. He has written for the New York Times, Boston Globe and Washington Post.

Iraq vets on the road to recovery

Sometimes the best treatment for war wounds is a long bike ride

On the road to recovery

Last September, I was in the saddle of my bicycle somewhere in the middle of Pennsylvania. Dark green farms materialized from the mist as one hill rolled into another. Somewhere out here, United Airlines Flight 93 crashed.

In about a day, I would be at the exact place where the plane went down, by the sides of dozens of troops who were injured in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. I was chronicling a solemn moment on the 10thanniversary of the 9/11 attacks for “Recovering,” the documentary film I’m directing about troops who have turned to an unlikely recreation, bicycling, to heal from wounds such as post-traumatic stress disorder and lost limbs.

But Shanksville was far away. It was raining and cold and I kept pedaling. I was wet, breathing hard, my ass hurt and heart felt like it could burst. I wanted to stop. But that was out of the question. I wasn’t going to let the other cyclists down.

I looked down at the Garmin mileage tracker on the handlebars of my road cycle. It read: “790.”

In just 121 miles, it would hit “911.” Then the champagne would flow.

In my 12 years as a journalist this moment ranks high in terms of unusual situations that I’ve been in. Here I was, supposedly reporting and the battery for the tiny HD camera attached to my bike had run out. Walkie-talkie contact with my director of photography, “Blood Diamonds” author Greg Campbell, was long lost.

Alone with my thoughts and too tired to talk or do anything constructive for the film, I kept spinning my legs. I wondered if I ought to be on the back of a motorcycle, armed with a camera and helping Greg. Or maybe I should be in a van, waving my arms and squinting at horizons, sipping a perpetual cup of lukewarm coffee and looking like a film director.

It was a moment of doubt. I wondered, “Was I still making a difference to this film?”

It was also a moment of pain with pain. I was, as cyclists say, bonking, or hitting a proverbial wall of fatigue after riding hundreds of miles, including several days with a small group of cyclists through Tropical Storm Lee. The proverbial wall became a real one: this damn hill. On any other ride, I may have quit.

But today, most of the cyclists around me were hurting just as bad. As Dexter Durante, an Army master sergeant who was blinded when a small bit of C-4 explosive detonated in his face during a training accident, told me, cycling is like a bad relationship – the kind so bad that it’s good for you, if that makes sense. “You know, she hurts so bad,” he says in his poetic way. “Yet still, she’s addictive, you know. I can’t stop loving her. I’m all into her, even when I’m climbing up them hills.”

For years I’ve reported on the toll of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, including here at Salon. In two investigations, reporter Mark Benjamin and I revealed that troops with severe psychological trauma had been mistreated by commanders when they returned from brutal war deployments. Some were drummed out of the Army without adequate access to benefits, like help for their PTSD, at a time when suicides were hitting record highs.

Now, I was pulling a new thread in this story that has sweeping ramifications for not just a generation of American troops, but also their communities. Troops are fighting to recover from their wounds. If there are enough of them, they may alter the stereotype that many returning veterans are hardcore substance abusers who can become violent and dangerous.

I met young privates, hard-nosed sergeants, fresh-faced officers, Navy SEALs, Army Rangers and Special Forces officers. They were all joining cycling rides  – whether they were wounded warriors or not. Neither rank nor branch of service matters. When former Army Chief of Staff George W. Casey, a retired four-star general, joined the trek in September, he told everyone to call him “George.”

Vietnam vets I met along the way were almost jealous of this – in a melancholy sort of way. More than one told me they wished there was something like this for them when they returned from war back in the 1960s and 1970s. One told me he was so inspired by the young riders that he was now, after all these years, starting to address long-lingering psychological issues, including simmering, vague anger, head-on. Everyone I met, it seemed, was having nightmares. And everyone was finding a way to talk about them.

This is what John Wordin, a former pro cyclist and executive director of the Ride2Recovery nonprofit, wanted. Hundreds of troops, clad not in camo and boots, but superhero-like Lycra and clicky shoes, all riding together, helping one another by literally lending a hand by placing their palm on the back of the rider next to them (or on the push-bar of a hand cycle or recumbent). This makes hills easier. Moreover, they could talk about their problems with people who understand.

As I pedaled for hundreds of miles last summer and fall through several East Coast states and Normandy, France, I received a few pushes myself. I returned the favor and began to push others. Somewhere in there, riders began to trust us and tell their stories on camera.

In the film, troops talk about how their post-traumatic stress disorder evolved. Wives share what they thought when their husbands lost their legs. Riders speak about the darker places in their souls. Suicide was a subject that came up.

Then we’d ride some more. Then came laughter.

Besides the obvious benefits of cardio exercise, weight loss and muscle gain, bicycling creates a “runner’s high,” a rush of endorphins and a sense of euphoric bliss. As Tony Dragovich, a doctor at the pain clinic for Fort Bragg, North Carolina, tells me, “You relieve your own pain by doing this. So it becomes a self-fulfilling pain treatment.” The activity can be so powerful, he says, that riders with severe pain have kicked their dependence on prescription pills.

For some riders, there’s a new addiction: speed. After a grueling climb comes the reward of a fast descent in which bicycles can hit speeds of up to 60 mph. My mini bike computer has told me I’ve hit speeds in the high 50s many times and I can only say that it is seriously fun and scary all at once.

There are crashes. I saw one unfold before my eyes. As a small group of riders zoomed down a hill in Pennsylvania as part of a ride to meet up with a larger contingent of riders at ground zero in New York on Sept. 10 last year, three riders tumbled on the road when a stick got caught in someone’s spokes. One rider, Dick Brock, a gray-haired man who just rides because he loves being around veterans, needed a hip replacement.

That event was on my mind as we closed in on mile 911 in the suburbs outside the Pentagon in late September. I was also thinking about Army Sgt. 1st Class Justin Minyard, a 9/11 first responder and rider who came up with the idea of the 911-mile journey to honor the victims of 9/11. He couldn’t make it because of a medical issue and not being there was something he said he’d probably regret for a long time.

When we hit 911, champagne was everywhere, all over everyone. I’ve never poured champagne over anyone for a story. This was not any old story.

Several of the soldiers and Marines I rode with now call Greg and me friends. We made friends. As one sergeant wrote to me, “For a bunch of wounded guys and gals to accept and let you into our circle may not seem like a lot but it is. We are very protective of whom we tell and how we tell it. We created a special bond that I know that I will never forget.”

That’s the kind of solidarity that I want every average American to know is out there for them if they take the time to care. There are a lot of positives to having a military where men and women voluntarily agree to serve, but the system has also led to a divide. Many families seem blissfully unaware of the challenges faced by military families, including their tragic losses.

Whether you were for or against the wars, I’m here to tell you times are changing and war is winding down. The troops are coming home in droves and many have experienced horrific moments. Soldiers and their loved ones often tell me they are somehow different than when they left, changed in a sad sort of way, like the excitement of life is gone and can’t be recaptured. They are seeking their old selves – their true selves. They are looking for the persons they were before they went into combat. I am honored that I was there to catch a glimpse of the spark returning to their eyes.

To see the trailer for the film “Recovering,” click here.

 

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Michael de Yoanna is a journalist and documentary filmmaker who won an Edward R. Murrow award for investigative radio journalism in 2011. You can view his past work at Salon here, visit his personal website here, and follow him on Twitter @mdy1.

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