Supreme Court

Unjust executions

Sentencing errors send inmates who deserve life to their death, even after the mistakes are discovered and ruled unconstitutional.

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Unjust executions

Dobie Gillis Williams was picked up in a police roundup after a woman was stabbed to death in her bathroom in rural Louisiana in 1987. With an IQ of 65, and a lawyer who was subsequently disbarred for incompetence, Williams was tried for murder, convicted and sentenced to death. He twice came within hours of execution, only to have the process stayed, first by the U.S. Supreme Court and a second time by the governor.

A federal judge finally overturned Williams’ sentence, citing two errors: Williams had confessed only after a police officer promised Williams he wouldn’t get the death penalty, and his attorney never offered any evidence of mitigating circumstances during the sentencing phase of his trial — evidence that should have included Williams’ mental deficit and a childhood of abuse and neglect.

But Williams was executed anyway in 1999, when the notoriously pro-death-penalty 5th Circuit Court of Appeals (which serves Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas) overturned the district court judge’s decision, ruling that the revelation of errors came too late under the 1996 Effective Death Penalty Act (EDPA). Williams’ appellate attorney, Nick Trentacosta of the Louisiana Center for Equal Justice, maintains that his client’s execution was in error. The fact that mitigating evidence hadn’t been presented to the jury wasn’t in dispute — just the timing of when that issue had first been raised on appeal.

Williams, whose case might seem unique in its disastrous outcome, was hardly unusual. Nobody has yet come up with an irrefutable example of an innocent person having been executed since states began reinstating the death penalty in 1976, but even death penalty advocates concede that sentencing errors in death penalty cases have led to the execution of many criminals who, by law, should not have received the ultimate sanction.

“There are definitely plenty of sentencing errors where those who die haven’t deserved to die,” says Robert Blecker, a self-described “staunch advocate” of the death penalty who teaches criminal law at New York Law School. Blecker, who believes that errors work both ways — with people who should, in his view, be executed getting off — adds that the main cause of wrongful executions is inadequate counsel and the failure to present mitigating evidence to the jury.

And, he says, such sentencing errors “tend to happen most often in cases where those who die don’t really deserve to die.” In the most heinous murders, he claims, sentencing errors are rare.

Appellate courts have found sentencing errors in more than 40 percent of all capital cases since 1973 — when the Supreme Court ruled the existing death penalty statutes unconstitutional — but there are no figures to indicate how many inmates were executed or remain on death row due to sentencing errors. Steven Hawkins, a staff attorney with the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, estimates that “at least 40 to 80″ of the 800 people executed since 1977 “were probably victims of obvious error, such as failure to have mitigating circumstances raised at trial.” An equal number, he adds, were “simply victims of the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to make various death penalty rulings retroactive” for all condemned inmates.

That last condition — essentially, the stubborn upholding of fatal errors by the courts — is remarkable, given the stakes. The decision to apply rulings exclusively to future cases, largely to avoid disrupting legal precedents, is typical of the U.S. Supreme Court. Most often, it is barely noted. But in death penalty cases the procedure has enormous impact. When a sentencing error has been exposed, often as an unconstitutional element of existing law, but not applied retroactively, it means that those on death row as a result of the same unconstitutional law will not be spared — unless their case was specifically part of the appeal that brought the ruling.

Just last year, for instance, the Supreme Court ruled it was unconstitutional for death penalties to be determined by trial judges. Rather, the court held, that decision belongs to juries alone. Yet a number of condemned men — in states such as Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Montana and Nebraska — have subsequently been executed after being sentenced to death by judges — sometimes, as in the case of Alabama, Delaware, Florida and Indiana, by judges who actually overruled juries that had recommended a lesser sentence. More prisoners, with older cases, are still being sent to their unconstitutional death. In fact, this is true for many, if not most, of the Supreme Court’s more far-reaching death penalty decisions.

The same holds for lower court decisions. In December 2001, a federal District Court in Pennsylvania overturned the death sentence of death-row prisoner Mumia Abu-Jamal, on the grounds that his jury in 1982 had been provided with a sentencing form so confusing that it appeared to require all 12 jurors to agree to a mitigating circumstance before any one of them could consider it in deciding whether Abu-Jamal deserved the death penalty or life without parole.

Abu-Jamal, a journalist and former Black Panther convicted of killing a white policeman, came within days of being executed back in 1995 because of this error, but he was spared when his appeal hearing ran past the execution date, voiding it. In fact, Pennsylvania, like most other states with death penalty statutes, says that if any juror finds a mitigating circumstance, that juror may consider that factor in deciding between life or death. (Since a death sentence must be decided unanimously by a jury, just one juror voting against death results in a life sentence instead of execution.) Yet despite the reality that many of the 244 other people on Pennsylvania’s death row were sentenced by juries using the same confusing form, no blanket order revoking those sentences was issued following the ruling in Abu-Jamal’s case.

Jim Liebman, a professor of law at Columbia University, is the lead author of two recent studies of death penalty errors, which surveyed virtually all the death penalty cases in the country since the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment in the mid-1970s. He points out that the highest rates of sentencing error are consistently found in states such as Arizona, Nevada or Pennsylvania, all of which have very “broad” death penalty statutes — that is, statutes that allow for capital punishment for a wide variety of crimes — while a state like Colorado, which has a very narrowly applied death penalty, has far fewer errors.

In reviewing all 5,760 death sentences issued between 1973 and 1995, Liebman says he found that 41 percent — about 2,360 cases — had been tossed out on appeal because of “sentencing errors.” Among those, more than 300 were overturned on initial appeal by a state court on the grounds that the so-called aggravating circumstance (a finding required for imposition of the death penalty) in fact did not exist. A third were overturned at the post-conviction phase or by a habeas appeal on grounds of “ineffective counsel” (most often for failure to introduce mitigating evidence at a sentencing hearing). Another 19 percent were overturned because of the suppression of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors.

Subsequent to their sentences or convictions being overturned, 82 percent of capital defendants have received lesser sentences — a figure that leads Liebman to conclude that “they were oversentenced in the first place.” Liebman notes that sentencing errors are also likely to be common among the 59 percent of capital cases in which the convictions were not reversed on appeal.

While public debate and media attention about the death penalty have focused on wrongful convictions, “sentencing errors go to the heart of the problem with the death penalty,” Liebman argues. “The idea of the death penalty is that it is supposed to be applied to the worst of the worst offenders, but this is not what is happening.” He adds that “hundreds of cases of sentencing error” have gone uncorrected, including many that have already led to executions. Agreeing with Blecker, he adds, “The marginal cases are where most of the errors turn up.”

Advocates of capital punishment, for the most part, express little concern about sentencing errors. “Just about anyone would agree that the execution, or for that matter just the incarceration of an innocent person, is of far greater concern than the execution of a person who is actually guilty of premeditated murder,” says Kent Scheiddegger, of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, a pro-capital-punishment organization based in California. “I don’t think that the execution of a person who has committed premeditated murder is an injustice. The worst it can be is an uneven dispension of mercy.”

Others see the matter differently. “Even if it is someone who is a killer, we’re still talking life and death,” Liebman says. “I don’t think we can be so callous as to say, ‘They’re killers, so who cares if they live or die’ — especially since you see people with resources getting their sentences overturned and others without resources going on to execution.”

Besides, not everyone sent to death row is guilty of premeditated murder. Take Phillip Tompkins, a borderline mentally retarded black man convicted of killing a woman in Texas after deliberately colliding with her car and then taking her to a secluded spot to rob her. According to prosecutors, Tompkins tied the woman, Mary Berry, to a tree, stuffed part of a bedsheet in her mouth, and then left to use her ATM card and steal $1,000. An all-white jury found that Tompkins had murdered her, but it was never clear whether he had intended to do so, particularly given his low IQ.

Manny Babbitt suffered the same fate. A decorated Vietnam War veteran (he was awarded his Purple Heart on San Quentin’s death row only weeks before his death), Babbitt was executed in May 1999 for the death of Leah Schendel, a 78-year-old woman who died of a heart attack in 1980 during Babbitt’s attempt to burglarize her home. No claim of premeditated murder was made by the state. Rather, it became a death penalty case because of a California law making death caused in the process of a burglary a capital offense.

Babbitt’s state-appointed trial attorney — who was later disbarred for financial improprieties — failed to introduce mitigating evidence of his client’s prior confinement in a mental hospital, or of his obvious symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder from his Vietnam experience — Babbitt had been observed reenacting battle scenes as a homeless person in Providence, R.I., prior to the burglary.

Two jurors in the Babbitt case subsequently testified that had they known of his wartime experiences and mental history, they would not have voted for death. His subsequent execution, which followed a rejection by Gov. Gray Davis of his clemency appeal (which had been endorsed by hundreds of Vietnam vets), also illustrates how capital-sentencing error, like murder itself, casts a wide net of suffering.

“When my Manny was sentenced to death, at first I thought of killing myself,” recalls his older brother Bill, 60, who personally turned in his brother after word of Schendel’s death, on a promise by the police that his brother would not receive a death sentence. “I turned Manny in because I felt sympathy for that family, and I felt very guilty about it when they went ahead and sought the death penalty.”

Bill Babbitt, now active with the group Murder Family Victims for Reconciliation, says that his brother’s 17 years on death row, and his ultimate execution, were “devastating” to his family, which included himself, a mother, two children and several grandchildren. While saying he feels great sympathy for the victim’s family, he asks, “What kind of closure did they have? They could have had closure in 1982 if Manny had been sentenced to life in prison. The prosecutors told them that when Manny was dead, they’d feel better. Instead, the state kept that wound open almost 20 years. That’s closure?”

Bill Babbitt watched, along with several of Schendel’s relatives, as his brother was killed by injection. “Her granddaughter couldn’t watch,” he recalls. “She looked at the floor. So did the prosecutor. But I watched the whole thing. My brother had told us he was not afraid to die, and that we should not show any malice toward the victim’s family. He said he would keep his eyes closed and meditate on God and Jesus, but that he wanted a smiling face watching him. So I told him I’d be there.”

Liebman says that since sentencing errors are so often the result of incompetent or inadequate defense attorneys, they are often red flags for probable errors in the guilt phase of the trial — suggesting that some of those with sentencing errors may well have been wrongfully convicted too. “It’s just that sentencing errors are much easier to prove,” he explains.

That is because while guilt must be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the standards for justifying the death penalty are much lower. “In the conviction phase of a capital trial, the whole burden of proving guilt is on the prosecution, so you pretty much have to prove the errors occurred there, which is harder to do,” says Liebman. “In the sentencing phase, part of the burden is on the defense — to bring in mitigating evidence to convince a jury that death is not appropriate. If an attorney doesn’t do that, it’s easy to point it out on appeal.”

That doesn’t mean an appeals court will go along with a claim of ineffective counsel, however. Even in cases where defense attorneys slept through trials or attended while stone drunk, higher courts have upheld the subsequent convictions and death sentences of their hapless clients. But at least it is relatively easier to present evidence that no mitigating evidence was submitted than to prove that a conviction was incorrect.

Liebman adds it is also politically easier for judges in capital cases to overturn a sentence that leaves a convict behind bars for life than to overturn a conviction, which raises the possibility that the individual might end up back on the street. At the same time, he says it is clear that, since the reinstatement of the death penalty in the United States nearly three decades ago, hundreds of capital prisoners have already been executed whose sentences were in error.

That certainly was the case with Robert Coe, the only prisoner to be executed in Tennessee since the reinstatement of the death penalty in that state. Coe, executed in 2000, was a severely mentally ill individual with a grotesque history of abuse as a child — his father raped his sister in front of him and had punished him for a childhood transgression by deliberately shooting him in the leg.

While there were serious questions about whether Coe was even guilty of raping and killing a young girl — the police found bloody sheets in the room of a prosecution witness whom the defense argued might have been the real killer, but they “lost” the evidence before testing the blood — what is beyond debate is that Coe’s public defender, like Dobie Gillis Williams’ attorney, never introduced any mitigating evidence during his sentencing hearing. The jury never heard that he had been institutionalized in Florida for severe schizophrenia, nor did jurors hear anything about Coe’s history of child abuse at the hands of his father — evidence that ought to have mitigated against a death sentence.

Attorneys brought into the case late in Coe’s appeal to the federal courts tried to introduce the mitigating evidence, but the federal courts, bound by the strictures of the Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, held that it was “too late” for such evidence to be considered. They ruled that Coe’s original trial attorney and his first appellate attorneys had erred in not introducing that evidence at the state court level, and that it was thus “procedurally barred.” (In an all too common Catch-22, the court also held that the seemingly outrageous error of not introducing readily available mitigating evidence was not sufficient evidence of ineffective counsel.)

As in Williams’ case, a federal district judge did temporarily lift Coe’s death sentence on the grounds of an erroneous jury instruction, but a three-judge panel of judges in the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals overturned that ruling on a 2-1 vote, and Coe was executed.

“The state of Tennessee decided to execute a mentally ill person. They knew he was mentally ill and that he had been an abused child, but they decided to go forward with Tennessee’s first execution in 40 years,” says the Rev. Joe Ingall, who came to know Coe during his years of incarceration on death row. “This case was all about the politics of death, not about justice. They needed to kill somebody, so they killed Robert.”

After years of clamping down on death row inmates’ right of appeal, the Supreme Court seems to have lightened up in recent months, making capital-punishment cases a little harder to win and a little easier to challenge. Besides its ruling that juries alone can vote for a death sentence, the court more recently lowered the standard of proof for death row inmates seeking to claim that their jury panels were unconstitutionally purged of minority jurors. The court also criticized the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals and lower federal courts in the district for accepting without question the rulings and procedures of state courts in death penalty cases, suggesting that “technicalities,” which can be life-or-death matters in capital cases such as Coe’s and Williams’, while an important aspect of American jurisprudence, are not clear-cut matters of fact.

Finally, the court ruled that retarded people should not be executed, though it left unresolved how lower courts should determine what constitutes retardation.

But capital-punishment critics like Liebman, and even death penalty advocates like Blecker, argue that the problem of errors, in both the guilt and sentencing phases of capital cases, will continue to plague the system, at huge cost — both psychological and financial — to society and to inmates, and to the families of victims and inmates.

“Everybody loses,” says David Elliott, a spokesman for the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty. “Remember that people on death row have relatives, and those relatives are losing a loved one. And the victim’s relatives have to live through years of trials and hearings. And then there’s the prisoner,” he adds. “If he’s executed because of a sentencing error, that’s terrible, but even if the error is eventually corrected, he has lived under the threat of death for years. We have seen these people, and afterwards many of them have something resembling post-traumatic stress disorder. They can’t adjust to the reality that they aren’t going to die.”

Both Liebman and Blecker suggest that the quickest way to reduce these errors would be to ensure that all capital murder defendants are provided the resources to put on an adequate defense, and for legislatures and prosecutors to narrow the range of crimes that allow for a death penalty.

But mandating adequate defense counsel in capital cases is costly, and in most states, the burden of financing first-class defense counsel and appellate counsel for capital cases would fall on already strapped local governments. Raising taxes is always a hard sell. Raising them in order to help capital defendants beat the rap, or to help convicted killers contest their convictions or their sentences is an even harder sell. Yet critics of the system say something has to be done.

“When you have a death penalty system, and you start diluting it by executing people who don’t deserve to die while not executing others who do, it means the system is breaking down,” says Liebman. “What’s needed is more honesty about what’s happening. We have to have a commitment to get rid of all the error.”

This story has been corrected since it was originally published.

John Roberts’ Gilded Age SCOTUS

Jeffrey Toobin shows how the Citizens United ruling challenged a century of efforts to rein in corporate power

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John Roberts' Gilded Age SCOTUSJohn Roberts (Credit: AP/Pablo Martinez Monsivais)

The most important revelation in Jeffrey Toobin’s 10,000-word New Yorker piece on Chief Justice John Roberts’ takedown of campaign finance laws in the Citizens United case is the extent to which modern conservatism is trying to restore the Gilded Age. That was a time when corporations had more rights than individuals, when a conservative Supreme Court did its best to protect those corporate rights, and wealth and corruption ran unchecked. Of course, we live in a neo-Gilded Age, when income inequality is more pronounced than at any time since the Great Depression, and the Roberts court’s decisions in the Citizens United case helps bring us all the way back to those bad old days.

Much is being made of Toobin’s revelations about the dramatic internal political divisions and infighting within the court triggered by the CU decision (more on that later). But what I think is most politically significant in Toobin’s piece is that it shows the dramatic rightward – and backward — march of Republicanism over the last 30 years. In January 1982, Ronald Reagan famously wrote in his diary, “The press is trying to paint me as trying to undo the New Deal … I’m trying to undo the Great Society.” Reagan was anxious to unravel the anti-poverty programs Lyndon Johnson pushed into place (though not Medicare), but he collaborated with House Speaker Tip O’Neill to pass payroll tax increases to stabilize Social Security for the next 50 to 60 years.

Today’s Tea Party, of course, is going after what’s left of the Great Society and the New Deal too, trying to privatize Medicare and Social Security and undo the labor protections passed by Congress and many states in the wake of the Great Depression. But the Roberts court wants to go back even further, to the Progressive Era, when some politicians in both parties recognized that the omnipotence of Gilded Age robber barons had to be curbed – and that campaign finance regulation was a good place to start.

Back then a conservative Supreme Court majority also disagreed with that Progressive reform push. In an 1886 tax case it first held that the 14th Amendment’s equal protection laws applied to corporations. In its 1905 Lochner ruling, striking down a New York law limiting bakery workers to a six-day 60-hour week, it declared such regulations a breach of contract rights, an “unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family.” As Toobin observes, “In simple terms, the majority in Lochner turned the Fourteenth Amendment, which was enacted to protect the rights of newly freed slaves, into a mechanism to advance the interest of business owners.”

Progressive era reform also included campaign finance regulation, starting with the 1907 Tillman Act, which prevented corporations from directly contributing to campaigns. The Court let the act stand, but over the years a series of rulings by conservative majorities have managed to establish that money is “speech,” and though contributions could be regulated, expenditures – speech – could not.

Toobin shows decisively that the court could have kept its decision on Citizens United quite narrow. Attorney Theodore Olson wasn’t seeking to strike down McCain-Feingold, but to clarify that it applied to television commercials, not to 90-minute political “documentaries” such as “Hillary: The Movie” (a shriekingly negative “documentary” on the woman who was expected to be the 2008 Democratic presidential nominee). But in oral arguments the conservative justices sought to broaden their purview, and Roberts helped them along. “As the Chief Justice chose how broadly to change the law in this area, the real question for him, it seems, was how much he wanted to help the Republican Party,” Toobin writes. “Roberts’s choice was: a lot.”

After taking a shot at drafting the CU ruling himself, he later assigned it to “swing vote” Anthony Kennedy, whose views on campaign finance regulation reliably put him with the conservative majority. Assigned to write the dissent, outgoing Justice David Souter accused Roberts “of violating the Court’s own procedures to engineer the result he wanted,” Toobin says. That’s when Roberts took the extraordinary step of asking that CU be re-argued – though with five justices already committed to a sweeping attack on McCain-Feingold, the outcome of those re-arguments were never really in doubt.

And indeed, Kennedy again wound up writing the majority opinion, which found that “The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations” since 1886, and that in McCain-Feingold “the Government has muffled the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy.” It’s unclear from the context whether Kennedy is saying what he seems to be – that corporations “best represent the most significant segments of the economy.”

Justice John Paul Stevens, a moderate Republican once on the court’s more conservative end, wrote in his dissenting opinion, “Five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.” Stevens’s dissent continued for a record 90 pages.

At bottom, the Court’s opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining self-government since the founding, and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange time to repudiate that common sense. While American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics.

Toobin’s conclusion is no less scathing: “The Roberts Court, it appears, will guarantee moneyed interests the freedom to raise and spend any amount, from any source, at any time, in order to win elections.”

It’s worth noting that the most spirited opposition to Citizens United is coming from Montana, where the ties between Gilded Age corporate abuse and campaign finance regulation are perhaps the most explicit. Copper mining interests essentially owned the state in the late 19th and early 20th century, but Montana Progressives pushed a tough campaign finance law as a way of clawing back control of their state from the “copper kings,” who Mark Twain wrote “bought judges and legislatures as other men buy food and raiment.” Montana’s state Supreme Court upheld that 1912 “Corrupt Practices Act” in January, putting the state on a collision course with SCOTUS. Gov. Brian Schweitzer has been one of the most articulate voices against Citizens United, and supports a state ballot initiative that would ban corporate money in politics and make it state policy that corporations are not people.

“Montana’s going first, but we have before,” Schweitzer told the Huffington Post earlier this month. “It was Montana in 1912 that banned corporate money from our elections. We don’t mind leading and we believe it has to start somewhere. This business of allowing corporations to bribe their way into government has got to stop.”

But in a world where the Citizens United decision is precedent, it’s hard to imagine that ballot measure surviving a legal challenge. Toobin’s piece makes clear the stakes in the 2012 presidential race as vividly as anything else does: American democracy can’t survive the appointment of more justices like Roberts, Sam Alito and Antonin Scalia, who mainly serve the interests of corporate America. Mitt “Corporations are people, too, my friend” Romney can be expected to give them company in the years to come if he wins the White House.

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Joan Walsh

Joan Walsh is Salon's editor at large.

Obama destroys Constitution with mild Supreme Court criticism

Conservatives and moderates declare SCOTUS-bashing to be "intimidation"

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Obama destroys Constitution with mild Supreme Court criticism (Credit: AP)

Ruth Marcus is unsettled. Maybe even queasy. There is probably some light nausea. What has her worried for the future of the nation, today? President Obama’s shameful, horrific, vicious attacks on those nice people in the Supreme Court.

Obama said that the court overturning Congress’ healthcare reform law would be a textbook example of “judicial activism” as “conservative commentators” define it: “that an unelected group of people would somehow overturn a duly constituted and passed law.” And hey, that seems like an eminently defensible and not particularly unsettling point! Conservatives made “judicial activism” into a talking point and rallying cry and defined it vaguely enough to encompass judges striking down basically any law or statute.

Marcus, though, is stopped cold.

And yet, Obama’s assault on “an unelected group of people” stopped me cold. Because, as the former constitutional law professor certainly understands, it is the essence of our governmental system to vest in the court the ultimate power to decide the meaning of the constitution. Even if, as the president said, it means overturning “a duly constituted and passed law.”

Judicial review, as a former constitutional law professor certainly understands, is not in the Constitution — an unelected activist judge made it up! — and the founders themselves disagreed on the wisdom of the principle. (They tended, in fact, to decide whether or not they liked judicial review based on whether or not the judges ruled in a way that they approved of.) The history of the Supreme Court is replete with nakedly political and mostly conservative rulings until very recently, when we had a brief period of liberal-leaning rulings from a marginally more diverse group followed by a return to status quo conservatism.

As long as the Supreme Court has been making awful and indefensible rulings based on ideology or racism, presidents and politicians have been criticizing the court. Abraham Lincoln attacked the Supreme Court in his first inaugural address, in a passage that conservatives love to quote when they’re attacking “activist judges.”

At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal.

I am stopped cold and unsettled!

Marcus, hilariously enough, supports the healthcare law and the mandate — she is the world’s most sensitive milquetoast moderate liberal newspaper columnist, after all — which theoretically means she thinks it’s constitutional, which would mean that declaring it unconstitutional should maybe upset her more than criticizing the court for being political, but on the other hand those judges seem very smart and our entire system of government could collapse if we aren’t all super polite to one another and constantly deferential to authority.

I would lament a ruling striking down the individual mandate, but I would not denounce it as conservative justices run amok. Listening to the arguments and reading the transcript, the justices struck me as a group wrestling with a legitimate, even difficult, constitutional question. For the president to imply that the only explanation for a constitutional conclusion contrary to his own would be out-of-control conservative justices does the court a disservice.

Yes, I could tell they were very seriously wrestling with a difficult constitutional question when Scalia began joking around about broccoli mandates and the legendary “Cornhusker Kickback.”

I’m not sure what more the Supreme Court could do before moderates like Ruth Marcus finally acknowledged that it’s a partisan body with a right-wing majority. If Bush v. Gore didn’t do it, maybe nothing could. But as a partisan body it is open to partisan attacks, and our fragile democracy will not descend into anarchy if people think as poorly of the Court as they currently do of Congress.

Of course, the Republican talking point is that the president is attempting to bully the Court into ruling the way he wants. (Because if they strike down the law, he’ll … yell at them during the State of the Union again? No one seriously predicts an arrest warrant for Chief Justice Roberts here.) Mitch McConnell: “This president’s attempt to intimidate the Supreme Court falls well beyond distasteful politics; it demonstrates a fundamental lack of respect for our system of checks and balances.” Lamar Smith: “What is unprecedented is for the president of the United States trying to intimidate the Supreme Court.” Mike Johanns: “”What President Obama is doing here isn’t right. It is threatening, it is intimidating.” (Did you notice how everyone used the word “intimidate”? That’s because they got their language from a memo.)

The only time, besides Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, that any president has seriously threatened the independence of the Supreme Court was when Franklin Roosevelt tried to amend the law to give the president the power to appoint more justices. And Roosevelt, frankly, was right on the merits of his proposal. The court is completely unaccountable and ridiculously powerful, it always has been, and pointing that out does not a constitutional crisis provoke.

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Alex Pareene

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

Justices run amok: Fixing the Supreme Court

Judges on the right and left legislate from the bench. So why don't we just elect them?

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Justices run amok: Fixing the Supreme CourtAntonin Scalia, John Roberts and Clarence Thomas

On Monday, we had another example of the Supreme Court’s ideological division: a 5-4 ruling, along partisan lines, giving police the right to conduct strip searches for any offense. This came on the heels of last week’s oral arguments before the Supreme Court about the constitutionality of the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act, which led many observers to predict that the nation’s highest judicial body will strike down part or all of the controversial healthcare reform package. But the hearings were instructive in other ways. They showed once again that political partisanship is closely correlated to a justice’s view of the law. And they proved that the Supreme Court once again is functioning, not as a court, but as a third house of the federal legislature.

The U.S. Constitution, like many state constitutions, really is two constitutions in one. There is the black-letter constitution, which consists of rules about which there is little or no dispute. Most of these have to do with qualifications for representatives, like Article I, Section 3, Clause 1, as amended: “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.” Not a whole lot of room for interpretation there.

The other constitution, embedded in the same document, is the Blank Constitution. It is not so much a limit on power as an assignment of the power to fill in blanks left in the text, like the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.” The need to fill in the blank is admitted even by champions of the “original intent theory,” who must dig up historical evidence of what the drafters and ratifiers might have thought was cruel and unusual punishment at the time of the Constitution’s adoption. The answer is not contained in the text.

Even the basic definitions of powers assigned to different branches of government are blanks that must be filled in. The basic issue in the case of the Affordable Care Act is whether Congress had the power to compel individuals to purchase private health insurance, under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution gives Congress the power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 gives Congress the power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”

Is the power to prescribe an individual health insurance purchase mandate included in these powers granted by the Constitution to Congress? The Constitution does not specifically say. If the Constitution were easy to amend, like some state constitutions, then it could be more specific — at the cost of having hundreds of amendments, like an imaginary Amendment Number 873: “Congress shall have power to impose an individual mandate to purchase health insurance.” But the federal constitution, for better or worse, was designed to be difficult to amend.

There is therefore no escaping acts of interpretation that are really acts of legislation: filling in the blanks in the text of the Constitution. The only real question, therefore, is how much latitude the federal judiciary should give Congress when Congress fills in the blanks by passing laws.

The Whig Party between the 1830s and the 1860s thought that the federal judiciary should defer to Congress. The Whigs favored a strong, competent federal government and opposed restrictions on federal power in the name of the states. Opposed to the administration of Andrew Jackson, the Whig Party also wanted the powers of the presidency strictly limited. In the Whig view, the federal judiciary should defend congressional power against encroachments by the states and the executive branch, while deferring to the decisions of Congress on matters of federal legislation.

The Whig theory of the Constitution strikes me as a pretty good one. But it rules out judicial activism, which has been embraced at different times by different factions in American politics. Between the Civil War and the New Deal, a pro-business federal judiciary persecuted unions and struck down federal, state and local restraints on corporations. In the civil rights era, liberal federal judges went beyond striking down racist laws to discovering a “right to privacy” in the Constitution that has been used to eliminate or restrict laws against abortion and homosexuality. Whatever you think about the outcomes of these cases, it is clear that the courts in all of them were just making things up.

In the case of the “right to privacy” they weren’t even filling in a blank in the Constitution, because the term does not exist in the text. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the 1965 case on which all subsequent federal law involving sex and reproductive rights including Roe v. Wade has been built, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that while the Constitution said nothing about contraceptives the “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.” The right to privacy is a penumbra from an emanation — in other words, it is whatever a majority of the Supreme Court says it is at any given moment.

Liberals applaud the federal judiciary when it pretends to find constitutional restrictions on the ability of states to ban abortion or gay sex, and conservatives and libertarians applaud the federal judiciary when it pretends to find constitutional restrictions on the ability of Congress to regulate the national economy. The left and the right endorse judicial activism when it works in their favor and denounce it when it produces what they think are the wrong results.

For my part, I think the Whigs with their theory of judicial deference to Congress got it right. The states have usually been a greater threat to personal liberty and economic growth than the federal government. Yes, the federal government interned Japanese-Americans during World War II and has abused civil liberties in other ways, and before the Civil War some Northern states were more protective of freedom than the slaveholder-dominated federal government. But throughout American history national majorities, acting through the federal government, have more often checked the illiberalism of local majorities.

Economic policy, too, is best carried out at the federal level in a nation with a continental market. The Balkanization of the U.S. economy into 50 separate state economies by state regulations — even good regulations — is something that should be avoided. And as corrupt and partisan as it is, Congress is better equipped to make public policy than judges.

But wouldn’t judicial deference toward Congress and a broad interpretation of congressional power run the risk of majoritarian tyranny over minorities at the national level? The historical record suggests otherwise. The Supreme Court has almost never been ahead of the political branches when it comes to minority rights or individual freedom. The Court intervened in Brown v. Board only when the civil rights revolution was well underway in the streets and in legislatures, and it intervened in Roe v. Wade and recent gay rights cases only when waves of reform were making progress in federal, state and local legislatures. The federal judiciary has often run out with its surfboard to ride a wave of liberation, but it has never caused the wave. Indeed, in the last half-century the same reforms — anti-racism, the liberalization of abortion laws and the rise of gay rights — have taken place at roughly the same time in all advanced industrial democracies, including Britain, which has no written constitution at all.

When they try to fill in the blanks in the Constitution themselves, instead of letting Congress do the job, federal judges cease to be judges and start acting as legislators — incompetent legislators, like the Supreme Court justices who wrestled with issues like adverse selection in insurance policies in last week’s hearings. A number of state constitutions provide for the direct election of state Supreme Court justices by the people. Perhaps the federal Constitution should be amended along similar lines. Why not? If our laws are to be made by a tricameral federal legislature with three branches of the legislature — the House, the Senate and the Supreme Court — we the people might as well be empowered to elect the lawmakers in all three.

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Michael Lind’s new book, "Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States", will be published in April and can be pre-ordered at Amazon.com.

Why I need Obamacare

I'm sick, and I will be for the rest of my life. Knowing I won't be denied the insurance I need matters

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Why I need ObamacareSupporters of health care reform stand in front of the Supreme Court in Washington, Wednesday, March 28, 2012, on the final day of arguments regarding the health care law signed by President Barack Obama. (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)(Credit: AP)
This originally appeared on Cedar Burnett's Open Salon blog. It was written in a response to a call for essays about people's personal experiences with the Affordable Care Act. Have an Obamacare story of your own? Blog about it on Open Salon.

Dear healthy people,

It’s great that you’re deriving intellectual pleasure from debating Obamacare. I love that this theoretical dance you’re engaged in has no repercussions to you, a healthy individual. I would love to join you some evening for a spirited discussion on the pros and cons of healthcare reform. Maybe over a glass of wine? Heck — over two or three glasses of wine. I’d love to lean forward, my arched brows furrowed, my full lips purple with the stain of a good Zinfandel, and throw out statistics and well-crafted one-liners about the plight of the uninsured, the underinsured, the sick. Those poor, poor sick.

But I can’t.

I can’t because it isn’t theoretical. I am sick. I’m so sick I can’t drink. I can’t drink and I can’t eat half the things a normal person eats and when I hear the word “Obamacare” hissed in snide derision I want to put a golf club through the windshield of the nearest Mercedes-Benz.

I’m 33 years old. I was diagnosed with an autoimmune disease called ulcerative colitis when I was 26.

Ulcerative colitis isn’t a disease people like to discuss. Most of what we experience is so embarrassing that many of us don’t tell people what we’re going through. We might tell you we’re “sick,” or “under the weather,” but we won’t tell you how bad it is. We won’t tell you we’ve had constant diarrhea for days, weeks, months on end, that we’ve been throwing up stomach acid, that we can’t eat anything but bagels, and that our joints ache so badly it’s hard to sleep. We won’t tell you how we’re wearing adult diapers under our clothes. We won’t tell you that getting in the car and driving three blocks away is the only activity we can do in an entire day.

But you know what we will tell you? We have to have insurance. We need healthcare and support because ulcerative colitis is a lifetime sentence. You know what else it is? A preexisting condition. Since receiving my diagnosis I have lived in fear of losing my insurance because if I let my insurance lapse, and Obamacare fails, I won’t be able to get it again. Ulcerative colitis and her sister, Crohn’s disease, are up there in the echelons of Scary Diseases Insurance Doesn’t Like to Cover.

I get it, I do. Some of our drugs cost a ton. It’s likely we’ll be hospitalized here and there. And many of us can look forward to bowel resection surgery or colon cancer. We’re expensive and we stay expensive for our entire lives. That’s the sticking point with chronic illness like Crohn’s and colitis: We’re sick but we just keep on living. We just don’t die fast enough.

If the health mandate stays, then the preexisting condition clause goes away. Insurance companies have to take everyone — even me. Lose the mandate and I’m right back to worrying about my care.

In truth, I think Obamacare doesn’t go far enough. My family is still coughing up $900 a month to insure the three of us, since my husband and I are self-employed. That’s pretty unsustainable. But at least the current plan includes a provision that insurance companies have to take me. I may have to pay ridiculous sums to keep my insurance, but I’m not going to live in fear of being dropped.

The last thing a sick person should have to worry about is how to pay for their care. The last thing the parent of a sick child or the child of a sick parent should have to worry about is how to pay for care. People should not have to choose between food and medicine, losing their house or losing their loved one. Let’s hold onto Obamacare as a stopgap, but let’s also work toward the goal of universal coverage.

For those of you who think of the healthcare reform debate in theoretical terms, I warn you: Your day is coming. Sure, you and your family are healthy now, but you might not be tomorrow. Sickness can come out of nowhere and knock your world upside down.

You’d better hope you have decent coverage. You’d better hope you’ve won the genetic lottery and you’ll never find yourself sitting in a flimsy hospital gown on a sheet of wax paper, staring down at your unshaven legs while a doctor tells you you have a golf ball-size tumor in your head or ulcers lining your intestines. You’d better hope Obamacare covers your theoretical ass.

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Cedar Burnett is a freelance writer and toddler wrangler living in Seattle. She is currently working on a book about living with ulcerative colitis.

The conservative grip on power

A ruthless GOP power grab, centered around the Supreme Court, has cemented conservative control in Washington

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The conservative grip on powerClarence Thomas, George W. Bush and Antonin Scalia (Credit: AP)

Writing in Salon, Natasha Lennard proposes that with the warm weather we can again expect the Occupy movement to shoot up. Arab Spring, American Spring. She’s right about one thing: Like in the decades before the Arab Spring, it has been a long, cold, American winter. In the 30 years since coming to power here, Republicans have used their initial ascent to power to seal themselves into office as tightly as the pharaohs. Smart commentators have noted how lawless the conservatives are in making substantive decisions, but that’s not the worst of it. The worst of it is how they use their tenure to make it increasingly impossible to oust them.

With this week’s Supreme Court hearings — which will end, liberals worry, with the justices overturning healthcare reform — we are nearing the apotheosis of conservative power. Let us recount how we got here: In 2000, a mob of conservative thugs stopped the vote recount in Florida. And that was before the court got involved, the five conservative justices seizing the election and handing the White House to George W. Bush. Secure in the tenure of their undemocratically selected president, the two older conservative justices, William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor, retired from the bench. Bush replaced them with two young conservatives, destined, by constitutional design and the miracles of modern medicine, to dominate the court into the foreseeable future. At the Supreme Court, it’s always winter (and never Christmas).

The stunningly inept performance by the Bush administration unforeseeably produced the first Democratic federal government since 1994. Immediately thereafter, the conservative Supreme Court majority ruled that the GOP’s wealthy sponsors could spend an unlimited amount of the money putting conservatives in office. Now, the conservative majority on the Supreme Court, appointed, in part, by the conservative president they put in the White House, is preparing to wipe from the statute books the only piece of meaningful progressive legislation in the last half century, passed during the brief Indian summer of a two-year Democratic majority.

And it’s not just the federal government. In 2010, fueled, in part, by the money the conservative justices unleashed, the conservatives took over state legislatures across the country. In power, they enacted a series of measures that should make Hosni Mubarak blush. They redrew the legislative maps to guarantee that they would hold a majority of the legislatures, state and federal, regardless of whether they failed to gain a majority of actual votes. (The design of the Senate, favoring sparsely populated rural states, already way overrepresents the Republicans.) Using a panoply of legislative strategies, they made it infinitely harder for the Democrats to register their supporters and for the Democratic voters, even if registered, to vote. Voters must be reported within 24 hours of being registered or penalties will be levied on the laggard registrars. Would-be voters must produce a fistful of identity documents, notoriously more common among old white (Republican) voters than the youthful and nonwhite Americans likely to support the Democrats. If they run the registration gauntlet, they must again verify their identity on Election Day, with the same culturally skewed set of papers. In the swing state of Florida, the New York Times reports, the activists have given up registering new voters: Too perilous.

True, the Democrats have not been models of political virtue. Cowardly when confronted by their powerful adversaries, confused about the moral grounding of their political vision, faithless to their allies, racketing from one trendy policy initiative to another, without anything resembling long-term planning — with enemies like the Democrats, who needs friends? But blaming the victim is way too easy. Democrats made the mistake of behaving as if the American rules of representative government still applied. Confronted with the lawless conservative Republicans, their fate was sealed.

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Linda Hirshman is the author of “Victory: The Triumphant Gay Revolution,” forthcoming in June 2012. Follow her on Twitter @LindaHirshman1

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