Terrorism

At the breaking point

The Bush administration's unrealistic war planning has increased the dangers facing the men and women on the ground in Iraq.

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At the breaking point

The U.S. Army faces a gathering threat that is more dangerous to its long-run capability than Saddam Hussein ever was. That danger, according to military strategists, lies in a foreign and military policy that is stretching the force to the breaking point, leaving it unable to execute its mission. The latest assaults on U.S. forces in Fallujah and Najaf starkly illustrate the problems facing U.S. troops, who are still trying to maintain control over Iraq almost a year after President Bush declared major combat operations over. Military commanders on the ground in Iraq describe the situation they face as all bad choices.

Throughout his presidential campaign, candidate George W. Bush beat the drum against the Clinton administration for misusing and abusing the armed forces. “This administration wants things both ways: to command great forces, without supporting them, [and] to launch today’s new causes with little thought of tomorrow’s consequences,” he declared in his first major national security speech, at the Citadel military academy in September 1999.

Bush was taking a swipe (without being specific) at Clinton administration forays into nation building and peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo. In both cases, the United States organized large international coalitions of its allies, went in with overwhelming power, lost not a single U.S. serviceman or -woman and maintained big forces on the ground to prevent conflict and begin reconstruction. But, in retrospect, Bush’s complaint seems to have more to do with scale than mission: The Clintonites were pikers compared with the Bushies when it comes to stretching the military.

Under the rubric of the war on terrorism, the U.S. armed forces are now conducting operations in more countries around the world than at any time since World War II, though in sheer numbers the current force of 10 active divisions is dwarfed by the 90 divisions of the earlier force. The Bush administration’s policies have created unsustainable and dangerous conditions in the U.S. Army, according to military experts, retired officers and a growing number of elected officials from both parties. The administration’s insistence on doing more with less has left the military unable to secure Iraq, triggering a ripple effect that threatens the morale of active and reserve members of the Army, retention, training schedules and, not incidentally, American lives. While some of the underlying issues predate this administration, they have been exacerbated by the decision to wage a war of choice in Iraq and critically bad judgments on how that war’s aftermath would play out.

“What we’re seeing is a repeat of the McNamara era,” warned Paul Van Riper, a retired three-star Marine general who was in the corps long enough to remember that time. “We’re seeing a leadership that is arrogant, is unwilling to listen to military advice. They thought they had the answer, [but] they fundamentally didn’t understand war. It was war as they wanted it to be, not as it exists in the hard realm of reality.”

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was determined that Iraq would not be your father’s (that is, Bush’s father’s) Gulf War. The U.S. and British march to Baghdad seemed the model of the kind of “transformation” that Rumsfeld had been advocating as the force of the future, with air dominance, ground speed and information superiority producing battlefield supremacy. And for a few weeks during the invasion last year, the Iraq war was as the Bush team wished it to be.

But if the plan of battle was long on style, the follow-on was short on substance. “The difficulties we face in Iraq now began more than a year ago, and they began because we have an arrogant, unprofessional, unschooled senior leadership in the Pentagon,” Van Riper says. “They believed that modern technology and some of their very weak operating concepts and unrealistic expectations of what the Iraqi people would do [would] let them go in on the cheap with ground forces.” He adds: “If you think I’m emotional about it, and I am, it’s because soldiers and Marines are dying today because of their incompetence.”

These problems were predictable and were in fact predicted. Three weeks before U.S. soldiers poured across the Iraq-Kuwait border, then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, a Bronze Star and Purple Heart recipient in Vietnam, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that because of Iraq’s size and ethnic makeup, any occupying force would require “on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers.” Shinseki was speaking from experience, having commanded NATO forces in Bosnia from 1997 to 1999.

The Pentagon’s civilian leadership responded with speed and force — against Shinseki. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told the House Budget Committee that Shinseki’s estimate was “wildly off the mark.” Having rejected Shinseki’s estimate — not his alone but the work of the Army’s top planners — Wolfowitz laid out a different scenario. Iraqis would greet allied forces as “liberators … That will help us to keep requirements down.” Rumsfeld gave a similar formulation to reporters: “The idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces I think is far off the mark,” he said.

The open undermining of the Army’s chief of staff is illustrative of Rumsfeld’s relations with him and other Army leaders, which were strained to the point that some active and former top Army officials grumbled that the secretary of defense was at war with the Army. In mid-2002, Rumsfeld’s office leaked the name of his nominee to replace Shinseki — 14 months before the chief’s tenure was to end. When Shinseki did leave as scheduled in June 2003, no one from the Office of the Secretary of Defense attended his retirement ceremony. If they had, they would have heard his farewell warning: “Beware the 12-division strategy for the 10-division Army.”

But Shinseki was not alone in his Iraq forecasts. He had history on his side. Traditionally, as Rand Corp. military scholar James Quinlivan noted in the summer of 2003, “successful strategies for population security and control have required force ratios either as large as or larger than 20 security personnel (troops and police combined) per thousand inhabitants.” That would compute to about 480,000 troops in 23 million-strong Iraq.

In 1996, the United States and its allies sent a force of 60,000 into Bosnia, which had 2.6 million people. And Iraq “isn’t just a larger Bosnia, it’s Bosnia logarithmically complicated,” says Stephen Cimbala, an expert on the military at the University of Pennsylvania.

Also predictable — and predicted — was the fact that Iraqis would react with something less than jubilation and docility to their “liberators.” In April 2002, the State Department began working on a “Future of Iraq Project,” which warned of widespread looting and violent resistance. But the Pentagon ignored the predictions.

Indeed, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to the House Armed Services Committee last November that postwar planning at the Pentagon was delayed for fear that it might indicate that the most telegraphed punch in military history was indeed coming. “We did not want to do anything that would prejudge or somehow preordain that there was definitely going to be a war,” Pace told the committee, presumably with a straight face. (Of course, we now know that this consideration did not prevent the planning for the war itself from starting in late 2001.)

While the swift battle proved that a smaller force could quickly conquer, the aftermath showed that some missions still require sheer manpower. “In a current force or transformed force, it doesn’t take much to seize ground, to seize key terrain,” says Dan Goure, a former Defense Department official who worked on Bush’s defense transition team and is now a senior analyst at the libertarian Lexington Institute. “It still takes a lot of people to occupy. And we are in an occupation, and figure to be in an occupation for a long time.”

Van Riper and his fellow critics argue that a larger U.S. force could have provided security for average Iraqis more quickly and secured the Sunni Triangle. “What they weren’t able to do was capitalize on that success,” Van Riper says. “This is operations and tactics 101. You need to be able to exploit success and you need a reserve.”

Shinseki, in a rare public appearance at the University of Georgia on April 16, recalled his experiences dealing with similar situations in Bosnia. Faced with guerrilla resistance, he said, he went on the offensive both militarily and in other areas such as humanitarian assistance, infrastructure repair and engaging the leaders of the different ethnic groups. “These activities were designed to put our unknown adversaries, unseen adversaries, on the back foot, denying them freedom to act,” he said. “To generate this kind of offensive action takes people. [It] takes people both in numbers and a wide range of skills and capabilities to enable us to have at least one more option than our adversary.”

But Rumsfeld prevailed in the planning for the war and its aftermath. And it was his belief that more from less would work as well with the occupation as it did with the military conquest. His faith was bolstered by neoconservatives’ insistence that the U.S. forces would be greeted as liberators; that once Saddam was toppled a democratic Iraq would immediately take its place; and that the allied troops and newly minted Iraqi security forces would bear their share of the burden.

The strategy went awry from the start, however, as Iraqis looted government offices unprotected by U.S. troops. Private militias like Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army were left to instill a sense of order in Baghdad. As images of the chaos in the city reached international audiences, Rumsfeld dismissed public concerns, saying, “Freedom is untidy.”

But the concerns were legitimate. Speaking at the University of Georgia, Shinseki said that for troops trying to keep peace in a country after a war, there is a “footrace” to establish a safe and secure environment before someone else fills the power vacuum.

“You have a finite period of time [after] the end of major hostilities in which you have to take control, to protect the population because there are lots of others who will fill that void; and if you don’t do it, others will step in, and you have to contend with them,” he said. “How well that was linked to the military phase I think is what we’re facing today. [It was] obviously not as well linked as we would like and perhaps not linked at all.”

The looting eventually faded, but it was emblematic of deeper problems in store for the United States and its allies. With an insufficient number of troops in country, Iraqi opposition — hard-line Baathists, disaffected youth without employment or other prospects and Islamic jihadists slipping across porous borders — was able to rally and grow.

“That invasion was mounted on the belief by the Department of Defense and the secretary of defense in particular that the United States could fight a lightning war and get out before the repercussions of that war were felt. Well, clearly that wasn’t the case,” says Bob Killebrew, a retired Army colonel who writes and lectures on military issues. “The low strength in Iraq has given the bad guys the breathing space they needed to mount the kinds of challenges we face today.”

On April 15, Rumsfeld admitted that the administration had miscalculated how the occupation would play out: “If you had said to me a year ago, ‘Describe the situation you’ll be in today one year later,’ I don’t know many people who would have described it — I would not have — described it the way it happens to be today.”

Of course, as a practical matter, admitting that occupying Iraq would have required much larger numbers of troops would have crippled Bush’s drive to war. Military theory holds that for every operation, the Army should have three units: one preparing to deploy to the operation, one executing it and one recovering from it. With active and reserve components taken together, the U.S. Army is a little over a million strong. An occupation force of several hundred thousand would have required the entire Army.

Even with an occupation force between 100,000 and 135,000, the Army is being pushed to the breaking point. “When a military force is wholly committed to a fight and can’t maneuver or can’t withdraw or can’t add any more force to the fight, we say they are decisively engaged,” says Killebrew. “The United States is close to being decisively engaged in Iraq, unless we call up more troops.”

How bad is it? This week, the Associated Press noted that all or parts of nine of the Armys 10 active divisions are either in Iraq or have just returned from a 12-month stint there. The sole exception is the 3rd Infantry Division that led the charge from Kuwait to Baghdad, which has already been warned that it may have to return as soon as November.

“There’s never been anything close to this much demand on the all-volunteer military in its 30-year history,” says Michael O’Hanlon, a military expert at the Brookings Institution. “Even in wartime, with conscription, we didn’t send people overseas on two tours of duty. Certainly in Vietnam, if you did your one tour, you were done.”

The 25th Infantry Division, based in Hawaii as a backup to forces in Korea, has been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Already, 40 percent of the troops in Iraq are reserves who have been called from their civilian lives to spend a year, minimum, in Iraq, a percentage that is not likely to change in coming years.

A study by the Congressional Budget Office released last November found that without significant Reserve call-ups, “the active Army would be unable to sustain an occupation force of the present size [150,000] beyond March 2004 if it chose not to keep individual units deployed to Iraq for longer than one year without relief.” The CBO estimated that the active Army could sustain between 38,000 and 64,000 troops in Iraq indefinitely with help from Reserve support units.

The problem is aggravated by the Army’s structure: The same small percentage of specialized reservists — military police and civil affairs specialists — gets called upon more frequently than other reservists. And despite assurances that duty in Iraq would be capped at no more than a year at a time, commanders recently informed 20,000 soldiers that their stay would be extended by three months, possibly as many as four. While the Pentagon had hoped to lower the level of occupying troops from around 135,000 to around 100,000, part of that plan was predicated on handing off more responsibility to new Iraqi security forces, units that have not proved reliable in taking on their own countrymen.

“We used to talk about ‘operational tempo,’ in the sense of how hard is it to do the normal pace-time training cycles — for example, for all the Army’s brigades, if we had to have two or three deployed over in the Balkans, and what effect does that have on our ability to engage in this or that scenario,” says Owen Cote of MIT’s Security Studies Program. “Now the entire active and reserve Army exists solely … to sustain this occupation of Iraq. There essentially is no ‘op-tempo’ outside of Iraq. The Army can’t do anything else right now, except under really extreme circumstances.”

The extraordinary strain being placed on the Army in both morale and physical wear and tear — as well as the need to bring units back to Iraq — creates a ripple effect that threatens training and maintenance.

“You can expect over time a slow erosion of U.S. power,” Killebrew says. “It will be because we lose the ability to train and maintain the force that we have [in Iraq] now. People wear out and so does equipment. And it’s wearing out now.”

The result has been unusually long deployments for active and reserve soldiers alike. These deployments — and the Pentagon’s inability to give soldiers a reliable date on which they can count on seeing their family — have badly corroded morale both at home and on the front lines.

It is a situation that threatens to break the all-volunteer Army. “What’s going to happen is, people aren’t going to reenlist in the numbers that you would like,” says Lawrence Korb, a Reagan-era defense official who is now a senior fellow at the liberal Center for American Progress. While studies by the Rand Corp. have shown a correlation between deployment and increased retention, those same studies also indicate that repeated tours diminish the effect, eventually turning it negative.

Rumsfeld and his team are quick to point out that retention remains basically strong. But there are signs of slippage: Last fiscal year the U.S. Army Reserve didn’t meet its retention goals. And USA Today reported that through the first half of this fiscal year, the active Army is on a pace to come up short of its retention goal.

Even allies of Rumsfeld admit that the current retention figures are distorted because the Pentagon has made liberal use of “stop-loss,” a power that lets it prevent troops from leaving the service when their time is up.

Indeed, a wealth of recent anecdotal and statistical information suggests serious problems for the Army. A survey last summer by the Army Surgeon General’s Office found that 52 percent of soldiers reported low personal morale and 72 percent reported that their unit had low morale. The survey also found that unit cohesion was low. “The most important reported deployment stressors included uncertain redeployment date, long deployment, separation and lack of communication with family,” the Operation Iraqi Freedom Mental Health Advisory Team reported last month. “These operational stressors were significantly correlated with low morale, low cohesion and behavioral health problems.” The Pentagon’s decision to hold 20,000 troops in Iraq for an additional three months can only have intensified these conditions.

A separate survey of military families conducted by the Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University found that fully half of military spouses predicted “major retention problems” in the Army.

“The family members that I’ve talked to basically have said that when Tom, Dick or Mary comes out, they’re going to stay out,” says Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., a member of the House Armed Services Committee. “The high personnel tempo, the high ‘op-tempo’ alone, is grinding down the military. The fact that we are breaking our promises, the fact that we are not being straight with people, naturally is going to cause problems not only with recruiting but with retention.”

Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee, expressed the same fears at a hearing in which he questioned Rumsfeld in February: “From my conversations with the Guard and reservists around the country, you are going to see a very large exodus of the members of the Guard and Reserve because of the incredible deployment and a burden that has been laid upon them.”

One solution that Tauscher and others favor is to increase the size of the U.S. Army, relieving the stress on existing troops by spreading the burden.

“Ten divisions is a very small force for a nation of 300 million people,” says Robert Scales, a retired two-star Army general and former commandant of the U.S. Army War College. “For a great power, that’s probably the smallest percentage of infantry in the history of the world, including the Romans. The Roman Empire had more infantry than the U.S.”

At least one prominent member of the Bush administration agrees. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a former naval officer, told the Washington Post’s Bob Woodward that he feared that the Army is too small for the Bush administration’s grandiose agenda. “Though [Armitage] believed they would put down the insurgency [in Iraq] and win in the end, the U.S. military was going to pay for ten years or more. The Army, in particular, was stretched too thin,” Woodward writes in his new book, “Plan of Attack.” “They were fighting three wars really — Afghanistan still, Iraq and the continuing global war on terrorism. It was not logical nor was it possible, in Armitage’s view, that this could be accomplished with a force of the same size that existed during the Clinton administration in peace time. But that was what the Bush administration was attempting.”

In the wake of the Cold War, the United States cut the size of the military from 18 active divisions to 10. (Each division has roughly 15,000 to 18,000 troops.) When Rumsfeld came into office, it was widely rumored that he wanted to cut two more divisions. Instead, in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, Afghanistan and Iraq, he’s fighting a losing battle to avoid permanently expanding the size of the military.

At the end of January, Rumsfeld conceded to his critics by approving an emergency increase in the size of the active U.S. Army of 30,000 troops above its congressionally approved limit of 482,000. In theory, the increase will last four years while the Army reorganizes.

Fundamentally, the Army is still structured in a Cold War mold, though in a trimmed-down version. It moves in division-size units suitable for facing Soviet divisions but less useful in a world where speed is salient. The Army also has an outdated mix of units: too much artillery, easily replaced with air power, and not enough civil affairs or infantry personnel.

Gen. Peter Schoomaker, a former head of the U.S. Special Operation Command whom Rumsfeld pulled out of retirement to replace Shinseki, wants to make the brigade, which typically has 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers, the Army’s main unit of action. Schoomaker is in the process of remixing the kinds of units the Army has in its active and reserve forces. Under his plan, the Army will go from 33 brigades to 48. At the end of the four years, the Army will revert to its limit of 482,000 active troops, but will remain at 48 brigades through the magic of eliminating unnecessary positions.

These moves are widely applauded by military experts who see the reorganization as a long-overdue reform. But many experts believe they do not go far enough in addressing the underlying issue of the need for more troops.

John Grady, spokesman for the Association of the U.S. Army, the Army’s civilian lobby, called the moves “a good first step” but said “the continuing commitments of the Army worldwide speak to the need of the Army having to have another 30,000 to 40,000 permanently.”

That is a notion that Rumsfeld and the rest of the administration absolutely resist. Why? Because they want their toys.

“If we permanently increase statutory end strength, we’ll have to take the cost out of the DOD top line,” Rumsfeld testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February. “That will require cuts in other parts of the defense budget, crowding out investments and the programs that will allow us to manage the force better and to make it more capable.”

The Pentagon’s budget has increased from $312 billion at the end of the Clinton administration to $469 billion in the past fiscal year (including various supplemental spending bills passed by Congress), according to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, but the money’s going to machines, not men.

“The real question is: What business is the U.S. military in?” says the Lexington Institute’s Goure. “Is it in the war-winning business and counterterrorism and preemption and all those things? Is it in the occupation and nation-building business? Because at the present time, with the kind of money we want to spend, you can do one or the other. You can’t do both. Because you can either spend the money on equipment, transformation, all those words, or you can spend it on people.”

Rumsfeld and Bush want to spend it on equipment, including “Star Wars” missile defense and an F-22 fighter aircraft that looks an awful lot like it was designed to take on the next-generation Soviet jet that is never coming.

“The defense budget has taken no sacrifice whatsoever, including a number of weapons systems that are Cold War relics and that are not attuned to what everyone acknowledges is the new asymmetric threat,” Rep. Tauscher says. “Even if we just slow-walked national missile defense, we could take $1.6 billion out of this year and we could buy 10,000 Army troops.”

But the Bush administration is making no plans to choose people over bigger and bigger toys. A decision to increase the size of the Army would require a trade-off, a sacrifice somewhere else in the defense budget, and neither Bush nor Rumsfeld has shown any inclination in that direction. Instead they are clinging to the idea that the combat-phase success of the transformed Army — lighter, faster, more lethal — can be translated into the hard slog of post-combat operations. So the crisis confronting the Army, weary and understaffed, hunkered down in an unstable Iraq, is deepening, and so is the danger to every soldier.

Robert Schlesinger, a former Pentagon correspondent for the Boston Globe, is a freelance reporter based in Washington and a contributing editor at the Washington Examiner.

Senate Democrats heroically fund TSA

Democrats score the dumbest political victory of 2012

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Senate Democrats heroically fund TSA (Credit: Reuters/Frank Polich)

On Tuesday, a Senate Appropriations Committee vote effectively highlighted everything that is stupid about politics.

The Transportation Security Administration, a universally loathed government agency, is facing a shortfall, despite its more than $8 billion budget. Instead of having a debate over what effective airport security might actually look like and how much should reasonably be spent on the honestly rare threat of commercial-air-travel-based terrorism, there was a debate over how best to come up with the money needed for all the radioactive naked picture machines and bomb-sniffing dogs. The Democrats suggested passing on the cost of ineffective, cumbersome and intrusive security theater to citizens, via higher fees on airfares. The Republicans, even more predictably, suggested cutting spending that directly helps poor people to ensure there is enough to spend on stopping imaginary future 9/11s.

The newspaper account of the debate in The Hill just reinforced the Republican spin, highlighting the Democrats’ decision to make people spend more money on the hated TSA and downplaying the actual existing Republican alternative to the proposal, which was not “spend less on the hated TSA” but rather “raise money for the hated TSA by slashing needed aid to states.” The Democrats won, or “won,” and now they will earn the fruits of that victory: well-deserved scorn from everyone. And Ben Nelson (D-Troll Town) voted with the Republicans. (Though surely having users pay the fees for supposedly necessary security measures is perfectly conservative, isn’t it? Am I missing something here? I mean besides the fact that the two sides in this debate weren’t actually “liberal” and “conservative” but rather “people who want to come up with a way of paying for the oppressive and useless national security state” versus “people who want there to be an oppressive national security state but hate government spending on feeding and sheltering impoverished people.”)

I don’t know of anyone not employed by the TSA or some other arm of Homeland Security that believes the TSA does a good job and deserves its massive budget, but everyone in Washington apparently feels differently (and is terrified of being blamed for “voting to cut TSA funding” if there is another terrifying and deadly underwear bomber, of course). This is why everyone hates politics and Congress and Washington. This and Iraq. And the drug war.

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Alex Pareene

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

Police arrest artist setting up ‘I Love NY’ work

The installation included a plastic bag with a battery inside of it, hanging from a tree

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Police arrest artist setting up 'I Love NY' work (Credit: http://tmiyakawadesign.com/)

NEW YORK (AP) — An artist who was setting up an “I Love New York”-themed public art display in Brooklyn was arrested after the wired contraption was mistaken for an explosive device.

Takeshi Miyakawa, a visual artist and furniture designer, was arrested Saturday after placing the installation in two separate areas of the same New York City neighborhood. His lawyer and employer both called the arrest a misunderstanding.

The first apparatus was found Friday morning after a caller reported a suspicious package to police. It consisted of a plastic bag that contained a battery and was suspended from a metal rod attached to a tree. The bag, which had the classic “I Love New York” logo printed on it, was connected by a wire to a plastic box that contained more wires.

The area was evacuated for two hours until a bomb squad determined that the device was not dangerous.

At about 2 a.m. Saturday, a police officer discovered Miyakawa on a ladder not far from where the first contraption was found. Police said he was tying a similar “I Love New York” bag to a public lamp post.

Miyakawa was charged with two counts of first-degree reckless endangerment, two counts of placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the first degree, two counts of placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the second degree, two counts of second-degree reckless endangerment and two counts of second-degree criminal nuisance.

A judge ordered him held pending a psychiatric evaluation. His lawyer, Deborah J. Blum, said Monday that she is filing for emergency relief to have Miyakawa released. A court date was set for June 21 to review the results of the evaluation.

“He’s still being held,” Blum said Monday. “I believe that it was a gross misunderstanding and other than that I don’t have any other comment.”

Miyakawa, who was born in Tokyo and is about 50 years old, has worked for a New York-based architect Rafael Vinoly for the last 20 years and also has an independent design practice.

Vinoly’s firm released a statement Monday praising Miyakawa for his “extraordinary brand of professionalism” and said he has been a mentor to generations of young architects.

“Takeshi is a fabulous human being and a person of extraordinary talent,” Vinoly said. “We hope this misunderstanding is cleared up as quickly as possible.”

New York Civil Liberties Union Executive Director Donna Lieberman said in a statement that the charges sounded “like a wild overreaction.”

“It’s hard to understand why a light-up bag in a tree would be treated as an attempted terrorist act unless there’s more to the story than has been reported in the press thus far,” she said.

In 2007, an artist touched off a terror scare in Boston by placing electronic devices around the city as part of a marketing stunt for Cartoon Network. The city closed bridges, roads and public transit before authorities realized the signs were not bombs.

On an average day, the NYPD receives nearly 100 reports of a suspicious package. Last year, there were more than 4,000 such reports. The number generally rises following any word of terror threats in New York and around the world.

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Behind the underwear bomb

The latest airplane terror plot wouldn't have been foiled without airport security -- but not the kind we all know

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Behind the underwear bombTravelers line up at a TSA checkpoint at Los Angeles International Airport. (Credit: Reuters/Danny Moloshok)

Another deadly plot taken down in the planning stages. This time, thanks to the work of a CIA double agent, officials were able to infiltrate a Yemen-based al-Qaida plot to destroy a U.S.-bound jetliner using a nearly undetectable underwear bomb.The moral of the story: Airport security works!Am I being facetious?  Not necessarily.  It depends on your definition of airport security.

In my mind, the key to keeping airplanes safe is, and always has been, stopping acts of sabotage while they are still in the planning stages. Here in the age of the TSA checkpoint, with its toothpaste confiscations and obsession with pointy objects, we tend not to think this way, preoccupied instead with a kind of airport Kabuki — the tedious, fanatical screening of passengers and their carry-ons. Real airport security takes place offstage, as it were. It is the job of the folks at the CIA and the FBI, working together with foreign authorities. And while TSA has an important role here too, we can do without the spectacle of airport guards rifling through innocent people’s bags in a pathological hunt for what are effectively harmless items.

The concourse checkpoint needs to be there.  Just the same, chances are good that once an adversary has made it to the airport, he or she has engineered a way to outwit the system.  And spend as we might, there will always be a way to outwit the system.  ”Even if our technology is good enough to spot it,” said California Rep. Adam Schiff, commenting on the news of the latest underwear plot, “technology is still in human hands and we are inherently fallible.”

That’s one of the smartest things I’ve heard a politician utter in some time.

Getting a handle on this takes us all the way back to Sept. 11, 2001, the day that everything, and yet really nothing, changed.  I’ve said this before, but it bears repeating: Conventional wisdom holds that the 19 hijackers exploited a weakness in airport security by smuggling box cutters onto four Boeing jetliners. But conventional wisdom is wrong. What the men actually exploited was a weakness in our mind-set — a set of presumptions based on the decades-long track record of hijackings and how they were expected to unfold. (In prior years, a hijacking meant a diversion, perhaps to Havana or Beirut, with hostage negotiations and standoffs; crews were accordingly trained in the concept of “passive resistance.”) The presence of box cutters on 9/11 was merely incidental. The men could have used almost anything — a deadly sharp can be fashioned from a broken first-class dinner plate or a ballpoint pen — particularly when coupled with the bluff of having a bomb. The success of their plan relied not on hardware but on the element of surprise. It wasn’t a failure of airport security that allowed those men to hatch their takeover scheme. It was a failure of national security — a breakdown of communication and oversight at the FBI and CIA level.

To put it succinctly: The success of the 9/11 attacks had almost nothing to do with airport security at all — a great and painful irony, of course, to any passenger forced to endure the checkpoint rigmarole in 2012.

Not that frontline guards don’t play a deterrent role.  And, in the opinions of some, the plot uncovered in Yemen underscores the value of full-body scanners — those controversial walk-through machines that allow guards to look beneath a passenger’s clothing. It’s a compelling argument, but the way in which these scanners have — and have not — been deployed is apt to make some of us cynical. For instance, the vast majority of body scanners are found at U.S. domestic airports. Overseas, where a bomb is far likelier to originate, they are rare. Is this really about safety, we wonder, or is it about billions of dollars going into the coffers of the companies contracted to build these machines?

And although the scanners are effective, where does the arms race end?  Not long ago, the idea that passengers would be marched through body scanners and photographed naked before being allowed to board an airplane, would have seemed outrageous. Yet here we are. What might be next?  The stubborn truth is, we can turn airports into fortresses if we want (in some respects we’re well along that path), yet we’ll never be entirely safe. Airport screening alone, no matter how thorough, how expensive, and how technologically advanced, will never defeat a relentless enough, resourceful enough adversary intent on downing a plane.

That isn’t capitulation, it’s reality.  And acknowledging this reality would go a long way toward warding off panic and overreaction when the next successful attack occurs.

Regrettably, too, we often forget that commercial air travel has long been a target of terrorist extremists.  The 1970s and 1980s in particular were, as I like to describe them, a Golden Age of Air Crimes, comparatively rife with bombings, hijackings and other deadly assaults against airplanes and airports. Over one five-year span between 1985 and 1989 we can count at least six high-profile terrorist attacks, including the horrific bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772; the bombing of an Air India 747 over the North Atlantic that killed 329 people; and the incredible saga of TWA Flight 847.  And let’s not forget what might have been, such as the so-called “Project Bojinka,” the 1994 scheme masterminded by Ramzi Yousef (nephew of Kalid Sheikh Mohammad), in which impossible-to-detect (at the time) liquid explosives were to be used to simultaneously destroy a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific Ocean. Fortunately the plot unraveled and Yousef was arrested.

While we can argue, quite persuasively, that many of the current-day security measures have done little if anything to make us safer, we’ve nevertheless introduced measures that have been useful and effective, from explosives screening of checked luggage to the sorts of trans-border partnerships that broke up the most recent plot from Yemen. Whether in spite of, or because of, the attention we’ve lavished on All Things Terrorism, the past decade has seen fewer attacks against commercial air travel than any since the 1950s.What we need to remember, though, is that our success has had more to do with the security measures we don’t see than those taking place in plain view. And if our luck is to hold, we need to better rationalize and streamline our entire approach to airport security. For instance, if we’re going to have those body scanners, let’s put them where they’re needed. If this requires negotiating with foreign authorities whose airports are beyond TSA’s jurisdiction, so be it. Meanwhile, here at home, TSA’s one-size-fits-all approach, in which every single person who flies is seen as a potential threat, is simply unsustainable in a country where close to 2 million people fly daily. Things like taking snow globes from children, haggling over tiny container sizes, or confiscating a dessert fork from a uniformed, on-duty airline pilot (it happened to me) serve no useful purpose whatsoever. On the contrary, they divert valuable time and resources away from the things that could make us safer.  Let’s scale back that concourse Kabuki and retrain guards in the finer points of a more sensible, risk-based assessment of passengers and their belongings.

And lastly, if only as an aside, let’s behold for a moment the term “underwear bomb.”  That was the operative phrase in literally hundreds of articles and broadcasts over the past several days, and nowhere did it raise a snicker.  What does it say about our country, I wonder, that such a preposterous expression is instantly understood and effectively taken for granted?

Strange times indeed.

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Hiding 9/11′s last secrets

The military tribunal for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed means the American people will never know what drove him to terror

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Hiding 9/11's last secrets (Credit: Reuters//Brennan Linsley)

After a Navy SEAL team killed Osama bin Laden at his Pakistan hideout a year ago this week, it flew his body to the Arabian Sea, weighted it down, and slid it silently off an aircraft carrier into the watery depths.

For many Americans, the secret raid provided a measure of revenge and catharsis for the strikes of Sept. 11, 2001. But it didn’t provide the kind of justice and official reckoning that the country needs to gain real closure. Now the government has a chance to achieve that through a full, fair and open trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four co-defendants, so the world can finally see the evidence against him as the true architect of the attacks on New York and Washington. The trial kickoff — an arraignment for the men — is scheduled for this Saturday at the U.S.-run detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

This should be our Nuremburg, the defining trial of the 9/11 era and a fitting coda to it.

Unfortunately, the U.S. government appears to be on the verge of squandering this opportunity, and with it, the best, and perhaps only, chance for the public to understand not only how the attacks came to be, but why Mohammed waged a relentless war against America and how we might stop the next would-be terrorist mastermind.

The problems lie within the reformed military-tribunal system that the Obama administration put in place after losing its fight for a civilian trial in New York. Political compromises have resulted in a flawed military commissions process that from outward appearances is not only rigged against the defense, but hyper-choreographed, censored and hermetically sealed.

“The process is designed to achieve a conviction, and to do it with as little revelation as humanly possible, but with the veneer of due process and justice,’’ said one participant who said restrictive gag orders prohibited him from talking publicly. “You’re talking about the most heinous crime ever, and we’re going to afford them less due process, less discovery, less of everything than we would the guy who shoplifted a pack of gum from CVS.’’

Obama administration officials say their reformed military commissions system is a vast improvement over the Bush administration’s version, which Obama moved to shut down on his first day in office in 2009.

Defense lawyers disagree, and insist they have been hamstrung in their efforts to mount the kind of aggressive defense needed to do their jobs including full and unfettered access to evidence, witnesses and even the accused themselves.

Four of the five legal teams had so few of their key players in place in recent months that they did not file the “mitigation submissions’’ that the government said it needed to decide which of the five men should face the death penalty and other key issues, such as whether to try them together or individually. They recently filed motions asking that the charges be thrown out because of fatal flaws in the system, which they say make it impossible for them to defend their clients.

“It’s window dressing,’’ Mohammed’s defense lawyer, David Nevin, said of the government’s improvements. “I am not all satisfied that it is a fair process. In fact, it is not a fair process.’’

Many of the defense lawyers have quit out of frustration or for other personal reasons stemming from the many delays in the process. Only a few have been there long enough to even begin to understand their clients’ case, not to mention the convoluted military commission process.

And they say they will be unable to effectively challenge confessions obtained when their clients were coercively interrogated in the CIA’s black site prisons, if they can broach the subject at all. This is important for the four men accused of helping Mohammed with the logistics of the plot. Several claim they have been wrongly accused, tortured into confessing, or both.

It is also important with regard to Mohammed, who confessed to dozens of plots while being waterboarded 183 times, and has said he may plead guilty even before the trial begins. Few U.S. counterterrorism officials believe all of his often boastful confessions, and it is important for the public to hear what, exactly, evidence the government has with regard to what he did and didn’t do, and whom he might have been protecting.

The team of Defense and Justice Department officials overseeing the military commission process, and the presiding judge, should quickly address the defense lawyers’ complaints, or a proceeding that some call “The Trial of the Century’’ will be delayed further by legal wrangling — and forever tainted by accusations of being unfair.

A full, fair and transparent trial, above all, will benefit the public. There is much the public doesn’t know about Mohammed, including the details of how he devised the plot, convinced bin Laden to let him do it and then orchestrated it “from A to Z,’’ to use his own words. It was Mohammed who masterminded dozens of other plots and attacks, some while staying a step ahead of the largest-ever criminal manhunt.

Mohammed, not bin Laden, was the one who traveled the world as a kind of “Johnny Appleseed’’ of terrorism, establishing alliances and creating a network of cells and lieutenants that in some cases remains today. And it was Mohammed who personally recruited young jihadist prospects much like a baseball scout, many of them Westerners, tapping into their grievances to turn them to his cause.

The U.S. government has kept the details of what Mohammed did — and how and why he did it — hidden in its most classified files since his capture in Pakistan nine years ago. The government should set the record straight on that, because there is an important lesson to be learned from the largely untold tale of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: It isn’t some monolithic group like al-Qaida that poses a continuing threat, it’s the one intelligent and energetic person who can emerge from nowhere and orchestrate a 9/11 while the world focuses elsewhere.

To that end, the government should declassify as much evidence as possible, and explain how it obtained it. It should call numerous witnesses to testify, especially since the one who has been publicly identified, Majid Khan, claims he was tortured while in CIA custody overseas.

Instead of limiting access to a few closed-circuit TVs, it should consider televising the proceedings. It should ensure that censorship is minimized, and used only to protect intelligence sources and methods, not to save the government from embarrassment. And it should let Mohammed and the others testify at length on their behalf if they so desire.

By doing so, the Obama administration will be able to say it did its best to put on the kind of civilian trial it has wanted all along, and one with a similar outcome to that of the al Qaida members charged with blowing up two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.

Those of us who witnessed that trial in Manhattan in 2001 saw the defendants squirm in their chairs as prosecutors introduced mountains of evidence against them. We saw eyewitnesses point the finger at the accused, and surviving victims glare at them from the pews.

We heard from the terrorists themselves, and learned a lot about why they did it, about how terrorist networks operate and about what might be done to stop people like them. And when the jury convicted them, there was no question that justice was done.

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Josh Meyer is the author, with Terry McDermott, of the new book, "The Hunt for KSM: Inside the Pursuit and Takedown of the Real 9/11 Mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.’’

FBI heroically locks up ridiculous anarchists on May Day

Feds stop inept radicals from carrying out a plot feds helped them conceive and carry out

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FBI heroically locks up ridiculous anarchists on May DayU.S. Attorney Steven Dettelbach, left, and FBI special agent in charge Stephen Anthony walk past a map showing the location of a bridge on Ohio Rt. 82. Five men, pictured on the wall behind the map, have been arrested for conspiring to blow up the bridge. (Credit: AP/Mark Duncan)

Happy May Day, fellow travelers! If you’re not currently disrupting capitalism and/or having your wrists zip-tied for exercising your right to freely assemble, you probably read about the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s latest, not-at-all suspiciously timed terror sting. The Bureau, in an inspired bit of early-20th century nostalgia, has railroaded a bunch of dangerous anarchists. (Or “dangerous” “anarchists.”) America will not waver in the face of the Galleanist threat!

Five young men from Cleveland are now in jail, accused of plotting to “blow up a bridge in the Cleveland area,” according to the FBI’s triumphant press release/criminal complaint. As is always the case with FBI terror stings, the “sting” part involved the bureau’s informant/agent provocateur mostly inventing the plot the accused have now been arrested for. In this case, the five planned to detonate smoke bombs as a distraction as they “topple[d] financial institution signs atop high rise buildings in downtown Cleveland.” But the informant (as usual, a sketchy unnamed character with a checkered past) strongly pushed the group to seriously consider different, more extreme plots. At the end, some or all of them were going to plant C-4 on the Route 82 Brecksville-Northfield High Level Bridge over the Cuyahoga Valley National Park.

So what was initially a political action aimed at financial institutions somehow morphed into a supposed attempt to destroy or damage a piece of publicly owned infrastructure in a national park. Anarchists sure do hate bridges, and parks, I guess. (No parliament of men has the authority to designate which spaces are “national parks”! The whole world is the worker’s national park!)

The FBI’s affadavit suggests that there was never actually a serious “plot.” The gang tossed around the idea of “taking out” a bridge in order to stop people from getting to work, but they also thought maybe they could use their (pretend) C4 on a Klan rally, or a neo-Nazi organization, or an oil well, or the Federal Reserve Bank. They eventually decided to maybe sink a ship. All of their many plans were super serious and well-thought out. (“To prevent capture, he suggested getting tacks that they could throw out of the back of a car if they get in a chase.”) Eventually they settled on the bridge thing, sort of, and bought fake IEDs from the guy they already suspected was a cop.

In other words, these are a bunch of dumbasses even by the standards of amateur “black bloc” dumbasses. Do you know how I know these morons weren’t serious? They planned to download the Anarchist Cookbook and follow its notoriously awful instructions. Every experienced anarchist knows that the Feds have a mole in your group house, but these guys were mainly concerned with having someone’s “hacker friend” explain to them how bitcoins work. Without the FBI’s intervention the most damage these idiots would’ve ever caused is a broken Starbucks window. So thank god they’re off the streets, and congrats to the FBI for getting this tale of dangerous, bomb-planting anarchists onto the news broadcasts on the day of Occupy’s big May Day action.

(At least the Feds are branching out from only targeting Muslims in these ridiculous “stings.” Some day all Americans, regardless of creed or color, will have their circle of friends secretly infiltrated by a paid informant.)

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Alex Pareene

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

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