Middle East

Susan Sontag’s final wish

She wanted hope, a reason to believe she would survive cancer. In a candid interview, her son, David Rieff, discusses his mother's battle to live and his struggle to hide the truth.

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Susan Sontag's final wishDie amerikanische Schriftstellerein Susan Sontag waehrend einer Pressekonferenz am Samstag, 11. Oktober 2003 auf der Buchmesse in Frankfurt am Main. Sontag wird am Sonntag mit dem Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels ausgezeichnet. (AP Photo/Michael Probst) ---US writer Susan Sontag is seen during a press conference at the Book Fair in Frankfurt, central Germany, Saturday, Oct. 11, 2003. Sontag will be awarded the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade on Sunday. (AP Photo/Michael Probst)(Credit: Michael Probst)

David Rieff has written a sobering and often horrifying account of his mother’s final days. In 2004, his mother, Susan Sontag, died from a brutal form of blood cancer, myelodysplastic syndrome. She fought her illness to the end, implicitly asking those closest to her, including her son, to lie: She didn’t want anyone to tell her she was dying. It’s a striking contrast. The celebrated writer demanded honesty of intellectuals — Rieff says she loved reason and science “with a fierce, unwavering tenacity bordering on religiosity” — yet maintained a willful delusion about her death.

In “Swimming in a Sea of Death,” Rieff wrestles with how to be a dutiful son to his dying mother while being true to himself. It’s a remarkably unsentimental account. There’s no gushing between mother and son or deathbed reconciliations. This is not a portrait of Rieff’s relationship with Sontag, though at one point he refers to their “strained and at times very difficult” relations. It is a book about dying, grieving and what it means to survive the death of a loved one.

Beginning in the 1960s, Sontag became a cultural critic with enormous range, dissecting everything from camp to Marxist critic Walter Benjamin, from photography to how illness is misread as a metaphor for patients’ psychology. She was a best-selling novelist and a singular presence — the brainy, glamorous woman who held her own among the testosterone-filled intellectuals of the period.

Rieff is a distinguished author in his own right. A contributing writer to the New York Times Magazine, and a past contributor to Salon, he’s reported on war-ravaged countries and carved out his own reputation as an acute analyst of foreign policy. Rieff refers to writing as “the family olive oil business.” His father, the sociologist Philip Rieff, wrote his own masterpiece, “The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud.” Sontag married Rieff when she was 17 and left him seven years later. In her later years, she had a relationship with Annie Leibovitz, whom Rieff avoids discussing in his memoir, except for one loaded comment about the photographer’s “carnival images of celebrity death.”

“I am not a confessional person,” Rieff insisted. He could be terse when fielding questions about his relationship with his mother, and he became angry at the notion she suffered a “bad death.” Still, throughout our interview, he displayed his own brand of remarkable candor.

When did you first hear your mother had this form of blood cancer?

It was in the spring of 2004. I was coming back from about a month in Israel/Palestine, where I was trying to do a story on Yasser Arafat. I have a habit — a superstition, really — of not calling people I’m close to while I’m on an assignment that could be dangerous. But I usually check in once I get out. I had to change planes at Heathrow Airport in London, so I called my mother. She said she might be ill again, might have some kind of blood cancer. She was trying to be cheerful. I was trying to be cheerful. Then I flew back. The next morning, I picked her up and accompanied her to the doctor who gave her the test results. The physician was not a very empathetic guy. I’m sure he’s a good doctor, but his human skills were not exactly brilliant. And he told her the bad news. She had this lethal blood cancer and, basically, there was no treatment.

It was a death sentence.

It was. The standard time between diagnosis and death is nine months, and there are no drugs that work more than a few months to keep your blood counts where they’re supposed to be. It turned out that if she wanted to try something rather than palliative care during the last months of her life, there was one possibility. It’s a long shot: an adult stem-cell transplant, a bone-marrow transplant. She found a physician at the great cancer center in New York, Memorial Sloan-Kettering, a brilliant man who had all the human skills the first doctor did not. He said, “If you want to fight, if what matters to you is not quality of life…” And my mother said, “I’m not interested in quality of life.” He said, “Well, the best place to have this transplant would be at the Fred Hutchinson Center at the University of Washington Hospital in Seattle.”

So she was going to do everything she could to survive.

She wanted to live at any price. When she said, “I’m not interested in quality of life,” she meant it. She was somebody for whom extinction — death — was unbearable. So she was going to fight for every breath, no matter how much suffering that entailed.

Twice before, your mother had cancer and survived. One time, weren’t the odds incredibly stacked against her?

They were. This was in the mid-’70s, a time when American physicians tended to lie to their patients and tell family members something closer to the truth. I was told by her doctors that she would die quite soon. She had Stage 4 breast cancer that had spread into her lymph system. She had a basis for thinking it wasn’t hopeless when a doctor said it was.

Yet this time it did seem hopeless.

The chances were indeed stacked against her. But she didn’t want to hear it. So what do you do, as the person who’s close to someone who wants to live at any price, when you think this fight isn’t worth it? Do you lie? Do you insist on telling the truth when it’s perfectly clear the person doesn’t want to know the truth? Which was certainly true of my mother.

Even though she did say, “Don’t lie to me.”

She wanted to be lied to. I mean, she didn’t want to be lied to, but she wanted to live. She hoped that I and other people in her life would give her reason to hope. I felt that I had to do that, whatever my own opinion was. Before the transplant, I thought the odds were bad. Coming back to my mother’s previous experience with breast cancer, I thought, “Well, don’t leap to conclusions here. They wrote her off in the ’70s. Yeah, it’s an even more lethal cancer, and yeah, she’s even 30 years older, but maybe she’ll beat the odds.” But when the bone marrow transplant started to go wrong soon after it took place, I didn’t think she would make it. Yet every signal she was giving me was, “Give me hope. Help me believe I might make it.” In the end, I chose to do that. The most important thing I thought was: It’s her death, not mine.

Can you tell me about your mother’s last days?

Everything that could go wrong did go wrong after the transplant. She suffered like someone being tortured. I found a way to be present but not look at the way she had become physically. She flew back to New York when it was clear the leukemia had become full-blown and the transplant had failed, and spent the last six or seven weeks of her life in Memorial Sloan-Kettering. In the end she couldn’t even roll over unassisted.

Once she died, I asked the other people in the room to leave. And I really looked. To be blunt, I took off her shirt. And she was just a sore. Her body was just a sore from the inside of her mouth to her toes. So the suffering was extraordinary. But the actual death was comparatively easy in the sense that she didn’t seem to be in pain. In the last days, she kind of withdrew. And when she spoke, she spoke about the distant past — about her parents, about people she was involved with 30 years before. She wasn’t focused on the present or any of us. Then she lapsed into a kind of somnolence. And then she died. It wasn’t terrible.

Did not telling her the truth about her condition take a toll on you?

It exacted a tremendous price. I never got to say goodbye. I don’t want to romanticize the end of life, but we never had the kinds of conversations I would’ve liked to have had with her. Conversations about the past. I would’ve liked to have said certain things to her. We had a complicated relationship. There were very good times and very bad times between us. I would have liked to have gone beyond those before she left us. But that’s impossible if you decide not to acknowledge the fact of dying. So that’s the price I paid. But she made it very clear what she wanted. I didn’t feel that my interests could be put ahead of that.

You write that it wasn’t just that she desperately wanted to live, she was also terrified of dying. Wasn’t there a kind of existential dread?

There was. In my experience, lots of people are terrified of dying. I’ve also met lots of people who aren’t. But she was one to whom it was just terrible news. So I don’t think she was at all unique. Of course, some people of faith find it easier. But my mother wasn’t a person of faith.

Your mother was an atheist. She refused to accept any consolation from the hope of an afterlife. How much did that contribute to her dread?

Well, I’m an atheist too; if anything, more militant than my mother. I think it would have been grotesque of my mother to have become a person of faith purely in the interest of consoling herself. Surely, that would have been the most terrible therapeutic use of faith, and a disgrace in terms of faith. You shouldn’t start to believe because it suits you.

But it does raise the question: Without the consolation of religion, does the prospect of dying lead to dread?

Well, it sure doesn’t help. I don’t know. There are certainly religious traditions that don’t believe in an afterlife. So I don’t think we can just take the Christian or the Islamic model and say those visions of a personal afterlife are what religious faith is. If you look at Buddhism, if you look at Judaism, neither has an afterlife in that sense. So I’m not sure it’s faith vs. atheism.

These days, there’s a lot of talk about what’s called “a good death.” Usually this means someone who accepts dying and stops fighting it. There’s a certain grace that can follow. Not only is there a sense of inner peace, but the dying person often has meaningful and profound conversations with friends and family. To use a word you scorn in your book, there is some “closure.” By contrast, it would seem that your mother had anything but a good death. Do you see it that way?

No, I think that’s something people say to console themselves. I don’t believe a word of what you just said. I don’t know whether you believe it or not. But I know this argument very well. First of all, I think that argument does a real disservice to human variety. People are very different in their lives and very different in their deaths. The idea that one good death fits all seems incredibly reductive to what human beings are all about. It’s like saying all human beings should be cheerful. I don’t know that being cheerful is better than being a melancholy person. People have different temperaments. When you say “grace,” it lets family members off the hook. They don’t have to feel so bad that the person is going. So I don’t buy it.

I have the impression that this is the way your mother had to die. Given who she was, there was no other way.

What I’m saying is that the right way for one person to die may not be the right way for another person to die. And she was somebody who desperately didn’t want to die. So why should she have made our lives easier by going gracefully? That doesn’t seem right to me.

She was buried in Montparnasse Cemetery in Paris, where many famous writers are buried. You say your mother had a horror of cremation. Do you know why that was?

Sure. Cremation seemed to confirm extinction. If you have a grave and your bones are there, it’s somehow less confirming of extinction. I understand that viscerally. She spoke a lot during her life about how horrified of cremation she was. But all the decisions about her burial are decisions that I made, trying to think through what I thought she wanted. She gave me no instructions of any kind.

You have just a brief reference to Annie Leibovitz, your mother’s off-and-on companion for 20 years. You call her book of photos — which included pictures of your mother as she was dying and after her death — “carnival images of celebrity death.” There seems to be a good deal of bitterness packed into that short sentence.

There is, but it’s contained in that sentence. And that’s all I propose to say about Annie Leibovitz.

You have been a writer for many years, but to my knowledge, it’s only been quite recently that you’ve written this directly about your mother. Not only did you write this memoir, you’re also editing her diaries and helping put out some of her unpublished essays. Why have you taken this active role in your mother’s work?

That’s a good question. One answer is because I’ll probably do a better and more responsible job than someone who didn’t know her. If I’m going to edit stuff about her life in the ’50s, I’m the only one alive who would know about it directly. Another answer is that if I had her journals in my possession after she died, and they were simply mine to dispose of as I wished, I don’t think I would have published them. I don’t know if I would have destroyed them or simply left them for other people to deal with after I’m dead. But I’m fairly certain I would not have published them.

But in her lifetime, long before she was diagnosed with MDS, my mother decided they were going to be public. She sold her papers, including her diaries, to UCLA. So they were going to appear at some point anyway. And she didn’t embargo them. So I felt either they would leak out in one way or another or I could try to edit them to make them coherent. What I’ve left out, people will be able to go to UCLA and read. It’s not as if I burned anything.

Near the end of the book, you say, “I have preferred to write as little as possible of my relations with my mother in the last decade of her life, but suffice it so say that they were often strained and at times very difficult.” Can you explain why they were difficult?

No, I think that explains it. What I will say, though, is that when I wrote this book, I thought a lot about what I’d say and what I wouldn’t say. And I decided, finally, that I would tell the truth about anything that I could tell the complete truth about. That doesn’t mean someone else who was there would agree with my account.

But I also decided that I was going to leave out certain things. And that may be because I didn’t want to have a fight with somebody, because I didn’t want to offend somebody, because I thought I’d hurt somebody’s feelings, or because I just preferred that something not be known. I’m just not prepared to talk in any seriously honest and self-revealing way about my relationship with my mother.

So I felt what I needed to do was not give the false impression that somehow our relations had been very good, but instead to say they were very complicated. And over that decade, they had very high highs and very low lows. It was important to have that on the record. But I wasn’t going to say anything more. I’m not a confessional writer. I’m not a confessional person. This is all very new territory to me.

It seems that something has changed for you, and you wanted to engage with your mother more directly in print.

I wanted to engage with her death in print. But I shall not write a biography. I will write prefaces to these journals, which will contain biographical material, and a future biographer may find them somewhat useful. But I didn’t want to write a book about my relationship with my mother, about her relations with other people, or a literary account of her work.

Do you think you will ever write about your relationship with your her?

God, I hope not.

Why not?

Because I don’t think it’s anybody’s business. It’s just prurient as far as I’m concerned.

But you know there will be future biographies of Susan Sontag. You could set the record straight.

Oh, you never set the record straight. People write what they want to write. When Max Brod wrote the famous first biography of Kafka, every future biographer has tried to point out what Max Brod left out. Anyway, I don’t want to write a biography of my mother. I don’t want to write a memoir of our relationship. But on the other hand, I’m a realist. I can’t stop people from writing biographies after her death, any more than she could stop any number of biographies, one of them extremely disobliging, from appearing during her lifetime. It’s just the way of the world.

Your book is remarkably self-effacing. At one point you say, “That my mother both enjoyed and made better use of the world than I have done or will do is simply a statement of fact.” You also write that you wish you’d complied more with her wishes during her life and suppressed more of your own. Aren’t you being awfully hard on yourself?

No, I don’t think so. I think the latter comment is in the context of talking about guilt that I think all survivors feel. A lot of what I describe in this book has nothing to do with the particular personality of David Rieff, or the particular personality, let alone celebrity, of Susan Sontag. From my experience in hospital wards, talking to family members of dying people, I think that a lot of what I describe is the common experience of people. I hope the book is helpful in that way.

So it’s wrong for me to read into this that you wish you had put some of your own needs aside and accommodated your mother more?

I do wish that. But I know it’s preposterous. I think it’s the commonplace guilt of survivors. The wonderful doctor and writer Jerome Groopman likes to quotes Kierkegaard that life can only be understood retrospectively but has to be lived prospectively. That seems just right. The other part — that she made better use of the world — I don’t think that’s self-effacing. That’s a fact. If there’s one thing I’m vain about, it’s that I’m willing to stare facts in the face. And my mother enjoyed the world more than I do. She did more things in the world than I do. She took more pleasure in the world than I do. Those are all facts. I don’t think that’s a particularly strange or masochistic thing to say.

As you look back over your mother’s career, how do you think she’ll be remembered? How should she be remembered?

I hope she’ll be remembered as a person who did good work, was serious, and didn’t give in to the kind of cheap easy way outs that intellectuals in our culture so often give in to. As far as the relevance or importance of her work in the context of the long history of literature and criticism, I think history will sort that out. That’s above my pay grade to say.

I interviewed your mother a couple of times late in her life. I was stunned by how dismissive she was of those dazzling essays that she wrote in the ’60s and that made her famous. When I asked her about one of her early critiques of the novel, in which she wrote, “I could not stand the omnipotent author showing me that’s how life is, making me compassionate and tearful,” she called that comment “juvenilia,” and said, “It’s really hard to be nailed to what one wrote 35 or 40 years ago.” And she went on to say that she no longer liked to write essays, saying, “I can do so much more as a novelist.” Why do you think she was so dismissive of her essays?

It’s funny. I think she’s right. And the idea that one is going to think the same thing at 68, or whenever you did the interview, as one did at 31 would suggest lack of growth.

Do you think her great achievement was the fiction she wrote in her last years?

I think [her 1992 novel] “The Volcano Lover” is the best thing she ever did.

But she is most famous for those essays she wrote in the ’60s and ’70s. She was a cultural critic of renown who had fascinating things to say about art and the avant-garde, not to mention various writers. You’re saying that’s not how she should be remembered in the future?

It’s not for me to say how she should be remembered. I’m not Solon the law giver. I don’t think, however, that the fact that she became famous has very much to do with the quality of her work. It’s indisputable, as you say, that that’s what brought her to national and then international attention. But that doesn’t mean that was what was most valuable about her work. But I don’t think she would have repudiated a lot of the essays she wrote. It’s just that she changed her mind about the novel. She was much more interested in experimental art when she was young than she became later in life. She didn’t want to be an essay writer, but she continued to write essays, although they came harder and harder throughout her career.

Your mother was an iconic figure in intellectual circles, not just because of what she wrote but how she looked and acted. Women in particular talked about her enormous cultural significance. She became the model of an intellectual woman who had both great flair and moral profundity. Why do you think she gained that stature?

Why people capture imaginations is a mysterious process. I agree with you entirely that she captured the imagination of a certain time and became famous, and then I think did really good work and backed it up. But why she became so celebrated, what the combination of elements were — her public role in the anti-Vietnam movement and other political events; her looks — I’m sure it was a complicated combination.

I’m sure you were aware of that mystique as you were growing up, the fact that your mother cut such a distinctive figure. Did you feel privileged? Intimidated?

No, not intimidated. It was a complicated experience. I felt lots of things, not all of them resting easily together. I had very complicated feelings, as one does about one’s parents. I mean, this book may be of interest because people have heard of my mother. If that’s what it is, there’s nothing I can do about it. I hope it has some relevance to people who’ve never heard of Susan Sontag, let alone of me. But I can’t control how people read a book. In fact, I think once you write a book, it doesn’t belong to you anymore.

I came across a photo of you and your mother that ran many years ago in Vogue magazine. You were probably 12 or 13 at the time. Her arm is draped over your shoulder. You’re wearing a John Lennon cap.

Yeah, it’s an Irving Penn picture.

Was it a heady experience to get that kind of attention for a boy at your age?

You mean the Macaulay Culkin syndrome? [Pause] I took it for granted in the world that I grew up in. I didn’t think it was particularly odd. I knew children of well-known people in my school and other places. “Heady?” I wouldn’t have said.

Do you think you became a writer because of your mother’s example?

No, I think I became a writer in spite of her. I don’t mean in the sense that she opposed it. On the contrary, she was very pleased that I was a writer and encouraged me in every way. I was one of those kids who was always writing stories and thoughts and all that. Fortunately, I don’t keep my journals. So after I’m gone, nobody is going to be able to publish them. Also, I wasn’t a prodigy. My mother was a prodigy as a child.

When I say “in spite of,” what I mean is that when I saw that I still wanted to write in my early 20s, I thought very consciously, “Oh, if I become a writer, I will spend the first 10 years of my career having anyone who reviews a book of mine say, ‘David Rieff, Susan Sontag’s son.’” And I didn’t want to go through that. And I was too unwilling to pay that price, so it took me a long time to become a writer and pay that price, which I did. For the first 10 years of my career, that’s indeed what happened. Eventually, I did enough work so people got bored connecting me to my mother.

Do you think it’s not an accident that the area you carved out for yourself as a writer — going to war-torn countries and covering foreign affairs — was very different from what your mother wrote about?

It wasn’t conscious but it certainly makes sense. I never thought about it. But I’m sure it’s true. It’s too obvious not to be true.

I’ve heard that your mother had a wonderful and vast collection of books in her apartment. What happened to those books?

They were sold to UCLA.

So not just her papers, but the books, too?

Yes, the library as well. It’s all at UCLA.

You didn’t want the books yourself?

They weren’t mine to keep. She’d sold them. I have a library anyway. I come from a line of people who have private libraries. It’s a weird thing in this age of the Internet. My mother had a big library. My father had a big library. I have a big library. They’re stand-alone projects.

Steve Paulson is the executive producer of Wisconsin Public Radio's nationally syndicated program "To the Best of Our Knowledge." He has also been a Templeton-Cambridge Journalism Fellow in Science & Religion.

Saturday Morning Gift

A short film based on a real interview with a young boy who survived the 2006 war in Lebanon

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Filmmaker Bassel Shahade, who directed “Saturday Morning Gift,” is 28 years old, a graduate of Syracuse University’s School of Visual and Performing Art and a very brave young filmmaker. Unfortunately, he is also missing. Shahade traveled to Syria to document the unrest and, he hasn’t been heard from in months. If you have any information on his whereabouts, please notify us via studio [at] salon.com.

When dictators tweet

Arab despots are starting to use Facebook and Twitter to strike back against democracy activists

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When dictators tweet Bahrain's King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa waves as he leaves 10 Downing Street in London, December 12, 2011 (Credit: Reuters/Finbarr O'Reilly)
This article originally appeared on GlobalPost.

DOHA, Qatar — Twitter and Facebook have been widely credited with enabling citizens to upend dictatorial regimes.

Global Post

But while oppressive governments were initially caught off guard by the new media tools, those still in power appear finally to be catching on. In some cases they are happily embracing social networking to play Big Brother in a way never before possible.

Many governments struggling with dissent appear to be using a double-barreled strategy to fight back against the so-called Facebook revolutions: classic repression and by promoting their own views using the very same platforms.

“The thought police already have a presence online in these countries,” said Mohamed Abdel Dayem, the Middle East and North Africa program coordinator for the Committee to Protect Journalists. “And they have a very heavy presence on Twitter, Facebook and other social media networks. They go out there and intimidate people. And they accuse people of being heathens. And call for their heads.”

Jeffrey Ghannam, a media lawyer and analyst in Washington, thinks the propaganda strategy will win out over subjugation.

“It’s my sense that Arab governments will focus less on control, filtering and blocking — though those efforts will not completely disappear — and begin to assert their own views in the Arab cyberspace,” he said.

“Consider the cases of so-called Bahraini twitter trolls and the Syrian cyber attacks that go after critics of these respective Arab regimes. The official Arab government view is increasingly in the mix,” he said. “Another example is the way the SCAF (Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed Forces) uses Facebook and Twitter. It may not be beautifully done, and it does draw tens of thousands of critical remarks online that are viewable, but the SCAF is contributing its views. These are all significant developments and point to increasing government engagement in the Arab cyberspace.”

Some of the official efforts smack of classic public relations techniques.

In Bahrain, the government launched an online campaign called “We Are All Hamad,” asking supporters to post pictures of Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s ruler, on their Facebook and Twitter pages.

In Tunisia, government officials, including President Moncef Marzouki (@Moncef_Marzouki) have joined Twitter. The royal family in Jordan, as well as the mayor of Amman, Jordan’s capital, also use Facebook and Twitter to speak directly to constituents.

These regimes, however, have a long history of using heavy-handed tactics and are apparently not about to give up on old habits. Many, in fact, have learned that social media can help identify potential targets of their crackdown.

This nascent trend, however, has not led authorities in these countries and elsewhere to give up old habits. Many have continued to opt for the more traditional and heavy-handed response.

Last month, for instance, Moroccan authorities arrested 18-year-old college student Walid Bahomane on charges of “defaming Morocco’s sacred values” by posting unflattering pictures and videos on Facebook that poked fun at King Mohammed VI. Authorities also convicted another student, Abdelsamad Haydour, 24, earlier in the month for criticizing the ruler in a video posted on YouTube.

These developments have taken place in a country largely praised for its response to citizen discontent over the past year. In November, Morocco held peaceful parliamentary elections as part of a governmental reform process initiated by the king that also included a new constitution.

In Saudi Arabia, 23-year-old journalist Hamza Kashgari faces charges of blasphemy, an offence that carries the death sentence, for tweeting an imaginary conversation he was having with the Prophet Muhammad. The uproar over Kashgari’s comments prompted the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh, to issue a fatwa against Twitter, which he told “real Muslims” to avoid as a “platform for trading accusations and for promoting lies,” according to an article in The National.

And in Jordan, a masked assailant on Feb. 20 stabbed university student Enass Musallam after he published a blog post that criticized a member of the Jordanian royal family.

Authorities in the region are now also turning to old laws — such as emergency laws, anti-terrorism laws and press laws — to justify the arrest, fines and incarceration of individuals for online expression.

“When the internet and social media blogs were just starting to become popular, press laws were only applied to the mainstream media. But that’s no longer the case as these media platforms continue to converge,” said Courtney Radsch, program manager for the Global Freedom of Expression Campaign at Freedom House in New York.

Earlier this month, for instance, authorities in the United Arab Emirates arrested pro-democracy activist Saleh al-Dhufairi for tweets criticizing the UAE’s decision to deport Syrian expatriates who demonstrated outside their consulate in Dubai without a permit.

“Saleh al-Dhufairi has been arrested on accusation of spreading ideas by speech, writing and any other means that provoke strife, hurt national unity, and social peace,” a spokesman for Dubai police said in a statement.

Al-Dhufairi’s arrest is a scare tactic by a government that is itself scared of any significant dissent, CPJ’s Abdel Dayem.

“Events are occurring that are of monumental political weight and have very far reaching implications. So what happens in Tunisia matters in the Gulf and what happens in Syria matters in the Gulf,” Abdel Dayem said. “These are obviously separate political entities and separate states but there is a Pan-Arab media consumed across borders, so journalists, bloggers, regular citizens and everyone else is exploring these new found venues for expression.”

“They are testing government tolerance for criticism, not just in Libya, Egypt and Yemen where there was an actual change in the political arrangement, but also in countries where there hasn’t been change.”

And these governments in turn are testing their responses, said popular UAE commentator Sultan Al Qassemi, who has more than 100,000 followers on Twitter.

“What we are seeing today is part of the teething process of accepting social media as an avenue of communication and criticism of society and government in the Gulf,” Qassemi said. “As the adoption of social media tools grows in the Gulf there will naturally be a larger output of opinions, some less agreeable to the authorities than others.”

Citizen journalists, bloggers and average citizens who run afoul of the law for expressing their opinions online must also contend with inadequate legal representation.

“This is a new realm for many lawyers in these countries. It requires training and requires a level of experience with the technology and that’s lacking in many countries if not all,” Radsch said. “Certainly, in the U.S. where you’ve had a longer history with internet-based content you have some more sophistication there.

But in many of these countries, blogging really just got going in 2004 and 2005.”

“With the advent of TV, you saw fewer cases against broadcasters at the beginning because it was still new and they were figuring things out, but you’re going to continue to see this battle between governments and citizens play out,” she said.

This time, however, the very nature of the internet and social networking might be enough to break the cycle.

“One thing is different,” Radsch said. “There are a lot more stakeholders and users of social media. The mainstream media is owned by a few and provides jobs for a few more but the vested interest across the broad swath of the public using social media could mean far more stakeholders could fight for the right to keep this space open.”

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The growing U.S.-Israel divide over Iran

A flurry of meetings between the two countries reveal disagreements about when and whether to resort to force

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The growing U.S.-Israel divide over IranIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Barack Obama
This article originally appeared on GlobalPost.

JERUSALEM — On Monday, both Israeli President Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Ehud Barak head to Washington for separate but urgent meetings, a day after Iran beat Israel at an indisputably benign competition, the Oscars in which the Iranian film, “A Separation,” beat Israel’s “Footnote” for best Foreign Film.

Global PostThe matter was at the root of wry commentary accompanying a flurry of visits not seen in years.

In the past few weeks, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon have all held high level meetings in Jerusalem. Barak is scheduled to meet with Panetta and with Vice President Joe Biden. Peres will meet with President Barack Obama, as will Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who will fly to Washington for a much anticipated meeting on March 5.

The subject at hand is nuclear Iran — not the movie version, and not even the proxy war version, which has seen the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, the attempted assassinations of Israeli diplomats, and genial computer viruses attack Iranian nuclear installations, making centrifuges spiral out of control, as in Hollywood’s imagination.

On the eve of the Israelis’ Washington visits, there is a divergence of opinion between the United States and Israel regarding the utility of the recently hardened sanctions on Iran, and a growing apprehension on both sides about what the other may be prepared to accept from the Islamic Republic’s leadership.

Eytan Gilboa, an expert on U.S.-Israel bilateral relations who holds posts at Bar Ilan University and at the University of Southern California, said the situation is stark and in some ways unprecedented.

“The Obama administration has little trust in Netanyahu and vice versa. The new sanctions that have been imposed have produced economic hardship in Tehran, but this does not mean they are working. To work, they have to change the Iranian government’s policy toward nuclear development, and this has not yet happened.”

“The UN Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has just announced that Iran has substantially increased enrichment, which seems to contradict American statements that have appeared in all the media suggesting that Iran has not yet made the decision whether to develop nuclear weapons.”

Two points of dispute stand out in creating what Sen. John McCain, also on a visit to Israel last week, called the “daylight” between the two countries regarding Iran’s nuclear plan.

The first is the question of what constitutes unacceptable progress toward the manufacture of an armed nuclear device, or, in Barak’s words, Iran’s entry into a “zone of immunity.” The other is the extent of uranium enrichment at a nuclear site near the holy city of Qum, which was highlighted by the IAEA report.

The United States and Israel agree that the secret underground structure is better protected from a possible military strike than other known Iranian facilities. But from that point of agreement, different conclusions are drawn.

Israeli analysts believe Iran is moving fast toward a nuclear military option, and taking advantage of the pressure of sanctions and the time granted by European offers to negotiate in order to assemble all the parts necessary to build a bomb. The United States, which is in the midst of an election year, meanwhile, thinks sanctions may yet bring Iran — “if it is behaving as a rational actor,” in Gilboa’s words — to negotiate.

“The process is preparing everything for the building of bombs, with the aim of creating all the parts and then needing only a very short period of time to assemble a weapon. So it is just playing with words if we say that we don’t know whether they have made a decision. If you produce all the parts, it is obvious that means you intend to produce a bomb,” Gilboa said.

“I think that what Obama wants from Netanyahu next week is a commitment not to strike Iran at least until the American election, to give heavier sanctions a chance and not to surprise the United States.”

Gilboa does not believe Israel would attack Iranian nuclear installations without notifying the Americans beforehand.

Still, he points out, “The current situation is unprecedented. The U.S. has never before asked Israel to refrain from military action, and Israel has never before asked the U.S. for permission. This is all new ground.”

The 1981 Israel Air Force attack on Osirak, Saddam Hussein’s French-built nuclear reactor is now ancient history. In that campaign however, only eight jets were involved.

The New York Times estimated that at least 100 Israeli fighter planes would be needed today for a crippling attack on Iran. At the time of the Osirak strike, the United States angrily condemned Israel. But in 2005, former President Bill Clinton said, “Everybody talks about what the Israelis did at Osirak in 1981, which I think, in retrospect, was a really good thing.”

The current disagreement between Israel and the United States seem not to be on the substance of Iran’s nuclear program, or even on the possibility of a necessary, last-resort, military strike, but on the timetable and method of response to the threat.

Many Israeli analysts believe the Obama administration and Europe are not convinced that the full effect of sanctions has yet been felt. Israelis are concerned that by the time they are felt, possibly by next summer, when Europe’s oil embargo on Iran is scheduled to go into effect, it might be too late.

“What Obama would like is to put the crippling sanctions to the test. He thinks that the sanctions being used this time, alongside the oil embargo, will actually have an impact,” said Tel Aviv University professor Uzi Rabi, the director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies.

“He is in effect saying to Israel, don’t surprise us. We want to be updated from A to Z. The second thing, I think Israel is being asked is to play down the shadow war and really just let sanctions work. If the sanctions are going to be fully implemented it could inflict a lethal blow on the Iranian regime, and since what we are talking about is the survival of the regime itself, this could be very effective.”

As to Israel, Rabi says, “It would like to make sure everybody knows that from its point of view, a nuclear Iran is unbearable. This combination of ayatollahs and power is something that poses an existential threat to Israel, and it is something Israel is really afraid of. What Israel thinks is the right thing to do is to make sure the military option is not only on the table, but actually feasible.”

Not many in Israel think that Iran, even with a nuclear weapon in hand, would attack Tel Aviv.

“Based on rational thinking, which is not one of the strongest characteristics of the Middle East, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it would be tantamount to suicide were they to use them. Iran would be wiped out by Israel’s second strike capability and by American nukes,” Gilboa said.

“I think they want them in order to acquire hegemony in the Middle East. By becoming a nuclear power they can threaten anybody. The power of threat is much more than the power of destruction.”

Gilboa predicts that next week Netanyahu will ask Obama how he plans to ensure Iran’s non-nuclear status in the event sanctions fail to cripple the nuclear program, and that Obama “will evade the answers.”

Rabi says “Israel is afraid to be left alone. I don’t think Iran would attack Israel. But their actions provide a source of inspiration for lunatic radical movements like Hamas and Hezbollah, and the fact that they are attacking Israelis in Baku, Delhi and Tbilisi, though ineffective for now, show that this is a state that could act in accordance with the modus operandi of a terrorist group. This has very negative implications for the stability of the Middle East.”

Not all Israeli experts see in the commotion of transatlantic visits and consultations evidence of tension between the United States and Israel. Shlomo Shpiro, vice chair of the Department of Politics at Bar Ilan University, believes those claims to be overstated.

“I think there anxiety among some in the U.S. administration who fear that a powerful Israeli military action against Iran could have an impact on the election in November. I don’t think there is tension. A whole range of senior American officials have been visiting Israel almost on a weekly basis.”

“I think the threat assessment is very similar in Washington and in Jerusalem,” he adds. “I think Obama is very concerned about the possibility of Iran getting nuclear weapons. Both are very worried, and both countries agree the process is moving quickly. The disagreement is only about how to prevent or delay it.”

Any Israeli military option, Shpiro says, would be a “last resort.”

“But if it comes to a last resort, I think Israel’s leadership will not hesitate. It all depends on the progress of Iran’s nuclear program and on information that the U.S. and Israel obtain about that program.”

For now, the war of nerves will play on, with Israel pressuring the U.S. and Europe to fully implement severe sanctions as soon as possible, and demanding assurances, perhaps impossible to give, about what the West will do if sanctions do not deter Iran.

The psychological warfare, many say, may lead Iran to believe it can “safely assume it can continue with its plan to build nuclear weapons without much interference,” Gilboa said. “There is a possibility the Iranians are laughing at everybody. For example, why announce sanctions and then say you’ll impose them only in six months?”

“The Iranians are the only ones producing consistent statements, and this is our problem. Too many of the statements coming from the West are confusing and could be interpreted in any number of ways.”

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Hezbollah fights for relevance

The Shiite militia defends Iran's mullahs at the expense of the Arab Spring. Its best hope may be war with Israel

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Hezbollah fights for relevance Hassan Nasrallah (Credit: AP/Mahmoud Tawil)

Since the heady first days of the Arab Spring, it has become increasingly obvious that things are not quite as they seem.  Many of the idealistic, youth driven uprisings have been manipulated by great powers to serve a much bigger regional game.

The age old rivalry between Russia and the West is being played out in the Middle-East, pitting the largely Sunni Muslim Arab states against Russia’s ally  in the region- Iran. An important player bridging the gap between Shi’ite Iran and the Arab Sunnis is Lebanon’s Shi’ite resistance movement known as Hezbollah (Party of God.)

Hezbollah has enjoyed enormous popularity across the entire region, perceived by many as the champions of the Arab world, successfully standing up to the bully in the playground, Israel. There was a time when the portrait of Hassan Nasrallah hung on the walls of homes and cafes from Baghdad to Casablanca. Yet, following a relatively cool reception of Nasrallah’s speech on the 16th of February , one got the distinct impression that the Lebanese resistance leader may not enjoy the same popularity he once did with the Arab masses.

A simple explanation might be Hezbollah’s unequivocal support for Bashar el-Assad’s regime in Syria.  In a speech broadcast by al-Manar on May 25th 2011, Nasrallah declared his group’s strong support for the Assad regime. He hailed Syria for its support of the Resistance movement in Lebanon and Palestine. Many have been unable to comprehend why the former champions of the resistance would side with the regime against the people, especially considering Hezbollah’s unreserved support for the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain. This has eroded the party’s popularity not only among Sunnis in Syria, who dominate the opposition, but also in the Arab world at large as regional tensions intensify between Shi’ite Iran and the predominantly Sunni Arab states.

Ironically, the very cause which won Hezbollah respect from thousands across the region, also, lost them the support of their own people. Throughout the 1990s, the Lebanese, regardless of sect, were united by Hezbollah’s resistance to the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and again in 2006 when Israel threatened reinvasion. However, critics point to Hezbollah’s reluctance to disarm as the main source of national instability. Lebanese political leader Samir Geagea asserting that “The ones who are involving Lebanon [in crises] are those wielding power outside the Lebanese state” and demanding that Hezbollah put down its arms and integrate itself with the official Lebanese army and government.

In a similar vein, Hezbollah has alienated many followers by becoming embroiled in a petty tit-for-tat exchange with the March 14 coalition over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq el-Hariri.  Many, regardless of their politics, had respected Nasrallah for his commitment to his cause and ability to avoid entanglement in party politics.

Though not Hezbollah’s fault, as such, the persisting devastation of the socio-economic condition and infrastructure of southern Lebanon has also served as a harsh reminder, to the organisation’s critics, of the consequences of war with Israel

In the Asia Times, Sami Moubayed, points out Hassan Nasrallah’s total withdrawal from public life in Lebanon in recent years; choosing to address his supporters on live television rather than the massive public rallies for which he has been famed. His disappearance has been due to security fears. However, this has made it difficult for followers to connect with him. It is, also, now harder to draw in new supporters from across the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Despite their somewhat dented popularity, Hezbollah is still massively important on a strategic level, with regard to predicting the outcome of unrest in Syria.

In a speech broadcast by al-Manar on the 25th August 2011, Nasrallah named Syria as a very important ally in the region “The Syrian support has been crucial. A great part of the Iranian support comes through Syria. If it had not been for the will of Syria, even the Iranian support would have been blocked”.  So, it is reasonable to assume that the fall of the Assad regime would serve a tremendous blow to Hezbollah, but also, act as catalyst to a power struggle within the country. A regime in Syria based on the Sunni Muslim majority would most likely be more friendly to Hezbollah’s local rivals in the March 14 coalition. Such a regime would also have good relations with regional powers that have severe disagreements with the Hezbollah movement over sectarian and political issues.

Prof. Joseph Bahout at Sciences Po in Paris notes that, in such a situation, Hezbollah would be faced with two alternatives, if faced with waning support from Syria “will Hizballah gradually become more flexible in terms of Lebanonization and civilianization? Or, on the contrary, will it increasingly pursue a radical position and bitterly defend its share of the Lebanese system while echoing Tehran’s dictum that Assad’s rule in Syria is a red line?” Judging by Hezbollah’s stern rhetoric over the past few months, the leadership has already decided on the latter and will continue to stand by the Assad regime.

Perhaps, most dangerously, Hezbollah also play an extremely important strategic role in what has been suggested as an imminent conflict between Israel and Iran. Would Israel be capable of conducting an aerial battle with Iran at the same time as defending itself against Hezbollah, closer to home?

Ha’aretz commentator Yoel Marcus thinks not, saying that a strike on Iran would be out of Israel’s league and points to cautions issued by former Mossad chief Meir Dagan against attacking Iran, amidst concerns that such a move would drag Israel into a regional war, which would involve Hezbollah, Hamas and possibly Syria.

Tensions have been escalating between Israel and Iran for some time, recently, heightened following attacks on Israeli embassies in India, Thailand and Georgia. An official for the Israeli counter terrorism bureau, quoted in Ha’aretz warned Israelis of further attacks and noted that Nasrallah’s threats of revenge for the 2008 assassination of Hezbollah commander Imad Mughaniyeh were being taken into account.  Nasrallah categorically denied any involvement in the explosions in his speech on February 16th.

But what would such a conflict mean for the Arab world at large? It seems unlikely that Egyptians, Jordanians or, the Palestinians, all not so embroiled in the sectarian debate, would support Israel in any conflict against Muslims whether they be in Lebanon or, in Iran. However, countries in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) might have more to gain from a weakened Iran.

The GCC have been concerned about Iran’s capabilities, behavior and intentions for a long time, but it takes on an additional importance in light of the Arab Spring. This has certainly been the case in Egypt and Bahrain, in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, possibly in Yemen, and now in Syria.

GCC countries have repeatedly accused Tehran of attempting to destabilise their internal security, and attempting to instigate sectarian strife. Iran has rejected these accusations, and pointed to the GCC’s appalling treatment of Shi’ite citizens. Particularly, concerning the brutal suppression of the largely Shi’ite uprising in Bahrain against the Sunni al-Khalifa monarchy, a struggle which was obviously covered up by Gulf sponsored media such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya.

Tensions have also been rising over Iran’s ability to developing nuclear weapons, something that is already of great concern to the GCC. Without a nuclear advantage, the Gulf far outguns Iran in terms of military capability, although, Iran is not reluctant to use its geopolitical position and has threatened to close off the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil passes, if pressured.

When placed in the context of a larger regional conflict between Israel and Iran, Hezbollah plays an absolutely crucial part as an ally of Iran, especially in the absence of Syria. Yet, when the financial might of the GCC is also turned against Iran, Hezbollah, which is ultimately a financially dependent arm of Iran, becomes inconsequential.

It is possible that Hezbollah may look to find solutions to its waning popularity, and a possible run in with the GCC, by pre-emptively launching a strike against Israel. In his speech on Feburary 16th, Nasrallah ambiguously claimed that “We have arms and they are increasing [in number]. We have well-known weapons and there are others which are hidden and unknown. We are hiding them because we need to protect our country and prepare surprises for the Israelis.” Whilst this may be an empty threat, a Hezbollah spokesman has said that the organisation would be willing to go to war with Israel, should Syria be attacked. It seems likely that the same logic would apply if an attack were to be staged against Iran.

Prof. Juan Cole has said that, in the case of a conflict with Iran, Hezbollah would almost certainly launch a rocket attack, which would threaten up to a quarter of the Israeli population. The casualties might be even worse if Hezbollah is able to target toxic gas storage in Haifa or nuclear reactors in Dimona and Nahal Sorek. Already Israel has been taking steps to shut down these facilities, in the event of an attack.

This seems to be a departure from Nasrallah’s statement in 2006, shortly after the 34 day war between Hezbollah and Israel, when he told Lebanon’s NTV that had he would not have ordered the capture of two Israeli soldiers, had he known that this would lead to such devastation. However, six years on, the situation between Iran and Israel has escalated, and for Hezbollah this has become a battle for existence. In an earlier speech, February 7th, Nasrallah admitted that the organisation has been completely dependent on Iran for “moral, political and financial support” since 1982.

Hezbollah has found itself in the unenviable position of choosing between its Iranian financial backer and its Arab popular support base. Ironically, Hezbollah’s only hope may be an Israelis attack on Iran, thus gaining it some support, once more, as the champion of resistance against the Zionist aggressor. But should the pressure on Iran be laid on by the Gulf states, Hezbollah will be left with no alternative but to cut its ties with Iran or, face complete irrelevance within the Arab world.

 

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Why Obama won’t intervene in Syria

Despite some superficial similarities, it's not another Libya

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Why Obama won't intervene in SyriaSyrian rebels (Credit: AP)

Syria looks like Libya all over again. A brutal dictator uses his military to repress his country’s protests. A civil war erupts. And, oh yes, a split opens among American liberals over what to do about it.

With a few notable exceptions, the conservative movement has been of one mind on foreign policy issues since 9/11. All right-wingers supported the Afghanistan war, and virtually all supported Iraq, as well. Every conservative believes President Obama has been a craven appeaser of America’s enemies, and now all believe that pressure should increase against Iran, even if that means another war in the Middle East.

Liberals have shown no such unanimity. They were divided not only on Iraq but also on President Bush’s 2006 surge, Obama’s Afghanistan escalation, and the intervention in Libya. Views fall roughly along two lines. Dominating the party since Bill Clinton’s ascension are liberal hawks who believe it is in America’s interest to use military power abroad to promote human rights and expand democracy. More popular among the rank-and-file of the Democratic Party are attitudes skeptical of the use of force in major wars. (The only exception to this split is over the use of drones, which nearly all Democrats support).

Though Barack Obama opposed the Iraq War when he was a state legislator, as president he is closer to the liberal hawks camp. The best account we have of the decision-making on Libya, from Michael Hastings in Rolling Stone, has the president explicitly declaring that America needs to have an expanded conception of its role in the world. Just looking after its own affairs, attending to its national interests, is “not how America leads,” Obama said. The rationale Obama employed in a speech delivered at the National Defense University in March of 2011 was the closest he has come to defining an Obama doctrine.

On the surface, the criteria that Obama outlined in his Libya speech are present in Syria: impending and ongoing massacres; a multilateral coalition led by America’s traditional allies; and an opportunity to side with the people in a crucial state in the Arab spring. For this reason, many liberal writers have called on the U.S. to intervene. Paul Berman has signed onto a conservative-led letter to the president asking him to intervene in Syria. The New Republic has an entire symposium with intellectuals (mostly) asking Obama to side militarily with the Syrian resistance. “Lead again from behind!” Leon Wieseltier exhorts. Especially powerful is a heartfelt plea for American help from a Syrian activist in Washington:

If the United States does successfully build a partnership with Syria’s democratic opposition right now, at its time of greatest need, it will have earned a steadfast regional ally for the long-term. Indeed, Syria’s political future, and its future alliances, are currently up for grabs. In that way, there are important strategic, as well as humanitarian, issues at stake.

Pressure is building in Congress. Republican Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who both serve on the Armed Services Committee, have argued for arming the Syrian rebels. Obama’s former State Department policy planning head Anne-Marie Slaughter was among the first to call for intervention. In late January, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said it’s only “a question of time” before President Bashar al Assad falls. In December, the State Department pointman said Syria’s leader was a “dead man walking.” More recently, White House press secretary said on Tuesday that “additional measures” such as rebel-arming may need to be taken if the international community keeps dithering.

There are two significant reasons the administration has not pushed for military intervention, however. First, the international consensus that existed on Libya is not present in Syria. Russia and China vetoed a Western- and Arab-sponsored U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian government. Imagining that they would agree to a military intervention is simply fanciful.

What hasn’t been much discussed is why China and Russia vetoed the resolution. And here we circle back to Libya. The resolution authorizing military action in Libya was limited to protecting civilians in Benghazi and other areas. NATO and its allies quickly went beyond the scope of this mandate, using airpower to assist the rebels in defeating Col. Gadhafi and his forces. Such actions may have been morally justified, but they didn’t go unnoticed by the Chinese and Russians, who are extremely sensitive to infringements on state sovereignty (lest they be targeted one day). Tellingly, foes of the proposed Syria resolution explained their decision in terms of national sovereignty. Russia’s foreign minister said that “the Security Council by definition does not engage in domestic affairs of member states.” Russia’s U.N. envoy faulted the resolution for aiming at “regime change,” even though the wording of the text notably did not call for it and the Arab states explicitly rejected Western military intervention.

The second reason Libya isn’t acting as a template for Syria is one of logistics. As Middle East expert Marc Lynch has explained, “Military intervention in Syria has little prospect of success, a high risk of disastrous failure, and a near-certainty of escalation which should make the experience of Iraq weigh extremely heavily on anyone contemplating such an intervention.” The Syrian opposition, impressive and courageous as they have been, is divided, weak and controls no territory. Air power of the sort the West can provide would not be effective in preventing civilian deaths, and the fighting is taking place in densely populated cities. For these reasons and more, a Libya-style no-fly zone simply won’t fly.

Eventually, the Syrian government’s efforts to suppress the rebellion may be so bloody that the Obama administration feels compelled to intervene. But so far, the conditions that were present in Libya are not present in Syria. It may be a double standard, and one that liberal hawks are not comfortable with, but it is one with good reason.

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Jordan Michael Smith writes about U.S. foreign policy for Salon. He has written for the New York Times, Boston Globe and Washington Post.

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