The coming earthquake

Having failed on the battlefield, Israelis question their leadership and their national direction.

By Aluf Benn

Read more: Israel, Ariel Sharon, Lebanon, Opinion, Hezbollah, Ehud Olmert

Photo: AP/Oded Balilty

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert addresses a special session of the Knesset Aug. 14, 2006.

Aug. 14, 2006 | Israelis are digesting their lack of success in the month-old war against Hezbollah in Lebanon -- formally ended as a United Nations-sponsored cease-fire went into force early Monday morning -- and the country is gearing up for a postwar political bloodbath and national soul-searching over goals, aims and priorities.

Israelis were surprised by the visible inability of their military, considered the strongest and most sophisticated in the Middle East, to defeat a guerrilla army of a few thousand fighters. Having become accustomed to quick victories against Arab armies, as in the wars of the past, the current reality in Lebanon has been unprecedented and unexpected.

Israelis were astonished by Hezbollah's seemingly intact ability to hit northern Israel with a daily barrage of 100-200 rockets, holding about a million people in shelters, regardless of what the Israel Defense Force was doing to the Lebanese. And they were shocked by the government's incompetence in dealing with the plight of the Israeli civilian population in the rear. The fact that Lebanon's civilians have been hit much harder was hardly comforting.

And last, but not least, Israelis were unprepared for the war in Lebanon -- which remained off the public agenda in recent years -- or for the length of the war. The world, and especially the American administration, stood by and allowed the shooting, killing and destruction to go on without turning over the famous "diplomatic hourglass" to stop the belligerents in their tracks.

To the older generation, the current mood in Israel is similar to that in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. Back in October 1973, the country lost thousands of men in the Sinai and Golan Hieghts battlefields. The Yom Kippur duel opened with a timed surprise attack by Egypt and Syria, and ended with a narrow Israeli victory, as the IDF stood closer to Cairo and Damascus than before the war. In 2006, the military and political leaders are trying in vain to convince the public that the war ended in Israel's favor.

In both cases, the enemy shocked Israelis with its willingness and ability to fight, and the public sank into despair and got angry with a dysfunctional leadership. But unlike in 1973, this time the civilians in the rear were among the 150 casualties, and there was extensive rocket damage to many cities. And unlike in 1973, there were no "winning images" like Ariel Sharon's crossing of the Suez Canal, which turned the tide of the war on the Egyptian front. Instead, the world saw images of a thousand Lebanese casualties, most of them civilians.

Ehud Olmert, Israel's prime minister, is now fighting for his political survival. Olmert decided to go to war almost instantly after hearing that Hezbollah had abducted two IDF soldiers and killed eight others in a cross-border attack on July 12. The country's nerves were already wrecked by a similar ambush and abduction conducted by Hamas near Gaza, and Olmert felt that he must react forcefully to the additional provocation on the Lebanese border. His credibility as a leader was in question, as both he and Amir Peretz, the defense minister, had had no experience in war and peace matters. So they decided to hit back. Sharon, Israel's best battlefield commander, or Ehud Barak, the IDF's most decorated soldier, could say that "restraint is strength" without losing face. But not Olmert, who hardly did any military service, or Peretz, a former junior ordnance officer. Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, even mocked his adversaries' inexperience.

Before the recent escalation on both fronts, Gaza in the south and Lebanon in the north, Olmert and Peretz were trying to sell their lack of military background as a virtue -- namely, that "civilian leaders" are better suited to lead contemporary Israel than their ex-general predecessors. The civvies, argued their supporters, would bring a fresh attitude to their jobs, rather than "watching the Arabs through the gun sights" like Sharon, whom Olmert replaced in early January. Peretz, a former trade union boss, campaigned before the March 28 election on a "social-economic platform" and argued for shifting resources from defense to welfare programs.

Alas, their initiation to the violent realities of Israel's neighborhood occurred earlier than anybody had expected. On Aug. 12, the Olmert-Peretz coalition Cabinet marked its first 100 days in office. Rather than initiate foreign policy and domestic reforms, as it planned, the government is now preoccupied with security matters -- and will remain so for a while, if indeed it survives in power. Before the election, Olmert pledged to turn Israel into a country "that's fun to live in." Fun is now the last thing on the minds of Israelis. Tens of thousands are still mobilized in emergency reserve duty, or need to rebuild their ruined homes and businesses in northern cities and villages.

The Lebanon campaign has shown Israelis that military experience at the top is a necessity, rather than a luxury, in a country that has been at constant war with its Arab neighbors since its inception in 1948. Olmert and Peretz failed to grasp the subtleties of using military power, and unnecessarily prolonged the war in search of an elusive victory.

Next page: This final-hours operation achieved little, but cost the lives of 30 soldiers