Will Bush choose his new friends over his old?
The president's Shiite allies in Iraq really don't like some of James Baker's Sunni-friendly suggestions.
By Juan Cole
Read more: George W. Bush, Iran, James Baker, Iraq, Opinion, Juan Cole, Iraq Study Group
Photo:AP/Hadi Mizban
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, left, and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, of SCIRI, arrive to deliver a statement in Baghdad, Iraq, Sunday, Nov. 26, 2006.
Dec. 8, 2006 | At a press conference on Thursday, George Bush was asked whether he was "in denial" about Iraq. "It's bad in Iraq," he shot back, to laughter. "That help?" He also noted that the report of the James Baker-led Iraq Study Group, which was released Wednesday, was important enough that he had read it.
But the immediate speculation in Washington was that even if the president has really accepted that things are "bad," it doesn't mean he's ready to follow the ISG's advice on how to make things better. Some wondered which prescriptions he would ignore, while others suggested he might be trying to sabotage the ISG's suggested remedies altogether.
The reality is that the president, via briefings, has probably long been aware of what the ISG report would say. In fact, when Bush met Iraq's two leading Shiite politicians in the week just prior to the report's release, he was almost certainly acquainting Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq party chief Abdul Aziz al-Hakim with the ISG's key proposals.
It is also true, however, that there are parts of the report that run counter to Bush's own strategy in Iraq, and not just in terms of how long to stay. In a real sense, Bush has developed Iraqi constituencies and political allies. Bush has already picked his horses in Iraq, and they are Shiite. And that puts him at odds with the panelists of the ISG, most notably James Baker, the very Bush family loyalist whose efforts on his behalf in Florida six years ago helped land him in the White House.
When Bush met with al-Maliki in Amman, Jordan, one week ago, the timely leak of a scathing memo on the eve of the summit suggested that the administration was trying to undermine the Iraqi prime minister. In the memo, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley wrote, "The reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests al-Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action." The memo apparently so angered the prime minister that he declined to show up at a banquet where he was scheduled to dine with Bush and with Jordan's King Abdullah II.
In reality, though some Washington insiders were pushing for a change behind the scenes, Bush claims he's not switching horses. At the conclusion of the summit, he publicly endorsed Maliki. "He's the right guy for Iraq and we're going to help him and it's in our interest to help him." The Shiite fundamentalist United Iraqi Alliance has come out on top in both of Iraq's parliamentary elections, and al-Maliki heads a key component of the UIA, the Islamic Call Party (al-Da'wa). He is in coalition with the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which has also done well in the polls. Bush decided that since al-Da'wa and SCIRI were winners in Iraqi politics, he would have to develop good relations with them. Sources in Washington confirm to me that Bush thinks of the two Shiite leaders as "our guys," and he has entertained Da'wa and SCIRI officials at private White House functions.
In turn, Bush and Maliki are in accord on several of the ISG's key proposals. The ISG report envisages that the Iraqi army "would take over primary responsibility for combat operations." Maliki has the same vision, and Bush likely met with him precisely in order to explore the issue of the prime minister's control over his own army. That the president was open to the further transfer of authority over the Iraqi army to al-Maliki suggests that this recommendation by the ISG will form part of administration policy. On Monday, U.S. commanders transferred control of the Third Iraqi Army Division, stationed in the northern province of Ninevah, to the prime minister. It was the third division to be put under Baghdad's control; seven others still take orders from the Pentagon.
The prime minister's own timeline for taking control of the remaining divisions is even more ambitious than that of the ISG. "At the beginning of next year we will increase the training of our forces," said al-Maliki. "When they reach an acceptable level, we can talk about transferring power from multinational forces to Iraqi forces." He has long maintained that the Iraqi military is capable of taking over more security tasks faster than Washington imagines. He told ABC news after the meeting with Bush in Amman, "I can tell you that by next June our forces will be ready."
Next page: He may be forced to choose between his new Iraqi friends and James Baker