Even under Trump, American democracy is not a lost cause — yet

In her latest book “The Backsliders: Why Leaders Undermine Their Own Democracies,” political scientist Susan C. Stokes traces the recent erosion of democracies around the world, including the United States under President Donald Trump and the MAGA movement. 

“In earlier eras,” she writes, “the main threat to democracy was the military coup, a threat confined to new democracies in poor countries. Now we face the prospect of democracy eating away at itself from within, and doing so in some wealthy and seemingly established systems. And whereas coups came as sudden explosions, impossible to hide, democratic backsliding has had a stealthy, gradual, slow-drip quality, making it harder for the population to realize what is happening until the process is well underway.”

Stokes, who serves as the Blake Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and directs the Chicago Center on Democracy at the University of Chicago, sees Trumpism as not just an American crisis, but a global one. 

I recently spoke with Stokes to better understand the ongoing collapse of American democracy and how this reflects a much larger global dynamic. This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

You just finished a book on global autocracy and our embattled democracies. Given the escalating political and social crisis in the United States — especially over the last few weeks — how are you feeling and trying to make sense of this all?

I’ve felt best when I am working with other people to try to push back, even in little ways. We may not have succeeded in these efforts, but it was invigorating to be around people who feel just as strongly as I do about the threats to our country’s democracy and civil society and to use whatever skills we have to try to make a difference. When we are isolated in such times as these, we feel much worse. I’ve felt the worst when I’ve felt isolated.

People ask me all the time what I think will happen with the age of Trump and what comes next. I tell them that these are the good times compared to what comes next: Enjoy them. What are you telling the people in your life?

I tell them that we now have an administration, with Trump back in the White House, that is basically authoritarian, but it is operating in a society that is still democratic. I also tell them there are realistic scenarios in which Trump sinks very low in public opinion and comes to be seen as a failed president. If this were to happen, Trump and his MAGA movement’s hold on the Republican Party would loosen, and they could lose elections badly enough that efforts to distort or steal them would be unlikely to succeed,

This scenario is by no means inevitable, but Trump’s insulation from wise counsel, his reckless treatment of the economy and other irresponsible behavior could result in such an outcome.

Blind optimism is not helpful for those Americans who want to save American democracy. But nor is it the case that democracy in our country is a lost cause. Moreover, pessimism can be immobilizing. The end of American democracy is not a fait accompli under Trump — yet.

How is America like other countries that have experienced the collapse of their democracies? How is it different?

I completed my book in 2024. It includes a table that explains the would-be autocrats’ “playbook” — the targets they take aim at [such as] the press, courts, opposition parties, etc. and gives examples of the kinds of actions that each target has experienced in various countries around the world. I divided these actions between “milder” and “more severe” actions or strategies. Actions by Donald Trump and his administration in his first term were typical of the playbook but generally milder than in several other countries. For example, with regard to the press, some backsliding governments beat up on the press verbally, as did Trump. Others elsewhere in the world closed down major publications and even turned a blind eye to the killing of journalists.

Now, as of mid-2025, some actions of the U.S. government under Trump appear even more extreme than in other eroding democracies around the world.

Given how quickly and how far the shift toward autocracy has gone under the second Trump administration, I am beginning to favor terms like “democratic breakdown” over “erosion” or “backsliding.” The latter terms suggest a gradual process. There is nothing gradual about [the] autocratization under Trump II.

Have scholars and the commentariat been too complacent about democratic backsliding under Trump? What does the data and other evidence tell us about the rise of autocracy and authoritarian populism and forms of illiberalism around the world? What are the trends?

[D]uring the first Trump administration, some scholars and commentators insisted that the country was safe from autocratization. This was understandable in a sense, given the well-known stealth with which democratic backsliders often act. (All stealth has gone by the wayside under Trump II.) And it is also the case that — again, in Trump I — scholars and commentators sometimes voiced more dire predictions than what actually happened.

The events of Jan. 6, 2021, sparked more clarity and — for a time — consensus around the idea that Trump was at least fully autocratic in his intentions and would take drastic action to carry those intentions out. But after he briefly retreated from the scene, there were some debates about whether the United States had returned to its normal state of democracy, or whether we dodged a dangerous bullet and experienced some good luck in avoiding a further descent into autocracy.

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The first eight months of Trump II have changed all of that. Those who deal in facts and who are paying attention are fairly uniformly terrified for the future of American democracy. There is much disagreement among experts about how to try to claw our way back to democracy in this country, but little serious disagreement about the dangerous state of affairs at present.

Trump has been described as putting the United States in…the orbit of autocratic and authoritarian regimes such as Russia and Hungary. Trump and the American right have literally modeled their attempts to end multiracial pluralistic democracy — and their assaults on civil society — on [Viktor] Orbán’s Hungary. 

Democracy-eroding leaders around the world come in basically two ideological flavors: Right-wing ethnonationalists or left-wing populists. (Though not all right-wing ethnonationalists or left-populists attack their democracies if they rise to power.) The right-wing ethnonationalist backsliders mobilize electoral support for themselves by vilifying minorities of various kinds, especially those with relatively little power or electoral clout. The despised Other is often the migrant or refugee, to whom many evil intentions and actions are imputed. They are supposed to be criminals, rapists; they want to steal your social benefits; they don’t understand “our” way of life; they eat the “real” people’s pets, etc. And the vilification spills over onto domestic minorities: Muslims in Modi’s India and in Orbán’s Hungary, for example.

A liberal tolerance of difference goes out the window in such settings.

In a shining example of how democratic systems and the rule of law punished an autocrat, former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro was just convicted and sentenced to 27 years in prison for his role in an attempted coup that was inspired by Jan. 6. What do these recent events in Brazil potentially mean for the global autocratic project?

In some ways the Bolsonaro case represents a re-democratizing path forward for countries that have experienced democratic backsliding. Bolsonaro himself will never again be able to run for any public office [in Brazil]. The example of this double accountability may act as a deterrent for other Brazilian leaders who might want to follow his examples.

But of course, nothing is ever easy. Brazil, like many eroding democracies, is extremely polarized. Bolsonaro’s prosecution and the guilty [verdict] are interpreted on the pro-Bolsonaro side of the divide as evidence of improper manipulation of criminal justice to silence a political opponent of the now-ruling party. This is the interpretation championed by international allies of the former Brazilian president — most notably, Donald Trump. Never mind that the fairly aggressive judge in this case, Alexandre de Moraes, is linked to a conservative political party, not President [Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s] Workers Party — and there is no love lost between de Moraes and Lula.

In all likelihood, holding a former autocratizing leader to account will always involve trade-offs between keeping them away from power and allowing for a perception among their supporters that the other side has no commitment to democracy or the rule of law.

Trump admires strongmen like Bolsonaro and the leaders of El Salvador and Argentina. There are many “little Trumps” all over the world. Bolsonaro and [Argentinian President Javier Milei] have also been feted by Republicans and conservatives at meetings such as the Conservative Political Action Conference. Why are these autocratic alliances between the American right and their foreign counterparts so important?

Autocratic leaders draw inspiration and strategy ideas from one another. Trump has inspired leaders like Bolsonaro and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. But the admiration goes in the other direction, as well — Trump has taken not just inspiration but strategy advice from international autocrats.

Trump’s attempt at a national-level gerrymander is exactly what Orbán did in 2011, thus allowing his Fidesz Party to avoid losing many parliamentary seats in 2014, even though its vote share declined [from] 2010.

[Trump] attributed to Vladimir Putin the idea of moving away from mail-in ballots. Trump said that Putin told him that fair elections were impossible with this voting method. The irony of taking advice from the Russian dictator about the conduct of free and fair elections did not appear to bother [him].

Trump recently visited the United Kingdom. Trump himself is unpopular in the UK, but Trumpism and other forms of right-wing authoritarian populism are not. Can you explain some of the dynamics at work there?

Trump’s tariff policies, his inconsistent support of Ukraine and perceived tilt toward Russia, as well as his reversal of climate policies are all unpopular in the UK. 

[He] is more popular on the British right than on [the] left. Conservative Party leaders and voters are more positive about him, more so those from the “Brexit,” anti-immigrant wing of the party. Trump is more popular still among supporters of the Reform Party, the political party formed by Nigel Farage, one of the key proponents of Brexit [and an] opponent of migrants in the UK…

Internecine conflicts on Britain’s far right might get in the way of the Reform Party’s path to victory in British national elections, which will have to be held by mid-2029 at the latest. Though much can happen in the meantime, the current Labour government’s performance, under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, has been lackluster. The Conservatives were voted out decisively in 2024, after 14 years in power, and lack strong popular support at the moment. The Reform Party is leading in many polls. Its victory would bring to office a leadership that shares many policy orientations and uncertain commitment to democracy, like its allies in the MAGA GOP.