Populism

God’s demagogue

Rabble-rousing Christian, harsh critic of Big Money, champion of the working man, William Jennings Bryan was the original American populist -- and politicians from Wallace to Clinton to George W. Bush are his grandchildren.

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God's demagogue

A hundred years ago, it would have been hard to find an American in any field of endeavor who was better known, or more widely loved, than William Jennings Bryan. By 1906, Bryan had already lost two presidential elections, with one more defeat to go. In fact, that’s one way of summarizing Bryan’s peculiar legacy: Among major-party candidates in American political history, he’s the all-time champion loser. Then as now, Bryan cut a much grander figure on the national stage than the men who defeated him: William McKinley in 1896 and 1900, William Howard Taft in 1908. McKinley was assassinated by an anarchist; Taft was enormously fat. Who among us knows, or cares to know, more than that? Bryan, although he retains only a flickering shadow of his former fame, still hovers over the early 20th century like a frock-coated ghost, Holy Bible in one hand and United States Constitution in the other. If we have come to believe, in the eight decades since Bryan’s death, that those two documents are at war — or rather, that one must be subservient to the other — he never saw it that way.

Bryan was the most famous American orator at the turn of the last century, simultaneously the nation’s leading populist politician and its leading evangelist. In his own time, he was very much identified as a man of the left, even a radical. Historian Michael Kazin, in his new Bryan biography, “A Godly Hero,” calls him a “Christian liberal,” and that label will do as well as any. But the problem with Bryan is that his politics don’t make much sense in 21st century terms, and that the “prairie populism” he personified is now identified so strongly with the right. It doesn’t help that Bryan is mainly known today for a sideshow act performed at the very end of his life, when he helped prosecute a Tennessee schoolteacher for half-heartedly leading a lesson about evolution.

In a hymnlike poem thumping with faux-jazz rhythms, written in 1919 when Bryan had faded from the political scene but had not yet become a laughingstock of the educated classes, Vachel Lindsay fulsomely sang the three-time loser’s praises and mocked his various nemeses. “I brag and chant of Bryan, Bryan, Bryan/ Candidate for president who sketched a silver Zion,” he wrote. (We’ll get to that whole gold-and-silver business in due course.)

For Lindsay, Bryan was “the one American poet who could sing outdoors,” a big-hearted democrat (both upper-case and lower) who led the oppressed and unwashed masses of the recently annexed Great Plains and Western states against the “elephant plutocrats” of the Eastern money establishment, “the dour and old, the mean and cold.” In an especially memorable passage, Lindsay recalled Bryan’s 1896 campaign, which electrified the torpid landscape of American electoral politics, as a violent confrontation, almost a new civil war: “Prairie avenger, mountain lion,/ Bryan, Bryan, Bryan, Bryan,/ Gigantic troubadour, speaking like a siege gun,/ Smashing Plymouth Rock with his boulders from the West.”

Kazin, a Georgetown professor who has previously written an important history of populism, labors valiantly to rehabilitate Lindsay’s doomed troubadour for contemporary readers, to provide us with a more generous understanding of why so many working-class and middle-class Americans followed Bryan so passionately. It’s a tough job, but I suppose somebody has to do it. Ever since the tragicomedy of the Scopes “monkey trial” in the summer of 1925 — when Bryan was publicly humiliated by Clarence Darrow, and died only days later — the man once known as “the Great Commoner” has been remembered principally as a bulwark of fundamentalism, ignorance and intolerance. H.L. Mencken memorialized him as “the idol of Morondom,” and the label has pretty well stuck.

As Kazin makes clear, this is manifestly unfair both to Bryan and the millions who loved him. Kazin is also correct that contemporary Americans on both the left and the right largely misunderstand Bryan’s legacy. His name is attached to a fundamentalist college in Dayton, Tenn. (site of the Scopes trial), and he is listed as a formative influence on the foundation of the Christian Coalition. But the flesh-and-blood Bryan would have found little agreement with such institutions and their leaders, outside of theological matters — and even there, he was not what we would today call a fundamentalist. (Like many mainline Christians, he believed that the Bible was true and holy, but not always to be taken literally.)

Bryan’s politics were resolutely anti-corporate (bordering on anti-capitalist) and anti-imperialist. He was an early supporter of labor unions, women’s rights, progressive taxation and the federal government’s central role in safeguarding the poor, the old and the sick. By driving out the high-tariff, low-tax conservatives who had dominated the Democratic Party since the Civil War, Bryan set his party on a fateful course: It became, more or less officially, the party of income redistribution, of big government, of “the working man.” Bryanism pointed the way toward Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society and, at least arguably, the bewildering, half-repudiated, middle-of-the-road liberalism of today’s Democrats.

Even as he focuses on Bryan’s indisputable credentials as an early avatar of progressivism, and proposes him as a possible model for a future Christian left, Kazin to some extent misses the larger point of the Commoner’s career. Yes indeed, Bryan is a more complicated and paradoxical figure than the yahoo caricatures perpetuated by snob sophisticates like Mencken and John Reed make him out to be. But to suggest that Bryan’s overall influence on American political history was positive is quite another matter.

There are many reasons why Bryan would have made a poor president — even Kazin seems grateful he was never elected — and it may be specious to suggest that the lack of personal drama or internal conflict is among them. But no biographer has done much to explicate Bryan as a man; few of his personal papers survive, and there is no hint of scandal or trauma in his private life. Unlike Washington or Jefferson or Lincoln or virtually any other major American historical figure, Bryan seems to have been an incurious person with little capacity for introspection and almost no intellectual breadth.

He knew the Bible, he knew and loved the social novels of Dickens and Victor Hugo, and he knew the smattering of classics that a 19th century middle-class education in small-town Illinois afforded. Beyond that, Bryan never read much or learned much. Although he traveled around the world (and was greatly impressed by the proto-welfare states emerging in Western Europe), his impressions were largely superficial, and colored by xenophobic and racist assumptions. He gave the same speeches year after year, over and over again. Kazin estimates that Bryan’s best-known addresses, “The Value of an Idea” and “The Prince of Peace,” were each delivered at least 1,500 times, and that nearly half of all Americans had personally heard him give one or the other.

In part, this reflects Bryan’s supreme self-confidence and his genuine belief in his creed, which, as Kazin writes, “married democracy and pietism in a romantic gospel that borrowed equally from Jefferson and Jesus.” This in turn echoed the widespread optimism of a young country suffused with both Protestant evangelicalism and republican ideology, where equality before the law and before the Creator were seen as interchangeable, and the growing inequality between rich and poor was understood by many as sinful.

It would be more accurate to observe, of course, that only some people were seen as equals before God and the law, and that only inequality of wealth among light-skinned men of European ancestry was understood to be sinful. Throughout his 30 years in public life posing as the champion of the oppressed, Bryan made virtually no mention of the 9 million or so American citizens whose parents had been in chains a generation earlier, and who, more recently, had been systematically disenfranchised by Jim Crow laws throughout the South at the end of Reconstruction.

Kazin does not avoid this topic entirely, citing it as Bryan’s “one great flaw,” but he seems determined to defuse it, if possible. He adds, rather lamely, that no other Democrat objected to white supremacy in the South until at least the late 1930s, and that Bryan never expressed any of the overtly racist rhetoric that was common currency in Democratic politics. Are we supposed to be comforted by the idea that the Great Commoner was a stupid or unconscious hypocrite, rather than an intelligent, self-tormented one like his slaveowner hero Thomas Jefferson?

As far as that goes, it seems more plausible that Bryan was simply recognizing ugly political reality — an inverted version of the same political reality that bedevils the Democratic Party today. If invited into Bryan’s coalition, African-Americans would surely have embraced his positions on economic and political issues (some prominent Northern blacks, W.E.B. Du Bois among them, supported him despite his silence on racial issues). Many were evangelical Christians with visions of a social gospel close to Bryan’s own; even a token gesture of friendship might have made him the most popular white politician in black America since Lincoln (not a tall order, admittedly).

But no Democrat could be elected president in those years without carrying all 11 states of the defeated Confederacy, just as no Republican can win today without carrying all, or almost all, those states. Bryan carried them in all three of his campaigns, as did Grover Cleveland and Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic presidents elected before and after him. Reaching out to black voters in any form would have destroyed the fragile alliance between white Southern Democrats and big-city Northern Democrats (as in fact happened, many years later), and severely endangered the party’s survival.

Racial exclusion and white supremacy lay at the heart of American democracy, poisoning its discourse in all directions and going essentially unchallenged within either major party. Almost the sole exception to this rule was Wisconsin Gov. and Sen. Robert La Follette, the legendary Republican progressive who offered almost all of Bryan’s political agenda in a more coherent form, without the moral compromises or egregious blind spots. (Perhaps not coincidentally, he was nowhere near as popular.)

Even if we agree with Kazin that Bryan was innocent of conscious racism, just as his diatribes against the bankers of New York and London who oppressed agrarian America were not consciously anti-Semitic, he was perfectly happy to channel such sentiments. Kazin reports that after each of Bryan’s electoral defeats, his mailbox filled up with hundreds of letters from true believers alleging sinister anti-democratic conspiracies orchestrated by Catholics or Jews. His core followers were always Midwestern Protestants, but as time passed, they became less optimistic and less tolerant, more likely to look to their hero as a preserver of Christian tradition than as the herald of a more just future society.

As the histrionic imagery of Lindsay’s poem perhaps inadvertently captures, there was always an undercurrent of regional and class hostility beneath Bryan’s ebullient rhetoric, and the target of his populist anger was often ambiguous. Shortly after his election to Congress from Nebraska in 1890 (the only elective office he would ever hold), Bryan sounded a keynote theme of his career, telling a Kansas City audience: “We simply say to the East, take your hands out of our pockets and keep them out.”

Officially, he was discussing the gold standard, an issue that’s barely comprehensible today, but let’s assume for the purpose of argument that his position made sense at the time. (The gold standard was seen as deflationary, which tended to benefit banks and other major creditors; “free silver,” which Bryan supported, would presumably loosen the money supply and benefit farmers and small merchants.) As Thomas Frank has observed, Bryan’s anti-elitist rhetoric — with its implied subtext that people who live in East Coast cities are somehow not real Americans — may have expressed a left-leaning version of populism in the 1890s, but it sounds an awful lot like the right-wing populism of today.

Bryan was acclaimed by admirers and enemies alike as the greatest public speaker of his day and perhaps the greatest the republic had ever seen. Not much of this can be detected in transcripts of his speeches — which profess pedestrian themes, in the overly flowery language of the time — or in such primitive audio recordings as exist. (In the best of those, you can catch an inkling: a mellifluous tenor voice, superb breath control and a wavelike cadence building slowly toward climax.) Bryan’s appeal evidently stemmed from his charisma, his delivery, his frank appeal to the listener’s emotions and his powers of persuasion, and not from what he actually said or the issues he nominally trumpeted.

After all, the most famous speech of Bryan’s career, the “Cross of Gold” address that galvanized the 1896 Democratic convention, came as no surprise to the audience packed into the Chicago Coliseum. The doctrine of free silver, or “bimetallism,” was the only real issue of Bryan’s campaign, and he had already shaped it into an emblem of all the injustices perpetrated by the powerful against the powerless. As Kazin observes, “Bryan never forgot that he was speaking to a gathering dominated by people … who agreed with him. What they craved was a memorable statement of what they already believed.”

When Bryan mounted the platform after a day of contentious debate, he launched into an extended paean to the common man, proclaiming that wage laborers, farmers, miners and small merchants were as important to the economy as “the few financial magnates who, in a back room, corner the money of the world.” He indulged in biblical quotations, classical and historical references that may have gratified his listeners but probably also whizzed over their heads, and paid obligatory homage to the greatness of his country and the revolutionary spirit of 1776.

Then he moved in for the kill. “Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world,” he said, stretching his fingers along his forehead, “we will answer [the Republican financiers'] demand for a gold standard by saying to them: You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.” Then Bryan stepped back from the podium and stuck out his arms horizontally from his sides, holding a crucifixion pose for several seconds. A “painful” silence fell, Kazin reports, and then the crowd exploded.

It was obviously great theater at the time. Bryan, a Nebraska outsider who was just 36, won the Democratic nomination the next day, and became the party’s leading figure through the next five election cycles. But in historical hindsight, it looks more than a little ridiculous.

Those critics who thought Bryan was blaspheming had a point: Was he really comparing the difficulties caused by a debatable monetary policy to the most potent symbol of human suffering the Christian faith could offer? Wasn’t he even comparing himself to Jesus by mimicking his pose? And given the popular view that the Jews had killed Christ, and the fact that the biggest international bankers, many of them Jewish, were among Bryan’s targets, wasn’t there, at the very least, a troubling potential subtext here?

Kazin tells us that on the day of Bryan’s triumph, Illinois Gov. John Peter Altgeld, another populist lionized by Vachel Lindsay, told his friend Clarence Darrow (the same lawyer who would oppose Bryan almost 30 years later in Tennessee), “I have been thinking over Bryan’s speech. What did he say, anyhow?”

Kazin doesn’t quite answer this question, but one way of approaching it is to say that in the speech Bryan had harnessed an inchoate desire for change, as populists always do. He had captured a general sense of aggrievement and yoked it to a hot issue people thought they cared deeply about (they didn’t, as things turned out) and to deeply rooted totems of belief: the greatness and goodness of America, the passion of Jesus Christ.

By Bryan’s next campaign in 1900, bimetallism was a dead issue and he ran as an anti-imperialist, opposed to the U.S. annexation of the Philippines in the wake of the Spanish-American War. In characteristic fashion, he argued simultaneously that this was unfair to the Filipinos, who wanted independence, and that America did not need a new “race problem” to go with our old one.

He took the 1904 election off — just as well, since Teddy Roosevelt had stolen a page from the populist playbook and would have been unbeatable — and returned to the fray in 1908. By then the Philippine crisis was long over and Bryan became an arch-reformer, running to control the power of the “trusts,” as major corporate entities were then known. There is no reason to doubt his sincerity on any of these issues, or others he embraced, and on many of them he was ahead of his time.

But the pose Bryan struck on that Chicago podium in July of 1896 was not coincidental. Like all successful populist politicians, he had the gift of tapping into public anxiety and distress and channeling it to his advantage. It looks from this distance as if his real cause was not the elevation of the working man or the moral purification of America, although he believed in those things, but rather the Christ-like glorification of William Jennings Bryan.

Bryan’s contemporaries were sharply divided about him; long before Mencken turned on him in Tennessee, plenty of people viewed him as a phony. “What a thorough paced hypocrite and demagogue he is,” wrote Teddy Roosevelt to a friend, “and what a small man.” Famed journalist William Allen White saw in Bryan the “breezy amiability” of a St. Louis shoe salesman, and warned Americans, “There is really no more reason for electing an orator to office than for electing a fiddler. Both talents rouse the emotions.” (White presumably could not have imagined an American future in which a retired film actor would be elected to major office, not once but several times.)

Novelist Willa Cather, a fellow Midwesterner who followed Bryan’s career closely, was in some ways more sympathetic. She had only scorn for his intellectual abilities, but she saw in him the qualities of their native region, “its newness and vigor, its magnitude and monotony, its richness and lack of variety … its high seriousness and self-confidence, its egotism and its nobility.” What really interested her about Bryan was what the rise of such a pious, earnest and altogether anachronistic figure said about Americans. “It is an interesting study in reactions,” she wrote, “that the most practical, and prosaic, and purely commercial people on the planet should be dazzled and half convinced by a purely picturesque figure — a knight on horseback.”

Kazin accepts the value of these insights, but still believes that White and Cather “too easily dismissed [Bryan's] critique of the emerging corporate, imperial order.” This may be true, but Bryan’s limitations became more obvious late in his career. He lent his prodigious influence to Woodrow Wilson’s campaign in 1912, even though the two men had never liked each other, and his egotism led him to two awkward years as Wilson’s secretary of state, increasingly unhappy with America’s gradual entanglement in the Great War. (Kazin thinks Bryan was right about that one.)

The final causes of Bryan’s career were his most moralistic and sanctimonious: the banning of alcohol (he was a lifetime teetotaler) and the squelching of evolutionism. Prohibition, as Kazin reminds us, was a radical populist cause, even a socialist one — a way of saving the working man and his family from the depredations of big capital, as embodied in the brewer, the distiller and the saloonkeeper.

Like Thomas Frank, Kazin mounts an effective argument that Bryan saw the teaching of Darwinian evolution not as a matter of theological error but of social justice. For him, abandoning biblical teaching was a gateway to social Darwinism and eugenics. If children were taught that all was animal brutality and we were just apes wearing clothes, morality would evaporate and the poor, the ill and the undesirable would be wiped out by tyrants. Perhaps it could be said that Bryan was anticipating horrors yet to come, but by the time he died in Tennessee he seemed to have become a scold and a puritan, a fragment of the 19th century trapped in a world of electric light and motorcars.

Bryan came close to being elected president only in his first campaign, the revolutionary autumn of 1896, when Kazin calculates that 20,000 votes spread across six close states would have given him an Electoral College victory. He never had the money or the organization to compete on equal terms with Republicans in the vote-rich Northeast, the region he so pointedly disdained. But as I said earlier, his repeated defeats made him much more famous than the men who were actually elected, and he transformed American politics in ways that would not become clear for years to come.

Bryan inaugurated an era in which style and sentiment would trump substance, personal charisma would trump intellect or ideas, and pious moralizing would trump social consciousness. Politicians of the Gilded Age had remained aloof from the public, relying on printed broadsides, entrenched partisan loyalties and local organization. Bryan invented the glad-handing, “happy warrior” style of the modern political campaign, crisscrossing the country tirelessly by rail and delivering countless speeches to crowds large and small. (It has often been observed that if radio or television had existed in Bryan’s day, he would have beaten the drab McKinley or pretty much anyone else.)

He convinced his followers that he was for the little guy and for Christian virtue, and that they came to the same thing in the end. But beyond a general constellation of issues that varied only slightly during his 30 years in public life, neither Bryan nor his believers worried much about ideological consistency. At various times and for various reasons, Bryan made common cause with the Socialist Party, the American Federation of Labor, biblical fundamentalists and the Ku Klux Klan.

Kazin may not intend this, but as he fleshes out his fascinating portrait, Bryan comes to seem the central influence on 20th century American populist politics of all persuasions. His descendants are scattered across the ideological map: FDR and LBJ, and maybe even George McGovern and Paul Wellstone, lie in one direction. Huey Long, George Wallace and Pat Buchanan lie in another. Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, different as they may be, are all Bryan’s grandchildren.

On the last page of “A Godly Hero,” Kazin describes Bryan as a sincere, warm and passionate man who engaged the public’s yearning “for a society run by and for ordinary people who lead virtuous lives.” Well, OK — but who gets to decide what “ordinary” and “virtuous” mean? Kazin seems less troubled by Bryan’s hypocrisy than he might be, and the political realm Bryan bequeathed to us is one where hypocrites thrive, and indeed one that makes honest people become hypocrites. Anytime you see a politician proclaiming himself an outsider and a champion of the common man (often in contravention of all logic), wrapping himself simultaneously in the flag and the mantle of Jesus, you see the solemn ghost of William Jennings Bryan, arms spread in that crucifixion pose for all eternity.

Why do the Republicans nominate blue bloods?

The potent combination of Jacksonian populism and old money oligarchy

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Why do the Republicans nominate blue bloods?Andrew Jackson and Mitt Romney (Credit: Wikipedia/AP)

If Mitt Romney receives the Republican presidential nomination, he will be the third upper-class candidate in a row nominated for the presidency by a party that speaks in the accents of Jacksonian populism and pretends to be against “elites.”

America may not have titled aristocrats, but it has always had patrician families, defined by a combination of wealth, educational affiliations and public service.  Today’s Republicans may sound like George Wallace in their denunciations of paper-pushing bureaucrats and pointy-headed intellectuals, but their presidential selection pool is a very selective country club.

Between 1980 and 2008, inclusive, there have been eight presidential elections.  The Republicans have nominated five presidential candidates — Ronald Reagan, George Herbert Walker Bush, Bob Dole, George W. Bush and John McCain.  During the same time, the Democrats have nominated seven presidential candidates — Jimmy Carter, Walter Mondale, Michael Dukakis, Bill Clinton, Al Gore, John Kerry and Barack Obama.

The middle-class Republican candidates — Reagan and Dole — have been outnumbered by the candidates born into the social elite — the two Bushes and McCain.  George Herbert Walker Bush’s father, and George W.’s grandfather, Prescott Bush, was a wealthy Connecticut senator, whose own father, Samuel Prescott Bush, was a rich steel and railroad company executive.  John McCain’s father and grandfather were both four-star admirals.

Among Democratic presidential nominees in the same era, only Kerry — related to the wealthy Forbes, Winthrop and Dudley families of the Northeast — could claim anything like the pedigree of the Bushes.  If it takes three generations to make a gentleman, or even two, Al Gore doesn’t qualify as upper class.  His father, who preceded him as a senator from Tennessee, came from a modest background and received his law degree from the Nashville YMCA Night School of Law.  The other Democratic nominees in the 1980-2008 period came from middle-class backgrounds, like Barack Obama, the son of two college professors.  Bill Clinton was born into the lower middle class.

The plot thickens further, when Republican denunciations of government as tyranny are contrasted with the multi-generational commitment to public service on the part of Republican presidential candidates.  Samuel Prescott Bush, who served in the government during World War I, founded a dynasty that has produced a Connecticut senator, Prescott Bush; a Texas congressman and president, George Herbert Walker Bush; a Texas governor and president, George W. Bush; and a Florida governor, Jeb Bush.  John McCain, as we have seen, is the heir to a family tradition of military service.  Mitt Romney, the former governor of Massachusetts, is the son of George Romney, who was governor of Michigan.

So much for pork-rind populism.

The mystery deepens even further.  In the 19th century, the Republican Party was founded by Abraham Lincoln and others, devoted to the Henry Clay’s idea of the “self-made man.”  But in spite of conservative rhetoric about small business, today’s Republican economic orthodoxy does not promote the interests of entrepreneurs or industrial capitalism.  Instead, it promotes the economic interests of rentiers — families with inherited wealth and Wall Street investors — the kind of people who make money in their sleep, in the words of the 19th-century classical liberal economist J.S. Mill, who despised them.

The GOP crusade to abolish the estate tax — the “death tax” — does nothing for American business in general, even as it chiefly benefits the trust fund babies of a few super-rich families.  A lower tax rate for capital gains than for earned income means that the idle rich, and the hedge fund managers who manage their assets and are taxed at the capital gains rate, pay a much lower tax rate on their income than the majority of Americans who depend on wages or professional fees for a living.  Self-made entrepreneurs?  Hardly.

Nor does Republicanomics serve the interests of captains of industry.  If the Republican economic plan were drafted by CEOs of American-based companies that actually make things, rather than rearrange money, it would not necessarily please liberals but it would bear little resemblance to the rentier-friendly plans pushed by the Wall Street right.  The emphasis would be on a permanent R&D tax credit, lower corporate taxes, depreciation allowances, public infrastructure investment, policies to lower the costs of energy and other inputs, dollar devaluation and other policies to promote the inshoring of production in America.  Genuine captains of industry would not assign priority to estate tax relief and low capital gains taxes for the benefit of the trust fund set like the Bushes and Romneys.

The conclusion is inescapable.  The Republican Party is not really a pro-business party at all.  It is a pro-hereditary wealth party.  Its platform serves the interests of those few Americans who are born into wealth and seek to preserve their fortunes, not those who start new companies or invent new technologies.  Naturally, therefore, the party’s presidential candidates are chosen nowadays from among the pedigreed, hereditary social elite who are the chief beneficiaries of its policies.

How is it, then, that the party of old money has succeeded in winning the vote of the white working class since Nixon and Reagan?  To understand how this could occur, we need only look at American history.

In the 19th century the Jacksonian coalition, then identified with the Democrats beginning with Andrew Jackson, was, like the Republican Party today, based on an alliance of white Southerners and Southwesterners with working-class whites in the North.  Like today’s neo-Jacksonian Republicans, the original Jacksonians posed as the champions of the common man, denouncing government tyranny and privilege.

But Jacksonian common-man rhetoric was a camouflage for the interests of the most parasitic rentier elite in American history: the Southern slaveowners, including Andrew Jackson himself.  The rentiers of the plantation South were allied with Northern crony capitalists — businessmen and bankers who sought to loot the public domain by means of what today would be called “privatization.”  That is why the Jackson administration destroyed the Bank of the United States, a quasi-public agency that was the largest corporation in the country, and distributed its financial assets to “pet banks” allied with Jackson and his cronies.  The modern equivalent would be the privatization of Social Security and Medicare and the diversion of their vast revenues into private hands, which, of course, is the centerpiece of the Republican economic agenda for America.

Old or new, Jacksonianism has always combined the pretense of egalitarian rebellion against privilege with the reality of domination by upper-class rentiers and crony capitalists.  In the 21st century as in the 19th, the Jacksonian oligarchs divert the attention of their yeoman followers from what is going on by means of military jingoism (Jackson bellowed at France, today’s Republicans threaten Iran).  Central to the Jacksonian tradition is the exploitation of paranoid fears of federal tyranny, combined with dark undercurrents of racism (witness Ron Paul’s recent denunciation of the Civil Rights Act and the blacks-on-welfare trope cynically deployed by Gingrich and Santorum).

Can the Jacksonian trick of enlisting the white working class in the service of hereditary wealth and crony capitalism work again?  Why not?  It has worked before.

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Michael Lind’s new book, "Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States", will be published in April and can be pre-ordered at Amazon.com.

Ron Paul’s phony populism

The libertarian presidential candidate is a true friend of the 1 percent

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Ron Paul's phony populismRon Paul, phony populist (Credit: AP)

To me, the epiphany of the most dreadful presidential campaign in history took place in Keene, New Hampshire, last week, when a Ron Paul town meeting was interrupted by some Occupy Wall Street hecklers.

“Let me address that for a minute,” the Republican presidential candidate said, “because if you listen carefully, I’m very much involved with the 99. I’ve been condemning that 1 percent because they’ve been ripping us off –” He was interrupted again, this time by cheers, almost drowning him out.

After the usual chants of “We are the 99 percent” and “There are criminals on Wall Street who walk free,” Paul quickly took back the audience, not that he had ever lost it. “Do you feel better?” he asked, to laughter.

“We need to sort that out, but the people on Wall Street got the bailouts, and you guys got stuck with the bills, and I think that’s where the problem is.”

It was a masterful performance. Ron Paul — fraudulent populist, friend of the oligarchy, sworn enemy of every social program since Theodore Roosevelt — had won the day, again.

Why shouldn’t he? Frauds win, whether they are in finance or politics. Bernie Madoff proved that, and so did Ronald Reagan. The success of the Ron Paul campaign with young voters, which David Sirota pointed out in Salon Monday, is but the latest example of how Americans can be persuaded to support the most reactionary politicians in America when they’re suitably manipulated, even if they aren’t reactionary and, sometimes, even when they identify themselves as progressive.

There’s little doubt that aspects of his message are both appealing and sincere. There is a definite “yay factor” in some of his oratory, and his denunciations of Dick Cheney are the kind of thing that gets yays on “The Daily Show With Jon Stewart.”

Paul has been consistent in opposing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in opposing American military adventures in general. He has staked out a lonely position as the only presidential candidate to oppose aid to Israel (until Rick Perry more or less aped him on that), and his distinctly non-aggressive posture on Iran is indistinguishable from that of dovish Democrats like Dennis Kucinich.

So there’s no question that there’s a lot to like in Paul’s foreign policy positions, if you’re leaning to the left. The problem is that Paul is less of a 21st century dove than he is a throwback to the isolationism of the early to mid-20th century, in which fear of foreign entanglements was embraced by the hard right — with all that came with it. Paul emerges from that mold as about as far right as they come, further right than Ronald Reagan ever was, more of an enemy of the poor and middle class, and an even warmer friend of the ultra-wealthy. A Ron Paul America would make the Reagan Revolution look like the New Deal.

Paul’s own oratory tends to deemphasize his reactionary stance on social issues, or to sugarcoat it. But his program is now laid out in black-and-white. Last month, the Paul campaign set forth the details of what it grandiloquently called a “Plan to Restore America.”  It has received surprisingly little attention, given Paul’s surging popularity.

This is not a plan for the 99 percent. It is about as much of a 1 percent-oriented ideological meat cleaver as you can find anywhere in the annals of politics. Paul would take an ax to the federal budget, hacking off $1 trillion in the first year alone, ripping and cutting and deenacting and deregulating so as to ostensibly return America to “its former constitutionally limited, smaller-government and less-burdensome place.”

“Return” implies that America would be taken back to a starting place, though it’s not clear where that would be. What I do know is that there is definitely an undercurrent to his slash-and-burn philosophy, a strong whiff of Ayn Rand — the Russian-born philosopher-novelist, atheist and advocate of individuality, rational self-interest and selfishness. Paul is, in fact, the closest of all the GOP candidates to carrying out the anti-government policies Rand advocated.

To be sure, there are aspects of this budget plan that hardcore Randers would not like. It leaves in far too many nonessential government functions, such as allowing the continued existence of the Department of Health and Human Services. But, from the Randian perspective, Paul is definitely moving in the right direction. His “restore” plan embraces the kind of deprivation that Rand’s Objectivist philosophy would impose on America, and would enact a fundamental change in the role of government that the radical right cherishes.

After spelling out the good stuff from the leftist perspective — a 15 percent Defense Department spending cut ending all funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — the hard charge backward commences:

  • No more aid to education. Goodbye, Department of Education.
  • No more government-subsidized housing. Goodbye, Department of Housing and Urban Development.
  • No more energy programs. Goodbye, Department of Energy.
  • No more programs to promote commerce and technology. Goodbye, Department of Commerce.
  • *No more national parks. Goodbye, Department of the Interior.

His opposition to the very existence of the Federal Reserve — he wrote a book titled “End the Fed” — is straight out of Rand, as is his promotion of the gold standard.

Paul would not reform the abysmally flawed and underfunded Securities and Exchange Commission, he would eliminate it. The only agency of the federal government that stands between the public and greedy bankers and crooked corporations would be gone. He is philosophically opposed to it, as he is to Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, the reform measures enacted after Enron and the 2008 financial crisis, respectively. His Reformed America would no longer discomfit Wall Street with the latter’s restrictions on banks or annoy corporate executives with Sarb-Ox’s ethics and fair-disclosure rules.

And this is but the beginning of the shower of blessings that would rain down upon the very richest Americans. He would end the income tax, thereby making the United States the ultimate onshore tax haven. The message to both the Street and corporate America would be a kind of hyper-Reaganesque “Go to town, guys.” With income, estate and gift taxes eliminated and the top corporate tax rate lowered to 15 percent (and not a word about cutting corporate tax loopholes), a kind of perma-plutonomy would come to exist in the land — to the extent that there isn’t one already.

The guts of Paul’s grand scheme, where its rubber hits the road, is in the all-important theme of cutting programs that benefit the poor and middle class. Despite all its window-dressing and spin, the heart of every libertarian plan for this country is a kind of mammoth subtraction: making deep cuts in programs benefiting millions of Americans, out of a belief that such programs are morally wrong. Restoring America is a moral statement, an enshrinement of the Randian belief that aid to one facet of the population (the poor) is really “looting” of resources from other facets of the population (the wealthy).

So when you see in this plan a $645 billion cut in Medicaid over four years, what you are seeing is an expression of the philosophy that Medicaid itself is wrong, that it should not exist because it is not the function of society to provide healthcare for the poor. If they get sick, tough. While Paul does not go the full Randian route by entirely eliminating this program, he goes a long way to establish the principle that as a general proposition, as a moral question, we simply should not have this program.

Ayn Rand believed that there is no such thing as a “public,” and that the public was a collection of individuals, each having no obligation to the other.  So when you read through this budget, and see the deep cuts in food stamps and child nutrition, what you are seeing is an expression of a philosophy that is at odds with the Judeo-Christian system of morality embraced by most Americans.

That, fundamentally, is what the deficit debate is all about, from the perspective of Ron Paul and the radical right. It’s not about getting the red ink out of the government but using the government’s fiscal travails as a pretext to change the very purpose of government. So yes, he opposed the Wall Street bailouts, as Rand no doubt would have, and that also is “yay”-worthy to many people. But if you buy that, if you buy Ron Paul, you have to buy the rest of his belief system: his opposition to securities regulation, his opposition to consumer protection, his belief that the markets can defend Americans from the depredations of big business.

What I’ve just described is many things, but it is the very antithesis of the values of Occupy Wall Street, which is based on opposition to the prerogatives of the top 1 percent at the expense of the 99 percent. Yet rather than forthrightly oppose OWS, which would at least be intellectually honest, Paul has sought instead to co-opt it, con it, calling it a “healthy movement” at one appearance, and seeking to link it with his “end the Fed” agenda. In Keene he went one step further by declaring himself as being in league with the 99 percent and against the 1 percent.

That’s about as far from the truth as it possibly could be. The only question is, how long is Paul going to be allowed to get away with his faux-populist con job? I agree with his backers in this sense: He is less of a fringe candidate than he is sometimes portrayed in the media. His positions are increasingly infecting mainstream Republican politics, and it’s scary.

No, strike that. His positions are scary only if you know what they actually are, and not how he spins them.

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Gary Weiss is a journalist and the author of "Ayn Rand Nation: The Hidden Struggle for America's Soul," to be published by St. Martin's Press on February 28, 2012. Follow him on Twitter @gary_weiss.

Nobody represents the American people

No matter which party runs Washington, only minor, marginal reforms ever take place

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Nobody represents the American people

The disconnect between the actions of the government and public opinion is the central fact of American politics today. It doesn’t seem to matter whether liberal Democrats or conservative Republicans are in power. Only minor, marginal reforms ever take place. The basic outlines of American economic policy and foreign policy remain the same, even as Congress and the White House change hands. The changes promised by progressive Democrats and Tea Party Republicans are quickly discarded after the elections.

The changes that do take place are often the opposite of those that majorities of Americans want. Most Americans want Social Security to be strengthened and American manufacturing protected. But the conversation among elites inside the Beltway-New York bubble is about cutting Social Security and more one-sided “free trade” deals with mercantilist nations that, unlike the U.S., protect and promote their domestic industries.

Many Americans have come to the conclusion that nobody represents them in Washington anymore. They are right.

This situation is not the result of a sinister conspiracy by a single, unitary, all-powerful and diabolical elite. The origins of the disconnect are structural. The mass membership organizations that once represented ordinary Americans at the state and national level have been replaced by elite organizations that raise their money from a small number of billionaires rather than hundreds of thousands or millions of dues-paying members.

Compare the United States of 1950 with the United States of 2010. In 1950, many regular Americans belonged to the political parties, which were still federations of city, county and state parties. A third of the private sector workforce belonged to private sector unions, which were also organized as federations.

Mass membership organizations were important in the nonprofit sector as well. Local chapters of organizations like the United Way were part of state and national federations.

In the last half-century, as scholars like Robert Putnam have shown, these civic armies have more or less collapsed and have been replaced by small, elite organizations that specialize in raising money from a shrinking number of Americans who monopolize a growing share of the gains from national economic growth. This is as true on the political left as on the political right.

The national parties have long since ceased to be healthy mass membership federations. The national and state parties have been reduced to shells. Most Democratic and Republican politicians are independent entrepreneurs, raising as much money as they can on their own. Like the bank robber Willie Sutton, they go to where the money is. It is more efficient to get a few big checks from billionaires and industry lobbies than lots of little donations.

The parties don’t even bother to recruit non-plutocratic members anymore. I have been contacted by the Democratic Party precisely once in my life. Twenty years ago I received an invitation to buy a seat at a fundraiser for $1,500. Clearly the invitation was a mistake, and I have never received any direct mail or phone calls from the Democratic Party again. I have never received any solicitations from the Republican Party, either. Clearly I don’t make enough money to be of interest to the two parties.

The unions, like the parties, were once mass membership organizations that transmitted the demands of ordinary Americans upward to national elites. No longer. Government and business working together since Reagan have crushed organized labor in the U.S. Fewer than 10 percent of private-sector workers belong to unions. Most union members are public-sector employees, who make easy targets for the faux populists of the right.

Mass membership charities, too, seem to have gone the way of the dinosaurs. Do any children still collect money for UNICEF on Halloween? The siphoning of more and more national wealth to ever fewer people makes that kind of approach anachronistic. Why bother with a March of Dimes-style campaign, when you could get the same amount from one check by Bill Gates or Warren Buffett?

The nonprofit advocacy sector is bigger than ever, but it is chiefly funded by rich individuals in a few coastal cities as well as large donor foundations. Progressives complain that the Tea Party movement is an “astroturf” movement — that is, a simulacrum of a genuine grass-roots movement. But practically all progressive environmental or social campaigns are astroturf movements, too. They may do work in Albuquerque or Oshkosh, but if their money is coming from New York or San Francisco or Los Angeles rather than from local membership dues, they are pure astroturf.

We should not idealize the mass membership movements of the past. The old party machines were notoriously corrupt. Unions were often racist and in league with organized crime. And local civic organizations were often snobbish and clique-ridden.

The point is that the existence of these mass membership organizations, along with dues-paying charitable organizations, served as transmission belts bringing demands and values up from ordinary people in local communities to politicians and policymakers at the state and local level. These institutions complemented elections and made electoral democracy work.

If you keep elections but get rid of mass membership organizations, then democracy breaks down, as it has in the U.S. Contemporary American politicians interact with ordinary Americans only at the polls. The politicians do not need the money of ordinary people, as it is easier to raise large sums from rich people and lobbies. And between elections, the advocacy groups of the left and right that meet with politicians and their staffs are usually funded by the rich and large foundations, rather than dues-paying members.

In this new institutional environment, it is only natural that more and more elected officials should pay attention to the rich few who pay for their campaigns and for the advocacy groups that present them with proposals and platforms. Campaigning for office becomes an exercise in telling ordinary voters of the left, right or center what they want to hear and then ignoring them until the next campaign.

Having lost the old mass membership organizations that once represented them in state and national politics, alienated Americans in recent years have found leaders among preachers and media demagogues. This explains why the influence of African-American preachers like Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton and white evangelical preachers like Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell rose in the 1980s and 1990s, even as religious belief in the U.S. population steadily declined. The churches were, and are, the last mass membership organizations in the U.S. And politicized local congregations have taken it upon themselves to get their members to the polls — a function once performed by local party machines who ensured that the party faithful would vote “early and often.”

The renaissance of the churches in politics, however, appears to be over, perhaps because regular church attendance is dropping, even among Americans who claim religious beliefs. The preachers are being replaced by media figures. The grandchildren of the Americans of 1950, who took their cues from local politicians or local union officials or civic leaders, now look for guidance to Glenn Beck or Jon Stewart. But the flash mobs that Beck and Stewart produced on the Mall in Washington are no substitute for member-based organizations. Politicians have no incentive to pay any attention to one-off media events that replace sustained campaigns.

If this analysis is correct, then the crisis of American politics is not a matter of finding this or that philosopher-king to run for office. In the present environment of organizational weakness and plutocratic power, it is not clear that leaders as great as Lincoln or Franklin Roosevelt would be able to get things done.

If America is to be rescued, the American people must be mobilized. But in today’s America, the money is mobilized and the people are not.

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Michael Lind’s new book, "Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States", will be published in April and can be pre-ordered at Amazon.com.

Where are the peasants with pitchforks?

Republicans embrace populism but fight statism, while Democrats champion statism but fear populism

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Where are the peasants with pitchforks?

In the aftermath of a global economic collapse brought about in part by the corruption of big government by big finance, many pundits expected a voter backlash in America to take the form of a combination of populist anti-elitism and statist anti-capitalism. But that has not happened, nor is it likely to occur. In the United States, the populists are anti-statist and the statists are anti-populist.

The last realignment of the American party system took place in the 1970s, when the civil rights revolution along with the cultural revolutions of the 1960s blew apart the New Deal order that had coalesced in the 1930s. In the post-New Deal system that exists to this day, the Republican Party is a neo-Jacksonian coalition whose base consists of Southern white Protestants and, to a lesser degree, conservative white Catholic ”ethnics” in the Northern suburbs. The Democratic Party is based in big cities and college towns. Among ethnic and racial groups, its most consistent electoral supporters are blacks and Jews, followed by Latinos.

The different ethno-regional bases of the two parties explain their different attitudes toward populism and statism. The Republican Party’s combination of hostility to the federal government with the rhetoric of populism is a revival of the Jacksonian synthesis of the 1820s and 1830s. From the perspective of Jacksonian Democrats or neo-Jacksonian Republicans, anti-statist populism is a rational strategy.

The Jacksonian Democrats of the 19th century, like the neo-Jacksonian Republicans of the 21st century, have believed, not without reason, that wealthy, educated Northeastern elites will always dominate a powerful federal government and sacrifice the interests of the Northern white working class and white Southerners and Westerners. This fear on the part of Jacksonians, past and present, produces a combination of folksy populism with support for state and local governments, which are less likely to be captured by metropolitan elites who look down on Irish and Italian Catholics in the North and the Scots-Irish in the South.

The strategy of today’s Democratic base is equally rational, given its core constituencies. The post-’60s coalition of minorities that forms the Democratic base naturally favors a strong federal government to protect the civil rights of its members from the bigotry of local racial and religious majorities.

But the same logic that leads the Democratic base to favor a strong central government leads it to oppose the kind of nationalism and populism that, in other democracies, as well as in the United States of Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, have been invoked to justify strong, activist national government. Jews, blacks and Latinos, as well as other pro-Democratic minorities like gays and lesbians and secularists, fear that the populism of the white Christian majority, if unleashed, would quickly become xenophobic, intolerant and oppressive. Even an inclusive, non-racist, liberal “melting pot” nationalism is viewed as a threat by those members of minority groups who don’t want their groups to melt away because of intermarriage or assimilation.

This strategic logic explains the apparent paradox that many of the same progressives who call continually for strengthening the central government of the American nation-state also denounce populism and nationalism in America. The interests of the Democratic voter base, rather than philosophical consistency, explain why the same Democrats who favor universal, national social insurance policies also support non-universal civil rights policies like affirmative action and minority redistricting.

Ever since the present party system took shape three decades ago, there have been ephemeral movements that do not fit into the modern Republican pattern of anti-statist populism and the modern Democratic pattern of anti-populist statism. In different ways, Ross Perot and Lou Dobbs represented a third alternative — the combination of populism with a more statist approach to economics. The reward of these mavericks was to be denounced by Republicans for being too statist and to be viewed with suspicion by Democrats because of their populism.

Indeed, the two parties agree that any combination of populism and statism other than their own two patented variants is “fascism.” It is acceptable to be against big government and for big business, or to be against big business and for big government. But consistent populists who oppose both big business and big government are potential Hitlers, according to anti-populist statists on the left and anti-statist populists on the right.

The reactions of both parties to the Great Recession can be explained in part by the strategic calculations of their respective ethnic and regional constituencies. Consider the debate over infrastructure. Progressive Keynesians are quite right that massive public spending is necessary to compensate for reduced private consumption — and that investment in infrastructure would be among the best uses of otherwise idle funds. Most progressive Democrats insist on inter-city high-speed rail as the centerpiece of their infrastructure plans, even though costly, highly subsidized passenger rail would be at the bottom of any rational list of transportation priorities, compared to repairing and expanding the nation’s highways, bridges, freight rail network and inland waterways and modernizing the electric grid.

The chief beneficiaries of high-speed rail would be urban real estate interests, big city governments and the elite members of the disproportionately urban Democratic base who could afford the expensive tickets. There would be little or no benefit to the white working class in Northern suburbs or sprawling Sun Belt cities. It is small wonder, therefore, that today’s neo-Jacksonians reject high-speed rail as vehemently as the original Jacksonians rejected ambitious federal programs of “internal improvements” in the 1830s. Nor is it coincidence that Republicans prefer the present system of highway funding, dominated by members of Congress from small-population states in the hinterland, and tend to oppose the idea of an infrastructure bank that might be staffed by members of the Atlantic seaboard elite.

Then there is the debate over healthcare. Because their base includes the black and Latino working poor, who are disproportionately likely to be uninsured, the Democrats naturally made universal coverage the basis of their approach to healthcare, rather than cost containment, which was a secondary consideration. However, most members of the white working class and middle class have coverage through their employers. Their main concern is with the rising costs of drugs, hospital stays and doctors’ visits. It was therefore relatively easy for conservative Republican strategists to portray Democratic healthcare reform as a plot to raise taxes and cut healthcare spending for white working-class and middle-class Americans in order to subsidize poor black and brown outsiders, including illegal immigrants.

In this year’s midterm elections, Democrats who favor greater federal government activism but are wary of invoking what they view as a potentially dangerous and xenophobic populism are going to lose congressional seats and possibly one or both houses of Congress to Republicans who, in true Jacksonian fashion, combine unapologetic populism with hostility to a federal government that they view as being dominated by racial, regional and religious outsiders. At some point the present party system will give way to another pattern. But in the near future, conservatives who celebrate the people and oppose the central state will be found in one party, and progressives who favor the federal government but fear the dark side of populism will be found in the other.

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Michael Lind’s new book, "Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States", will be published in April and can be pre-ordered at Amazon.com.

David Broder’s helpful advice for the Tea Parties

The most moderate, sensible political journalist alive tells the raging white populists to stop being so angry

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David Broder's helpful advice for the Tea PartiesDavid Broder (left) and a Tea Party activist in Smithtown, NY.

Extremist moderate Washington Post columnist David Broder — the dean of American political journalists — has some helpful, moderate advice for “the Tea Parties,” an exciting political movement he heard about on “Meet the Press”: They should become happy and moderate.

Knowing he needed to learn more about “the Tea Parties” before he wrote a Sunday newspaper opinion column all about them, Broder turned to American Enterprise Institute vice-president Henry Olsen, who is not affiliated with “the Tea Parties,” but is a longtime conservative think tank fixture who recently wrote a lengthy piece on American populism for a largely unread political journal.

Yes, this member of the Washington conservative think tank elite will definitely help Broder understand what these “Tea Parties” are all about.

The history of American populism, according to Olsen as filtered through reflexive centrist Broder, is a history of two distinct sides, liberal and conservative, that were both unsuccessful not because of the merits of their ideas or the righteousness or destructiveness of their ideologies, but because they were both too extreme. The conservative populists became successful when Ronald Reagan appeared to move them toward the center. Once ideas are mainstream, they are good. Before they are mainstream, they are scary and bad and wrong. The end.

Oh, but what should the “Tea Parties” do, according to Broder?

[William Jennings] Bryan failed in part “because he made a majority afraid. Some libertarian populists, with their rejection of every facet of the modern welfare state, are likely to do the same — because even this center-right nation does not want to see the welfare state dismantled.” Republican Senate candidates in Kentucky and Nevada need to have those words imprinted on their brains.

Huh. OK. So, if libertarian populists want to succeed, they should stop advocating for the dismantling of the welfare state. I cannot foresee a problem with that proposal.

The need for Republicans, then, is to do what Reagan did — “to propose alternatives that offer a real change of direction without seeming too radical.” He had an advantage that is too often overlooked. As the two-term governor of our most populous state, Reagan could answer those who viewed him as dangerous by pointing to the success he had achieved in managing California.

The new conservative populists, Olsen says, need their own positive vision, one that can “turn an intense but transient public sentiment into an enduring political force.”

The Republicans need a positive vision, like Ronald Reagan. And “alternatives” that don’t seem “too radical.” I am sure the Tea Partiers will agree with this sensible moderate advice.

When I asked Olsen if the House Republican plan to draft a new version of the 1994 Contract With America met that need, he responded as I would: Let’s see what their ideas are.

The drafters have postponed the moment of truth by conducting a series of grass-roots hearings and soliciting ideas from the voters — and, it turns out, in private sessions with Washington lobbyists.

Building a majority coalition will require a strong, sensible platform. And a clear separation from the kooks and cranks who sank both Bryan and Goldwater.

So the Tea Partiers need to be “sensible” and separate themselves from “kooks” and “cranks.” This is great advice! I am sure the angry minorities of raging white populists who pop up to hysterically attack every Democratic president will listen carefully to Broder and his friend, and decide to stop advocating for the radical, revolutionary changes that are their animating causes. Once they learn that they must be sensible, these nativists, modern-day Birchers, conspiratorial cranks, and right-wing libertarians who are terrified of losing “their” country will get to join the grown-ups table with Mr. Broder.

All they really have to do is not be who they are!

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Alex Pareene

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

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