Simon Tisdall

October surprise in Iran?

The Bush administration is set to take a tougher line with Tehran despite a lack of consensus among its allies.

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The U.S. charge sheet against Iran is lengthening almost by the day, presaging destabilizing confrontations this autumn and maybe a preelection October surprise.

The Bush administration is piling on the pressure over Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program. It maintains Tehran’s decision to resume building uranium centrifuges wrecked a long-running European Union-led dialogue and is proof of bad faith.

The U.S. will ask a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency on Sept. 13 to declare Iran in breach of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, a prelude to seeking punitive U.N. sanctions.

Iran’s insistence that it seeks nuclear power, not weapons, is scoffed at in Washington. John Bolton, the hawkish U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control, says there is no doubt what Tehran is up to. He has hinted at using military force should the U.N. fail to act. “The U.S. and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques” to halt nuclear proliferation, including “the disruption of procurement networks, sanctions and other means.” No option was ruled out, he said last year.

Last month in Tokyo, Bolton upped the ante again, accusing Iran of collaborating with North Korea on ballistic missiles.

Israel, Washington’s ally, has also been stoking the fire. It is suggested there that if the West fails to act against Iran in timely fashion, Israel could strike preemptively as it did against Iraq’s nuclear facilities in 1981, although whether it has the capability to launch effective strikes is uncertain.

The U.S. has been pushing other countries to impose de facto punishment on Iran. Japan has been asked to cancel its $2 billion investment in the Azadegan oilfield, and Washington has urged Russia to halt the construction of a civilian reactor.

Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. national security adviser, said last weekend there was a new international willingness to confront Tehran, but declined to rule out unilateral action if others did not go along.

That will fuel speculation in Tehran and elsewhere that the Bush administration may resort to force, with or without Israel, ahead of November’s election. Options include “surgical strikes” or covert action by special forces.

Such a move would be a high-risk gamble for George Bush. After the WMD fiasco, there would inevitably be questions about the accuracy of U.S. intelligence. In the past Iran has vowed to retaliate. Although it is unclear how it might do so, the mood in Tehran has hardened since the conservatives won fiddled elections last winter.

“I think we’ve finally got the world community to a place, the IAEA to a place, that it is worried and suspicious,” Rice said in one of a string of interviews with CNN, Fox News and NBC television. She vowed to aim some “very tough resolutions” at Iran this autumn. “Iran will either be isolated or it will submit,” she said.

Officials in London say she exaggerated the degree of unanimity on what to do next. Britain, France and Germany are the E.U. troika that has pursued a policy of “critical engagement” with Iran, despite U.S. misgivings.

Jack Straw, the British foreign secretary, has invested considerably in resolving the issue, traveling to Tehran on several occasions. A diplomatic collapse would be a blow.

“There has been no such decision at all,” a Foreign Office spokesman said yesterday of U.S. efforts to take the dispute to the U.N. Security Council. “The dialogue [with Iran] is ongoing and the government still believes that negotiation is the way forward at this stage.” But Britain is in danger of being dragged down a path of confrontation that it does not want to travel.

Nuclear weapons are not Washington’s only worry. The U.S. charges include Iran’s perceived meddling in Iraq, where the blame for the surge in Shiite unrest is laid partly at Tehran’s door. It also takes exception to Iran’s ambiguous attitude to al-Qaida and Tehran’s backing for anti-Israeli groups such as Hezbollah. The recent Thomas Kean report on 9/11 detailed unofficial links between some of the al-Qaida hijackers and Iran.

Investigations into other terrorist attacks since 9/11, including this year’s Madrid bombings and failed plots in Paris and London, point to an Iran connection, though the extent of any government involvement is obscure.

While the Bush administration is set on a tougher line there is no consensus even in Washington on what to do.

A report by the independent Council on Foreign Relations says since Iran is not likely to implode anytime soon, the U.S. should start talking.

“Iran is experiencing a gradual process of internal change,” the report says. “The urgency of U.S. concerns about Iran and the region mandate that the U.S. deal with the current regime [through] a compartmentalized process of dialogue, confidence building and incremental engagement.”

That suggestion was mocked by a Wall Street Journal editorial as “appeasement.” Hawks say the nuclear issue is too urgent to brook further delay. And therein lies the rub. Bringing Iran in from the cold is a time-consuming business. But the Bush administration, as usual, is in a hurry.

Brave talk — no action

The U.S. and England rattle their sabers at the Sudan -- where civil unrest has led to 30,000 deaths -- and still nothing has happened.

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Sudan is becoming a dark study in disillusion. Only two weeks ago, Britain was openly hinting at military intervention to end the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region. In an echo of the build-up to war in Iraq, Tony Blair spoke gravely of a “moral responsibility” that must not be shirked.

Not to be outdone, Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, warned of dire consequences should the Islamist-led Sudanese government fail to fulfil its undertakings to the United Nations. He demanded an immediate end to a conflict that has cost an estimated 30,000 lives (there are no wholly reliable figures) and displaced more than 1 million people.

The clamour to “do something”  and quickly  became a crescendo as the UN, development officials and aid agencies warned of a catastrophe in Darfur and in the refugee camps in neighbouring Chad.

Anxious to have its say before going on holiday, the US Congress grabbed some headlines of its own by labelling as genocide the mayhem perpetrated by Janjaweed Arab nomad militias.

Serious stuff indeed. So what happened? Did the B52s scramble? Did Nato volunteer to go “out of area”? Did Pentagon supremo Donald Rumsfeld rally the “new” (as opposed to “old”) Africa to confront what the US deems a terrorism-sponsoring state of concern?

Not exactly. After all that noisy talk, the UN security council met last week and passed a motion.

The Sudanese government was given 30 days to call off its proxy killers or face unspecified punitive “measures”  but, mark well, not formal sanctions, not military force and certainly not a regime-changing invasion. And that only if the UN deemed the government to have made insufficient progress by September.

Khartoum’s militia puppet-masters were, in effect, let off the hook. They now say they will comply to the best of their ability  but want 90 days rather than 30 to do so, as previously agreed with the UN boss, Kofi Annan.

Even this conditional acceptance is hedged with qualifiers. For Sudanese ministers also claim that they do not control the Janjaweed, who (they say) may be impossible to rein in.

And they warn that implementing the UN resolution in full, including assisted resettlement of displaced people and the resumption of a political dialogue in Darfur, will be “extremely difficult” in so short a timeframe. After over a century of foreign interference and post-independence neglect, disputes over customary water and land use, and growing ethnic and tribal tensions in Darfur, that contention has a ring of truth.

But it also seems clear that Khartoum plans to play for time. The government is likely to exhibit only limited compliance with UN demands while waiting for the international hubbub to die down and for some new political and media sensation to shift attention elsewhere.

That, after all, is how it has always been in Sudan since the 19th century joustings of Ismail Pasha, the Mahdi and Herbert (later Lord) Kitchener. In the end, everybody tends to walk away from Sudan, somewhat baffled, lances a trifle bent. It is just too big and too complicated.

Sudan’s present-day leader, Omar al-Bashir, may not be the smartest bean in the box. But he probably calculates that Mr Blair, for all his moral conviction, has a lot of other fish to fry. The prime minister surely cares. But he is no Charles “Chinese” Gordon, the British general killed in the siege of Khartoum in 1885 after refusing a way out.

Similar calculations also suggest that George Bush, in a neck-and-neck autumn US election race, will avoid a post-Iraq adventure overseas. It smacks too much of Somalia, his father’s parting folly in 1992-93. Nor will his hyper-cautious Democratic challenger, John Kerry, push for intervention.

And what if the UN does move towards punitive “measures” this autumn? Russia or China, with oil and commercial interests in mind, may veto them.

But even if they do not, such restrictions would make little difference to Khartoum’s already isolated leadership  although ordinary people could suffer. The US, for example, already has bilateral sanctions in place.

So far the only concrete western military move has been the deployment of French troops along the Sudan-Chad border.

Such maneuvering may make President Jacques Chirac, a rival to Mr Blair in Africa as in so much else, feel like a player. But like the British, and indeed like the EU’s nascent military organisation, the French do not have the numbers, the gear or the logistical reach to make a real difference.

There is something depressingly familiar in international affairs about this sequence of events, this transition from brave words and high principles to shabby compromises and receding expectations.

In truth, the west’s behaviour to date is the opposite of Teddy Roosevelt’s old maxim about speaking softly and carrying a big stick.

On Darfur, it transpires, western leaders are all hat and no cattle (perhaps that should be camels).

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