Daryl Lindsey

After the fall

The Taliban is on the run. What happens now? Who should govern Afghanistan? And how hard will it be to win the war of the caves?

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After Taliban forces retreated Tuesday from Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, the U.S.-supported Northern Alliance took control of the city. The White House said that President Bush was “very pleased” with the advance. The Taliban’s unexpectedly sudden withdrawal — on the heels of defeats in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif — represented an important military triumph for the U.S. (On Tuesday, it was reported that Northern Alliance troops had pushed on from Kabul to the Taliban’s stronghold, Kandahar.) But the Taliban’s unexpectedly sudden withdrawal also gave new urgency to major issues — Afghanistan’s political future, the trustworthiness of the Northern Alliance, the next step in the military campaign, the status of humanitarian aid and the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.

Several experts on the region spoke with Salon about what the future holds for Afghanistan and the region and what the United States should do next.

Joel Charny, Asia expert from Refugees International

The Northern Alliance progress means that 70 to 80 percent of the Afghans in need of assistance are now in Northern Alliance territory. This is critical. We need the Northern Alliance to provide enough stability and security so we can provide humanitarian aid.

If it can do this, we’ll be able to save a lot of lives. This is potentially a huge victory for humanitarian efforts, but it can only happen if Mazar-e-Sharif becomes a normal city where the international community can set up a base of operations. We need to make this clear to the Northern Alliance. We need to tell them that any future role they might have in the Afghan government is dependent on their ability to create a stable place for assistance. The Afghan people desperately needs someone to govern this country, if only to make a way for the international community to help.

This is also important for the coalition. They can’t attack terrorism and bomb the Afghan people and then pull out when it comes to human aid. I think the international community is aware of this, but here’s our chance. We need to become proactive. If people die unnecessarily, that will be a blow to the Northern Alliance and to the coalition. We can’t underscore this enough.

The Northern Alliance’s past record is dismal. They’ve been unable to work together among themselves. There have been a lot of betrayals among them over the past 10 years. Furthermore, they have a very poor human rights record. So the question now is whether cooler heads will prevail, whether they know what’s at stake and whether they’ll comply.

There’s also been talk of creating a multinational police force under U.N. auspices. But because there is no standing force like this already in place, it takes a while to organize. And yet, Kofi Annan has said that the U.N. has to act as swiftly as possible, so it might happen sooner than expected. But surely, one way to potentially control the situation on the ground is to have a multinational police force — preferably with people from Muslim countries.

The difficulty is going to be in implementing that. It’s clear that putting U.S. special forces in charge of anything in Afghanistan is a non-starter. [Lakhdar] Brahimi, the U.S. special envoy, went out of his way to make that point when he started working on Afghanistan again in September. You can’t look to the U.S. because no American force will be accepted there. So you’re stuck with exerting U.S. force on the Northern Alliance or creating and asserting influence on an international force.

Robert Legvold, political science professor at Columbia University specializing in former Soviet states

There’s more nuance to [the falling of Kabul]. My reading of the news is that commanders have restrained troops from sweeping in. Instead they’ve sent in limited numbers in order to go from house to house to make sure that the Taliban have left. Abdullah Abdullah [the Northern Alliance's foreign minister] has said that it’s very much in the interest of the Northern Alliance to respect the wishes of the international community, for them not to seize Kabul, and they seem to be complying.

The question is whether there is a spontaneous movement on the part of some of the forces under warlords that can’t be controlled by the central leadership. It’s a matter of how much control the Northern Alliance has over itself.

The second question is whether the international community can get their act together in time. Secretary of State Colin Powell has agreements from Muslim countries, but not Arab countries, and I think that’s the key. There needs to be an Arab presence that then creates a constabulary force, an international monitoring force to oversee what the Northern Alliance does. This should be in place until the larger question of the shape of interim government can be answered.

So you have two kinds of institutions that are needed: one, a quick monitoring force that ought not to be Western powers; and second, a solution to this longer-term problem of trying to find some kind of broad government. Both of those things should fall under the mediation of the international community, preferably the U.N.

But we’re having a lot of trouble getting that off the ground. The main problem with the first institution is time urgency. They need to do this as soon as possible.

So the real issue for now is whether and where the Taliban will make their stand. Presumably they’ll build up their military power around Kandahar. The further south they move from Kandahar, or the closer [north] to Iran, the weaker they are in terms of tribal support. So my guess is that the war will intensify south of Kabul and east to Pakistan.

I’ve also heard that the Taliban has been fractured, that they don’t have communications with each other. If that’s true, then it may be that regardless of their will or strength, they won’t be able to pull themselves together militarily and will be much weaker. But I wouldn’t count on that until we see it happen.

Harvey Sapolsky, defense expert and professor of political science at MIT

It looks good. I don’t know what’s going to come next; who knows what’s really gong on with Afghan politics. But it shouldn’t matter to us. The goal was to destroy the Taliban and get al-Qaida, and while we don’t have al-Qaida, we have the Taliban on the run. It’s a victory.

There should be more on the way. Everybody who wants to fight the U.S.-assisted Northern Alliance will be at a disadvantage. Our air power makes a big difference. The Northern Alliance had 10 percent of the country; now they have, say, half of it. This couldn’t have happened without our help. And going south, they’ll still have this borrowed strength. It will only get better because we’re now setting up bases in Tajikistan.

It’s true, we haven’t got much control over the Northern Alliance. We should tell them not to commit atrocities. But unless we want a lot of American ground troops to take their place, we don’t have much choice but to accept what they do. I’m of the opinion that whatever we have there will be better than the Taliban. Whether it has a Pashtun mix, or more Tajiks doesn’t matter. We shouldn’t encourage the world’s paranoia. People already think we run the world and they blame us for everything. We shouldn’t feed the anger with a strong American presence. We shouldn’t create the government there. We should want a more stable government, we should give them aid, but it’s not our business to see who runs Afghanistan. We should only make sure the government doesn’t harbor people who want to destroy American buildings and commit terrorist acts. And if we’ve done that, then we should get out.

John Voll, Islamic history professor at Georgetown University

A lot will depend upon the behavior of the Alliance troops as they take control of newly conquered areas. If there are many revenge killings and looting and disorder, then most people in the Muslim world will blame the U.S. for aiding violence and will argue that the U.S. is being hypocritical — bombing the Taliban for being supporters of terrorism but rewarding the Alliance even when it engages in acts that are like terrorism. I do not think Muslim peacekeeping troops will make much difference, because the forces would simply be seen as military forces acting under orders. Sending Turkish troops would do nothing to improve such sentiment, since the Turkish military has a reputation in much of the Muslim world as acting to suppress Islamic movements.

I would hope that the Northern Alliance victories would allow for a suspension of bombing during Ramadan, but my guess is that military planners would not want to lose the momentum from the string of victories and would probably not suspend bombing until after some major victories in the south.

Retired Col. Dan Smith, chief of research for the Center for Defense Information

The fall of Kabul must be considered a victory. The U.S. did not expect Kabul to be so precipitously abandoned. Next comes more effort in tracking down the al-Qaida leadership and bin Laden. This has been a separate but parallel track with the Northern Alliance effort against the Taliban. The two are now intersecting more, but it can complicate the search because there will be more small groups the Special Forces will want to avoid or will have to fight if encountered as they search for al-Qaida.

Could the retreat be a trap? It seems too disorganized and fragmented to involve one. If the Taliban leadership can reestablish some control of hard-line fighters, they could begin some kind of guerrilla activity after a few weeks. The south is their ethnic stronghold, so they may find some assistance from Pashtuns living in the south or even from across the international border.

As for Northern Alliance atrocities, not all reprisals can be stopped no matter how big an international force may go in. What must be done is to internationalize control of the cities with Afghan assistance and begin the process of rebuilding civil society — government, police, courts, the whole justice system.

Thomas Barfield is professor and chairman of anthropology at Boston University.

Given their dismal track record during the civil war, can we trust the Northern Alliance?

One of the problems is that the Afghan civil war is extremely complicated. When Borhanuddin Rabbani took over in 1992 [from the communists] there was no violence, all the communist and mujahedin factions joined together to form a new government. There was no bloodbath.

But because the outside world walked away, there was no international attention to getting the country back on its feet and the factions started fighting amongst themselves for power because each thought that they could get more out of the deal.

After 10 years of civil war now they know that they can’t. When the Northern Alliance says it wants a broad-based government, they’re honest. Everyone knows that they all had a chance and failed — even the Pashtuns who ruled as the Taliban have learned that. Now they’re much more amenable to creating a broad based government

How difficult will it be to create a new, multi-ethnic government in Afghanistan?

In the east, the Pashtuns have already revolted against the Taliban in some places like Ghazni, which is halfway down the road to Kandahar from Kabul, and there’s been some unrest in Kandahar itself. You have to realize that the Taliban exploded out of Kandahar and took over 90 percent of the country really quickly. They never really won a battle because Afghans really want to be on the winning side. During the rise of the Taliban only one Afghan faction was able to retreat successfully with its forces intact, that was [former Northern Alliance Leader Ahmed Shah] Massoud. When most other Afghan factions retreat, their followers make a calculation about who’s going to win and decide to ally themselves with successful invaders. Throughout history the country has turned to one side or another with remarkable rapidity without decisive battles because people calculate who’s going to win and jump ship. Afghans are very pragmatic.

We’re seeing that people have decided that the Taliban is on the way out. In the north they fell because it wasn’t their territory. However, in the south a good chunk of their forces are composed of the so-called Afghan Arabs, who will fight it out for ideological reasons. But most Afghans have a much finer grained sense of self and don’t readily ally themselves with a larger group. This isn’t like Yugoslavia, where you saw people allying themselves with their ethnic groups. In Afghanistan the sense of ethnicity is very fluid, with a few exceptions like the Hazaras. Traditionally there’s lots of intermarriage. Politics is not based on ideology or ethnicity. If the Pashtuns want to come over to the Northern Alliance then they’ll be accepted.

One of the problems is that everyone brings their own lens to this. For most people, the first time they’d heard about Afghanistan and its ethnic groups was six weeks ago. Suddenly people learn really quickly and focus on these ethnic groups, and the most recent thing we’ve read about ethnic groups was in the Balkans, where every time you create a nation for an ethnic group you get new revolts. The Afghans are not like that. There is not a single party in Afghanistan that has threatened to join a foreign country like the Kosovars in Macedonia. The amazing thing about Afghans is that they have co-ethnics along all their borders, and despite that not a single group has said “if we don’t win we’re going to form our own country or join with a foreign country.” These guys are like poker players — they argue about the division of the pot, not the table.

Afghanistan is the size of France and Afghans understand that you need a country of a certain size in order to survive. If you’re five different countries then each one becomes an appendage to a neighboring country and everyone gets screwed. Central Asian ethnicity is very different from Eastern European ethnicity. They’ve always lived in multi-ethnic societies and have never suffered the ethnic problems of Eastern Europe.

One of the things that surprised me is how quickly the Pashtun areas seem to be unraveling. Until recently it had been thought that the country could be divided between the North and South along ethnic lines, but Pashtuns seemingly want to have no part of this.

Why should we think that a new government can work in Afghanistan?

The entire country has undergone considerable change. After the communist government fell in 1992, there was a real government to seize. But since the Taliban rose there hasn’t been a government there. There’s no army, no institutions, it’s just a symbolic shell. That’s one of the reasons they can agree to accommodate one another.

In the past it was a Pashtun-dominated government but all power came out of Kabul. The Pashtuns dominated because they controlled the monarchy and the military while the Tajiks controlled most of the bureaucracy. The Hazaras were discriminated against and got the short end of the stick. Then in the war against the Soviets they all learned that they could all fight. Previously the Pashtuns said “we’re the best fighters.” In that war the Tajiks proved to be among the best fighters under Massoud. The Hazaras also proved considerably tough warriors and pushed the Pashtuns out of some areas. So what has happened is that all ethnic groups have a certain amount of respect for one another. The Pashtuns know that there’s no way of recreating the ethnic balance that existed before 1978 and everyone else is much more secure in their regional identities than before. Everyone is now talking about a central government, but it’s not clear that will be very strong. They’ll need a central government, at a minimum, to cash foreign aid checks and divide it up.

So you don’t expect the new government to be effective?

Afghanistan has collapsed before, in 1929. The central government was restored but it took many years for it to become effective. The deal that the communists broke was that the Afghan central government leaves everyone alone as long as you’re peaceful. No one collects taxes in Afghanistan, the government relied on taxing trade and smuggling for its revenue. That means that Afghan national governments rarely interfere in local affairs. The communists interfered by insisting on local land reforms and other policies. We’ll probably go back to an era in which the central government allows local areas to administer themselves. Kabul used to appoint regional leaders; now local areas have appointed their own.

Will a weak central government hamper international aid efforts?

You don’t even need a central government to do this sort of reconstruction. Every major city is close to another country: Mazar-e-Sharif is something like 60 miles from Uzbekistan, Kabul and Kandahar are right across the border from Pakistan and Herat is just 80 miles from Iran. If you want to set up reconstruction projects or policies based in each neighboring region then you can run all of that from outside. So let them spend next six-eight months arguing about the form of a central government while the international community actually does the rebuilding.

What reconstruction needs to be done?

There’s relatively little that needs to be done because there wasn’t much there before. They need roads and agriculture and little else. The first thing they need is a large amount of grain because Afghanistan has suffered three years of drought. USAID is planning to ship in tons of grain in order to bring the price down across the country. They only have one main road, the circuit road around the country, that needs to be rebuilt. It’s a relatively simple job to do but needs to be done. Actually all these returning refugees from Iran have been doing road work in Iran for the past 10-20 years, so put them to work.

The northern part of country is the agricultural center, so they need to get their roads up in order to feed the south and then run transit from Pakistan to Central Asia which represents lots of revenue for the country. Afghanistan’s not a cul-de-sac — all its neighbors would like to have its infrastructure together too because they all want to get their trading routes back up and running.

Does the Taliban pose a lasting threat in Afghanistan?

Mullah Omar says his forces will retreat to the hills and start a guerilla war. The West says “oh my god,” but they forget that guerillas need to be resupplied. The mujahedin won against the Soviet Union because we resupplied them and they could retreat into Pakistan. If Omar goes into the hills he can buy supplies from smugglers but he will have to pay cash and can’t retreat to another country; he will be stuck in the hills and caves. It will be especially difficult for him to hide if the country becomes more developed because his hiding places will rapidly disappear.

The United States’ demand is that Afghanistan turn over all foreigners. It’s relatively easy for the Afghans to turn over foreigners. The interesting thing is that you don’t see one Afghan in one of these terrorist groups. They’re very parochial. Even the Taliban were intent only on putting the Islamic revolution in place in Afghanistan, while Osama wanted to spread it to the world. It was a symbiotic relationship, but the Afghans haven’t had any interest in going off to kill anyone outside their territory. They even had to bring in Arabs to kill Massoud because they probably couldn’t get Afghans to do it.

Second, Afghans of whatever ideology really don’t want to sacrifice themselves outside of their own country. If you get the economy going they won’t even attend madrasas because they’ll have better things to do. It’s an easier problem to take care of rather than many of the other difficulties we’ve been dealing with. In some ways we’ve invented some bogeymen. The collapse of the Taliban has taken many people by surprise, but if you look at their rise it’s exactly what happens in Afghanistan’s political history.

You hear military experts on TV saying that the flip side could be that the Northern Alliance is moving so fast that it could be counter-attacked, but the guys who were Taliban yesterday are part of the Northern Alliance today. And they won’t change back, because they will go with their own interests which are now firmly aligned with the Northern Alliance. And given the power and resources Afghanistan might actually stabilize. Twenty-five years of fighting has taught the warlords that there are better things to do.

Sanjoy Banerjee is a professor in the international relations department at San Francisco State University.

What happens now?

The Northern Alliance forces have now entered Kabul and control the city. After that there are a range of options. They have named [Borhanuddin] Rabbani president, who was president before the Taliban took over. [Rabbani is still recognized by the U.N.] They’re clearly moving politically to create a government, but so far they have been silent on the role of Mohammad Zahir-Shah [the deposed king of Afghanistan]. So we can imagine a government more dominated by the Northern Alliance or they can try to bring in Zahir Shah and then move towards a more inclusive government. I think that they want to reestablish the pre-Taliban government as much as they can and then they can try to be more inclusive of Pashtuns, at least those free of taint of the Taliban.

Other discussions have been going on about bringing in various foreign Muslim armies under U.N. auspices like Turkey, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. The United States is talking about that. Pakistan has volunteered but they’re unpopular with the Northern Alliance because they supported the Taliban against Rabbani and previous groups.

Under these circumstances we can see quite a bit of Northern Alliance consolidation in the north amidst a very fluid situation. We’ll have to see if the Taliban can consolidate in the south. If they can then Afghanistan will be de facto partitioned. If that happens then American goals will be unachieved; al-Qaida will still be ensconced in the south.

Why does the south represent such a potentially difficult battle?

First, there is this big ethnic divide. You would have the Taliban guerillas able to rely on villages that they could not in the north for more enthusiastic and active resistance. They could allow any penetrating army to move as they wish initially and then stage hit-and-run attacks, whereas before they were trying to block access to Kabul. They can rely on the Pashtun population to assist them and also utilize the extensive networks of caves and tunnels. The terrain and the predominant ethnicity tend to favor the Taliban more in the south.

Politically the Taliban is much stronger in the south. We’ve seen, in spite of two months of bombing and offers of inducements to Pashtun leaders to defect, very little success. The few interested parties were killed. That could change now that the tide of battle has really turned. But we cannot underestimate the significance of the Taliban’s strength.

How stable is the Northern Alliance politically?

The odds of their factions fighting against one another before the threat of the Taliban and Pakistan is resolved aren’t high. Many have switched sides many times but history has moved on. Possible coalitions have congealed and changed so there aren’t really a lot of options for leaders to switch sides. Other groups haven’t really fought against one another. I think the Pashtun against non-Pashtun is the big conflict. There are other dangers, though, like a lack of discipline, which may have prompted the reported massacres after the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif.

How strong is the Northern Alliance administratively?

They haven’t demonstrated any great administrative capacity in the past. But it also was not a valid test because there was always outside interference. When they first established a government in the early ’90s, Pakistan intervened. Now they probably have better options. They’ll certainly have access to much greater resources in terms of material and expertise from the U.N. and the West. They have friends in Russia and India. They’re not even dependent exclusively on the West and the U.N., though that is likely to be their first and main target for support because that’s where the money is.

How do you see a future Afghan government? Will it be a strong state?

A lot of the suggestions that were made as of 48 hours ago suggested that Afghanistan would emerge as a semi-sovereign state with a lot of foreign supervision. That prospect may be receding as the Northern Alliance moves in, especially with President Bush expressing support even though he was saying something completely different 24 hours earlier. It’s not even that Bush is doing a big flip-flop — this just wasn’t the scenario he was envisioning. He though that there would be a civil war within Kabul, but when the Taliban pulled out the local population welcomed the Northern Alliance.

Under those circumstances, even with the human rights violations against prisoners, the Northern Alliance capture of Kabul is more legitimate than anticipated. They were consistently popular in the north because of a shared ethnicity with the local population. But even in Kabul, which is less northern in ethnicity, they’ve shown some popularity. Maybe it’s only the co-ethnics in Kabul who are celebrating, but at least they’re not out fighting and protesting.

So the Northern Alliance took the initiative even amidst interest and pressure from global forces. That’s what’s interesting as an observer. Here you have a minuscule force driving history and the U.S. having to change its line over six hours.

What role does Pakistan play in Afghanistan’s future?

That is the great issue of the future. Now, to talk about that I think you have to accurately describe the interaction between the United States and Pakistan after Sept. 11. Both in terms of government rhetoric and the United States media coverage it has been said that Pakistan is a crucial ally in the war against terrorism. That’s true up to a point: Pakistan has permitted American overflights of its territory and some limited non-combat operations from its territory, although Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have done quite a bit more for the American war effort in Afghanistan. Moreover in Pakistan you have these fairly large holy warrior outfits who are the ones now being massacred after they’ve been captured. They’ve been moving into Afghanistan without being constrained by the Pakistani government.

The actual attitude of the United States towards all this isn’t that easy to fathom. If you listen to Bush’s speech to the U.N. a few days ago it contains a few passages whose meaning isn’t self-evident. There were sharp passages directed against terrorists, but they don’t seem to be directed towards Syria and Iraq — which has led some to think that it’s a veiled threat against Pakistan that it needs to deal with the holy warrior outfits on its territory.

So maybe we’ll have a Pashtun buffer zone between the Northern Alliance and Pakistani zone. But that wouldn’t really be acceptable to the U.S. because the U.S. would really like to see radical terrorist outfits excluded in some reliable way from the Pashtun area in the south of Afghanistan.

The United States has quite a tricky problem to solve. Most of it involves Pakistan’s holy warrior outfits and their relationship to the government. From Sept. 11 onwards the U.S. has talked about Phase 1 as getting rid of the Taliban and al-Qaida; phase two was getting rid of the rest of terror networks. The second phase has sometimes been considered Iraq-centric, but the way it has evolved I think it has a lot to do with Pakistan — using economic and other pressures on Pakistan to gradually quiet down the holy warrior outfits and stop fresh production of extremist madrasas and other types of training that go on in and around Pakistan.

If we think of the struggle against terrorism, then that is in many ways the main action because it’s through that holy warrior nexus that the Taliban emerged and al-Qaida and Osama were able to find a sanctuary that Pakistan diplomatically protected for three years. So I think that that’s the next problem that Bush is going to have to deal with.

The short-term challenge is establishing a non-Taliban, non-al-Qaida government in Afghanistan — even, optimistically, in the south. The long-term challenge is to protect that political structure from subversion from Pakistan, which is what happened in early ’90s.

What can Pakistan do in this situation?

It depends on what they’re ready to sacrifice. The Pakistani army is pretty good in terms of training and confidence, plus they have national guard militias which brings the total number of forces under Musharraf to about 1 million. If he decides to move these forces against the holy warriors, which might number 200,000, he could do it, but it would cost him something. He’s using the holy warriors to fight in Kashmir.

If the military and fundamentalists fall out it also opens the way for democratic forces like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Shariff [former Pakistani prime ministers] who are national democrats as well as the ethnic parties, the majority of which are still not fundamentalists. Musharraf wishes to continue his military dictatorship; he recently announced that wants to remain in power after elections in 2002. The danger is that to some extent Pakistan’s commitment to fighting in Kashmir is connected to preserving the military’s political power in Pakistan itself.

If Musharraf does substantially crack down on holy warriors and the U.S. believes that he’s doing that, then I believe that a lot of money will flow. My hunch is that the aid that has been promised to Pakistan is contingent on that. It’s the U.S. strategy — you play ball with us and we’ll help you out.

Turning Pakistan around is a big part of the challenge. It seems to be something that the Bush administration recognizes but cannot openly say. Bush praises Musharraf but presses him in more elliptical terms.

How likely do you think it is that a centralized government will emerge in Afghanistan?

It’s hard to envision a highly centralized successful government in Afghanistan at this time. Historically, multiethnic states can federalize or move towards tight centralization. But to follow the tight centralization strategy you need a historical opening to allow it to happen like a Tito in Yugoslavia.

The reality is that a lot of Yugoslavs did collaborate with Nazis and that’s what allowed Tito his opening, because many sympathizers were ashamed of their actions during the Second World War. In Afghanistan it would take a temporary period where those that resisted centralization would then be ashamed. The government would have to create something that worked. But Afghanistan doesn’t really have its Tito, the Northern Alliance is not really Tito-like in leadership. So it’s not easy to see a very centralized structure coming up soon, but we could be in for surprises.

Charles Santos is a former U.N. mediator in Afghanistan and former executive at Delta Oil, where he was negotiating the right-of-way for a pipeline that would carry Central Asian oil through Afghanistan.

The Northern Alliance has moved into Kabul and announced that they’re going to return former President Rabbani to power from his exile. Can this be considered a victory for the U.S., given that the Bush administration asked the alliance not to enter Kabul yet? Could this complicate international efforts to build a transition government?

The U.S. position was reasonable. But what we have to do is take a step back. Instead of talking about personalities, which everybody wants to do, and trying to determine who’s a bad guy and who isn’t, we should try to understand the nature of the country and the structure of the government. The problem isn’t a person. It’s more important to focus on what kind of state we want to see in Afghanistan and to understand what drove the conflict during the ’90s. What were the things that turned Kabul into the place where most of the fighting was going on?

The reason was that Kabul is perceived in the Afghan context as the seat of power. Whoever controls Kabul controls everything. But that paradigm doesn’t work for Afghanistan because the people who aren’t a part of the power structure begin to feel very insecure — they don’t have a presence there and aren’t able to assert themselves. That ultimately leads to conflict. A power struggle invariably ensures. The return of Rabbani to Kabul is less important than the notion of the city being perceived as the center of everything. What we need to do is look at how we can encourage a system that decentralizes power in Afghanistan and de-emphasizes the importance of Kabul. A diverse country requires that it reflect the decentralized nature of the communities and devolve power from the center to those regions. That’s the thing that will prevent Kabul from turning into another nightmare.

If you got rid of the Taliban and put in a whole bunch of new people, even representing the different communities, but you still left the central state in Kabul as it is, then you still set up the pressure for further conflicts.

The U.N. and President Bush are calling for a “broad-based” and “multi-ethnic” post-Taliban government, which sounds very centralized. Can that type of government work in Afghanistan after 20 years of civil war?

We should be empiricists and look at what happened in the ’90s. Every U.N. resolution, every U.N. mediation effort, went with that as its core set of principles — that you have to set up a broad-based, multi-ethnic government. But we were not able in a centralized way to establish that. Every effort looked at: How do you create a broad-based government in Kabul? How do you create a broad-based government in Afghanistan so people would feel confident that their interests were being represented in that central authority? That did not work. The very notion of a centralized power in Kabul provokes instability in the region because people never feel secure.

What we’ve got to do is look first at how you encourage confidence among different ethnic communities in Afghanistan; how you encourage goodwill among these different communities. Let’s be honest: A lot of that goodwill has been evaporated over the last 10 years of fighting, driven in part over this desire to determine power for their own groups. We can say the Pashtuns, because they were the largest of the ethnic groups (though still a minority) have held out the longest. But Massoud and Rabbani were also trying to control and hold Kabul as the central authority that controls everything and everyone. That just doesn’t work.

What would this decentralized system of governance look like? You’ve said it could resemble the United Kingdom, where there are powerful regional governments with legislative bodies in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Or like Switzerland. I see it as something like a canton system, where a lot of the functions of the central government are devolved out to the regions, where they have much closer connections to the grassroots communities they’re serving. It would be a regional structure that would give a kind of autonomy — economic and cultural — to these regions. There would still be a central government, but it wouldn’t be the kind of central government that controls everything. That’s been the problem in the past.

Maybe in 15 or 20 years a more centralized government will be chosen by the Afghans as the way to go, but in this context we found that it doesn’t work. We need to think of Afghanistan not in terms of what works for us, but in terms of what works for them. What tends to happen is that the United Nations and national governments tend to like central power because it’s easier — you know who to talk to, it’s simple, it’s the way you see the world. But that doesn’t work in Afghanistan. Instead, we need to develop a system that reflects the decentralized nature of the place.

If you had a decentralized system of governance, would it be delineated along ethnic lines?

There are a lot of areas that are mixed ethnically, so you would want to structure this more regionally. Those regions would somewhat reflect an ethnic composition, but it wouldn’t be total.

Could you foresee the Taliban ruling the areas dominated by ethnic Pashtuns?

There are a number of people who may have initially been in the Taliban movement who left it who could play some role. But I think many Pashtun communities are going to be very upset with the road the Taliban leaders led them down, which has been disastrous. I’m less worried about present Taliban leaders playing a significant role — they’ve already been discredited, and not only internationally. Now, with the loss of the north, west and center of country, the very notion they were playing on — one of Pashtun ethnic dominance — has been cracked. These communities are much more now interested in their preservation, not their ability to dominate. Most Afghan Pashtuns would rather find a way in which they can live peacefully within their own communities and be protected. That’s where a decentralized system will play an important role: It will give confidence also to the Pashtuns that their future will be secure. That’s what we’re looking to figure out — how we create a sense of security among these various communities. The centralized power structure in the past has created insecurity. It’s the thing that’s driven the ethnic identification in a significant way. A hundred years ago, people weren’t as ethnically identified in Afghanistan, but today they are. That’s a problem.

Who could be the best mediator for a new system of governance in Afghanistan? Could it be the U.N., given its failure to do so in the past? Could it be the U.S. , which has bombarded Kabul?

The U.N. clearly has a role in this, but I would like to see the U.S. play a leading role. Contrary to what some people think, among the Afghans, it has an enormous amount of respect. Afghans also understand that the U.S. is really the main player in all of this. As a country taking a leading role, that would be helpful. There might even be a place for an international conference that would help to establish such a system.

Pakistan has been a longtime ally of the Taliban. How will their relationship with Afghanistan evolve once the Taliban is out?

What the Pakistanis did by supporting the Taliban created more instability in their own country than stability. It helped further radicalize the Islamicist elements within Pakistan, it put them in jeopardy of being isolated by the world. If you can create a stable political system in Afghanistan, it will spill over into Pakistan. For Pakistan, it’s a recognition that the Pashtuns will have a role to play — and that’s not really anything they can complain about if it happens.

Do you think the Northern Alliance is being fairly portrayed in the Western media? Reports depict Northern Alliance leaders as warriors and barbarians.

I’m amazed. What’s the difference between an Afghan leader and an Afghan warlord? We see this written up in the press all the time. This guy is a warlord, that guy is a leader. Can you explain the difference? Both have armies, both represent communities. Why this kind of reporting?

We also have to understand that this country has been at war for years. Everybody has been involved in the fighting, everybody has taken a side and played a role. To say that because they’ve defended their communities — which is how they would see it — that that somehow makes them bad and unable to play any role is crazy. There’s nobody in Afghanistan right now who hasn’t been involved in something or other that we might not like. The question is whether they have the capacity to administer a government. Has the situation evolved enough, with enough stability, that their communities feel secure enough that such things won’t happen again? We have to understand that there’s a basis for their actions in the past: a very insecure political system.

Rashid Dostum, for example, is being referred to as an “ethnic Uzbek warlord.” I’m amazed that they don’t put the ethnicity in front of Rabbani and say he’s an “ethnic Tajik warlord president” or something like that. I don’t quite understand it. Dostum was a major part of the resistance during the Soviet times and a major figure in the war. I don’t quite understand how those determinations are made. I find that a lot of the reporting seems to be coming out of Pakistan with Pakistani ISI sources, and I just wonder if people are really understanding that they may be being played a bit in all of this. This has always been one of the problems. The Pakistani and Pashtun perspective has always been the one that gets reported because Pakistan seems to be the gateway for reporting about Afghanistan. It’s a disservice because then you only get a piece of the story — it’s not the only perspective. You should want to get a more comprehensive perspective of what Afghanistan is.

Dostum, Ismael Khan and Karim Khalili are all serious leaders who are connected and rooted in their communities. Dostum, who was in charge of Mazar-e-Sharif at the time, was in my mind, was very helpful when a U.N. human rights team came in to investigate atrocities in 1997. One of the amazing things that’s never been reported is that not only did he want to help — he also personally went with them. He was incredibly supportive and said he wanted them to see the mass graves. He went with them and brought his men in order to guarantee their security. He directed the investigators to bodies of civilians murdered by General Pahlawan Malik. Then he’s attacked as being a warlord with no interest in human rights. I’m always amazed that the press always misses those pieces.

These three men have all run decent administrations in the area. Dostum and Khan opened schools, Dostum had a university, girls were allowed to attend school, there was no dress code the way there has been under the Taliban. If you wanted to wear a burqa you could. Women were working — they were working in hospitals, they were working in various aid organizations. There were restrictions, but it was a much more open place in an Afghan context. Of course, you can’t apply Afghanistan to New York City, but in the Afghan context it was one of the most open places you could work and live, and it was quite peaceful during most of his reign. The fighting came after the Taliban’s arrival, and you can’t blame him for that. The same is true with Khan — they both ran multiethnic administrations, they didn’t just dominate with their own ethnic group. It’s extraordinary to me that these guys are being tagged as some kind of wild maniacs — it’s nonsense and it’s not the way it was. Most of the fighting was going on in Kabul.

In his book “Taliban,” Ahmed Rashid writes that U.N. mediators didn’t trust you because you were too aligned with the U.S. and had a “personal agenda.”

Rashid has had a long personal disagreement with me and I’m sad that he needs to carry this out in his book. He’s attacked me a number of times, but what I’ve found is that he’s taken sides himself in all of this. His criticism about my being close to the U.S.? I was close to many different governments because I was trying to encourage them to get interested in Afghanistan because none of them were paying attention to it. The personal agenda he’s talking about is that I was committed to trying to solve this problem. You can see that from my long history of involvement in Afghanistan. But that doesn’t always go over well in a U.N. bureaucracy or any kind of bureaucracy that tends to like to see a more bureaucratic approach to addressing these kinds of problems.

I’m very open — I stepped on a lot of toes in places where I could have probably been more careful, but I thought it was worth it because it meant trying to get issues in front of people. He makes these comments about U.N. officials complaining about me, but there were also high-level U.N. officials who were very supportive of my career who he doesn’t quote who have written quite highly of me in their books. He decided to listen to those two and not others. That’s reflective of his style of journalism — he has an agenda himself and he decides what he thinks is true and what he thinks is not. Unfortunately, people have accepted his position as the gospel truth. But the reality is that he’s a guy with a perspective that’s sometimes a little off the wall. But he’s entitled to his own opinions.

“We are all Americans”

With the news that several hijackers studied in Hamburg, Germans throw their support behind Bush, and the tensions of his early months in office melt away -- for now.

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Americans are not the only ones who have been glued to their television sets since Tuesday’s horrific attacks in New York and Washington. All across Europe, TV stations have followed the story nonstop, often forgoing commercials, and a deep sense of horror has taken hold that could make it easier for President Bush to build international support for retaliation.

Many Germans saw Tuesday’s events as an attack against them as well, since the terrorist strike was clearly intended as a blow to the West. But Germany’s sense of being closely involved with the American drama was heightened Thursday when news broke that three of the men involved in the hijackings lived in Hamburg and may have planned part of the attacks from here in what is being described as a terrorist cell.

Mohammed Atta, the 33-year-old who likely flew American Airlines flight 11, and his cousin, Marvan Al-Shehhi, 23, who was on American Airlines Flight 175, lived in a $500-a-month apartment in Hamburg’s Harburg neighborhood, according to the Bild Zeitung newspaper. The two men left Germany in March 2001 for Florida, where they enrolled in flight classes at Huffman Aviation in the Gulf Coast town of Venice. German commandos reportedly stormed eight apartments in Hamburg and arrested one suspect after being tipped off by the FBI Wednesday night.

Atta and Al-Shehhi were enrolled as electrical engineering students at Hamburg-Harburg Technical University, and a third suspect who perished in the Pennsylvania crash is also believed to have studied there. Neighbors quoted on German public television said the suspects lived fairly “anonymously” in their Hamburg neighborhood.

Osama bin Laden, the Saudi exile explicitly named as a suspect Thursday by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, is believed to have ties to operatives in the Hamburg area. But so far officials have been unable to nail down a firm connection between the terrorist mastermind and the men suspected of attacking the U.S.

Even before news broke about Hamburg’s apparent role in the events leading up to this week’s calamitous developments in New York and Washington, the talk in Europe has mostly been of solidarity with the United States. There’s a sense here that what happened in the U.S. was an attack against all of humanity and that no one will be safe in the United States, Europe or anywhere else until the terrorist threat is eliminated.

In fact, some are calling it an attack on Europe, since many European nationals also perished in the destruction. More than 100 Britons have been confirmed dead, and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw estimates the number could rise to the “middle hundreds.” Four Germans have been confirmed dead, and the German Foreign Ministry has registered hundreds of missing persons since the tragedy.

People all across Europe had reacted to the news with often dramatic expressions of grief. Thousands have turned up at U.S. embassies to pay their respects. Government leaders have urged people all across Europe to observe three minutes of silence Friday in honor of the thousands who perished on Tuesday.

Flags have been at half-mast at the Reichstag and other federal buildings since shortly after the horrific news hit. Thousands of grief-stricken Germans attended special masses. Even the first night of Berlin’s version of Oktoberfest was called off — and the main event in Munich may also be canceled. The sense of shock may fade in the coming days, but it’s doubtful that a reinvigorated sense of solidarity with the United States will.

The fences protecting the blocks surrounding the American Embassy here have been transformed into impromptu memorials, with people laying flowers, candles and cards in front of them. Hundreds waited in line to sign the embassy’s official book of condolences.

Some demonstrators carried signs begging the United States not to launch World War III in retaliation. Another pleaded with the U.S. not to take “rash steps.” But largely the demonstrators and their signs seemed to be offering unconditional support for America and its victims.

That sentiment has been echoed by European government ministers, most dramatically at NATO headquarters in Brussels, where officials have for the first time invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, saying they are prepared to view this attack on the United States as an attack on all of NATO. The action was taken partly because NATO hopes to be involved with the inevitable military retaliation, so it can help define its terms. But it’s also clear that President Bush already has more international support behind him than even his father did in assembling his Gulf War coalition. The sense across Europe is that this is a time for closing ranks swiftly and unmistakably.

“This is an act of solidarity,” NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson said. “It’s a reaffirmation of a solemn treaty commitment which these countries have entered into.”

Of course, Bush could squander that support by overreacting. And some observers caution that even Article 5 doesn’t commit specific states to get involved with a U.S. military response. On Thursday, Defense Minister Rudolph Scharping noted that the NATO vote does not mandate that Germany undertake any military action. The U.S. must decide whether it will take retaliatory steps, he said, and Germany can then decide whether it wants to help or not.

But it all represents a dizzying turnaround from the turbulence in U.S.-European relations that had generated so much press attention in the first months of the Bush administration. Just six months ago, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder visited the White House and found his first face-to-face meeting with Bush so disappointing, he reportedly told people he thought the U.S. president had trouble remembering his name, according to Maureen Dowd in the New York Times.

That was the same day that Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, setting in motion months of difficult dealings between Europe and the United States. The split over global-warming policy culminated in July with the European agreement in Bonn, Germany, to go ahead with the Kyoto process, even without the U.S.

This week, that was all forgotten — at least for the time being — along with European worries about Bush’s mania for missile defense. Like Tony Blair, Schroeder could hardly have been a more steadfast, even passionate, ally in the wake of the attacks Tuesday. Visibly shaken, Schroeder told the German parliament Wednesday that the terrorist attack was “a declaration of war against the entire civilized world,” earning a unanimous show of applause from different political parties.

A day later, Schroeder powerfully invoked history: “When it came to defending the freedom of Berlin, John F. Kennedy said ‘Ich bin ein Berliner.’ It was the expression of an unbelievable solidarity. Today I think Germany has an occasion to return this solidarity.”

Just as a reminder of where this is all heading, the new U.S. ambassador, former Indiana Senator Dan Coats, was sworn in Wednesday — 10 days ahead of schedule. Considering that Berlin has been without a full-fledged U.S. ambassador for most of the last year, once John Kornblum announced his plan to step down, it seemed a potent reminder of the need for closer U.S.-German relations as this most unclassifiable of wars unfolds.

Germany and the rest of Europe have often felt that President Bush takes them for granted, but that’s all out the window now. And Bush is trying to mend his ways. Suddenly he’s calling Schroeder on the phone to confer, something he has pointedly not done at key junctures in the recent past.

Europe and the United States, it appears, may have little choice but to maintain the close relationship they have had for decades, even if a more assertive Europe grows into a more pronounced role.

And for now, the German people are standing behind Americans, as are the citizens of the rest of Europe and most of the world. At times that support has been poignant. In Berlin, many locals have tearfully recalled the Berlin Airlift that kept this city alive in 1948.

At the makeshift memorial set up outside the U.S. Embassy, a postcard of the World Trade Center was taped to a flower and set against the cyclone fence. “We are so sad and shocked. — Olgo and Elmo Kraft, Berlin,” the card read. Another, from an elementary school in Berlin stated: “We will pray for the lost souls in this tragedy.”

Germany’s most important politicians and thousands of citizens converged on Berlin Cathedral Wednesday morning to mourn the losses. The cathedral was so packed that hundreds had to stand at the plaza outside.

As Peter Struck, a Social Democrat parliamentary leader, said simply: “Today we are all Americans.”

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A royal pain

Romance can get complicated for anyone, but it's become a nightmare for the world's crown princes.

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In the cult of celebrity worship, nothing ranks higher than royalty. Yet royalty’s tradition and glamour often shield a murky reality that, as we learned from this summer’s regicide in Nepal, can be more Columbine than Camelot. Royal marriages are the stuff of Franklin Mint and Bridal Mart dreams — with higher-profile couplings like Charles and Diana or Edward and Sophie Rhys-Jones immortalized in porcelain dishes and figurines. But behind every dream wedding, there are numerous near misses and crash landings.

A scan of recent royal relationship catastrophes reveals what a nightmare life has become for crown princes, the world’s most eligible bachelors. For every wedding day special on network television, there seem to be dozens more varnish-removing exposés in the tabloids spotlighting every royal misstep — be it sexual or financial — which is making it downright difficult for the next in line for the throne to make it from “Will you marry me” to “I do.” The torture starts almost from the first date. If the monarchs had their way, the poor princes would lead lonely, celibate lives or wind up with handpicked fiancies bred for the icy confines of proper royal life.

Royals have always been the subject of more interest than your average Ben Affleck or Julia Roberts on the fickle public’s fascination scale. “We are totally obsessed with the way royals lead their lives and the way they marry,” says Marco Houston, editor of Royalty magazine. “It must be very hard for a young prince to deal with the sexual and financial scrutiny.”

Ever since the days when King Edward abdicated the throne in the name of love to marry American divorcée Wallis Simpson, the world has absorbed tales of royal courtship, marriage and breakups with insatiable appetite. In the 1970s, the collapse of Princess Margaret’s marriage to Anthony Armstrong-Jones captivated a global audience, as did the tragic deaths of Princess Grace of Monaco, in 1982, and Princess Diana in 1997.

Marco Houston’s father, Bob, who founded Royalty and has observed media coverage of kings, queens and their spawn for decades, chalks it up to sleazier media tactics in a landscape where the likes of Rupert Murdoch rule. “There used to be a deference in the way the media covered the royals,” he says. “Following the breakdown of the marriage of Charles and Diana, all bets were off. There’s this feeding frenzy mentality that’s become the modus operandi for tabloids. They are the voice of the people, which is crap. They only report on royal events these days when there’s a smell of scandal hanging about the air. They don’t even talk about the serious aspects of royalty anymore.”

Instead, they feature articles on, say, Princess Diana’s penchant for colonic irrigation or, more recently, the royal massacre in Nepal, which, according to most reports, was triggered by deranged Nepalese Crown Prince Dipendra’s parents’ refusal to permit him to marry the woman of his choice.

Longtime American expatriate Barbara Adams, a charismatic figure, 40-year resident of Kathmandu and an observer of the royal family, knows better than most how tangled royal relationships can get. She’s no stranger to controversy herself — Adams’ affair with a Nepalese royal has long been rumored to have been the source material for Han Suyin’s 1959 novel “The Mountain Is Young.” Adams, now in her 60s, lives in Long Island, N.Y., and has observed the tragedy in Nepal with much interest. “It’s been a terrible struggle for Prince Dipendra,” she says. “They wanted to choose his wife, and they never would have been happy with who he had chosen.”

But there was little scrutiny of Dipendra’s relationship by the media. That’s in stark contrast to his counterparts in Western Europe, where Holland’s Crown Prince Willem-Alexander and Norway’s Crown Prince Haakon have been dragged across the coals on their way to the altar. These days, young princes are the hottest players in the sizzling royal reality soaps and it seems no prince can get the role right.

Before he became engaged, Crown Prince Willem-Alexander, heir to the Dutch throne, was a playboy and a partier. He earned the moniker “Prince Pils” for his beer-swilling talents at the University of Leiden. Then Argentine aristocrat and Deutsche Bank executive Maxima Zorreguieta came along and tamed him. The glamorous brunette won the hearts of Queen Beatrix and her successor to rule the House of Orange. But when it was reported that Zorreguieta’s father was connected to Argentina’s oppressive Videla regime of the ’70s and ’80s — a period when more than 30,000 dissidents were murdered or disappeared — a near-constitutional crisis erupted in Holland, a country where Parliament must give the future king’s fiancie its blessing.

Zorreguieta had virtually no chance of further reforming Willem-Alexander or helping him to breed a future heir to the throne if she did not take extraordinary steps to distance herself from her parents. “Disappearances, torture and killing have left great scars on the society in Argentina,” Zorreguieta told her future countrymen at her first public appearance at The Hague in March. “I renounce the regime. I have learned about the importance of democracy and human rights.” She also learned Dutch, became a naturalized citizen of her adopted land and told her parents she’d rather not have them at her wedding later this year. The extraordinarily popular Queen Beatrix also came to Zorreguieta’s public defense in order to save the planned marriage.

For Mette-Marit Tjessem Hoiby, fiancie to Norway’s strapping Crown Prince Haakon, the issue was the father of her 3-year-old child — the man had been convicted of cocaine possession. Haakon and Hoiby, a Gwyneth Paltrow clone, have been celebrated in spreads in the glossy society fanzine “Hello!” But the media had a field day with reports of her previous boyfriend’s drug history and her own penchant for frequenting house parties where drugs were exchanged freely. Though the prince and Hoiby were engaged last December and got married last weekend, the scrutiny was embarrassing for the couple, and for the royal family. In a twisted bit of irony, the same media that ran through Hoiby’s past with a fine-toothed comb feted the couple’s August wedding with double-truck spreads in magazines and four-hour television coverage.

Until Prince Edward met Sophie Rhys-Jones, all tabloid bets were that he was gay. “I am not gay,” Edward famously told London’s Daily Mirror newspaper following reports that he had had a “touching” relationship with the male lead of an Andrew Lloyd Webber musical. But apparently Rhys-Jones wasn’t good enough for the British press either. The 36-year-old countess’ reputation was stained when she made disparaging remarks about the royal family and British Prime Minister Tony Blair in an effort to secure business from a News of the World reporter who had disguised himself as a posh Arab sheik.

Tapes of her conversation were eventually released and dubbed “Sophiegate.” Most embarrassingly, in an effort to circumvent publication of the tapes, Rhys-Jones agreed to an interview with the Rupert Murdoch-owned tabloid, in which she offered, unsolicited, “My Edward is not gay.” After another publication printed portions of the tape’s contents, the News of the World went ahead with full publication — an embarrassment for the palace, Prince Edward and Rhys-Jones, who at the time was working in public relations.

Then there’s the unfortunate matchmaking that can break a prince or a princess. The textbook example was the supposed fairy tale marriage between Prince Charles and Diana Spencer. In Charles’ marital failure, biographer Penny Junor, author of the bestselling “Charles: Victim or Villain,” sees a link to the classic problem of modern crown princes. “There is no doubt that the Prince of Wales was put in an impossible position, and I suspect that his son William will find life even tougher. The intrusion of media means that any kind of normal courtship with a girl is out of the question. If Charles was seen with a girl, she immediately found herself on the front page of every newspaper, and if he was seen with her two or three times, they would dig up friends, long-lost cousins, nannies, old boyfriends, anyone with the faintest connection to interview about her. This sent the right sort of girls running, and attracted the wrong sort of girls.” (Girls, perhaps, like Koo Stark. Did ever an heir foul up more than Charles’ younger brother Andrew when he struck up a relationship with Stark, who starred in such soft-core skin flicks as “The Awakening of Emily,” which featured the 17-year-old in a lesbian shower scene?) “And because the media is so much more brazen today than it was when Charles was William’s age, it will be infinitely worse for him,” Junor says.

At the same time, today’s princes may be paving the way for William. Good luck finding a suitable virgin his age in the U.K. as his father was forced to do. Ironically, the recent royal eruptions in Holland and Norway, where the princes were publicly humiliated but were ultimately successful in convincing their compatriots to stand behind their choice of fiancies, may make life easier for the next generation of royals like Prince William. Concludes Royalty’s Bob Houston: “The straitjacket on many of the men has loosened and will loosen considerably.”

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Germany allows its first gay “marriages”

With the law just one day old, same-sex couples are flooding the wedding registry.

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Germany allows its first gay

The district of Schvneberg, long the gay center of this city and once the romping ground of expatriate writer Christopher Isherwood, was ground zero yesterday for the first celebrations — legal and in the streets — of Germany’s first legally recognized civil unions of same-sex couples.

Around 9 a.m., several dozen people gathered inside Schvneberg’s City Hall — where in 1963 President John F. Kennedy gave his famous “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech — to witness the union of theologian Gudrun Pannier and lawyer Angelika Baldow, the first lesbian couple to apply for a same-sex civil union in Berlin. Outside were an American-style media stakeout and a few demonstrators, most of whom protested that the new law, which permits “registered domestic partnerships,” falls short of bestowing equal legal rights on same-sex unions.

Inside the City Hall, Pannier and Baldow, both 36, exchanged vows before family, friends and reporters. “We exchanged rings symbolically five years ago,” says Pannier, “but this is the real thing.”

And so, even as special-interest groups continue to lobby for the introduction of a constitutional amendment that would ban same-sex marriages in the United States, Berlin is in the grip of gay wedding fever. Appointments at the city’s wedding registry offices are already booked up through the first two weeks of August; so intense is the interest in gay marriage that employees at the office stopped counting the number of people calling for appointments after the number exceeded 250.

The Pannier and Baldow nuptials were the ceremonial apex for a city that has been reveling in all things gay for weeks now. In June, acting Mayor Klaus Wowereit of the ruling SPD Party (the Social Democrats) introduced a new phrase into the German lexicon by outing himself and announcing to the world: “I’m gay, and that’s a good thing.” Earlier this week, the Green Party threw a bash for Berlin’s gays and lesbians to celebrate the civil union victory.

In a statement released Wednesday, Wowereit announced: “The [civil union] law doesn’t fulfill everyone’s needs, but it’s a great step forward. It should cause something that was never abnormal to be recognized as normal everywhere in Germany.” His sentiments were shared by Claudia Roth, leader of the Green Party, which was instrumental in pushing the law through the Bundestag. “Something in Germany had to change, and that’s a good thing — things will become more open, more tolerant, and [Germany] will become more European,” she told reporters.

The Green Party’s next move will be to introduce legislation meant to pave the way for same-sex couples to adopt children. But it’s going to be an uphill battle. The Constitutional Court decision that legalized same-sex unions in Germany, and the legislation that followed, do not include provisions that would permit homosexuals to adopt. In a fashion similar to Vermont’s “civil union” law, the registered partnership measure in Germany skirts the prickly issue of what might come after “marriage” in these newly legal unions.

Basically, the new civil union law offers gay and lesbian partners the right to sign up for health insurance with their spouses. It also offers same-sex couples the right to register their partnerships — in most cases at the same registration offices where heterosexuals seek wedding applications. (The new law also requires that a couple seeking to dissolve the partnership must do so in court.) Finally, the law extends immigration rights to same-sex partners who are not German citizens.

But opponents say that like any compromise legislation, the German gay civil union law is flawed, granting gay couples fewer rights than those enjoyed by heterosexual couples. For example, gay couples will still lack many of the tax benefits bestowed on heterosexuals who marry.

And there is no guarantee that gay “marriage” will be an option any time soon in certain areas of the country. Bavaria, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Hesse are delaying implementation of the new federal law because they have not yet passed their own versions of the law, which gives German states wide latitude in how they allow gays to register their partnerships. The process by which couples may apply differs from state to state — in most, they can obtain a license from the wedding registry office, but in some, they must pay a visit to the local notary’s office. (By sending gays to a notary’s office, critics argue, certain states and communities are trying to push gays as far away as possible from the places where traditional marriages are registered.)

In fact, as Berliners celebrated their pioneering gay unions, dozens turned out in Munich to protest the Bavarian government’s steadfast refusal to enact the law. Bavaria, along with Saxony, unsuccessfully appealed in July for an injunction against the law. The states argued that same-sex civil unions would endanger the institution of marriage between a man and a woman. Bavarians must wait until the state legislature implements the law in the fall before they can register their partnerships.

Yet despite the official foot-dragging in these states, support for gay marriage is strong in Germany. A national poll conducted last Friday showed 60 percent of the country supporting gay civil unions that are equal to heterosexual marriage. At least 55 percent said they didn’t believe gay marriages would have a negative impact on families. Germans may well have been influenced by European neighbors with civil union laws already on the books. Denmark, France, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and the Netherlands already have same-sex civil union laws (as does the U.S. state of Vermont, which celebrated the first anniversary of its gay civil union law in July). Holland is the only country that allows full-fledged gay marriages.

Those who showed up in the Schvneberg area to protest the weakness of the new law vowed to fight any remaining injustices in the measure. Carrying a banner that read “All or nothing,” student members of the socialist PDS Party sought to raise awareness of the fact that, while representing a great social advance in Germany, so-called gay marriage is still a long way from having equal footing with heterosexual couplings.

“We are here because this new law is not enough,” said 20-year-old Nura Sch|ttpelz, a Free University of Berlin political science student. “Everybody should have the right to marry. Everybody should be allowed to have or adopt children, build a family and be equal. The homosexuals are not really allowed to marry — this is really a civil union. They should have the same rights that everybody else has,” she said.

But even the steady complaints of disgruntled demonstrators could not put a damper on the festivities here. Hartwin and Karl-Heinz, who refused to give their last names to the media, showed up in white suits and were the second couple to be issued civil union status. The two men, now in their 60s, have been partners for more than 36 years.

“It’s really simple,” said Hartwin. “As we say in Germany: It’s better to kill two birds with one stone. Because of the efforts of several German political parties, we didn’t get the second half of what we wanted, but we hope that it will come in the future. Above all, we want our marriage to be a symbol. For the past year, more or less, we’ve been trying to get married. As you can see, we did it on the first day.”

But the joy of Hartwin and his partner is bittersweet. “It’s still not enough — we want the tax and legal advantages,” he says. “We’re now over 60 and won’t be adopting any children, but we would have liked to have been able to do it 20 years ago.”

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Woe is me-zine

After bemoaning attacks from the "far left," Andrew Sullivan returns a sponsorship from the pharmaceutical industry.

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Andrew Sullivan’s latest controversy began Tuesday, when the New York Times published an article on the recent phenomenon of online “me-zines” — scrappy, self-produced, sometimes stream-of-consciousness commentaries by celebrity intellectuals. But Sullivan’s attempt to achieve what has eluded most online journalism ventures — make his Web site self-sustaining, maybe even make a profit — landed him in new trouble with his critics this week, after the story matter-of-factly reported that Sullivan had signed up his first corporate sponsor: the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.

PhRMA is the association that looks out for the interests of industry giants like Pfizer and Merck on Capitol Hill and elsewhere. What the Times failed to report is that Sullivan has used his own Web site, as well as his posts at the New York Times Magazine and the New Republic to repeatedly — and controversially – defend the pharmaceutical industry against criticism over its role in the global AIDS pandemic.

The controversy over Sullivan’s site sponsor was short-lived: After reporters from Salon and other news organizations made calls to Sullivan’s editors, as well as to journalism experts, about the ethics of a journalist being personally sponsored by an industry he frequently defends, Sullivan announced he would return the $7,500 annual sponsorship. But the larger question raised by the flap isn’t likely to go away: How can a one-person “me-zine” develop ethical standards that allow it to accept the kind of advertising and sponsorships that go to corporate media monoliths, without the conflict of interest taint that naturally goes along with a journalist getting the personal backing of a controversial patron?

Loren Ghiglione, the newly installed dean at Northwestern University’s Medill School of Journalism, told Salon: ” If there is an appearance of a conflict of interest, then Sullivan — and the media that run him — ought to be concerned. They can choose to find someone else to write on pharmaceutical topics, identify whatever relationship he has with pharmaceuticals (including recipient of major advertising) to put readers on notice, etc.”

And that’s precisely the approach his editors at the New Republic and the New York Times Wednesday said they would adopt.

In an e-mail message, Peter Beinart, editor of the the New Republic, where Sullivan writes the prestigious and widely read TRB column, wrote: “Andrew did not consult with me before making this decision. And should he write about the pharmaceutical industry for TNR, he will disclose the relationship.”

New York Times spokesman Toby Usnik also issued a statement to Salon on behalf of the New York Times Magazine (editor Adam Moss helped craft the statement) and the newspaper. “We would expect that if Mr. Sullivan were undertaking an article about the pharmaceutical industry for The Times that he would be obliged to disclose such a relationship with his sponsors to the editors and discuss the potential ramifications,” the statement read. “Ramifications could include passing on the assignment or, depending on the then current circumstances, disclosing the information to the readers. This is because Mr. Sullivan, like other New York Times freelancers, is required by contract to “avoid conflicts of interests or the appearance of conflict” in accepting assignments for The Times.”

Late Wednesday afternoon, Sullivan (who has also written for Salon) e-mailed to inform Salon he had decided to return the money and pull the plug on the sponsorship.

Sullivan had initially moved quickly to spin the issue after the Times story originally appeared, making shrewd use of his own Web site to respond before any media critics had a chance to. “The usual suspects from the far left have emailed me outraged that this website has accepted a small sponsorship from PHRMA,” Sullivan wrote Wednesday morning. “It behooves me to say I see absolutely no problems with it. In fact, I am extremely proud to get some support from a great industry that has saved my and countless other people’s lives, despite a massive attempt to penalize them for their work.” He then went on to describe criticism from his readers as “paranoid hooey” and to claim that “the real worry of those who want to attack the free market in pharmaceuticals is that I might have been a teensy bit effective in my arguments — and that these arguments might even have some merit. The usual suspects want to silence the opposition.”

But by late Wednesday, Sullivan had added an entry, again attacking potential critics (including Salon) while also, eventually, confirming that he would drop the sponsorship. Sullivan conceded: “[I]nevitably, it’s andrewsullivan.com, which makes the appearance of a conflict of interest almost unavoidable.” He continued, “It doesn’t help matters that my first sponsors are the target of leftist hatred and demonization, and that they are embroiled in a public controversy I intend to keep writing about. … But I don’t want to have every argument I make about the importance of pharmaceutical research to be undermined by the lie that I have been bought and paid for.”

Sullivan then explained that his site is maintained and managed by fantascope.com, the parent company for andrewsullivan.com, and that there is a strict wall between the editorial and financial arms of the business. But given that the primary property of andrewsullivan.com is Andrew Sullivan, that’s akin to Martha Stewart disavowing herself from a business decision made by Martha Stewart Living or the line of K-Mart housewares named after her. In a later e-mail, Sullivan dismissed the characterization. “As to the Martha Stewart point, I don’t think she thinks that every ad contract her magazine gets is a personal pay-off. It’s a business. Does Mort Zuckerman [publisher of U.S. News and World Report and the New York Daily News] or Marty Peretz [owner of the New Republic] treat advertising in their magazines as personal remuneration? I doubt it. Loads of people own media outlets. But those media outlets are not synonymous with them.

“This is a completely new issue because this is a completely new phenomenon: me-zines. They’re both a magazine and a person. In some ways, andrewsullivan.com is a broadcast company. I own it but it isn’t me. Yet its brand is me. … I wish I were Martha Stewart. But then I guess many gay men feel that way,” he quipped.

Still, Sullivan goes further in distancing himself from the PhRMA deal by pointing out that his webmaster negotiates all business deals — and that webmaster Robert Cameron disclosed the deal to the New York Times “before it was even completed.” He also told Salon that the money would only have gone toward the maintenance of the site. “A salary is a long way off,” he wrote in an e-mail.

Sullivan, who is HIV positive, is undergoing treatment with the anti-retroviral cocktail drugs that have been at the core of the access-to-drugs controversy in Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing regions. He has long praised the pharmaceutical industry in print, but had he not dropped the PhRMA sponsorship, and had he continued to rally behind the industry on his Web site, it would have been increasingly difficult for him to argue that he wasn’t, in fact, a paid pharma flack.

This isn’t the first time Sullivan has been criticized for his writings about AIDS and gay issues. Sullivan became the subject of the chattering classes in May after a New York gay publication accused Sullivan of soliciting unprotected gay sex on the Internet, and argued that his sexual proclivities seemed to contradict the preachiness of his widely respected writings on gay themes. To his critics, Sullivan had crossed the line and committed hypocrisy at a time when, according to the latest Centers for Disease Control reports, HIV infection rates are on the rise among young gay men in the U.S. To their critics, it was an egregious violation of Sullivan’s privacy.

But it’s Sullivan’s writing on the global AIDS crisis and his open bias in favor of the pharmaceutical industry that has been a lightning rod for criticism. The New York Times Magazine published an essay by Sullivan last October in which he wrote: “Here’s an unfashionable romance: I love America’s pharmaceutical companies,” he wrote. “I asked my pharmacist the other day to tote up my annual bill (which my insurance mercifully pays): $15,600, easily more than I pay separately for housing, food, travel or clothes,” he wrote. “Whether we like it or not, these private entities have our lives in their hands. And we can either be grown-ups and acknowledge this or be infantile and scapegoat them. They’re not ‘powerful forces,’ penalizing America’s ‘working families.’ They’re entrepreneurs trying to make money by saving lives. By and large, they succeed in both. Every morning I wake up and feel fine, I’m thankful that they do.”

The piece prompted the Village Voice’s Cynthia Cotts to write, “Shilling for the drug industry in the Times is the equivalent of giving a blow job in Macy’s window, and Sullivan left nothing to the imagination,” and pointed out an unfortunate juxtaposition in the magazine. “Given the synergy between his viewpoint and the industry’s, could it have been a coincidence that Sullivan’s essay appeared in the same issue of the Times Magazine as a 17-page ad supplement from PhRMA?” Moss, however, told Cotts that Sullivan’s “Pro Pharma” column, and the PhRMA ad were “totally unrelated.”

In March, Sullivan wrote on his Web site: “If you listen to some activists, the answer to the world’s AIDS crisis is simple. Just break international patent laws, rip off the drug companies, shower the Third World with protease inhibitors and all will be well. I wish it were that simple.”

Of course, the pharmaceutical companies have been at the center of the campaign to stop compulsory licensing of patented drugs in developing nations. A case in point is the recent lawsuit mounted by the pharmaceutical industry in South Africa, where a law had been passed that would have permitted the generic manufacture of patented drugs in a health crisis and the importation of branded drugs from countries where they are sold at cheaper prices. The pharmaceutical companies dropped the suit after the South African government pledged to inform the industry before issuing any licenses or conducting so-called parallel imports. There’s little wonder that activists from the “far left” — or journalists, for that matter — would question how a journalist could accept a sponsorship from an industry in a global controversy that he regularly champions and maintain credibility.

Still, Sullivan doesn’t see any inherent conflict of interest in the sponsorship — nor, he said, was he persuaded by the statements of his New York Times and New Republic editors to terminate the relationship. “The statements … were not the basis of my decision,” he wrote. “I intended to add such a disclosure if I were to write anything on the subject in the future. The basis of my decision is as I said on the site. I didn’t want to have to deal with people dismissing my views as bought and paid for. It’s important for me to address this issue in the future without that kind of ammunition from my critics. It would get in the way of work.”

He added: “It’s not a conflict of interest in any meaningful sense. My views on this subject have been quite clear and well-known for years. The idea that I’d changed my views on financial grounds is simply nuts. I’ve criticized and praised these companies before. I think even my worst enemies would concede I’m sincere on this. By far a bigger conflict of interest is the fact that these companies have saved my life. But under the rules of journalism, that is irrelevant. But a few bucks to pay expenses is regarded as horrifying.”

His solution? Continue the hunt for sponsors, but maybe with slightly higher standards. “If you know of any company that would be willing to sponsor this site, with a minimum sponsorship of $10,000 … We need financial support,” he wrote in a post on his site last night, before adding, “and we’d prefer it from companies which are not directly involved in major controversy.”

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U.N. commits to AIDS reduction

Its far-reaching declaration could funnel billions toward reducing the spread of the disease by 25 percent.

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The United Nations wrapped up its first-ever meeting focused on the global AIDS crisis in New York this week with a sweeping 16-page “Declaration of Commitment” on HIV/AIDS endorsed by all 189 member nations. Surely no one will leave completely happy with the result: an international treaty with bold propositions that is, ultimately, unenforceable.

But there were also enough firsts for AIDS activists, women’s rights activists and gay and lesbian human rights groups that nearly everyone could walk away with some sense of a victory.

“I must say that, for once, controversial issues were not covered in a blanket of diplomatic language,” said Pieter Piot, executive director of the United Nations AIDS program (UNAIDS). “The issues were discussed explicitly.” Or, as Gudmund Hernes, director and coordinator of AIDS activities for the U.N. agency UNESCO, put it: “If anyone told me 30 years ago that the General Assembly would talk about condoms, I would have said that it was impossible.”

The drafting of the declaration proved to be the most contentious challenge of the summit, and ended with major modifications of the text that proved unpopular with some countries, which had wanted language that was decisively pro-gay rights and franker in its description of intravenous-drug use and prostitution. Still, argued U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the declaration ultimately proved “progressive.” For example, it calls for nondiscriminatory access to “condoms, microbicides, lubricants, sterile injecting equipment, drugs including anti-retroviral therapy” and more. Sterile injecting equipment, of course, could be read as an allusion to clean needles for intravenous-drug users.

Much ado had been made at the opening of the meeting about a fight between conservative religious blocs led by Islamic nations and the Vatican and socially liberal countries led by the European Union and Canada over whether the declaration should explicitly make reference to homosexuals, intravenous-drug users and sex workers — language that reportedly was included in a draft version of the document created by UNAIDS. That battle, along with disagreement over human rights guidelines for dealing with the HIV/AIDS crisis, led to a rift that prolonged negotiations until 3 a.m., and held up approval of the declaration until the final day of the meeting.

The United States, according to foreign press accounts, joined the Vatican and the Islamic nations in arguing against inclusion of the language. The exclusion of such language would be consistent with previous positions taken by President Bush, from a comment made during the presidential debates that he doesn’t believe in “special rights” for gays to a statement last month in which he said that he would not acknowledge June as Gay Pride Month because, as a spokesman said, Bush does not believe in “politicizing people’s sexual orientation.” Generally speaking, Bush seems to eschew any legal or official recognition of gays and lesbians.

When asked whether the United States played a role in modifying the declaration, John Sandage, a State Department lawyer who was a chief U.S. negotiator, told Salon: “We were comfortable with references to gay men in the document. We had difficulties with the way it was worded, and we wanted to find a text that could get the support of everybody because we thought it was important that the world speak with one voice. So we had flexibility on the choice of words. But we didn’t have any difficulty acknowledging that gay men are a vulnerable group.”

Sandage declined to specify what language created obstacles, but when asked whether it was the term “men to men sex” (a term others report caused major controversy in the draft negotiations) the U.S. had objected to, Sandage said: “It wasn’t that we were uncomfortable with it, it was that other member countries were uncomfortable with it and we wanted to be sure we could find a text that everybody would support.” The compromise language alludes to gays, drug users and sex workers (“sexual practices, drug using behavior, livelihood”) in a section calling for programs that address the groups most vulnerable to HIV infection.

Though all member nations ultimately agreed on the declaration, the cultural differences that arose were apparent in speeches given before the General Assembly by some Islamic nations, including Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya.

Iranian Deputy Minister of Health Ali-Akbar Sayyari admonished delegates not to forget the “moral aspect involved” in HIV infection and attributed “irresponsible sexual behavior” to the rapid spread of the disease. Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister of Health Youssouf Al-Masruwah, meanwhile, said his country would support the U.N.’s effort to eradicate AIDS, provided that the international strategies are “in conformity with the teachings of Islam.” Libyan Ambassador to the U.N. Abuzed Omar Dorda took it one step further: “Homosexuality is one of the main causes of this disease. In fact, God sent the prophet Lot with a clear message preventing such practices and banning them.”

In a related fracas, Karyn Kaplan, head of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, the only gay and lesbian nongovernmental organization invited to speak at the meeting (as a participant in a round-table panel on AIDS and human rights), had her invitation temporarily rescinded after Islamic nations objected to her organization’s presence. Kaplan’s name was restored to the speaking roster after Argentina, Canada, Norway and the European Union introduced a resolution in the General Assembly calling for her inclusion that was approved by a 62-0 vote, with 30 countries abstaining and many more not participating in an effort to prevent a quorum.

The vote itself was significant, says Scott Long, project director for IGLHRC. “This was the first time a gay and lesbian issue has ever been debated on the floor of the General Assembly. It’s a precedent that will have serious impact on the way vulnerable groups and marginalized groups and outsiders from all parts of society can get involved in the U.N.”

But Long also criticized the final U.N. declaration, which excluded the human rights guidelines for dealing with the AIDS crisis that had been negotiated at a 1996 meeting of UNAIDS and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and made specific references to gays, and particularly the need to decriminalize homosexuality and repeal sodomy laws. “Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia and other Organization of the Islamic Conference member nations didn’t want specific commitment on human rights they would be held accountable to,” he said. “It’s disgraceful. Everyone knows that HIV is enabled by human rights violations.”

It’s clear U.N. leaders were concerned that the clash with Islamic nations would obscure the positive developments and pledges of commitment at the conference. “At the end of the day, all the disputes over wording will seem trivial. This is truly a historic moment in the epidemic,” UNAIDS senior policy advisor Julia Cleves told reporters Tuesday. And at a press briefing on Wednesday, Annan told reporters, “In the last three days, some painful differences have been brought into the open. But like AIDS itself, these differences need to be confronted head-on, not swept under the carpet. What is important is that after today we shall have a document setting up a clear battle plan for the war against HIV/AIDS with clear goals and a clear timeline.” Annan also said that the declaration sets “standards against which people can measure their own performance, that the average citizen can use to challenge their governments.”

War metaphors like Annan’s were popular during the conference. During his remarks before the General Assembly on Monday, Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke of “no enemy in war more insidious or vicious than AIDS. An enemy that poses a clear and present danger to the world. The war against AIDS has no front lines. We must wage it on every front.” By contrast, AIDS activists with organizations like ACT-UP and the Health GAP Coalition were hawking Holocaust metaphors, characterizing the reluctance of some member nations to support anti-retroviral drug treatments and prevention efforts as promoting “genocide.”

Like many battle plans, the final declaration adopted by U.N. member states included the ambitious goals one might expect in a major theater of war. Its most ambitious agenda item calls for a 25 percent reduction in HIV prevalence among young men and women between 15 and 24 by 2005. It also calls for countries to take steps to empower women by “promotion and protection” of their “full enjoyment of all human rights” and to reduce their vulnerability to HIV/AIDS by eliminating risk factors such as discrimination, violence, trafficking of women, sexual abuse and “customary practices,” an allusion to the female circumcision or “female genital mutilation” that is performed as a ritual in some African and Islamic nations.

Borrowing a line from the Spice Girls, who have charmed many an African leader, Annan said of the gender provisions: “It has been said that ‘girl power’ is Africa’s own vaccine against HIV, and that should be true for the whole world.” Ex-Ginger Spice and former U.N. goodwill ambassador Geri Halliwell couldn’t have said it better.

The declaration also states that by 2005 member states should provide access to sterile supplies for drug users, female and male condoms and clean blood supplies to help prevent the spread of the disease. And the many groups demanding debt relief and poverty eradication as a key weapon in fighting AIDS should be pleased with the declaration’s language urging developed countries to observe the pledge they made to the Organization of Economic and Development Cooperation nearly 30 years ago to spend 0.7 percent of their gross national product on development assistance to developing nations.

The declaration includes a provision calling for governments to “strengthen healthcare systems and address factors affecting the provision of HIV-related drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs” by 2003 — a move that pleased the many nongovernmental organizations that demanded provisions for treatment of those already infected with HIV. (On Tuesday, activist groups ACT-UP and OxFam staged a brief protest in the basement of the U.N. headquarters calling for increased access to anti-retroviral and other anti-AIDS drugs.)

“The declaration puts treatment firmly on the map,” said Anne-Valerie Kanina of Doctors Without Borders’ “Access to Essential Medicines” campaign. “It confirms that there can be no choice between prevention and treatment; they are mutually reinforcing.”

Even U.S. officials — who had been critical of anti-retroviral drugs because, they argued, Africans do not have the infrastructure or requisite sense of time to properly administer the right dosages (possibly leading to variant strains of the HIV virus) — seem to have done a turnaround on the subject. And that was despite the presence of U.N. delegation member Henry McKinnell, CEO of pharmaceutical giant Pfizer and chairman of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.

Less than a month ago, U.S. Agency for International Development administrator Andrew Natsios roused AIDS activists when he told the Boston Globe that U.S. contributions to the U.N.’s global AIDS fund should not be used to treat those who are currently HIV positive because Africans “don’t know what Western time is” and because of the “lack of infrastructure, lack of doctors, lack of clinics, lack of electricity.” It was a terrible entrance for Natsios, and he backed away from those comments in an interview with the Associated Press this week. “I visited with the [Congressional] Black Caucus and I apologized,” he told the wire service. “I used extemporaneous language. It came out the wrong way and it certainly upset people and I recognize that.” And this week, U.S. officials confirmed that the U.N. AIDS fund would support the distribution of anti-retroviral drugs in areas where it is feasible.

Although neither the text nor any of the pledges in it is legally binding, UNAIDS executive director Piot described the “Declaration of Commitment” as an “instrument of accountability.” The structure of the AIDS fund has not yet been determined, and many NGOs and other observers viewed the creation of a new U.N. bureaucracy with skepticism, which Annan and other officials tried to tackle head-on. Annan said that to build momentum behind the superfund, which aims to raise $7 billion to $10 billion for a global anti-AIDS war chest, the participation of nongovernmental organizations and the private sector (including pharmaceutical companies) is essential.

Annan also addressed long-standing criticisms of the all too often slow-moving U.N. bureaucracy when he laid out the early parameters of the fund for reporters. He stated that there would be a small and nimble board composed of representatives from governments, NGOs and the private sector and a scientific panel to determine the most effective and sound methods of dealing with the AIDS crisis. Countries would apply directly to the fund with proposals, and the money would likely be managed using the infrastructure of the World Bank. Donors to the fund — both public and private — would be permitted to place conditions on the expenditure of their funds, a provision that many believe will help spur donations from groups that might otherwise decline to participate. Annan said the secretariat responsible for the day-to-day administration of the fund would be small, and that monitoring systems would be put in place to ensure that donor money was spent appropriately. Annan said he planned to appoint a transition team to begin working out the technical details within two weeks.

The model for the superfund, he said, would be the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, a successful and nimble U.N. program that distributes vaccines.

Some question the need for a new U.N. bureaucracy to deal with the AIDS crisis. In her speech before the General Assembly, Britain’s international development secretary, Clare Short, told member nations, “It is my strongly held view that we waste too much time and energy in U.N. conferences and special sessions. We use up enormous energy in arguing at great length over texts that provide few, if any, follow-up mechanisms or assurances that governments and U.N. agencies will carry forward the declarations that are agreed to. Poor countries have to commit ministers, officials and resources to participating in a U.N. talking shop, when such people are needed to tackle the desperate problem HIV/AIDS poses at home.”

Short’s criticisms were shared by Carole Collins, the HIV/AIDS director of Britain’s Christian AID. “There were lots of raised expectations; people were hopeful about the fund,” she said. “But we now know that there’s only been a small amount of money pledged and that trying to administer it [will be difficult] … When you ask them how they will create these boards, they say they’ve referred them to working groups that haven’t been established yet. It’s going to be very problematic. The lack of reference to community strengths was a serious omission.” Collins also said that despite Annan’s support for community-based programs, they had only been paid lip service in the declaration.

Collins has a point on the financing of the fund. Annan has said that $7 billion to $10 billion is required to seriously address the HIV/AIDS crisis, but by the end of the day Wednesday, the U.N. had managed to get only $500 million worth of pledges from countries — and some of them would not specify whether the money would go to general AIDS expenditures or to programs funded by the U.N. AIDS superfund. So far, the financing of the fund has been an unmitigated disaster.

But that could change. Democrats and Republicans in the House of Representatives reached an agreement Wednesday to spend as much as $1.36 billion during the next fiscal year to fight AIDS globally. As much as $750 million of that could be used for multilateral aid, including the U.N. AIDS superfund. The amount agreed on was significantly higher than the annual AIDS expenditure of $480 million pledged by the Bush administration, via Colin Powell, on Monday.

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